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The United Nations was established in the belief that working together states could curb the 
use of force and the damage to states and individuals associated with it. Upon its creation the United 
Nations Security Council became the global policeman enforcing the rules of the Charter aided by the 
weapons contained in Chapter V11. One of those weapons was the recourse to economic sanctions. In 
theory, if the economic lifeblood of a state is cut off it will be forced to modify its behaviour without 
the need for military intervention. As such, economic sanctions are an attractive resource for an 
institution seeking to avoid recourse to the use of force. 
In practice, however, economic sanctions have proven to be a complex tool, which have 
caused significant damage to those targeted by them. They have caused significant humanitarian 
difficulties, have been widely breached and have, in some instances, only served as a prelude to the use 
of force. Literature in this field to date has concentrated on single sanctions regimes or particular 
aspects of sanctions. It has, therefore, failed to get to the heart of the issue, which is: what has caused 
these problems, are they being appropriately addressed and how should they be resolved going 
forward. 
This thesis focuses on these issues. By tracing the development of economic sanctions from 
the establishment of the United Nations to date it offers a unique perspective on how they have 
evolved. It uses case studies and illustrative examples supported by a wide range of legal, political, 
historical and economic material to show the context in which economic sanctions are taken. It also 
critically analyses the difficulties that have arisen with sanctions regimes and the attempts that have 
been made to resolve them. Aligned to the consideration of economic sanctions is a reflection on the 
extent to which the power of the United Nations Security Council has developed during this time 
period. It suggests that the United Nations use of economic sanctions, in light of recent judicial 
decisions, is under threat and offers a solution in the form of a proposal for two new institutions, which 
would support the United Nations in its use of economic sanctions. 
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1 
Economic Sanctions in the UN Framework 
'I believe to a certainty that the passage of the sanctions law and the heightening of 
international efforts to isolate South Africa's apartheid government contributed significantly to the 
watershed political changes that have occurred on that portion of the African continent. 
As I stood in Pretoria to witness the inauguration of President Nelson Mandela, I reflected on 
the positive contribution that the international sanctions effort had made in accelerating the inevitable 
coming to power of a government in South Africa based on the principle of nonracial democracy. What 
also seemed clear was that the timely and deliberate use of economic sanctions had mitigated against 
the possibility that this inevitable victory might have come as a result of 'a further protracted and 
deadly violent armed struggle, fought to a bitter conclusion with all of the lingering consequences that 
would militate against reconciliation and national development. " 
Economic sanctions are the most significant non-military measures imposed by states and international 
organisations against other states, entities or individuals. As elucidated, in the quotation above, by 
former US congressman Ronald Dellums, economic sanctions are seen by their supporters as measures 
that can prompt significant political change whilst avoiding the collateral damage inherent in armed 
conflict. This thesis concentrates on the evolution of international economic sanctions within the UN 
framework, which it contends has occurred in a reactionary fashion. It demonstrates this reactionary 
development by tracing the UNSC's use of economic sanctions from its first case to date. On 
examination, it becomes clear that, where UN economic sanctions have evolved, that evolution has 
been as a direct result of difficulties seen in previous sanctions regimes. 
This reactionary development reflects Charlesworth's commentary on the development of 
international law. ` ' She suggests that international law, as it stands today, has been shaped by crisis. 
Through the lens of NATO's intervention in Kosovo, she suggests that, international lawyers `revel in 
a good crisis" and argues that when a crisis arises the reaction of the international community to that 
crisis constitutes a development to international law. She describes the events in Kosovo in 1998-99 as 
`a paradigm of a meaty international law crisis, a real-life Jessup moot problem', which has led to 
extensive debate amongst international lawyers at conferences and in articles and books 4 Charlesworth 
attributes this focus on crisis, which causes reactionary development, to the questions posed by crisis, 
which she notes in the case of Kosovo included inter alia: sovereignty and self-determination; grave 
human rights abuses and expulsions; international peace-keeping; and the role of international 
Ronald V Dellums, 'Foreword' in David Cortright and George A Lopez (eds) Economic Sanctions, Panacea or 
Peacebuilding in a Post-Cold War World? (Westview Press 1995) vii. 
' Hilary Charlesworth, 'International Law: A Discipline of Crisis' (2002) 65 Modern Law Review 377. 
ibid. 
4 ibid, 379. 
tribunals. 5 This she suggests gives `international lawyers a sense of relevance, of being exhilaratingly 
close to the heart of grand and important issues of our time. '6 
UN economic sanctions also raise issues of fundamental importance to the development of 
international law. They have raised issues in relation to the balance of international security and human 
rights, the supremacy clause in the UN Charter and the limitation of UNSC power, all of which are 
discussed in this thesis. It is, therefore, of little surprise that UN economic sanctions have developed in 
a reactionary fashion. Furthermore, to some extent it is also necessary that UN economic sanctions 
develop in a reactive fashion as it allows problems to be addressed as they arise. 
However, Charlesworth notes that this reactionary development comes with ethical costs, two 
of which are also visible in UN economic sanctions. Firstly, it `promotes a narrow agenda" for 
economic sanctions. This has meant that the development of UN economic sanctions has rarely been 
discussed in a panoramic fashion in isolation to a crisis, instead only being modified on the occurrence 
of a new crisis. The result has been that developments may, in resolving one problem, create further 
difficulties. 
Secondly, she notes that during crises concentration is focused on `the public realm' noting 
that by this preoccupation with great crises, rather than the politics of everyday life... international 
law steers clear of analysis of longer-term trends and structural problems. 8 This phenomenon is 
illustrated in the sanctions realm by the related UN institutional development. Institutional 
development has occurred in individual sanctions regimes in an attempt to rectify problems seen in 
each particular regime at a point in time without consideration of institutional development in the UN 
sanctions system as a whole. This piecemeal development has meant that the roles of certain 
institutions have been overlapping and that there has been considerable duplication of work with 
previous institutions remaining in place as new institutions are developed. The UN has also suffered 
from a lack of accountability as institutions have proliferated. 
Each UN economic sanctions regime has raised unique, interesting and difficult questions 
with respect to international law. As such, the international community has treated each regime as an 
individual crisis. The issues that have arisen in one crisis have informed the establishment of the rules 
of the next regime, until it too becomes a crisis. Once it does, the significant issues that it raises are 
ibid, 381. 
6 ibid. 
7 ibid. 386. 
" ibid. 388-389. 
used to form the basis of the next regime, without retaining the lessons learnt from the preceding crisis. 
This has led to episodic development of UN economic sanctions. 
This thesis is written chronologically. It considers four major economic sanctions regimes in 
detail 
- 
Southern Rhodesia, Iraq and the two main targeted economic sanctions regimes, the 1267 
regime and the Counter-terrorism regime. It also illustrates the transition to targeted economic 
sanctions by considering many of the other UN economic sanctions regimes that have been adopted. It 
focuses on the challenges that have been raised by each sanctions regime (or crisis) and uses this focus 
to demonstrate that economic sanctions have developed in a reactionary fashion. In the early stages this 
reactionary development allowed sanctions to progress and become more refined. However, it becomes 
clear in the latter stages of the thesis that, by failing to deal with challenges in a holistic fashion rather 
on a case-by-case basis, significant issues of concern have not been afforded proper consideration in 
the development of sanctions regimes. The result is that targeted economic sanctions are now facing 
judicial challenges that impact on their very foundations. This thesis argues that these challenges can 
only be resolved by significant institutional change. Such institutional change is necessary if the UNSC 
is to continue to use economic sanctions in a meaningful way. It ultimately proposes the development 
of two new institutions for that purpose. 
This chapter sets out the background to the thesis. It outlines the definition of economic 
sanctions that is used for the purpose of this thesis. It then examines the basis, purposes and use of 
economic sanctions under the UN Charter. `' Finally it discusses the key characteristics of UN economic 
sanctions. 
1.1 Defining Economic Sanctions 
How to define economic sanctions has been the subject of academic debate. Different commentators 
have put forward different definitions as to what economic sanctions are. At the end of the 1990's 
Drezner defined `economic coercion', in which he includes economic sanctions, as `the threat or act by 
a nation-state or coalition of nation-states, called the sender, to disrupt economic exchange with 
another nation-state, called the target, unless the targeted country acquiesces to an articulated political 
demand. i10 However, Drezner's work at that time focused exclusively on non-institutional measures. In 
" Charter of the United Nations (1945) 892 UNTS 119 (, UN Charter'). 
1' Daniel Drezner, The Sanctions Paradox Economic Statecraft and International Relations (Cambridge University 
Press 1999) 2. 
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2001 this approach was called into question by Professors James Crawford and Georges Abi-Saab in 
their provocative debate on the definition of economic sanctions as contained in Vera Gowlland- 
Debbas's collection on UN sanctions. " 
Professor Abi-Saab's definition of an economic sanction in that work contains three elements. 
it is defined as a coercive response to an internationally wrongful act authorised by a competent social 
organ. 'Z In his response, Crawford queries whether the UNSC, which he suggests must come within the 
definition of a `competent social organ', is authorised to take economic sanctions as defined by Abi- 
Saab. 13 This is because the UNSC is authorised to respond to threats to or breaches of the peace, which 
Crawford submits, save in circumstances where there is a determination of an act of aggression, do not 
necessarily amount to `internationally wrongful acts'. 14 However, a more fundamental criticism may be 
made of the suggestion that economic sanctions can only be taken in circumstances where an 
internationally wrongful act has occurred. This suggestion does not reflect the use of economic 
sanctions in practice, either traditionally or since the creation of the UN nor is it mandated by the 
provisions of the UN Charter. 
To consider an early example of economic sanctions, in 432 BC the city of Athens excluded 
citizens of a neighbouring city, Megara, from the market of Athens in response to the kidnapping of 
three Aspasian women. '5 As such, economic sanctions were being taken in a situation where there had 
been no internationally wrongful act. This has continued to date with examples including: US sanctions 
against Japan between 1917 and 1918, which were taken in an attempt to restrain its commercial 
expansion into the Far East; 16 Arab League sanctions against Canada in 1979, which had the intention 
of deterring the planned move of an embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem; " and Greece taking 
sanctions against Macedonia in 1994 in an effort to force it to change its name. '8 Given that economic 
sanctions generally do not require there to have been an internationally wrongful act it is unclear why 
" Vera Gowlland-Debbas (ed), United Nations Sanctions and International Law (Kluwer Law International 2001). 
12 Georges Abi-Saab, The Concept of Sanction in International Law' in Vera Gowlland-Debbas (cd). United 
Nations Sanctions and International Law (Kluwer Law International 2001) 39. 
" James Crawford, 'The Relationship Between Sanctions and Countermeasures' in Vera Gowlland-Debbas (ed), 
United Nations Sanctions and International Law (Kluwer Law International 2001) 57-58 ('Crawford. 'the 
Relationship Between Sanctions and Countermeasures'). 
14 ibid. 57. 
" Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey Schott, Kimberly Ann Elliot and Barbara Oegg, Economic Sanctions 
Reconsidered (3`d edn, Peterson Institute for International Economics 2007) 9. 
" Jeffrey Safford, 'Experiment in Containment: The United States Steel Embargo and Japan. 1917-1918' (1970) 
39 Pacific Historical Review 439. 
" Jean-Marc F Blanchard and Norrin M Ripsman, 'Lightning Rods Rather Than Light Switches: Arab Economic 
Sanctions against Canada in 1979' (2002) 35 Canadian Journal of Political Science 151. 
1" 
'Greece Closes Macedonia's Main Trade Route' New York Times (New York 18 February 1994). 
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they would do so solely when they are taken by the UN. In this regard, it should be noted that in her 
2004 work Gowlland-Debbas herself acknowledges that the use of sanctions to designate enforcement 
measures under Chapter VII, however is in accordance with the current practice of States and the term 
has, moreover, crept into the vocabulary of Council resolutions... as well as confirmed by regular 
reference to "Sanctions Committees", and the current use of the term "targeted sanctions". 19 
The cases outlined above also demonstrate that Abi-Saab's opinion, that economic sanctions 
necessitate there being collective as opposed to individual action, is a fallacy. It is clear that economic 
sanctions existed prior to the development of `competent social organs' such as the UN or League of 
Nations and that states have continued to take economic sanctions individually since the development 
of those institutions. In fact, in 1931, the League of Nations discussed China's boycott of Japanese 
goods, which had been instigated as a result of Japan's invasion of Manchuria, and considered that it 
was justified as a measure of reprisal against Japan for its unlawful invasion. 20 Lowenfeld offers two 
reasons why economic sanctions do not have to be collective measures. 2' Firstly, he indicates that 
states do in practice both take unilateral sanctions and tolerate unilateral sanctions taken by other states. 
Secondly, he notes that whilst states are not obliged to impose sanctions in circumstances where the 
UNSC has considered and rejected the imposition of such measures, neither are they precluded from 
doing so. 
With respect to Abi Saab's third criterion it should be noted that, as will be discussed later in 
this chapter, economic sanctions are not always coercive measures. They are, in fact, also employed as 
punitive and symbolic measures. 
It is suggested, therefore, that a more functional approach to the definition of economic 
sanctions is appropriate. The most suitable definition for economic sanctions as they are currently 
invoked is the prohibition on economic interaction with any state, entity (including commercial 
entities) or individual. This definition reflects the process of economic sanctions whilst acknowledging 
that they may be taken in a variety of situations by a variety of actors. However, the definition for the 
purpose of this thesis is more nuanced as this work deals only with UN economic sanctions. Therefore, 
') Vera Gowlland-Debbas, 'Sanctions Regimes Under Article 41 of the UN Charter' in Vera Gowliand-Debbas (ed), National Implementation oJ' United Nations Sanctions A Comparative Studv (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2004) 5. 
League of Nations Official Journal, 13 (1932) 1883-1884. 
Andreas Lowenfeld, 'Unilateral Versus Collective Sanctions: An American's Perception' in Vera Gowlland- Debbas (ed), United Nations. Sanctions and International Law (Kluwer Law International 2001) 96. 
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the definition that will be adopted for this purpose of this thesis is the prohibition by the UNSC on 
economic interaction with any state, entity or individual. 
UN measures, as opposed to state or regional measures, have been selected because of their 
immense potential. The UN was born out of a belief that a peaceful world is possible. UN economic 
sanctions could help in the fulfilment of that ideal by being used in place of military sanctions and by 
being used to stifle individual states' attempts to use force. They, have two primary advantages over 
economic sanctions taken by individual states or regional organisations. 
Firstly, UN economic sanctions could be used effectively against any state. It is difficult for 
an individual state to take effective economic sanctions against another states. In order for such 
measures to be effective the sanctioning state would have to be the target state's main source of both 
imports and exports. If not the target will be able to import goods from and export goods to other 
states, thus negating the intended impact of the economic sanctions. In contrast, if UN economic 
sanctions are taken, then all Member States are obligated to implement the measures. Assuming that 
there are no significant breaches of UN economic sanctions, a targeted state must rely on its own self- 
sufficiency to negate the effects of such measures. 
Secondly, UN economic sanctions, as a collective measure, are perceived as having greater 
legitimacy than sanctions taken by individual states or regional organisations. Van Genugten and de 
Groot suggest that the appearances are against bilateral sanctions' because they lack the legitimacy 
that multilateral economic sanctions such as those taken by the UN have. 22 They note that the 
legitimacy of economic sanctions increases when more countries support them and provide that they 
are less open to misuse the more states that support them. 23 Whilst UN economic sanctions are adopted 
by the UNSC, it has been the case that in circumstances where non-UNSC Member States are opposed 
to a particular sanctions regime it has not been adopted, even in situations where such a regime has 
received P-5 support 
. 
24 When they are taken, therefore, they are reflective of international censure of 
the behaviour against which they are adopted. 
UN economic sanctions are also considered here because it is argued that some significant 
changes to them need to take place if they continue to be employed by the UNSC. Despite their 
''' Willem van Genugten, Gerard de Groot and Saskia Lavri, jssen, 'Guidelines on the Future Use of Sanctions: An 
Evaluation' in Willem JM van Genugten and Gerard A de Groot (eds). United Nations Sanctions: Effectiveness 
and Effects. Especially in the Field of Human Rights. A Alit pproach (Intersentia 1999) 149-150, 
ibid. 
See for example the proposed sanctions against Zimbabwe discussed in section 1.4.3. which were rejected albeit 
that both the US and the UK had domestic sanctions in place against them. 
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potential advantages over economic sanctions taken by other actors, there have been some difficulties 
when UN economic sanctions have been implemented by states. They have had significant 
humanitarian consequences for citizens of states targeted by them, most visibly in the case Iraq. 25 
Domestic and regional courts are now criticising the impact that targeted economic sanctions have on 
those subjected to them. 26 Yet, these difficulties have not been adequately addressed and the UNSC 
continues to adopt economic sanctions. Recommendations for the development of the UN economic 
sanctions framework are made in chapter 5 and 6 of this thesis. 
The final reason for the focus on UNE economic sanctions in this thesis is that they are an 
institutional measure whose development mirrors and therefore serves to illustrate some of the wider 
developments within the UN framework. The powers of the UNSC have expanded over the life of the 
UN and the move to targeted UN economic sanctions serves to demonstrate this. The sanctioning of 
individuals by the UN has pushed its powers to their limits and the repercussions of this are important 
for any meaningful discussion of the UNSC, as well as for UN economic sanctions themselves. 
Furthermore, there has been a proliferation of institutions surrounding the development of economic 
sanctions within the UN framework. 
1.2 The Basis for Economic Sanctions in the UN Charter 
The UN was founded against the background of World War 11 and following the failure of the League 
of Nations. Whilst the objective of the UN was the maintenance of international peace and security, 
there was a need to have a means in place to address conflict when it did arise. The means of dealing 
with such conflict was provided for in Chapter VII of the Charter. 
Chapter VII endows the UNSC with powers to decide measures to be taken should there be ` a 
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or an act of aggression' in order to prevent that threat or breach 
from progressing. 17 Aside from the option of calling upon a transgressor to comply with provisional 
measures, 28 the UN can take military sanctions under Article 42 or non-military action under Article 
25 Peter 1. Pellett, `Sanctions, Food, Nutrition, and Health in Iraq' in Anthony Arnove (ed). Iraq Under Siege The 
Deadly Impact of Sanctions and War (2"d edn, South End Press 2002). 2' Joined cases C-402/05 P& C-415/05 P Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council q/ the European Union and Commission of the European Communities [2008] ECR 1-06351 ('Kadi (Decision of the ECJ)'). Her Majesty's Treasury (Respondent) v Mohammed Jabar Ahmed and others (FC) (Appellants) Her Alajestv's Treasury (Respondent) v Mohammed al-Ghabra (FC) (Appellant) R (on the 
application of Hani El Saved Sabari Youssef) (Respondent) v Her Majesty's Treasury (Appellant) [2010] UKSC 2 (': 1, K. A/ v HAI Treasury (No l)'). 
27 Article 39, t1N Charter. 
2S ibid. Article 40. 
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41. Article 41 embodies David Kennedy's belief that `rather than operating as a stasis against violence, 
institutional energy must be harnessed to do the work of war without violence, or to deploy violence on 
behalf of peace. '29 
Article 41 states that `[t)he Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use 
of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of 
the United Nations to apply such measures. This may include complete or partial interruption of 
economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, 
and the severance of diplomatic relations. ' As such, the invocation of economic sanctions within the 
UN relies on action by the UNSC. 
lt was clear from the decision to give the UNSC so much power with respect to the invocation 
of economic sanctions that their development within the UN framework would be reactionary. The 
predecessor to the UN, the League of Nations, also had provisions for economic sanctions in its 
Covenant. 30 Under Article 16 of the Covenant Members of the League of Nations were obligated to 
automatically cease economic relations with any state that was deemed to have committed an act of 
war against any other member. This created uncertainty as to how economic sanctions would actually 
be triggered.; A Committee of Jurists determined that the states themselves would be required to 
decide when an act of war had occurred that necessitated economic sanctions. 32 This led to a situation 
whereby three states refused to take economic sanctions against Italy for its invasion and colonisation 
of Ethiopia on grounds that it did not constitute an act of war. " 
In contrast the UN Charter places the decision that economic sanctions are necessary in the 
hands of the UNSC, with states only responsible at the point of implementing the measures that the 
UNSC decides upon. This provides a trigger mechanism as to when economic sanctions will be 
invoked. However, it leaves the power to invoke economic sanctions in the hands of a small minority 
of states and, as such, economic sanctions (and other measures) may be taken in circumstances that do 
not reflect the will of the majority of UN Member States. 
29 David Kennedy 'The Move to Institutions' (1987) 8 Cardozo Law Review 841 at 867. 
'('The Covenant of the League of Nations (1919), 225 Parry 195. 
" Jeremy Matam Farrall, UN Sanctions and the Rule q/'Law (Cambridge University Press 2007) 53. 
"- Abi-Saab (nI2). 40. 
George Scott. The Rise and Fall oj'the League of Nations (Hutchinson 1973) 340; Abi-Saah (n7). 40. 
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Under the UN Charter, UNSC resolutions adopted on non-procedural matters'' require the 
affirmative vote of all P-5 members plus of at least four non-permanent members. 35 This gives the P-5 
an absolute veto on the invocation of economic sanctions, which will be discussed later in this chapter. 
Although not envisaged in the UN Charter, it has become accepted practice that the voluntary 
abstention from or non-participation in a UNSC vote does not prevent a non-procedural resolution from 
passing. 36 This allows resolutions to pass in situations where states, although not rejecting the 
measures, are not offering their full support to them. 
1.3 The Purposes of Economic Sanctions 
The effectiveness of economic sanctions is a contentious issue that has been debated by 
commentators. 37 This thesis, therefore, does not deal with whether or not UN economic sanctions are 
per se effective. However, in order to assess different sanctions regimes, the reasons why UN 
economic sanctions have developed in certain ways and the best way for them to progress in future, it 
is necessary to consider whether sanctions, as implemented, have been effective. It is also clear that, 
irrespective of how effective they actually are, economic sanctions are being used by the UNSC. For 
that reason the means of making sanctions regimes as effective as possible are considered. In order to 
consider the effectiveness of economic sanctions the possible purposes of UN economic sanctions may 
need to be understood. Economic sanctions have three principle purposes: coercion, punishment and 
symbolism. Often, as is demonstrated in this chapter, systems of sanctions will have more than one 
underlying purpose. 
1-0 The distinction between procedural and non-procedural matters is not defined in the UN Charter. Simma has 
commented that in practice, decisions are clearly procedural matters if this is stated expressly or if the decision is 
adopted despite the negative vote of a permanent member of the SC' (Bruno Simma, Stefan Brunner and Hans- 
Peter Kaul, 'Article 27' in Bruno Simma (ed), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary (2nd edn, Oxford 
University Press 2002) 486. 
`5 Article, 27(3). UN Charter. 
'6 Simma, Brunner and Kaul (n 34) 493,499; Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South 
. 
Ifrica in Namibia (South [Vest ; Ifrica) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) (Advisory 
Opinion) 119711 ICJ Rep 16 at 22, para 22 ('The Namibia Case'). 
;' For an extended discussion on the effectiveness of economic sanctions see: Flutbauer, Schott. Elliot and Barbara 
Oegg (n15); Fred Grunfeld. `The Effectiveness of United Nations Economic Sanctions' in Willem JM van 
Genugten and Gerard A de Groot, United Nations Sanctions: E/fectiveness and Effects. Especially in the Field of 
human Rights, A Multi-disciplinarv Approach (Intersentia 1999) 113: Makio Miyagawa Do Economic Sanctions 
IVork? (St Martin's Press 1992):. 
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1.3.1 Coercion 
Coercive economic sanctions are taken in the belief that economic sanctions may persuade a state, 
person or entity to amend their behaviour. The intended coercive effect of economic sanctions taken 
within the UN framework is that they will be used to force states to abstain from or to cease threatening 
or breaching international peace and security. This is clear from the fact that the UN Charter endows 
the UNSC with the power to take economic sanctions for the purpose of `[maintaining] or [restoring] 
international peace and security. '38 
Barber has stated that `[i]n each case in which sanctions have been applied there appear at first 
sight to be clear objectives relating to changes in the behaviour of the government against whom they 
are directed'39 and this position reflects UN behaviour. UNSC resolutions will always cite coercive 
reasons for the invocation of economic sanctions and this has caused comment that `the generally 
accepted purpose and emphasis of such sanctions lies in modifying behaviour' 
. 
40 
For example, with respect to economic sanctions taken against Libya, states were required to 
take economic sanctions until such time as the UNSC determined that the Libyan Government had 
committed to ceasing all forms of terrorist action and assistance and responded to requests by various 
states in relation to the legal procedures related to the attacks carried out against Pan Am flight 103 and 
Union de transports aeriens flight 772.41 
Equally, economic sanctions were put in place against Haiti following the overthrow of the 
legitimate Government led by President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. Resolution 841 set out the measures, 
which it said would be put in place if attempts, being undertaken at that time by the UN Special Envoy 
for Haiti and the Organization of American States, to establish a political dialogue with the Haitian 
parties, failed. 42 These examples show that UN economic sanctions are adopted for coercive purposes. 
They also demonstrate that coercion may be pre-emptive in the sense of economic sanctions being 
threatened if certain issues are not resolved within a specified timeframe, as well, as being taken 
immediately in response to the occurrence of undesired behaviour. 
However, further analysis shows that in practice the UN's use of economic sanctions as 
coercive measures is somewhat uneven. For example, economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia, 
'x UN Charter, Article 39. 
James Barber, `Economic Sanctions As a Policy Instrument' (1979) 55 International Affairs 367,368. 
40 August Reinisch, 'Developing Human Rights and Humanitarian Accountability of the Security Council for the 
Imposition of Economic Sanctions' (2001) 95 AJIL 851. 
" UNSC Res 748 (31 March 1992) UN Doc S/RES/748 ("UNSC Resolution 748'). 
42 UNSC Res 841 (19 June 1993) UN Doc S/RES/841 ('UNSC Resolution 841'). 
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which will be discussed in considerable detail in chapter 2, were clearly intended to have a coercive 
effect. They were put in place for the purpose of bringing an end to illegal white rule in Southern 
Rhodesia and remained in place until there was regime change at which point they were lifted 
. 
43 In 
contrast, economic sanctions against Iraq, discussed in chapter three, were on their face coercive in that 
they were stated to be for the purpose of forcing Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait, which it had invaded. " 
However, even following its withdrawal from Kuwait economic sanctions against Iraq remained in 
place. As such, it is clear that they were intended to have a purpose beyond coercion. 
It is important to note that, in order for an economic sanctions regime to have coercive power, 
the economic sanctions put in place must have such a detrimental effect on the target that it perceives 
that detriment to outweigh the advantages it was getting as a result of the undesired behaviour that 
resulted in sanctions being put in place. 
1.3.2 Punishment 
Economic sanctions are inherently punitive. 45 The use of the word `sanction', itself connotes a form of 
punishment even in cases where the purpose of the measures put in place is not simple punishment. 46 
This belief in the punitive nature of economic sanctions was also reflected in US Secretary of State, 
Hillary Clinton's, assertion in 2009 that Iran would, if diplomacy failed to bring about a favourable 
outcome, be subjected to `crippling' sanctions. 4' An example of purely punitive economic sanctions 
was the provision for reparations by Germany contained in the Treaty of Versailles following World 
War 1.48 In Part VIII of the Treaty Germany accepted responsibility for causing `all the loss and 
damage' to the allied countries, to the associated governments and to their nationals and agreed to 
make compensation for damage to the civilian population of the allies and associated states and to their 
property. Compensation was available not only for damage caused by Germany itself but also damage 
caused by its allies. 49 These provisions were purely punitive in nature because the action that had 
4' UNSC Res 217 (20 November 1965) UN Doe S/RES/217 ('UNSC Resolution 217'). 
44 IJNSC Res 661 (6 August 1990) UN Doc S/RES/661 ('UNSC Resolution 661'). 
4s Padraic Foran, 'The Cuban Embargo and Human Rights: Intercultural Human Rights Law Review Annual 
Symposium: October 24,2008: Why I luman Rights Confuse the Sanctions Debate: Towards a Goal-Sensitive 
Framework for Evaluating United Nations Security Council Sanctions' (2009) 4 Intercultural Human Rights L Rev 
123. 
" Steve Charnovitz, 'Rethinking WTO Trade Sanctions' (2001) 95 AJIL 792. 
4' 'Tim Reid, 'Hilary Clinton: US will organise 'crippling' Iran sanctions if diplomacy fails' Times Online (22 
April 2009) available at: http: //www. timesontine. co. uk/tol/news/world/us_and_americas/article6l49692. ece [last 
accessed 17 January 20111. 
"' Treaty of Versailles (1919). Reparations. Part VIII. Annex 1. 
4'' ibid. 
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caused their invocation was in the past and had ceased by the time that the sanctions were taken so they 
had no coercive value and there was little benefit that Germany could gain from complying with the 
measures. 
Commentators dispute the punitive quality of UN economic sanctions. In order for a state, 
person or entity to be punished it must have committed a wrong for which it is punished. Abi-Saab 
states that UN economic sanctions are based on a `finding' of wrongdoing by the UNSC, which would 
be consistent with sanctions having a punitive function. 50 And Al-Anbari has described the invocation 
of UN economic sanctions under Articles 39 and 41 of the UN Charter as `the equivalent to a 
judgment'5' that a wrong has been committed. This contrasts with Crawford's position as has already 
been noted. He states that no international wrong need be committed in order for economic sanctions to 
be taken in accordance with the UN Charter. 52 
An example of punitive UN economic sanctions are the economic sanctions put in place 
against Iran for its purported involvement in the development of nuclear technology for use in nuclear 
weapons. 53 These sanctions are coercive in that they aim to force Iran to conform to the terms of the 
non-proliferation treaty. However, they must also be perceived as having a punitive element as, whilst 
they are taken as a result of the failure to adhere to the terms of the treaty, they have not been taken 
against states that are known to have nuclear weapons and, as such, there is inherent condemnation of 
Iran itself, and not simply of its nuclear policies, in the invocation of UN economic sanctions against it. 
The premise behind economic sanctions taken against states is that, once the civilian 
population feels their effects it will seek to change its leadership to one that behaves in accordance with 
required norms. The difficulty with punitive economic sanctions is that they may have the undesired 
side effect of prompting the citizens of a country to offer support to the regime being targeted if they 
feel that economic sanctions are in some respect unfair. This occurred in Southern Rhodesia when the 
white elite modified their behaviour on the basis of economic sanctions where they felt that the 
sanctions were unreasonable. This behaviour modification led to economic sanctions being less 
effective in that instance than they would otherwise have been. 54 The punitive intent of economic 
sanctions, may also be diminished in circumstances where a black market economy develops, as those 
50 Abi-Saab (n 12), 39. 
s' A Amir AI-Anbari, 'The Impact of United Nations Sanctions on Economic Development' in Vera Gowlland 
Debbas (ed) United Nations Sanctions and International Law (Kluwer Law International 2001) 371-372. 
2 Crawtord. The Relationship Between Sanctions and Countermeasures' (n 13) 57. 
' UNSC Res 1737 (27 December 2006) UN Doc S/RES/1737. 
i4 See section 2.4.2.2.1. 
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involved in such a market may actually benefit from the impact of economic sanctions thus defeating 
55 their punitive intent. 
1.3.3 Symbolism 
lt has been said of economic sanctions that they reinforce public commitment to the norm that has 
been violated and generate a sense of civic virtue, without incurring unacceptable domestic political 
costs' and that a `militant sense of virtue and moral superiority... attaches to the application of 
economic sanctions'. sb 
Economic sanctions have a symbolic value and may be established for the purpose of 
conveying a particular message rather than achieving a tangible result, such as behaviour modification 
or punishment. Symbolic economic sanctions may be used in two ways. Firstly, they may be used to 
convey to a target that its behaviour is being viewed unfavourably. Secondly, they may be used to 
convey to the wider public, which has raised concerns about the target's behaviour, that their concerns 
are being taken seriously by the sender state or organisation. The symbolic value of economic sanctions 
may therefore explain why they are sometimes taken in instances where they seem extremely unlikely 
to succeed. 
Commentators support the opinion that economic sanctions are used for symbolic purposes. 
Eland has stated that `policymakers believe sanctions have utility as foreign policy tools, even if stated 
compliance goals are not likely to be met. 57 He offers the statements of President Carter at the time of 
the US grain embargo against the Soviet Union for its invasion of Afghanistan, which he states `seem 
to suggest that [Carter] wanted to use sanctions to demonstrate U. S. resolve and to deter the Soviets 
from further aggression into more strategic areas' as an example of symbolic sanctions. 58 He further 
states, `[i]n an anarchic and chaotic international environment, symbolic goals are important and may 
even be vital. 'S9 
" Sven Kuhn von Burgsdorff. 'The Cuban Embargo and Human Rights; Intercultural Human Rights Law Review 
Annual Symposium; October 24,2008: The Effectiveness of Economic Sanctions: The Case of Cuba' (2009) 4 
Intercultural human Rights Law Review 31. 
"' W Michael Reisman and Douglas L Stevick. `The Applicability of International Law Standards to United 
Nations Economic Sanctions Programmes' (1998) 9 EJIL 86 at 94. 
" Ivan Eland, 'Economic Sanctions as Tools of Foreign Policy', in David Cortright and George A Lopez (eds), 
Economic Sanctions, Panacea or Peacebuilding in a Post-Cold War World? (Westview Press 1995) 30. 
ibid. 
ibid. 31. 
13 
Barber has suggested that there are two aspects to symbolic sanctions. 60 The first is that 
symbolic sanctions `demonstrate a willingness and capacity to act' and the second is that they 
'anticipate or deflect criticism. "' Furthermore, he states that `[i]t is generally important for 
, governments to be seen to be concerned and busy. '62 This reflects the fact that where one state has 
behaved in a manner which could warrant economic sanctions, other states have to consider their own 
reputations in relation to whether or not they should take stline sort of action. This is particularly 
relevant to states that consider themselves to be world leaders in political, military or social terms as 
they have often placed themselves in a position that would be undermined if they stood by and ignored 
the undesirable actions of another state particularly if those actions threaten citizens. This is a view 
held by Galtung who states, `[w]hen military action is impossible for one reason or another, and when 
doing nothing is seen as tantamount to complicity, then something has to be done to express morality, 
something that at least serves as a clear signal to everyone that what the receiving nation has done is 
disapproved of. If the sanctions do not serve instrumental purposes they can at least have expressive 
functions. '63 
lt should be noted, however, that not all commentators agree that economic sanctions are often 
invoked for symbolic purposes. Drezner argues strongly against this theory. 64 lie relies heavily on three 
studies" to say that the empirical support for the [invocation of symbolic sanctions] is weak at best 
and insignificant at worst. ""' However, his position can be criticised on two grounds. Firstly, Drezner 
relies on there being a single, visible motivation for economic sanctions. Elliot contradicts this position 
suggesting that the actual goal of economic sanctions may have little or no relation to the stated aim of 
behaviour modification and proposing such alternative goals as deterring third states from engaging in 
undesirable behaviour, `enhanc[ing] the sender's credibility amongst its allies' and as a response to 
G0 Barber (n 39), 380. 
ibid. 
ibid. 
Johan Galtung. 'On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions: With Examples from the Case of Rhodesia'. (1967) 19 World Politics 378 at 411-412. 
Drezner (n 10), 60-68. 
James Blessing. The suspension of foreign aid by the United States, 1927-1948' (PhD thesis, State University 
of New York at Albany 1975): Richard Ellings, Embargoes and World Power: Lessons From American Foreign 
Policy (Westview Press 1985): Alfred Cooper Drury 'Economic sanctions and presidential decisions: models of political rationality' (PhD thesis. Arizona State University 1997). 
"' Drezner (n 10). 67. 
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domestic political pressure. ' 67 in practice it is clear economic sanctions do not always have only one 
aim`i8 and symbolism should not be disregarded as a secondary motivation behind their adoption. 
Secondly, Drezner limits his consideration to economic sanctions taken by a single state and 
expressly excludes sanctions taken by international organisations. "' As action taken by the UN is a 
collective measure, agreed by states, they have a stronger symbolic value than sanctions taken by a 
single state. 
Whilst it is submitted here that economic sanctions can and do have symbolic purposes it must 
be noted that the symbolic purpose of an economic sanctions regime will not be indicated on the face 
of the resolution adopting such a regime and may not be readily apparent from consideration of the 
regime. 
1.4 The Use of UN Economic Sanctions 
Although economic sanctions were included in the UN Charter from its inception, they were not 
invoked by the UNSC until twenty years later. 70 Even then it was not until the 1990's that economic 
sanctions were taken with any frequency. This section discusses the background to this uneven 
adoption of economic sanctions by the UNSC. 
1.4.1 The Cold War 
The Cold War paralysed the collective security system envisaged by the UN Charter 'because it 
depended on a community of interests among the major powers that did not then exist. '" This had a 
profound effect on the work of the UNSC during that time. The main states involved in the Cold War, 
the US and the Soviet Union, were P-5 members and, as such, could, and did, use their veto powers to 
prevent the passing of resolutions supported by their Cold War counterpart. That this was occurring 
seems evident from the inactivity of the UNSC during that time period 72 and is also born out by a 
`'' Kimberly Ann Elliot. 'Factors Affecting the Success of Sanctions' in David Cortright and George A Lopez (eds), Economic Sanctions. Panacea or Peacebuilding in a Post-Cold War World? (Westview Press 1995) 51. 
°R For example. to return to the case of economic sanctions against Iraq, they had the stated purpose of forcing Iraq 
to withdraw from Kuwait but remained in place after that had occurred. As such, they clearly had more than one 
purpose. 
°" Drezner (n 10). 104. 
70 UNSC Resolution 217 (n 43). 
" Michael J Matheson, Council Unbound: The Growth of UN Decision Afaking on Conflict and Postconflict Issues 
cater the ('old War (United States Institute of Peace Press 2006) 5 ('Matheson. Council Unbound') 
'= There were 647 UNSC resolutions during the first 45 years that the UN was in existence a figure that was almost 
met during the next (0 years when 620 resolutions were made 
- 
David Cortright and George A Lopez. The 
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statistical analysis of the vetoed resolutions. In the period between 1946 and 
2002 there were 294 
vetoes of resolutions by the UNSC with only 7 of those coming from the post-cold 
War period 1991- 
2002.73 Despite rhetoric to the contrary, once resolutions relating to the election of either a new 
Secretary General or new members are removed from the analysis, the bulk of those vetoes were 
almost equally distributed between the US and the USSR with the former exercising its power on 
70 
occasions and the latter 71 times. 
Action was taken by the UNSC in response to North Korea's invasion of South Korea in 
1950.74 This was only made possible by the USSR's boycott of the UNSC during that period in 
response to the inclusion of Nationalist China rather than the People's Republic of China. It was a 
mistake that the USSR vowed never to repeat. 75 
This combination of a relatively inactive UNSC and its frequent resort to its power of veto 
was detrimental not only to the functioning of the UN system but also to the resolution of international 
disputes. Upon the founding of the UN, the UNSC was charged with responsibility for international 
peace and security. In the absence of it functioning as intended, there was no provision for any other 
organ to perform its role and, as such, during the Cold War the `international community struggled 
from conflict to conflict with no other legal basis for action but the inadequate authority of other UN 
organs, the uncertain authority of regional orgnanizations, occasional authority drawn from specific 
treaties and the residual sovereign powers of states. '76 
The result was that during the Cold War period only two cases of economic sanctions were 
taken by the UNSC. Southern Rhodesia, as already mentioned, was one and South Africa, against 
whom an arms embargo was taken, '7 was the other. In contrast, following the Cold War, from 1990 to 
1999, the UNSC adopted economic sanctions regimes against twelve states. " This disparity highlights 
the extent to which the political situation at a given time can impact on the adoption of economic 
sanctions. 
Sanctions Decade Assessing UN Strategies in the /990s (Rienner 2000), 1 ('C'ortright and Lopez, The Sanctions 
Decade'). 
Peter Wallensteen and Patrik Johansson. 'Security Council Decisions in Perspective' in David M Malone (ed). 
The Security Council From the Cold War to the 21" Century (Rienner 2004) 20. 
74 UNSC Res 82 (25 June 1959) UN S/RES/82. 
" Paul Kennedy, The Parliament oj' Afan The United Nations and the Quest 
, 
lor Global Governance (Penguin 
Books 2006), 56. 
71 Matheson, Council Unbound (n 71) 5. 
" UNSC Res 181 (7 August 1963) UN Doc S/RES/181 (`UNSC Resolution 181'). 
78 The states sanctioned between 1990 and 1999 were: Iraq, the former Yugoslavia, Libya. Liberia. Somalia, parts 
of Cambodia. Haiti. parts of Angola, Rwanda, Sudan, Sierra Leone and Afghanistan. Cortright and Lopez, ]lie 
Sanctions Decade (n 72), 1-2. 
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1.4.2 Situations Where UN Economic Sanctions are Used 
At the time of the founding of the UN the focus of the world, in the aftermath of World War 11, was on 
the cessation and prevention of inter-state conflict. In fact, one of the motivations behind the US 
support for the UN was the hope that it could avoid involvement in future wars. 79 That the drafters did 
not envisage that the UNSC would interfere in internal conflicts can be seen in the reservation of 
powers to resolve such disputes to the states in which they were occurring. 80 It may be assumed that the 
drafters of the UN Charter intended that economic sanctions would be used, as they were against Iraq, s' 
in a situation were one state used force against another, because the UN itself was established for the 
purpose of avoiding such conflicts. However, the drafters of the UN did not envisage that the Cold War 
would stifle the use of economic sanctions for more than four decades, nor, that by the time economic 
sanctions were being used that the political landscape would have changed to the extent that it did with 
a resulting impact on the situations in which economic sanctions were invoked. 
The first change was the speed at which decolonisation took place. Antonio Cassese has said 
that at San Francisco it was `generally believed that the UN could achieve general disarmament in a 
decade, whereas decolonialization would take a century. '82 In fact, disarmament may never happen 
whereas decolonisation began almost immediately after the foundation of the UN with the Philippines 
and Jordan in 1946, peaked in the 1960s and continued until East Timor regained its independence in 
1999. Few territories now remain as colonies. 83 
This decolonisation process impacted on the situations in which economic sanctions were 
taken. This can be seen in the very first case of economic sanctions, which will be discussed in the next 
chapter. In the early to mid 1960s Southern Rhodesia, which had been under British control was slowly 
gaining independent powers. In 1965 Ian Smith, leader of the ruling white minority party, made a UDI, 
which was contrary to the wishes of the black majority at that time. The purpose of sanctions in that 
instance was to force the Smith government and white minority in Zimbabwe to allow the majority of 
Zimbabweans to gain their independence. 
71' Robert C Ililderbrand, Dumbarton Oaks, The Origins of the United Nations and the Search for Postwar Security (University of North Carolina Press 1990) 5. 
ri0 Article 2(7), UN Charter. 
x' UNSC Resolution 841 (n 42). 
42 Antonio Cassese, International Law (Oxford University Press 2001) 285. R" Examples include: Virgin Islands (USA), New Caledonia (France) and Tokelau (New Zealand) and some 
remaining British overseas territories, such as. the Turks and Caicos Islands. the Cayman Islands and Bermuda. The status of Western Sahara also remains uncertain. 
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Secondly, the fall of communism in the early 1990s prompted the use of economic sanctions. 
It caused not only the dissolution of the Soviet Union, which progressed peacefully, but also the 
dissolution of FRY, which progressed less peacefully. The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 
was composed of six SRs: SR Bosnia and Herzegovina, SR Croatia, SR Macedonia, SR Montenegro, 
SR Slovenia and SR Serbia. Upon its dissolution, it became clear that Serbia and Croatia were not 
satisfied with independence for all SRs along the borders in place at that time. 84 Of particular interest 
was the Bosnian territory, which led to fighting on that territory. An arms embargo ensued. 85 This can 
be seen as another aspect of conflict arising out of states gaining independence, albeit in this instance 
as the result of the dissolution of a federated state. 
Thirdly, UN economic sanctions have been used in attempts to resolve the internal 
disintegration of states. In the case of Haiti economic sanctions were used when a military coup 
overthrew Jean-Bertrand Aristide, the first president to be elected in elections monitored by the 
international community. 86 Sanctions were established in the form of a petrol and arms embargo in 
June 1993.8' They were suspended following a negotiated peace agreement in August of that year only 
to be reinstated following the collapse of that agreement 88 Full economic sanctions were instigated in 
May 1994. "" Ultimately, however, the situation was resolved by the deployment of a UNSC authorised 
multinational force. `"' Fourthly, economic sanctions were also taken, in the form of an arms embargo, 
as a result of ethnic cleansing in Rwanda. 91 
These cases demonstrate that the UNSC uses economic sanctions in a wide range of 
situations. Of particular note is that, over time, despite the suggested intention of the drafters that 
sanctions be used in inter-state conflict and the requirement that the action being condemned should 
threaten or breach `international' peace and security, economic sanctions have been invoked 
increasingly in situations that take place wholly within the borders of one state. 
a; Allan Little and Laura Silber, The Death of'Yugoslavia (Revised edn. Penguin 1996) 190-191. 
IJNSC Res 713 (25 September 1991) UN Doc S/RES/713 ('UNSC Resolution 713'). 
R" Elizabeth D Gibbons, Sanctions in Haiti, Human Rights and Democracy under Assault (Praeger 1991) 1. 
"' UNSC Resolution 841 (n 42). 
4S Gibbons (n 86), 5-6. 
UNSC Res 917 (6 May 1994) UN Doc S/RES/917 ('UNSC Resolution 917'). 
° UNSC Res 940 (31 July 1994) UN Doc S/RES/940 ('UNSC Resolution 940'). 
UNSC Res 918 (17 May 1994) 1 IN Doc SIRES/918 ('UNSC Resolution 918'). 
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1.4.3 The Absence of Consistent UNSC Practice 
As outlined above, the UNSC has used economic sanctions in a variety of situations. The language of 
Chapter VII was purposefully left open to allow the UNSC to `take enforcement action in a broad 
range of cases and not to subject it to severe restrictions in its decision when to act. '92 This makes it 
difficult to precisely ascertain the situations in which economic sanctions may be taken as the range of 
situations has grown incrementally. However, one way of identifying situations in which economic 
sanctions may be taken is to consider similar situations in which they were previously invoked. This 
would of course require that the UNSC behave consistently with respect to the situations in which it 
invokes economic sanctions, which has not proven to be the case. 
The clearest example of the inconsistent UNSC policy was seen during the 2008 rejection of 
economic sanctions against Zimbabwe. Both the EU93 and the US94 have had targeted economic 
sanctions in place against senior government members and other high-ranking officials in Zimbabwe 
for some time. On I1 July 2008, the UNSC debated whether it too should take action in the form of a 
tabled resolution containing an arms embargo and economic sanctions targeted at Robert Mugabe and 
13 of his supporters 9S In some respects Zimbabwe was an ideal target for economic sanctions given the 
humanitarian crisis that could be attributed to poor management of the country, the dispossession of 
citizens' lands and the questionable elections. However, the tabled resolution was defeated. Nine states 
voted in favour of the resolution, one abstained 96 and five voted against it, including both China and 
Russia exercising their veto powers. 97 
Following earlier examples UN economic sanctions could have been invoked against 
Zimbabwe for two reasons. Firstly, the situation in Zimbabwe did come within the UNSC's previous 
understanding of Article 39. Although the Russian delegate had raised concerns that the UNSC was 
`artificially elevating [the problems of Zimbabwe] to the level of a threat to international peace and 
"'' Jochen Frowein and Nico Krisch, `Article 41' in Bruno Simma (ed), The Charter of the United Nations: d Commentarv (2"d edn. Oxford University Press 2002), 718. 
Common Position 2004/161/CFSP (OJ L 50,20.2.2004. p 66): Council Regulation (EC) No 314/2004 (0J L 55, 
24.2.2004. p 1), Interpretative Council statement: OJ L 57,25.2.2004, p 1. As amended most recently by: Council Decision 2010/121/CFSP (OJ L 49,26.2.2010, p 30) Notice to listed natural person (OJ C 48,26.2.2010. p I) and Commission Regulation (EU) No 173/2010 (OJ L 51,2.3.2010. p 13) 
` Executive Order 13288 of March 6,2003. Blocking Property of Persons Undermining Democratic Processes or Institutions in Zimbabwe, Federal Register Vol 68. No 46 March 10,2003: Executive Order 13391 of November 22.2005. Blocking Property of Additional Persons Undermining Democratic Processes or Institutions in Zimbabwe, Federal Register Vol 70. No 226, November 25,2005: Executive Order 13469 of July 25,2008, Blocking Property of Additional Persons Undermining Democratic Processes or Institutions in Zimbabwe. Federal Register Vol 73. No 146, July 29,2008. 
UNSC Verbatim Record (I1 July 2008) UN Doe S/PV/5933 ('Record of the 5933d Meeting of the UNSC'). Indonesia. 
1)7 The other states that voted against it were: South Africa. Vietnam and Libya. 
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security', 0 and the activities that provoked economic sanctions were taking place wholly on 
Zimbabwean territory, the AU had passed a resolution expressing concern that the internal violence 
would spread throughout the sub-region 9`' The situation was also described by the deputy Secretary- 
General as the 'single greatest challenge to regional stability in southern Africa. '100 Furthermore, the 
UNSC has in previous cases, most notably Somalia, ")' allowed for economic sanctions to be adopted 
for the purpose of rectifying a domestic situation based on the premise that the internal instability could 
ultimately spread beyond the borders of the state. In fact, it has been asserted that the UNSC is 
increasingly circumventing the provisions of Article 2(7) by determining that extreme internal 
violence, as existed in this instance, constitutes a threat to the peace in accordance with the provisions 
in Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 102 It was therefore open to the UNSC to treat Zimbabwe similarly 
and adopt economic sanctions. 
Secondly, the situation in Zimbabwe was sufficiently seriously to warrant economic sanctions 
being taken. The government of Zimbabwe had, in May 2005, started a slum-clearance program. 
Zimbabwe had, in some areas, experienced an increase in informal trading and the construction of 
unauthorised housing for people previously displaced and the purported aim of the slum-clearance 
program was to enforce by-laws in relation to, inter atia, illegal structures. 103 What transpired was the 
systematic destruction of property, including not only residential dwellings, but stalls and markets, a 
Catholic refuge for Aids orphans, a secondary school, a World Bank-funded public lavatory and a 
Sunni Mosque, without sufficient warning to inhabitants or the provision of suitable alternative 
accommodation. 104 Despite the creation of a follow-up programme, Operation Restore Order, it was 
estimated that 700,000 people had been left homeless, unemployed or both and that a further 2.4 
million were affected in varying degrees with respect to access to food and water, education and 
healthcare. 105 Allegations of deaths caused by demolition were also made in relation to Operation 
°R Record of the 5933rd Meeting of the UNSC (n 95). 
"`' African Union Summit Resolution on Zimbabwe, Adopted at the Ordinary Session of the African Union 
Assembly. I July 2008, Sharm EI Sheikh, Egypt. 
(`° 
'Africa Urged to Act on Zimbabwe' BBC News Online (30 June 2008) (available at: 
http: //news. bbe. co. uk/2/hi/africa/7480584. stm (last accessed 9 June 20101). 
UNSC Res 733 (23 January 1992) UN Doe SIRES/733. 
10' Nigel D White, The Law of International Organisations (Manchester University Press 1996) 94. 
101 Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, 'Order out of Chaos, or Chaos out of Order? A Preliminary Report on 
Operation "Murambatsvina' June 2005 ('Report of the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum'). 
104 ibid. 
1" Anna Kajumulo Tibaijuka, UN Special Envoy on Human Settlements Issues in Zimbabwe. 'Report of the Fact- 
Finding Mission to Zimbabwe to assess the Scope and Impact of Operation Murambatsvinä 18 July 2005. 
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Restore Shelter. 106 These occurrences breach both domestic law1o7 and international human rights 
norms and were caused by negligent government policies. Zimbabwe was in any case experiencing 
extreme humanitarian difficulties, with hyperinflation and an estimated unemployment rate of 60 per 
cent causing food shortages amongst the general population, which were attributed to mismanagement 
by the Mugabe government. ")" Furthermore the elections of March 2008 had seen violence directed 
against supporters of the opposition political party 1°9 and detention of opposition leaders. "0 
These reasons would, in light of earlier sanctions, seem sufficient for sanctions to be legally 
invoked in this case. Additionally given criticism in previous cases such as FRY and Sierra Leone that 
sanctions had not been taken early enough with resulting mass humanitarian suffering it would not be 
unreasonable for sanctions to be taken in this case. 
There were valid reasons why the UN did not impose economic sanctions against Zimbabwe. 
Firstly, as noted, there was a belief that the situation did not qualify as threatening international peace 
and security. Talks, chaired by the government of South Africa, were ongoing between the various 
parties in Zimbabwe at that point"' and there was concern that a resort to sanctions might damage the 
progression of those talks. 
Secondly, there was a legitimate fear that Mugabe would react badly to economic sanctions 
being imposed. Sanctions were criticized as an `expression of imperialist conquest' during the UNSC 
debates on sanctions against Zimbabwe" 2 and an African diplomatic source was quoted as saying that 
Mugabe blames limited western sanctions for Zimbabwe's economic crisis and `[i]f he feels the talks 
are not going his way, he could well use the economy as an excuse for a state of emergency and try and 
cling on a little longer. '113 
Thirdly, there may have been concern that targeted economic sanctions would have an indirect 
impact on the already precarious humanitarian situation in Zimbabwe. 
10 Amnesty International, 'Zimbabwe: More deaths mass evictions continue unabated' 30 June 2005. 
107 Press Statement by the Law Society of Zimbabwe on Operation Restore Order. June 2005 
10S Report of the Zimbabwe I luman Rights NGO Forum (n 103). 
10") Neil MacFarquhar and Celia W Dugger. 'Security Council Urges Zimbabwe to Halt Violence' The New York 
Times (New York 24 June 2008). 
1) Peta Thornycrohl. 'Zimbabwe police detain MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai for second time in three days' 
Telegraph (London 6 June 2008). 
Mr. Kumalo (South Africa). Record of the 5933` Meeting of the UNSC (n 95). 
ibid. 
"' Jonathan Clayton. 'Zimbabwe slashes ten zeros off its currency' Times Online, 30 July 2008. Available at: 
http: //www. timesonline. co. uk/tol/news/world/article4428615. ece [last accessed: 8 June 20101. 
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Despite this reasoning, however, the refusal to take economic sanctions against Zimbabwe 
must still be viewed as being inconsistent with the previous practice of the UNSC. `14 As such, previous 
examples of economic sanctions will not be a good indication of the situations in which economic 
sanctions will be taken by the UNSC. 
1.5 Characteristics of UN economic sanctions 
Although it is difficult to delineate the precise situations in which economic sanctions may be adopted 
by the UNSC, economic sanctions taken by that body have certain characteristics, which will be 
discussed in this section. 
1.5.1 Binding and Supreme 
The most significant feature of UN economic sanctions is that, when they are taken by the UNSC under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, they are binding on Member States and are considered to take 
precedence over any other obligations of a state. 
Their binding nature comes from the UN Charter. The wording of Article 41 does not itself 
place a clear obligation on Member States to implement UN economic sanctions. ' 15 It provides that the 
UNSC ' may call upon' Member States to implement measures, including economic sanctions, which it 
has decided upon. However, Article 25 states that Member States ` agree to accept and carry out the 
decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the [UN] Charter'. When the two articles are read 
together it is clear that Member States were intended, in seeking membership of the UN and signing up 
to the Charter, to concede to follow the decisions of the UNSC, which would therefore make those 
decisions binding on Member States. ' 16 The binding quality of UNSC measures taken under Chapter 
VII has been borne out by UN practice, ' 17 statements of courts' 18 and state practice. 19 
114 For example. see the case of economic sanctions taken against Southern Rhodesia and Haiti, put in place as a 
result of political action taken by factions that did not represent the majority of citizens, which would justify 
sanctions taken on the basis of the March 2008 elections. See also sanctions taken against Angola as a result of 
internal violence and the unwillingness of the UNITA to adhere to the election result. 
"` Frowein and Krisch (n 92), 739. 
11" James A Nafziger and Edward M Wise, 'Section IV: The Status in United States Law of Security Council 
Resolutions Under Chapter VII of the United Nations' (1998) 46 American Journal of Comparative Law 421. 17 In UNSC Resolution 232, the first binding sanctions put in place against Southern Rhodesia, the UNSC at 
article 3 reminded states that they were obliged under article 25 of the charter to implement the measures. 
Furthermore, UNSC Res 670 (25 September 1990) UN Doc S/RES/670 ('UNSC Resolution 670') and UNSC Res 
1306 (5 July 2000) UN Doc S/RES/1306 ('UNSC Resolution 1306') remind Member States of their "obligations" 
under previous resolutions. 
"R See: Prosecutor v Tadic (Jurisdiction) (1996) 3 Intl Human Rights Rep 578 ('Tadic Case'): A. K. A/ v /fill 
rreasu v (No 1) (n 26): Case Concerning Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal 
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Despite these provisions, in practice not all UNSC resolutions are considered binding. The 
language used in the particular resolution as well as its context are considered indicative as to whether 
a resolution places obligations on Member States to undertake certain action or merely requests that 
they do so. 120 Higgins suggests that adopting a resolution under Chapter VII or using the phraseology 
of Article 39 (that is to say stating that the measure is taken as a result of a state breaching or 
threatening the peace or committing an act of aggression) is not determinative of the binding nature of 
that resolution. 121 However, this has not proven to the case with respect to economic sanctions where 
the only non-binding sanctions resolutions were those taken against Southern Rhodesia and South 
Africa, which were not stated to be taken under Chapter VII and which clearly indicated that states 
were requested (rather than obliged) to take the measures contained within them. )22 Subsequent 
resolutions have explicitly stated that they are being taken under Chapter VII and have, therefore, been 
binding on Member States. 123 
Although the binding nature of some of its resolutions is accepted, whether the UNSC is 
constrained in any way by international law when adopting resolutions, and if so to what extent, has 
been the subject of extensive legal commentary 124 and is discussed later in this thesis. 125 However, the 
question as to whether the UNSC can be bound by any legal norm in taking action should not be used 
to imply that Member States are not bound by UNSC resolutions in circumstances where the 
resolutions were intended to be binding. There is no provision for Member States to refuse to 
implement binding UNSC resolutions, even where the UNSC has acted beyond its powers, nor is there 
any provision for a review of such measures to ensure that the UNSC has acted within its powers. ' 
26 
Therefore, whether Member States are or are not bound by UN economic sanctions is left in the hands 
Convention Raising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v United Kingdom) (Request 
for the Indication of Provisional Measures: Order) [19921 ICJ Rep 114 at 126 para 42 (`The Lockerbie Case'). 
119 See Genevieve Burdeau and Brigitte Stem, 'France' in Vera Gowlland-Debbas (ed), National Implementation 
of United Nations Sanctions A Comparative Study (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2004) 197. 
120 The Namibia Case (n 36): Rosalyn Higgins. The Advisory Opinion on Namibia: Which UN Resolutions are 
Binding Under Article 25 of the Charter? ' (1972) 21 ICLQ 270. 
121 Higgins, 281. 
122 UNSC Resolution 181 (n 77): UNSC Resolution 217 (n 43). 
=' See for example UNSC Res 232 (16 December 1966) UN Doc S/RES/232, which was the first case of binding 
economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia ('UNSC Resolution 232). 
124 See for example: Elias Davidsson. 'Legal Boundaries to UN Sanctions' (2002) 7 International Journal of 
I luman Rights I: Alan Boyle and Christine Chinkin, The Making of International Law (Oxford University Press 
2007) 229-232). Erika de Wet, 'Holding the United Nations Security Council accountable for human rights 
violations through domestic courts: A case of 'be careful what you wish for"? ' in Jeremy Farrall and Kim 
Rubenstein (eds). Sanctions. Accountability and Governance in a Globalised World (Cambridge University Press 
2009) 143: Matheson. Council (Inbound (n 71) 34-37. 
12 See section 5.2.3.1. 
120 Matheson. Council (inbound (n 71) 37. 
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of the UNSC itself and they are obligated to implement resolutions that contain binding economic 
sanctions. 
As well as binding Member States, UNSC economic sanctions also take precedence over their 
other obligations. Article 103 of the UN Charter states that '[i]n the event of conflict between the 
obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under 
any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail. ' 127 lt is 
clear therefore that UN obligations supersede the obligations of states under other `international 
agreements' and the ICJ has accepted this position. 128 
Cameron, however, calls the supremacy of UN obligations into question. 12" He argues that `it 
is not possibly for states to avoid constitutional/international human rights obligations by creating an 
international body and delegating to it the power to do something they are unable to do by 
themselves'»° However, he does not support this argument convincingly. His thesis is that, whilst 
states can accept the supremacy of some international norms over their own domestic norms, as EU 
Member States have with respect to EC law, 'when public international law purports to force a state to 
do something against its own fundamental constitutional principles, then a state's acceptance of the 
reasonableness of the international claim is put sorely to the test. '131 He further states 'it is an open 
question, when push comes to shove, which will be preferred. '"Z To bolster his argument he uses the 
example of the UNSC ordering a state to detain indefinitely a person suspected of preparing a terrorist 
attack or to commit such a person to death. A recent House of Lords decision has indicated that a state 
faced with the former example would be obliged to detain the suspect, irrespective of whether such 
detention would be permissible in domestic law. 133 Even if the latter example was to be considered, and 
it is difficult to imagine such a situation arising in light of international sentiment with respect to the 
death penalty, surely Cameron cannot be suggesting that Member States need only consider their UN 
obligations as supreme so long as they are also compatible with their other obligations. The purpose of 
article 103, to which states have agreed to adhere to by taking membership of the UN, is that in cases 
''' Article 103. UN Charter. 
The Lockerbie ('ctse (n 118). 126 pars 42. 
'-" lain Cameron. 'UN Targeted Sanctions, Legal Safeguards and the European Convention on Human Rights' 
20Hl3) 72 Nordic Journal of International Law 159 at 179 ('Cameron. 'UN Targeted Sanctions. Legal Safeguards 
and the European Convention on I luman Rights"). 
ibid. 
ibid. 179-190. 
ibid. IBo. 
R (on the application of ; E! -Jedda) (FC) (Appellant, ) v Secretary of State. Jor Defence (Respondent) [20071 
11 Kill, 58. 
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of conflict states are obliged to comply with their UN obligations. It is completely contrary to any logic 
to suggest that article 103 ceases to apply in circumstances where there is a real conflict between 
domestic and UN obligations. Cameron himself seems to recognise this when he states that it may be 
possible to develop a system of legal safeguards to reconcile human rights norms with targeted 
sanctions norms because such a system would not be necessary if his argument that states could simply 
refuse to implement economic sanctions on grounds that the violate human rights was accurate. 
In contrast with Cameron's position, some commentators submit that article 103's remit is in 
fact not limited to `international agreements. ' Bernhardt indicates in Simma's text that the application 
of article 103 means that obligations on Member States that emanate from binding UNSC resolutions 
take precedence over any other commitment that Member States have"4 and further states that it 
would not be correct to assume that obligations under the Charter do not prevail in relation to [otherl 
obligations. '"5 Boyle and Chinkin note that this supremacy 'cannot be over-estimated' and suggest that 
it may mean that economic sanctions take precedent over even jus coIzens norms 136 
Rain Liivoja in her thoughtful piece on the scope of article 103 seeks to counter this 
suggestion. "' She looks to the preparatory materials relating to the UN Charter in order to support her 
contention that article 103 is limited to international agreements. She notes that the Advisory 
Committee suggested a supremacy clause 'which expressed the superiority of Charter-based 
obligations over 'any other international obligations to which [the Members of the UN] are subject'. ' 38 
However, this formulation proved contentious and was therefore replaced by article 103 limiting 
supremacy to 'international agreements'. This she contends proves that the supremacy clause was not 
intended to extend beyond international agreements. 
However, as will be discussed in chapter 5 with respect to whether the UNSC is obliged to 
take human rights into account in adopting resolutions, the UN Charter is a living instrument. Liivoja 
accepts this and attempts to further bolster her view by looking at the practice of the UNSC and 
UNGA, which she argues show no support for the contention that article 103 stretches beyond 
international agreements. "" In considering the practice of the UNSC and the UNGA she focuses solely 
on statements that they have made, for example she comments on the 1980 Friendly Relations 
1'4 Rudolph Bernhardt. 'Article 103' in Bruno Simma (ed). The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary (2"d 
edn, Oxford University Press 2002) 1295. 
ibid. 1298-1299. 
Boyle and Chinkin (n 124), 233. 
Rain Liivoja, The Scope of the Supremacy Clause of the United Nations Charter' (2008) 57 (CLQ 583. ibid. 604. 
1"' ibid. 607. 
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Declaration adopted by the UNGA which she notes states that `where obligations arising under 
international agreements are in conflict with the obligations of Members of the United Nations under 
the Charter of the United Nations, the obligations under the Charter shall prevail. ' 140 She also states 
that UNSC resolutions have not made a clear connection between customary international law and 
Article 103.141 Liivoja does not, however, actually consider the practice, as opposed to writing, of the 
UNSC and of UN Member States, which makes clear that article 103 obligations extend beyond 
international agreements. 
In practice, it is clear that in some instances the implementation of economic sanctions has 
breached customary international law in some cases and yet the UNSC has proceeded on the basis that 
states were obliged to implement economic sanctions despite this conflict. For example, sanctions 
against Iraq have been charged with causing the death of some of the civilian population, thus 
breaching the right to life. t42 Equally, when sanctions were in place against FRY it was stated that they 
resulted in maintenance of the status quo, limiting the possibility of self-defence and thus caused more 
deaths. `4' The UNSC has also adopted targeted economic sanctions that have authorised internment. '44 
By putting in place binding economic sanctions that breach customary international law the UNSC is 
indicating that states are required to fulfil their obligations under the UN Charter not only in cases of 
conflict with international agreements but also in cases of conflict with customary international law. 
Furthermore, despite these breaches of customary international law states have applied these sanctions. 
Yes, in some cases, humanitarian exemptions have been authorised but even where they have proven 
inadequate states have continued to apply sanctions. Thus, the practice of both the UNSC and states 
prove that article 103 applies not only to international agreements but also to other obligations on UN 
Member States. 
There have been recent judicial decisions, however, discussed in chapter 6, which have called 
into question the supremacy of UN economic sanctions. 
140 ibid, 606. 
141 ibid. 607. 
142 See section 3.5.2. 
14' Shale Horowitz. From Ethnic Conflict to Stillborn Reform The Former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia (Texas 
A&M University Press 2005) 197. 
144 IJNSC Res 1546 (8 June 2004) UN Doc S/RES11546 (`UNSC Resolution 1546'). 
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1.5.2 Political 
UNSC economic sanctions are, because of the way in which they are adopted, political instruments. 
The UNSC has five permanent members and ten non-permanent members that rotate every two years. 
Its decisions are inherently political because they are taken by a small number of states. A good 
example of the political nature UNSC decisions can be seen in China's veto of a peacekeeping mission 
to Guatemala in 1997. Speaking about the use of its veto, the Chinese government spokesman, Shen 
Guofang, said that whilst China did not object in principle to the provision of UN peacekeepers to 
Guatemala it was forced to use its veto powers because of Guatemala's stance on Taiwan. 145 
Guatemala has long recognised Taiwan and Mr Shen stated that it could not expect on the one hand to 
do something that harms the sovereignty and territorial integrity of China while on the other hand 
requesting China to cooperate in peacekeeping". The most contentious issue with respect to the 
political nature of UN economic sanctions is the veto powers of the UNSC mentioned above. '46 
Because resolutions on non-procedural matters, which include economic sanctions 
resolutions, can only be adopted by the UNSC if they are not vetoed by any P-5 member, the P-5 have 
the power to block the adoption of economic sanctions. These veto powers arose because of the belief 
of the great powers that they were somehow superior to the other states and that, as they would have 
the responsibility for enforcing the UN Charter, they should have the ultimate decision as to when 
intervention in a given situation should take place. 147 In the initial stages the USSR insisted that the 
veto should cover all of the work of the UN whether relating to international peace or security or 
otherwise. The US pushed for a veto on substantive political issues, for example membership 
questions, determining threats to the peace and enforcement actions. 14" This could have proved to be 
the breaking point for the UN. At Dumbarton Oaks the issue was once more addressed with Stalin 
expressing concern that the more limited US-proposed veto would allow for the USSR, as had been the 
case in the League of Nations, to be ousted from the organisation. 149 Once reassured that that would not 
be possible the USSR conceded to the US position on the matter. 150 The voting structure that ultimately 
ensued allows for the P-5 to veto any question put to the UNSC that does not relate to purely 
W Patrick E Tyler, 'China Asserts Taiwan's Ties to Guatemala Led to Veto' The New York Times (New York 12 
January 1997). 
"" See final paragraph section 1.2. 
147 Stephen Schlesinger. Act of Creation The Founding of the United Nations (Westview 2003) 55. 
'{" ibid. 55. 
149 ibid. 58. 
"') ibid. 59. 
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procedural matters. As mentioned, the UNSC has also in practice declined to treat an abstention from 
voting as a vote against a proposal. 
At the time that the UN was founded, in light of the failure of the League of Nations, an 
organisation that had not been supported by all of the major powers, there was awareness amongst 
states that in order for this new organisation to succeed the great powers would have to remain within 
its framework. 15' If getting the great powers to support an organisation that was being charged with 
averting any further world wars depended on allowing those states a veto the other states were willing 
to concede to this. However, the fact that the veto powers of the US and the Soviet Union paralysed the 
UNSC during the cold war called into question the practicality of the veto. And there remains concern 
to date that the veto is too frequently imposed by the UNSC for political rather than substantive reasons 
in situations where UN action is necessary and that its use may make the UN `appear wavering or 
passive'. 152 
Furthermore, in the current geo-political situation where the P-5 is no longer wholly 
representative of the strongest global military and economic powers, there are significant difficulties 
with the veto remaining in place. Firstly, it obviously gives those states more power than other Member 
States as they are involved in, and have the possibility of unilaterally quashing, all UNSC resolutions 
that deal with materially important issues. This has been criticised recently in light of the perceived 
links between Russia and China and regimes that are involved in the sponsoring of terrorism and the 
illegal proliferation of WMDs. 1S3 Secondly, the veto completely protects the P-5 from being subjected 
to the same rules as other Member States because each P-5 member can veto any proposed sanctions 
against itself. As noted when discussing the mooted sanctions against Zimbabwe, this opens the P-5 
and the UNSC generally to criticism that it is imposing the will of some states, and the ideological 
beliefs of those states, on others. ' 54 
'' Inis I. Claude. Swords into Plowshares The Problems and Progress of International Organi_ation (4`h edn, Random House 1984) 147. 
' Inocencio Aria, 'Shumanitarian Intervention: Could the Security Council Kill the United Nations? ' (2002) 23 
Fordham International Law Journal 1005. 
'' Alexander Benard and Paul J Leaf, 'Modern Threats and the United Nations Security Council: No Time for Complacency (A Response to Professor Allen Weiner)' (2010) 62 Stanford Law Review 1395. 
154 Katherine Hughes. 'Note: Operation "Drive Out the Trash": The Case for Imposing Targeted United Nations Sanctions Against Zimbabwean Officials' (2007) 76 Fordham Law Review 323. 
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1.5.3 Media-driven 
Over the last 50 years media and communications technology has changed considerably. Former UN 
Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali has said that `television has changed the way the world 
reacts to crises. "55 Whereas before the main sources of news were newspapers or radio broadcasts, 
today news images are available immediately not only on television but also 24 hours a day via the 
Internet. This increase in reporting has impacted on the use of economic sanctions. 
Broadly two trends can be seen in economic sanctions as a result of increased media attention 
and capability. Firstly, there is an increase in symbolic economic sanctions. When the situation in FRY 
reached crisis point the UN was already committed in both Iraq and Somalia. News reports of FRY 
showed `images of atrocities and refugees and media reports of rape, detention camps, and ethnic 
cleansing. '156 These images led to calls from the citizens of states that their government do something 
to ameliorate the situation. As the UN was already committed to action in other states economic 
sanctions were invoked out of a desire to be seen to be attempting to resolve the crisis. 
Secondly, media attention on a given situation can result in action being taken in an attempt to 
resolve the situation. For example, sanctions taken against Somalia as opposed to Sudan, have, in 
circumstances where the two states were experiencing similar difficulties, been attributed to the 
varying levels of information available with respect to the two situations. 157 
Media attention not only has an impact on economic sanctions but economic sanctions also 
have an impact on media output, as seen in FRY. As sanctions took hold it became almost prohibitively 
expensive to produce newsprint and other forms of media communication. The independent media 
outlets remaining, that spoke out in opposition to the conflict, became easier to silence. 158 Additionally, 
those who fled Yugoslavia tended to be the educated, middle classes, who would be expected to have 
supported human rights and antiwar causes being espoused by the remaining independent media. '59 
lt is inevitable that when a state is in crisis there will be some impact on its media. It should, 
however, be noted that there has also been criticism of the level of influence and control that states, 
particularly the US, exercise over media outlets on their territory, particularly in times of conflict. 1G0 
'" Paul Kennedy (n 75). 233. 
"h Julia Devin and 
. 
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This may mean that public perception, and therefore the public influence over what states are 
sanctioned, is misfocused as it relies on inaccurate information. It has been stated that during Operation 
Desert Shield major news organisations complained that the press was virtually totally controlled by 
the Pentagon and that from its outset the White House, Defence Department, State Department and 
other government agencies used numerous techniques to `manipulate the substance, flow and timing of 
non-military as well as military information to protect and support the Administration's policy. ' 161 
Furthermore, the censoring of media output aside, newspaper reporting is not always accurate. 
In 2004 USA Today journalist Jack Kelley was found to have fabricated substantial parts of some of 
his stories. 162 Yassin Abdullah Kadi, who was sanctioned by the EU as a result of UNSC measures, has 
argued that he was sanctioned at the request of the US, which relied on allegations made in a number of 
articles including one written by Mr Kelley. 163 
1.6 Methodology 
The focus of this thesis is on the development of economic sanctions within the UN framework. Of key 
importance is the interesting relationship between the UN as an institution, which creates obligations 
for its members, and its Member States. For that reason research for this thesis has been undertaken on 
a doctrinal and, to some extent, multidisciplinary basis. Case studies are used throughout the thesis to 
illustrate key aspects of UN economic sanctions and to demonstrate how economic sanctions 
developed. 
lt is clear that a predominantly legal positivist approach underpins this thesis because of some 
of the key assumptions and arguments that underline the analysis throughout it. Firstly, as has been 
established in this chapter, Member States are bound by UN economic sanctions, irrespective of their 
merit, because they have agreed to be so bound under Articles 25 and 41 of the UN Charter. Secondly, 
it is submitted that, following the text of the UN Charter, economic sanctions are supreme over all 
other legal obligations of Member States. This is the case even where applying economic sanctions 
causes an outcome (such as for example significant humanitarian difficulties) that is not perceived to 
satisfy the ideals of justice or democracy or protect fundamental rights. Finally, this thesis does discuss 
how UN economic sanctions may be made more effective and cause less collateral damage but it does 
"" ibid. 
112 Blake Morrison, 'Ex-USA Today reporter faked major stories' USA Today (19 March 2004). 
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not argue that these concerns impact on the fundamental power of the UNSC to take economic 
sanctions. It is suggested that in order for such measures to be improved the UNSC has to concede to 
this improvement because they are entitled, in any event, to adopt economic sanctions. 
However, there are elements of critical legal theory in the thesis too and it is accepted that 
states may be reluctant to implement economic sanctions if they perceive them as somehow being 
illegitimate. What distinguishes this from being a purely critical legal analysis is that, whilst it is 
recommended that the difficulties that cause states reluctance to apply UN economic sanctions be 
addressed, it is not accepted that states are entitled to refuse to implement sanctions so nor that by 
doing so they undermine the legality of such measures. 
The key source of primary law used has been the UNSC resolutions themselves. UN 
economic sanctions regimes are established through the use of UNSC resolutions. The resolutions 
outline the measures being put in place in a particular sanctions regime, state the reasons for such 
measures and indicate their purpose. By looking at various sanctions resolutions comparatively it is 
possible to trace how UNSC economic sanctions have developed over time. Material surrounding the 
adoption of these UNSC resolutions, which include the verbatim reports of UNSC meetings, statements 
of regional organisations and the reports of other UN entities, has also been analysed where necessary. 
The other frequently cited primary source has been the UN Charter from which the UNSC's powers to 
adopt economic sanctions and the obligations on Member States with respect to economic sanctions 
emanate. 
Underpinning consideration of economic sanctions themselves is consideration of how the UN 
functions and how it interacts with its members. These issues were considered by reference to the UN 
Charter, reports of states and decisions of the ICJ. In order to consider how economic sanctions 
function in practice, analysis of the reports of UN entities charged with monitoring sanctions, the 
reports of NGOs and other organisations outside of the UN and the reports of states have been collated 
and examined in order to ascertain to what extent economic sanctions were being implemented, the 
difficulties surrounding their implementation and the causes of such difficulties. With respect to 
targeted economic sanctions the key judicial decisions, of both regional and domestic courts, that deal 
with economic sanctions, have also been analysed for the purpose of ascertaining legal challenges to 
economic sanctions. 
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Secondary sources were also used extensively throughout the thesis. Secondary legal material 
is used to bolster legal argument. The use of case studies highlights the importance of context in the 
UN economic sanctions framework. The case studies in this thesis identify difficulties with economic 
sanctions and demonstrate how sanctions regimes have developed whilst in place. However, it is 
important that those issues are correctly attributable to the sanctions measures themselves and not to 
the historical, political or economic context in which they are being implemented. Context is also 
important with respect to states' obligations to implement UN economic sanctions as the political and 
economic context will impact on the capacity and willingness of states to implement UN economic 
sanctions. For these reasons, as well as secondary legal material, material from other disciplines 
including history, politics, economics and philosophy have been considered. Newspaper reports are 
also used for context and to outline key political events. 
The law and materials used in this thesis are up to date as of 31 January 2011. 
1.7 Structure of the Thesis 
The remainder of the thesis looks at how the use of economic sanctions by the UNSC has unfolded and 
how each episode of sanctions has impacted on subsequent regimes. 
The next chapter considers the first case of UNSC economic sanctions, which were those 
taken against Southern Rhodesia. It discusses the history of Southern Rhodesia. It analyses why 
economic sanctions were taken in that case and the arguments made by states for and against such 
measures. It considers the sanctions regime that was put in place and the difficulties that arose with 
economic sanctions in that case. 
The third chapter focuses on the second case of UNSC economic sanctions, sanctions against 
Iraq, which became the most comprehensive UNSC economic sanctions regime to date. It looks at the 
background to the invocation of economic sanctions before discussing how the sanctions regime 
developed. It considers the efficacy of economic sanctions against Iraq. Finally it examines the 
humanitarian problems that arose in the Iraqi context and the attempts made to resolve the crisis. 
The fourth chapter concentrates on the development of UN targeted economic sanctions. It 
outlines the different types of targeted economic sanctions. It considers potential modifications to 
UNSC targeted economic sanctions with a particular emphasis on the European Conferences. 
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The fifth chapter looks at the two predominant systems of UNSC targeted economic sanctions, 
those created under UNSC Resolution 1267 and those created under UNSC Resolution 1373.1 64 It 
considers how those sanctions regimes developed and the changes that they brought to economic 
sanctions within the UN. It also discusses the problems that became prevalent in UN targeted economic 
sanctions as they progressed. 
The sixth chapter explores jurisprudential challenges to UN targeted economic sanctions. It 
outlines two key cases and considers the consequences of those decisions and why those decisions 
were actually handed down. Finally, it proposes the development of a new institution to prevent such 
decisions from reoccurring and from stifling the UNSC in its use of economic sanctions going forward. 
The final chapter concludes the thesis by outlining the major features of UN economic 
sanctions that can be distilled from the analysis and by discussing how economic sanctions need to 
develop in order to retain their usefulness in the UN framework. 
1i4 UNSC Res 1267 (15 October 1999) UN Doc S/RES/1267 ('UNSC Resolution 1267') and UNSC Res 1373 (28 
September 2001) UN Doc S/RES/1373 ('UNSC Resolution 1373'). 
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2 
Southern Rhodesia 
- 
The First Case of UN Economic 
Sanctions 
Although economic sanctions were clearly provided for in the UN Charter, "'` they were not invoked by 
the UNSC until almost two decades after its inception when they were taken agäwst Southern 
\thodesia. Consideration of this episode of economic sanctions will therefore provide an insight as to 
how states initially perceived the UNSC's power to adopt sanctions. "'' 
In order to discover the initial opinions of states towards the idea of economic sanctions as a 
legal power of the IJNSC, this chapter will undertake a case study of Southern Rhodesia under 
international economic sanctions stretching from 1966"'' until l979. ' Initially, the chapter will 
explain why Southern Rhodesia has been selected as a starting point for discussing UN economic 
sanctions practice. The second part of the chapter will briefly outline the history of Southern Rhodesia. 
The third section will consider the various arguments put forward by states as to why sanctions were or 
were not permissible in the case of Southern Rhodesia. Finally, it will outline the resolutions that 
implemented economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia and discuss the initial difficulties therein. 
2.1 Why Southern Rhodesia? 
Southern Rhodesia has been chosen as the first case study in this thesis for three reasons. Firstly, it was 
the first UN example of economic sanctions. Secondly, it provides a closed system of sanctions. 
Thirdly, there is the perception that Southern Rhodesia was the 'perfect state' to be paralysed by 
economic sanctions and thus forced to amend its behaviour. 
""' See Articles 39.41 and 42 t IN Charter. 
note that throughout this chapter the native Southern Rhodesian population is described variously as the 
black txipulation. the native population and African and the European settler population is described as the shite 
population. the ' ettlers and European. This reflects the terminology used in commentary in relation to economic 
'i ctunn'. against Southern Rhodesia. 
"' I he first binding economic sanctions %%ere contained in LINSC Resolution 232 (n 123) although non-binding 
,. ºnctions bad been instigated it füll )ear earlier in t1NSC Resolution 217 (n 43). 
` ('NsC Re. 44H 131) April 1979) 1 !N Doc ti RFSi4481't'NSC Resolution 448'). 
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2.1.1 The First UN Example 
The primary reason for selecting Southern Rhodesia is that it was the lirst case of [IN economic 
sanctions. Whilst, as previously outlined in chapter 1.1"4 economic sanctions were not it creation of'the 
UN Charter. their use by the UNSC has differed from previous sanctions regimes in three key manners. 
Firstly. they require a previously unprecedented level of international cooperation. ''" Secondly, the 1'-5 
alone has the power to veto economic sanctions. 
"" Thirdly, economic sanctions are binding on UN 
Member States. "'' These changes have shaped the development of international economic sanctions, 
and, as such, sanctions prior to 1948 are of limited use in analysing the current conception of 
international economic sanctions. The result is that the case of Southern Rhodesia. as the first UNSC 
sanctions regime, is the most appropriate starting point for this thesis. 
Of further interest in relation to Southern Rhodesia's status as the first target of UN economic 
sanctions is the UNSC's reluctance to invoke economic sanctions prior to that time. As outlined in 
chapter 1, the Cold War impacted on the UNSC's use of economic sanctions" but other factors may 
have also contributed to this initial reluctance. The UNSC may have been of the opinion that no other 
state had demonstrated the type of behaviour that should provoke the invocation of economic sanctions 
until Southern Rhodesia. Alternatively, the initial hesitation in taking economic sanctions may have 
simply related to the fact that the UN Charter was a new instrument and as a result there was 
uncertainty as to its application. What is clear, however, is that the political situation in Southern 
Rhodesia and the reasons given by states for supporting economic sanctions in this case are extremely 
important indicators of how states viewed economic sanctions at that point in time. 
2.1.2 A Closed System of Sanctions 
Southern Rhodesia is not only no longer subject to economic sanctions 
- 
it no longer exists. This has 
two main advantages for the purpose of this thesis. Firstly, it allows the case of Southern Rhodesia to 
act as an effective base line as the situation, both in terms of the sanctions themselves and in terms of 
the conditions that prevail whilst a state is subject to sanctions, is no longer in flux. One of the 
difficulties with obtaining material relating to sanctions regimes is that the situations in %%hich 
""'Section 1.1. 
1D In order for economic sanctions to be properly enforced all states must implement them. 
''' See section 1.5.1. 
72 See section 1.5.1. 
"' Section 1.1.1. 
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economic sanctions are taken tend not to create favourable conditions for the transmission of accurate 
and comprehensive economic data to sources outside of the state where they would be properly 
archived. This is compounded in situations like that of Southern Rhodesia where following the end of 
sanctions the state became Zimbabwe, which resulted in new institutions being set up that may or may 
not have had access to material previously held by Southern Rhodesian institutions. Nor is it always 
ideal for the organisations that generally monitor the economy of a state to do so, when, quite aside 
from the sanctions themselves, there is a difficult political situation that necessitated the invocation of 
economic sanctions. Information, relating to the impact of economic sanctions on a state subjected to 
them is often more readily available following the cessation of the sanctions when the state targeted is 
in a better position to share information with the relevant analysts. 
Secondly, economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia were only ended, by Resolution 
460, when their stated aim was achieved and the sanctioned regime had made a commitment to change 
leading to majority rule. '74 Of course, economic sanctions themselves may not have been wholly 
responsible for the regime change in Southern Rhodesia and, in fact, given the period of time over 
which sanctions extended, it seems likely that there may have been many factors that ultimately 
contributed to the change. This does not, however, diminish the fact that economic sanctions stretched 
the length of the crisis in Southern Rhodesia and may have contributed its solution. 
Whilst some commentators favour the assertion that economic sanctions can be most 
accurately assessed following their cessation, with Geiss even going as far as to indicate that any 
comprehensive assessment of sanctions should include consideration of their long-term effects, it is not 
a universally accepted approach. 175. Eland has suggested that `[o]ne, two, or ten years from the 
initiation of the episode [of economic sanctions], it is easy to overlook the complexity of the 
environment surrounding the imposition of the measures'. 176 This reflects the discussion in the 
previous chapter about the purposes of economic sanctions and Elliot's view that they may have many 
goals beyond the rectification of undesirable behaviour of the targeted state. "' 
However, it is submitted that the use of a system of economic sanctions that has come to an 
end allows for a thorough examination of the strengths and weaknesses of that particular system of 
174 UNSC Res 460 (21 December 1979) UN Doc S/RES/460 (`UNSC Resolution 460'). 
17s Robin Geiss. humanitarian Safeguards in Economic Sanctions Regimes 
-A Call for Automatic Suspension Clauses. Periodic Monitoring, and Follow-Up Assessment of Long-Term Effects'. (2005) 18 Harvard Human 
Rights Journal 167. 
"`' Eland (n 57). 29-48. 
177 Elliot (n 67), 51. 
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sanctions. It also ensures that comprehensive material on the economic sanctions regime is available, 
both primary and secondary material produced at the time of the sanctions and analysis produced at a 
later date. Southern Rhodesia is a good example of such a system. 
2.1.3 The `Perfect Target'? 
The final reason that Southern Rhodesia has been chosen is the suggestion, as mooted by Anglin, that it 
was the ideal target for economic sanctions. 17" This concept of the `perfect target' relates not to the 
legal thresholds that need to be met before sanctions may be imposed but to other factors such as 
geographical, economic and social factors. As an initial point it is worth considering what exactly a 
"perfect target' is. The mythical `perfect target' would be a state that, if UN sanctions were imposed 
against it, would find its economy paralysed to the extent that it would have no choice but to 
immediately comply with the wishes of the UN in order to survive. It is difficult to even offer a 
coherent outline of the characteristics of such a state as some factors would seem simultaneously to 
make a state both a good and a poor target for economic sanctions. For example, an island state 
subjected to economic sanctions might find it relatively easy to continue to import and export goods 
due to the difficultly and cost involved in policing a long coastline. This might imply that an island 
state generally would not make a good target state and yet, on the other hand, the fact that all imports 
and exports have to be transported by sea or by air may make breaching sanctions more difficult, which 
would imply that an island state would be a good target for economic sanctions. 
There are of course some factors that are less likely to be capable of flexible interpretation. A 
state that relies heavily on importing and exporting goods rather than being largely self-sufficient is 
more likely to feel the impact of sanctions. Equally if a state receives a lot of international aid, the 
cessation of such aid due to economic sanctions could make it more likely to comply with the desires 
of the UN. However, not only is it unlikely that a state would have all of the criteria that would make it 
a `perfect target', it is equally unlikely that even if a state did fulfil those criteria that sanctions would 
act completely as predicted in paralysing the economy of such a state. 
The reasons given by Anglin as to why Southern Rhodesia constituted an ideal target for 
economic sanctions were that Southern Rhodesia was a small, landlocked country, which was 
particularly vulnerable to external pressure. As such, its geographical situation would make it more 
"R Douglas G Anglin, 'UN Economic Sanctions Against South Africa and Rhodesia' in David Leyton-Brown (ed), 
The Utility of Economic Sanctions (St. Martins Press 1987) 23-56. 
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amenable to the potential effect of economic sanctions. He stated that the theory of sanctions 
postulates a dual linkage between external trade and economic deprivation, and between economic 
deprivation and political change. ' 179 In the case of Southern Rhodesia, his argument suggested, the 
target was heavily reliant on a small number of trading partners, who, with the exception of Zambia, 
were not equally reliant on it for trade. Furthermore, Southern Rhodesia's exports focused on a small 
number of products. Those two factors combined to leave Southern Rhodesia, at least on paper, 
particularly susceptible to having its economy paralysed by economic sanctions. Anglin's suggestion 
raises two potential questions which will be dealt with briefly here. Firstly, was Southern Rhodesia the 
perfect target, and secondly, why, in any case, is that important? 
lt is difficult to say with absolutely certainty that Southern Rhodesia was the perfect target for 
economic sanctions. What commentators have said is that Southern Rhodesia `should have been, in 
theory, extremely vulnerable to the application of sanctions'. Strack bases this statement on Southern 18° 
Rhodesia's adherence to Galtung's description of the ideal target for economic sanctions. 1 ' Galtung 
sets out eight criteria that would make a state susceptible to economic sanctions: (i) imports are 
necessary for key sectors of the economy of the sanctioned state; (ii) there is no internal substitute for 
those imports; (iii) a large percentage of the imports come from the sanctioning state(s); (iv) there is no 
external substitute for the imports which the sanctioned state can switch to; (v) the imports are either 
only a very small percentage of the sanctioning states exports or can be exported to another state; (vi) 
exports from the sanctioned state are mainly sent to the sanctioning state(s); (vii) exports from the 
sanctioned state can be obtained elsewhere therefore causing little economic damage to the sanctioning 
state or in the alternative cannot be obtained elsewhere and this information is used by the sanctioning 
state to prove that it is willing to be deprived of the product rather than engage in economic interaction 
with the sanctioned state; and (viii) trade relations are visible and could potentially even be controlled 
(examples given are of an island state, a state surrounded by impenetrable terrain or bordered by 
nations that uphold the sanctions). 182 
Strack argues that Southern Rhodesia came within these criteria. tie states, with respect to 
exports from Southern Rhodesia, that 33 per cent were of one product (tobacco) and 40.5 per cent were 
of two (tobacco and asbestos) and that 25.3 per cent were exported to one state (Zambia) and 47.2 per 
1 79 33. 
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cent were exported to two states (Zambia and the UK). 18' Imports present equally persuasive evidence 
with 32 per cent focused in one area (machinery and transport equipment) and with 30.4 per cent 
imported from one trading partner (the UK) and 53.3 per cent from two partners (the UK and South 
Africa). '84 These limited trading partners could have paralysed the economy of Southern Rhodesia had 
they adhered properly to economic sanctions and in the absence of either adequate substitutes being 
available or there being time to develop such substitutes. 
Leys has argued that this reliance on a small number of products and the effects of that 
reliance had already been seen in the impact on the former Federation of Central Africa'85 of the 
collapse of copper prices (1956-8) and beginnings of recession in the US (1957-8). 186 Additionally, 
Strack indicates that a high percentage of Southern Rhodesia's national income came from exports (38 
per cent) and was spent on imports (34 per cent). 187 Furthermore, the fact that Southern Rhodesia was 
land-locked meant that exports could theoretically be prevented with ease, as they had to enter the port 
of another state and traverse that state's territory before ever reaching Southern Rhodesia. 
An additional point that should be made at this stage, in relation to Southern Rhodesia's 
suitability as a target for sanctions, is that the black majority in Southern Rhodesia were stated to have 
been in favour of sanctions. 18' This support not only lent credibility to the perception of economic 
sanctions as a valuable tool in dealing with the situation in Southern Rhodesia it also increased the 
likelihood of their success as the vast majority of the population was in favour of them and thus were, 
at least theoretically, less likely to make attempts to breach them. 
With these points in mind it could be said that whilst Southern Rhodesia might not be 
described as the perfect' target for economic sanctions it could certainly be regarded as a state that 
should have been very responsive to sanctions. However, as will be discussed later, there were 
difficulties with economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia such that they ultimately remained in 
place for more than a decade. Why then is this important? Put simply, if Southern Rhodesia was a 
susceptible target of economic sanctions and yet issues arose with respect to Southern Rhodesia those 
issues or problems must be attributable to the sanctions themselves rather than any difficulties that 
arose with Southern Rhodesia as a target. 
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2.2 The History of Southern Rhodesia 
This section gives the historical context of sanctions against Southern Rhodesia. it firstly outlines the 
history of Southern Rhodesia until the Federation was created in 1953. The Federation itself is 
discussed in section two, whilst the section thereafter discusses the issue of white oppression. The final 
section examines the UDI. 
2.2.1 A Brief History of Southern Rhodesia to 1953 
Southern Rhodesia was, prior to its colonisation, inhabited predominantly by two tribes, the Mashona 
and the Matabele. 1S9 Towards the end of the nineteenth century Britain, whilst still eager to extend its 
territory, became increasingly reluctant to commit to the occupation of new territories and, therefore, 
allowed private companies to undertake occupation on its behalf. On 29 October 1889 a Royal Charter 
was granted to the BSAC to enable it to exploit the Rudd Concession. '''° This concession, granted by 
Lobengula, King of the Ndebele to CJ Rhodes in 1888, gave Rhodes the mineral rights to lands 
interpreted as extending over what became known as Southern Rhodesia in return for a monthly 
payment and military equipment. 19' It has been described as `one of the very few cases in Africa of 
acquisition by undisguised conquest'. 192 
There was conflict from the outset. While the Royal Charter empowered the BSAC to settle 
and administer the area, the Rudd Concession contained no such rights. Occupation therefore took 
place by military force. '" In 1890 the first European settlement took place at Salisbury (Mashonaland). 
Within three years there were 3,000 settlers and in 1893 a force was raised which drove Lobengula 
from Matabeleland and brought the whole territory under BSAC control although there remained 
periods of unrest. '"' The original focus of the settlers had been on the belief that Southern Rhodesia 
was rich in gold. When this failed to materialise the focus shifted to the use of land for farming. '`" This 
18') Leonard T Kapungu, Rhodesia: The Struggle for Freedom (Orbis Books 1974) ('Kapungu. The Struggle for 
Freedom). 
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resulted in native Africans being pushed from their land and used as labourers for the European 
settlers. "" 
In 1918 the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council held that the land did not belong to the 
BSAC but to the Crown'97 and by 1922 a settlement was reached whereby the BSAC relinquished 
control of the territory and the settlers got to decide the future fate of Southern Rhodesia. I" Faced with 
a choice of either joining in union with South Africa or becoming a self governing colony, the settlers 
opted for the latter, '9" with 5,989 people voting for union with South Africa and 8,744 for becoming a 
self governing colony. 200 In 1923 the UK annexed Southern Rhodesia. 20' The settler government set 
about establishing and consolidating white supremacy by legislation, which will be discussed later. 
2.2.2 Federation 
The idea of a federation of Nyasaland, Northern and Southern Rhodesia had been suggested but not 
pursued for a number of years. In 1952 this suggestion solidified. The Federation of Central Africa was 
created by the UK in 1953. It comprised Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), Northern Rhodesia (now 
Zambia) and Nyasaland (now Malawi). Once created, the Federation exercised much of the power 
previously exercised at state level, however, the power of advancement over the African population 
remained within the ambit of each of the territories. 202 
it was during this period that the African population in Southern Rhodesia began to search for 
its voice. A number of political parties were formed, for example: 1957 
- 
the African National 
Congress, banned in 1959; 1960 
- 
the National Democratic Party, banned in 1961; 1961 
- 
the 
Zimbabwe African People's Union, banned in 1962.1961 also saw a referendum for a new 
constitution, which further entrenched racial inequalities. Those Africans entitled to vote largely 
boycotted the referendum but began to strike and riot. This brought the situation in Southern Rhodesia 
'03 to the attention of the UK. 
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The proposed dissolution of the Federation could be seen as the issue that forced Southern 
Rhodesia on to the agenda of the UN. Upon the dissolution certain powers that had been exercised by 
the Federation fell once more to the states. It had been agreed that the former Federal armed forces 
would be split between the three territories204 and that Southern Rhodesia would gain control of the 
Federal Air Force. 205 The African states raised their concern that once the white elite gained military 
power through the dissolution of the Federation they would use that power to attempt to promulgate 
their racist policies throughout Africa, which would ultimately lead to conflict in the region, at a 
meeting of the UNSC. 206 The seminal issue was what the military power would be used for. In the view 
of Mr Quaison-Sackey of Ghana, 207 the strongest air force on the African Continent was to be put in the 
hands of the white minority government of Southern Rhodesia. This, in his opinion, could then be used 
either to attack the civilian population or to mount external attacks. 208 The UNSC also saw the 
discussions at this stage as the opportunity for the UK to change the regime in Southern Rhodesia thus 
mitigating any need for sanctions. The draft resolution tabled at the 1068`h Meeting of the UN dealt 
primarily with the transfer of powers following the break-up of the Federation. 209 The first paragraph 
invited the UK to refrain from transferring to the colony of Southern Rhodesia any attributes of 
sovereignty until the government was fully representative of all of the inhabitants of the territory and 
the second invited the UK not to transfer to it what was previously the armed forces and aircraft of the 
Federation. It is clear, therefore, that initially the African states sought to prevent the devolution of 
power from the Federation to Southern Rhodesia, 210 
Despite initial intentions that the Federation was to be a long-term union it was ultimately 
dissolved on I January 1964. Both Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland were given independence but the 
UK refused to give Southern Rhodesia the same due to its racist franchise policies. 21' 
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2.2.3 Repression Through Racist Policies 
That Southern Rhodesia was, like many colonies and former colonies, very much rooted in the 
enrichment of the white settler population by the repression of the black native community is 
unsurprising. Cecil Rhodes, the person to whom the initial colonisation of Southern Rhodesia is 
attributed, has been quoted as saying of the English: `We are the finest race in the world and the more 
of the world we inhabit the better it is for the human race'. 212 Sir Robert Tregold, the Chief Justice of 
the Federation, illustrated the initial attitude of settlers when he stated: `it may or may not have been 
misguided and arrogant, but it was certainly sincere. We were deeply convinced that the Empire had a 
part to play in a great purpose for the world and that, in furthering this purpose we were doing a right 
and worthy thing'. '" However, he also acknowledged that the white paternalistic attitude towards the 
black population continued despite changing conditions. 214 
Commentators agree white people were never significantly more than 5 per cent of the total 
population in Southern Rhodesia. Despite this, by 1926 the black population had only 45,000 acres of 
alienable land compared with 31,000,000 acres that had been acquired by Europeans. 215 Additionally, 
most senior positions in public service were reserved for whites, healthcare, education and social 
services were heavily weighted towards whites and the property and educational qualifications for 
voting ensured that until 1979 whites had 95 per cent of the votes in national elections. 16 ' 
Repressive legislation was enacted which had adverse effects on the rights of the native 
population. The Native Affairs Act restricted movement by indigenous people who were required to 
carry a pass and left the authorities free to arbitrarily arrest any African charged with criticising the 
regime. The Land Apportionment Act forbade Africans from entering zones exclusively reserved for 
the white population. The Public Order Act forbade nationalist movements and any political activities 
on the part of the indigenous people. The Preventive Detention Act allowed the authorities to imprison 
any suspect for ninety days without trial. The Law and Order (Maintenance) Act empowered the 
Minister for Internal Affairs to proceed to the arrest of anyone and to detain him for five years without 
possibility of appeal. 217 
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A combination of factors in the mid-twentieth century resulted in this disparity being 
considered less acceptable than it had been previously and led ultimately to the invocation of sanctions 
by the UN against Southern Rhodesia. The process of decolonisation had begun in other states and 
Southern Rhodesia was anxious to gain its independence. 218 Simultaneously there was increased 
recognition of human rights and equality for all amongst the international community. 219 The concept 
of civilised settlers battling against, and then ruling over, an uncivilised native population was no 
longer acceptable. 
Mr Doudou Thiam of Senegal, in offering the opinion of the OAU with regard to the situation 
in Southern Rhodesia, effectively summarised the racial inequality that was being perpetuated there. 22° 
lie stated: 
`A so-called "self-government" is granted to a handful of settlers and then we are told that the 
provisions of Chapter XI of the Charter are not applicable to Southern Rhodesia because it is a 
"self-governing" colony. A constitution is granted to that same minority, enabling it to 
oppress and dominate the majority of the population of that country, in defiance of the United 
Nations Charter and the resolutions condemning the 1961 Constitution, and then we are told 
that the administering Power can no longer convene a constitutional conference and that the 
Africans should have accepted the 1961 Constitution which would have enabled them to 
influence political life in Rhodesia'221 
2.2.4 UDI 
Even when Southern Rhodesia, as a direct result of its racist policies, was not granted independence 
following the break up of the Federation, the Southern Rhodesian electorate, almost wholly composed 
of members of the white settler population, continued to support racist policies. 222 In 1962 the Rhodesia 
Front was voted into power. Its manifesto at that time was that it would lead Southern Rhodesia into 
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independence under white rule by whatever means were necessary. 223 In 1964 Ian Smith, leader of the 
Rhodesian Front, became Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia. The same year Smith held a 
referendum, which asked the people of Southern Rhodesia: Are you in favour of independence based 
on the 1961 constitution? ' According to Smith, 89 per cent voted in the affirmative. 224 This 
referendum, however, only measured the European settlers' support for Smith's proposition because 
with regard to the native African population, Smith argued that, due to high levels of illiteracy, a 
referendum would be an unsuitable means of assessing their opinion. Therefore, he held an Indaba225 
for 5 days commencing on 22 October 1964, which brought together 622 Chiefs and Headmen who 
professed unanimous support for Smith's proposal. 226 
In actuality, the majority of black nationalists in Southern Rhodesia were not in favour of a 
declaration of independence. As mentioned previously, the early 1960s had seen the rise of nationalist 
movements in Southern Rhodesia and despite the prohibition of various incarnations of these 
organisations they continued to grow throughout the decade. The two main national liberation 
movements at the time of the UDI were ZANU, formed in 1963, and ZAPU, which had been formed in 
1961 and, although banned the following year, remained active. "' Despite his protestations that he had 
black African support, it is incontrovertible that these organisations did not support Smith. Kapungu 
states that the `Rhodesian regime had ascertained, before effecting the UDI, that African nationalist 
movements had been suppressed and that the African population had been intimidated to such an extent 
that the organization of internal sanctions was made impossible. ' 229 Shanuyarira further states that 
`Smith... (niever managed to show that consultation had broadened beyond the... chiefs and headmen 
who were collected for the lndaba. '229 This implies that the opinions of the chiefs were insufficient as 
representations of the African opinion on a declaration of independence. He also discusses how the 
white settlers were perceived by the native population: 
" What do the Africans think of [the white settler population]? After all many of our people 
nursed some of these men as children. Smith grew up among Africans in Selukwe. His father 
was well liked; several Seluwke Africans cried openly at his funeral. The children and the 
223 Kapungu. The Struggle for Freedom (n 189) 51. 
==' Smith (n 218). 82. 
"` Indaba is a word of Xhosa and Zulu origin meaning a discussion or conference (Oxford English Dictionary). 221 Smith (n 218). 79-82 
227 Austin (n 192). 16-17. 
228 Leonard 'f Kapungu. The United Nations and Economic Sanctions Against Rhodesia (Lexington Books 1973) 
130. 
22" Nathan M Shamuyarira. Crisis in Rhodesia. (Deutsch 1965) 225. 
45 
farms of the Duke and other post-war arrivals are being tendered by our people. At the 
beginning of the struggle for freedom, we were surprised that these same Europeans we had 
known for so many years had become so aggressive. But few can doubt now that the 
European ruler is first to be distrusted, second to be disliked, and third to be fought against 
whenever possible. Every African, without exception, has been pushed by events into one of 
these three categories, although he may not show it at first sight. 9230 
It must be stated that the fact that the nationalists were not in favour of a declaration of 
independence is further confirmed by their behaviour during the period that Southern Rhodesia was 
under sanctions. In 1974, the leaders of Southern Rhodesia's national parties, by that stage, with the 
addition of the Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe and the African National Congress, numbering 
four, came together and entered into negotiations with Smith. These negotiations were unsuccessful, 
however, as agreement could not be reached on the issue of majority rule 
. 
23 1 
At the 2033`d meeting of the UNSC an invitation to speak was extended to Mr. Joshua Nkomo 
of the Patriotic Front of Zimbabwe (which had been formed of ZANU and ZAPU in 1976). 232 He spoke 
of the `supreme sacrifice' made by nationalists in Southern Rhodesia because the Smith regime had 
denied their right to self-determination and identified the parties to the conflict in Southern Rhodesia as 
the forces of the Patriotic Front in opposition to the British settler forces. 233 It should be noted that his 
participation at a meeting of the UNSC also illustrates the recognition that was being given to the 
Southern Rhodesian nationalists by this stage. 
In 1965, Britain stated the five principles on the basis of which it would be prepared to grant 
Southern Rhodesia independence. They were: (i) unimpeded progress to majority rule; (ii) guarantees 
against retrogressive amendment of the constitution; (iii) an immediate improvement in the political 
status of the African population; (iv) progress towards ending racial discrimination; and (v) Britain's 
need to be satisfied that any basis proposed for independence was acceptable to the people of Rhodesia 
as a whole. 234 The minority government protested that the system then in place allowed for majority 
rule and continued to push for independence. Ian Smith dissolved the government in March 1965 and 
held an election in May of that year in which his party won all 50 seats. The election was almost totally 
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boycotted by the black population 
. 
235 Following intense negotiations between Southern Rhodesia and 
the UK, the latter remained unconvinced that the five principles had been met. '; `' 
Finally on 11 November 1965 Smith asked his cabinet whether Southern Rhodesia should 
declare its independence. It was decided unanimously to do so. 237 
2.3 Discussion of Sanctions prior to Adoption against Southern Rhodesia 
As the first case of UN economic sanctions, and given the long delay between the establishment of the 
UN and the adoption of economic sanctions, the information available in relation to economic 
sanctions against Southern Rhodesia is particularly telling as to the opinions of states at that time in 
relation to economic sanctions. This section considers the reasoning offered by states both in favour of 
and against the sanctioning of Southern Rhodesia, analyses that reasoning and concludes with a brief 
discussion as to whether economic sanctions were in this case permissible under the UN Charter. 
2.3.1 Reasons for the Initial Reluctance to Invoke Sanctions 
This section is dealt with in two parts. Firstly, the UK position is considered. The UK is dealt with 
separately here because it was arguably still the administrating power of Southern Rhodesia when 
economic sanctions were invoked238 and because it was under pressure from the outset of sanctions to 
resolve the situation in Southern Rhodesia. 239 As such, it would have had a particular interest in seeing 
a solution to the problems in Southern Rhodesia. 
Secondly, the four predominant reasons why other states were initially reluctant to adopt 
economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia are considered: the threat to the peace; the international 
aspect of the situation in Southern Rhodesia; self-determination; and the fear of further economic 
sanctions regimes. 
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2.3.1.1 UK Reasons 
The UK initially considered economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia in 1963 and was, at that 
point, unwilling to take them. 24° The first argument against economic sanctions mooted by Sir Patrick 
Dean, the representative of the UK, was that the situation in Southern Rhodesia was one that came 
within its domestic jurisdiction and therefore, under Article 2(7) of the UN Charter, 241 the UNSC had 
no authorisation to interfere with it. 242 Dean also stated that the UK government did not consider there 
to be a situation in Southern Rhodesia, in any case, which would warrant intervention by the UNSC on 
grounds of maintaining international peace and security. 243 
These reasons were largely motivated by the desire of the UK to protect its own reputation. 
As the administering power, the UK, whilst seeking to exclude UNSC interference into Southern 
Rhodesia, did not exclude its own involvement in Southern Rhodesia. This was initially supported by 
the French delegation, which indicated that France would not support the draft resolution because, 
France, it was stated, had always been of the opinion that the UN had no power to decide whether or 
not a state is autonomous and thus whether it was subject to Chapter Xl of the Charter. 244 Initially, the 
UK was anxious to regain control of the territory in order to protect British settlers rather than move 
automatically to self-determination. The UK only changed its stance following the UDI when it had 
become clear that Southern Rhodesia could not be brought back under British control. 
2.3.1.2 General Arguments made by States against Sanctions 
The main arguments that economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia were illegal are discussed 
below. 
2.3.1.2.1 The Threat to the Peace 
The predominant argument against economic sanctions in the case of Southern Rhodesia was that there 
was no threat to the peace. This sentiment is most accurately captured by US Senator Harry F Byrd, Jr 
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of Virginia during the hearing on the Rhodesian Chrome Statute245 who stated: 'Whom has Rhodesia 
threatened? What nation has reason to fear an assault by this small African nation? The answer of 
course, is that no one actually believes that Rhodesia threatens the peace' 
. 
246 it was also raised in the 
UNSC by the representative of the UK, Sir Patrick Dean, who stated more generally, my Government 
does not consider that there is any genuine question of a situation existing in Southern Rhodesia which 
the UNSC should deal with in discharge of its responsibility to the maintenance of international peace 
and security'. 247 
Under Article 39 of the UN Charter the UNSC must determine that there is a 'threat to the 
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression' before taking action under Article 41 and Article 42. A 
preliminary flaw in the contention that the situation in Southern Rhodesia did not rise to the level of 
being a threat to the peace248 is that there is no precise definition of any of those terms. Shaw simply 
states that whether a given situation comes within these terms depends on each particular case and the 
political situation in the UNSC at the particular point in time. 249 He indicates that `threat to the peace' 
is the most difficult term to define and that since the Cold War the situations that have come within its 
ambit have vastly increased. 250 These terms were purposely left Undefined at the time of the drafting of 
the UN Charter in order to give the UNSC flexibility as to the use of Article 41 or Article 42.25' 
Ultimately the situation in Southern Rhodesia could be said to comply with Article 39 once the UNSC 
voted that it did so. 
As to the fact that there was no act of aggression prior to the initiation of sanctions, one was 
not necessary once either a breach of the peace or a threat to the peace was found. McDougal and 
Reisman suggest that, in any case, if an act of aggression was considered a necessity in order for 
Chapter VII action to be taken that burden could be met by the seizure of property the rest of the world 
believed to be British and by the racist policies of the Smith regime. 252 
The next issue is whether the actions of the white elite were in fact consistent with 
international law. An internationally wrongful act is not, as discussed in chapter 1, a prerequisite for 
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the adoption of UN economic sanctions. 253 However, a breach of international law might add support to 
the decision to take sanctions. In this case the white government had breached the right to self- 
determination of the majority by virtue of their UDI. 254 
2.3.1.2.2 The International Aspect of the Situation in Southern Rhodesia 
Whether the situation in Southern Rhodesia was international in nature is important for two reasons. 
Firstly, under Article 39 the stated aim of Chapter VII action is to `maintain or restore international 
peace and security. Secondly, the UN is precluded by virtue of Article 2(7) from intervening in 
situations that come within the domestic jurisdiction of a state. It has been suggested that this domestic 
jurisdiction discussion may be discarded as `Article 2(7) refers to "the domestic jurisdiction of any 
state" and Southern Rhodesia is not a state'. " That fails to address whether, even if Southern Rhodesia 
was not a state, if as part of the UK the term domestic jurisdiction in this case should mean the 
domestic jurisdiction of the UK. 
Clearly, in this case however, the African states did feel threatened, as, during the initial 
discussions at the UNSC, they argued that leaving military power with Southern Rhodesia, following 
the dissolution of the Federation, left them vulnerable to attack. 256 It was stated that the question of 
Southern Rhodesia raises particular and urgent issues which, on the information at present available, 
appear to all African States to constitute a serious threat to the peace and security of the African 
Continent'. 257 As such, the situation in Southern Rhodesia did in fact constitute a threat that went 
beyond its borders. 
if it is accepted that the situation in Southern Rhodesia did not have an international aspect it 
may have been reasonable to assume that economic sanctions could not have been taken. 258 However, 
South Africa's practices of apartheid, which could be considered as akin to Southern Rhodesia's racist 
policies had already warranted non-binding declarations by the l1NSC, which were not considered to 
have breached Article 2(7). 259 Furthermore, in subsequent economic sanctions regimes it has been 
established that the behaviour being sanctioned need not go beyond the territory of the state targeted 
253 Section 1.1. 
254 Self-determination is protected in Article 1(2) of the Charter of the UN. 
"` The Rhodesian Chrome Statute: The Congressional Response to UN Economic Sanctions Against Southern 
Rhodesia' (n 246), 524 
25' Record of the 1064th Meeting of the UNSC (n 206). Mr. Quaison-Sackey (Ghana). 22. 
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For example, economic sanctions have been put in place where mass breaches of international human 
rights or humanitarian law were occurring within a territory. 260 
2.3.1.2.3 Self-Determination 
Self-determination is established as a purpose of the UN in Article 1(2) of the UN Charter. 261 The term 
self-determination is not easily defined. Cassese suggests that it is `a democratic principle calling for 
the consent of the governed in any sovereign State: the people should always have the right freely to 
choose their own rulers' and `(f)urthermore, people and nations were entitled to be free from any 
external oppression, chiefly in the form of colonial rule'. 262 He also states that '[s]elf-determination 
appears firmly entrenched in the corpus of international law in only three areas: as an anti-colonialist 
standard; as a ban on foreign military occupation; and as a requirement that all racial groups be given 
full access to government'. 263 
Just five years prior to UDI the UNGA had passed the Declaration on the Granting of 
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, which was concerned with bringing about the end of 
colonialism. 264 It provided that: colonialism is contrary to human rights and an impediment to world 
peace; all people have the right to self-determination; independence should never be delayed on the 
grounds of inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational readiness; people should be 
allowed to peacefully exercise their right to independence; and that immediate steps should be taken in 
Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories and all other non-independent territories to transfer all power 
unconditionally to the people of those territories. 265 
Following this declaration by the UNGA, the white minority government perceived the UDI 
as an exercise of self-determination against a colonialist power. This idea was strengthened by the fact 
that after the Federation the other two constituent parts were given independence. Certainly Smith's 
declaration of independence accords with this idea. 266 Smith and the Rhodesian Front argued that they 
had black support for the UDI and that it was therefore an act of self-determination by the entirety of 
260 UNSC Res 794 (3 December 1992) UN Doc S/RES/794 (Somalia). UNSC Resolution 841 (n 42) (Haiti). 
261 Charter of the UN. Article 1: '[tlhe purposes of the UN are... 2. To develop friendly relations among nations 
based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate 
measures to strengthen universal peace... ' 
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the Southern Rhodesian population. However, this belief that there was black support for the UDI was 
founded on the fact that the African Chiefs of Southern Rhodesia had supported this declaration rather 
than on the basis that fair and open elections had been held and it is now clear that the African chiefs 
did not speak for the African population who were opposed to what they perceived to be the white elite 
protecting their power. 267 In fact almost all of the Chiefs were `servants of the government' . 
268 
This undermines any suggestion that the UDI was an act of self-determination. The UDI was 
in fact in direct opposition to the `requirement that all racial groups be given full access to government' 
and as Crawford has stated: `the minority government's declaration of independence was and remained 
internationally a nullity, as a violation of the principle of self-determination' 
. 
26 Rather than being an 
argument against sanctions, self-determination became the justification for the legality of economic 
sanctions and the UNSC called for `immediate measures in order to allow the people of Southern 
Rhodesia to determine their own future consistent with the objectives of General Assembly resolution 
1514 (XV)'. 270 
2.3.1.2.4 Fear of Further Implementation 
Certain states, most notably South Africa, would, at the time of sanctions against Southern Rhodesia, 
have been aware that their own behaviour could have made them susceptible to being subjected to 
economic sanctions. This, whilst not a legal argument, would have made states reluctant to sanction 
Southern Rhodesia for fear that they too would be ultimately sanctioned. 
This section has established that economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia were legally 
justifiable. They complied with the relevant provisions of the UN Charter and none of the criticisms 
made by various states could be sustained. The next section looks at the reasons why states decided to 
support economic sanctions in relation to the situation in Southern Rhodesia. 
2.3.1.3 The Appeal of Sanctions 
This section first looks at the symbolic value of economic sanctions, then at the fact that they were a 
compromise between the African position and that of the UK and finally at economic sanctions as a 
measure short of force. 
'`'' Kapungu. The Struggle for Freedom (n 189) 73. 
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2.3.1.3.1 Symbolic Value 
The actions of the UK in relation to Southern Rhodesia offer a good illustration of the symbolic value 
of UN economic sanctions. As discussed in detail already, the UK initially showed considerable 
reluctance to adopt economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia. One of the reasons for this was that 
in the initial stages much of the blame for the situation in Southern Rhodesia was being laid at the feet 
of the UK27 and, as a result, it likely was reluctant to agree to action simply because it would be seen 
as conceding that it was responsible, a view widely held amongst African States, which the UK denied. 
Clearly, however, no state can remain immune to criticism from other states indefinitely, this is 
especially true when the state in question holds itself to be an example for other members of the 
international community. A particularly provocative criticism of British policy was offered by Mr 
Coulibaly of Mali272 who drew an analogy with the Second World War. He asked, if Britain had not 
been successful and instead had the Nazis invaded the UK and held a referendum amongst their own 
people for the purpose of changing the status of the UK, would the British have considered the 
referendum to be valid? Yet, he argued, in 1922 the British had organised a referendum amongst white 
settlers in Southern Rhodesia which resulted in them being granted powers of self-government. The 
government of the UK were faced with a situation where they had to be seen to be taking some kind of 
action. In November 1965, the UK had ceased providing aid to Southern Rhodesia, frozen its sterling 
assets in London and excluded it from the sterling area and from Commonwealth preferences. 273 Non- 
binding UN sanctions followed later that month. 274 
Even then the African states remained dissatisfied as they felt that an oil embargo should have 
been included in the sanctions and, as a response, when Wilson rose to speak to the UNGA Assembly 
on 15 December 1965 in the region of one hundred African delegates left in protest. 275 As a result, and 
in order to be seen as taking action, the UK ultimately gave an invitation to the UNSC to create under 
Chapter VII what became UNSC Resolution 232.276 
271 See for example: Record of the 1064`h Meeting of the UNSC (n 206) 32,42: UNSC Verbatim Record (9 September 1965) UN Doc S/PV/1065,21,23 ('Record of the 1065`h Meeting of the UNSC'). 272 Record of the 1065'h Meeting of the l1NSC, 26. 
'" Robin Renwick. Economic Sanctions, (Harvard Center for International Studies, 1981) 27. 274 UNSC Resolution 217 (n 43). 
-" Martin Bailey, Oilgate, The Sanctions Scandal (Coronet 1979), 24 
276 Austin (n 192). 95. 
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2.3.1.3.2 Compromise 
Whilst, as mentioned, the UK displayed reluctance in the initial stages to take any action against 
Southern Rhodesia, the African states were from the outset committed to taking action given their 
concerns over the transfer of military power to Southern Rhodesia. '" In the initial stages the African 
states requested non-military action by the UK and the UNSC. Mr Coulibaly (Mali) stated the objective 
of the African states in coming to the UNSC as being: `to ask the Council to take preventive steps to 
avoid further outbreaks of violence which might cause casualties among men who have no other 
ambition than to live in peace in the land of their forebears and in respect for their human dignity'. 278 
He requested that: the UNSC invite the UK to refrain from transferring, to the settler government, 
powers which could cause disputes and threaten peace in the region; the UNSC take preventative 
measures for the purpose of preserving international peace and security; and that the UK not provide 
weapons that might be used against the African population in Southern Rhodesia. 279 
By the time of the UDI, pressure from African states had intensified and some were now 
demanding military intervention. The UNSC met to consider the situation in Southern Rhodesia on 30 
April 1965. 
-80 Mr. Doudou Thiam of Senegal, having been invited to participate without vote, spoke as 
a representative of the Organisation of African Unity. He criticised the British response. He noted an 
article had been published in the Manchester Guardian Weekly, which indicated that white Rhodesians 
believed that the British would not go as far as to ban tobacco sales let alone take military action281 and 
quoted a statement of Mrs Barbara Castle, the UK Minister for Overseas Development, made on 22 
April 1965 that: "[t]he UK would meet with a set-back if it tried to use force to settle the Rhodesian 
question". 282 The British Prime Minister had threatened that there would be an economic and 
diplomatic embargo on Southern Rhodesia if there was a UDI, 283 which Mr. Thaim argued was 
unlikely to be effective. 284 He questioned whether earlier sanctions had given any indication that such 
measures would work and instead sought proposals from the UK of specific measures and positive 
action in advance of any UDI. 285 
'" Record of the 1064'" Meeting of the UNSC (n 206) 22,24-25. 
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One of the strongest arguments put forth by Mr. Thaim was his pre-emption of Britain's 
argument of non-intervention where he stated that the UK had previously intervened in other states and 
that as Southern Rhodesia remained its colony it could legally use force should the territory rebel 
against the Crown. 286 The examples given were of the suppression of the Mau Mau in Kenya, and 
police operations in Oman and Southern Arabia. The first example might be the most useful 
comparator to the situation in Southern Rhodesia as it too was a colony where one racial faction rose 
against the other. 287 In that case the native African community rose up by force and the UK intervened 
to protect its white citizens. 288 
This opened the UK government to criticism during the situation in Southern Rhodesia that it 
would only intervene to protect its own white citizens and not the native citizens of its colonies. The 
issue of previous intervention by the UK was one that had an emotional value for the citizens of both 
the UK and the African states. It emphasised the underlying current beneath the push for action by the 
UK, namely that the UK was ignoring the African people in Southern Rhodesia and, more broadly, that 
it was ignoring the African states when they were suffering despite being in a position to go to their 
aid. 
By this time, not only had the UK established that it had to take some action to resolve an 
issue, which was increasingly outside of its control, but it was also faced with pressure to apply 
military sanctions. Arguments as to the legality of such action aside, it is extremely unlikely that there 
would have been support within the UK for military sanctions against Southern Rhodesia. Wilson, then 
UK Prime Minister, was aware that the public viewed the white minority in Southern Rhodesia as ` kith 
and kin' who had fought on their behalf in World War f[ with the result that there was support in the 
UK for Smith and to an extent UDI. ` 89 As such, a reasonable compromise between the African push 
towards military sanctions and the UK's initial reluctance to take action was the invocation of 
economic sanctions. 
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2.3.1.3.3 Measures Short of Force 
Whilst the UNSC determined that the situation in Southern Rhodesia constituted a threat to 
international peace and security, 290 it did not establish that it had risen to the level where Article 42, 
allowing the use of military sanctions, could be invoked. As such, action was restricted to lower level 
responses including those contained in Article 41. Other forms of action had already been exhausted 
both at state level, by governments condemning the regime and by the UNGA in the form of non- 
binding declarations. 29' The only option left open was, therefore, to instigate a system of economic 
sanctions, which would usually be considered as the last resort before authorisation of the use of armed 
force. 292 
The other point to reiterate in this regard is that even if armed force was legally permissible, in 
this case it may have been a politically unpopular decision. Winston Field had made a commitment that 
Britain would not react to the situation in Southern Rhodesia with military action. 293 However, it must 
be noted that force would eventually be authorised to empower the UK to stop oil destined for 
Southern Rhodesia arriving at Beira. 294 The Royal Navy continued to patrol the port of Beira 
throughout the sanctions against Southern Rhodesia at an estimated cost in excess of £100m. 295 
2.4 Implementation of Sanctions Against Southern Rhodesia 
The first part of this section outlines the action taken by the UNSC in relation to economic sanctions 
against Southern Rhodesia. The second part discusses the main issues that arose with economic 
sanctions against Southern Rhodesia. 
2.4.1 Measures taken by the UNSC 
The UNSC Resolutions dealing with Southern Rhodesia are considered under a number of headings: 
merely condemnatory or reaffirming resolutions; those resolutions containing economic sanctions; 
resolutions criticising breaches; and those dealing with third state issues. 
UNSC Resolution 217 (n 43). 
-ý' For example UNGA Res 1747 (XVI) (27 June 1962), UNGA Res 1755 (XVII) (12 October 1962) and UNGA 
Res 1760 (XVII) (31 October 1962). 
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2.4.1.1 Condemnatory or Reaffirming Resolutions 
The first UNSC resolution taken in relation to the situation in Southern Rhodesia was actually taken in 
1965, prior to the UDI, and did not contain or recommend any sanctions. 296 It was submitted by the 
Ivory Coast, Jordan and Malaysia and its purpose was to exert pressure on the UK to take action in 
Southern Rhodesia, where it was considered to be the administering power, 297 and to ask that should 
there be a UDI, that Member States would not support it. 29$ 
The next resolution to be taken in relation to Southern Rhodesia was taken following the UDI 
in November 1965.299 It condemned the UDI and requested that all states not recognise it. 30° 
UNSC Resolution 288'°1 and UNSC Resolution 314302 simply reinforced earlier resolutions 
with the latter highlighting that chrome ore came within the ambit of UNSC Resolution 253. '03 They 
were followed by UNSC Resolution 318,304 which approved recommendations and suggestions made 
by the Committee established in pursuance of UNSC Resolution 253. '°5 
2.4.1.2 Economic Sanctions 
The first UNSC resolution invoking economic sanctions was taken following the UDI and was not 
binding. i06 It condemned the UD1307 and requested that the UK take some action to `put an end' to the 
situation in Southern Rhodesia. 308 It then asked states not to recognise the UDI and to `refrain from any 
action which would assist and encourage the illegal regime and, in particular, to desist from providing 
it with arms, equipment and military material, and to do their utmost in order to break all economic 
relations with Southern Rhodesia, including an embargo on oil and petroleum products'. `09 
The first binding economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia were taken just over a year 
after the first economic sanctions. 310 The UNSC decided that all Member States should prevent the 
importation into their territory of asbestos, iron ore, chrome, pig-iron, sugar, tobacco, copper, meat, 
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meat products, hides, skins and leathers originating in Southern Rhodesia, activities either by their 
nationals or in their territories which would encourage such importation especially the transfer of 
money to Southern Rhodesia for that purpose and transportation by vehicles of their registration of 
those products. "" They were also required to prohibit activities by their citizens, or in their territories, 
that encouraged the sale or shipment of arms, ammunition, military equipment, military vehicles and 
the material toy the manufacture of those products to Southern Rhodesia, activities that encouraged the 
supply to, or manufacture in, Southern Rhodesia of any type of vehicle and the supply of oil or oil 
products to Southern Rhodesia. 312 The UNSC called on states not to give financial or other economic 
aid to Southern Rhodesia. ' 13 
When UNSC Resolution 232 was not implemented by all states, the UNSC responded 
eighteen months later with further binding sanctions. 314 It decided that states should prevent: the 
importation of all goods originating in Southern Rhodesia; activities by their citizens or in their 
territories that would encourage the same, especially the transfer of funds to Southern Rhodesia; the 
use of their vehicles for the transportation of goods to Southern Rhodesia; the sale or supply of goods 
to Southern Rhodesia (with some humanitarian exemptions); and the transportation of such goods. 3'3 
With certain humanitarian exemptions, 316 Member States were not to make available to Southern 
Rhodesia, or any commercial entity therein, financial or economic resources and were to ensure that 
their citizens did likewise. 17 The UNSC prohibited Member States from allowing entry to their 
territory of any person on the basis of a Southern Rhodesian passport or a passport issued under the 
UDI and requested that they take all possible measures to prevent entry by those ordinarily resident in 
Southern Rhodesia. "" Member States were to prohibit airlines or aircraft, registered in their territory or 
under charter to their nationals, operating to or from Southern Rhodesia. 319 Member States were called 
upon to take all measures to prevent encouragement, promotion or assistance to emigrate to Southern 
ibid, 2(a)-2(c). 
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Rhodesia. '20 The UNSC emphasised the need for the withdrawal of all trade and consular 
representation to Southern Rhodesia. 
3'`' 
Two years later, when Southern Rhodesia proclaimed the status of a republic, the UNSC took 
further binding economic sanctions. 322 The UNSC decided that Member States should refrain from 
recognizing the illegal regime and called on them to ensure that acts performed by officials of the 
regime would not be given any recognition by the competent authorities of their states. '23 In 
accordance with Article 41 of the UN Charter, it was decided that Member States should sever all 
diplomatic, consular, trade, military and other relations they had with the illegal regime, terminate any 
representation they had in that area and stop any means of transport to and from Southern Rhodesia. 324 
The UNSC called on Member States to take measures to suspend membership of the illegal regime in 
specialized agencies of the UN and urged Member States of international and regional organisations to 
refuse membership to, and suspend membership of, Southern Rhodesia. 325 Agencies and international 
organisations were requested, in consultation with the OAU, to give assistance to refugees from 
Southern Rhodesia. 326 
Economic sanctions under Chapter VII were extended further in 1976.327 The UNSC decided 
that Member States should take measures to ensure that nationals or persons in their territories did not 
insure commodities that were, or that they had reason to believe were, exported from or imported to 
Southern Rhodesia or any commodity, product or property in Southern Rhodesia. 32 It also decided that 
Member States should not grant any commercial, industrial or public entity in Southern Rhodesia the 
right to use any trade name nor should they enter into any franchising agreement involving the use of 
such a trade name. 329 
Binding economic sanctions were extended once more in 1977.330 The UNSC decided that all 
Member States should prohibit the use or transfer of any funds in their territories by the illegal regime 
in Southern Rhodesia including any office or agent thereof or by persons within Southern Rhodesia for 
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the purposes of office or agency of the illegal regime established within their territories other than for 
pension . 13 t
2.4.1.3 Condemnation of Breaches 
Not Iong after the first economic sanctions were invoked, the UNSC heard reports that a large shipment 
of oil destined for Southern Rhodesia had arrived at Beira and that Portuguese authorities might allow 
it to pass. 332 It called upon Portugal not to allow the oil to be pumped to Southern Rhodesia nor to 
receive oil at Beira destined for Southern Rhodesia333 and upon all other states to divert oil from Beira 
that they believed to be destined for Southern Rhodesia. 334 It also empowered the UK to use force, if 
necessary, to stop oil destined for Southern Rhodesia arriving at Beira. 335 
The actions of South Africa and Portugal, in refusing to observe sanctions against Southern 
Rhodesia, and the US, in authorising the importation of chrome ore and other minerals from Southern 
Rhodesia, were condemned in UNSC Resolution 320.336 South Africa was once more condemned for 
its refusal to adhere to sanctions against Southern Rhodesia in 1973.337 
The US breached sanctions against Southern Rhodesia on one further occasion in 1978 when 
it allowed Ian Smith and some other members of the illegal regime entry into the US. This was noted 
by the UNSC. 338 
2.4.1.4 Sanctions Relating to Third States 
lt was clear from the initial stages of economic sanctions that, by complying with economic sanctions 
against Southern Rhodesia, Zambia, due to its location and economic reliance on Southern Rhodesia, 
could have experienced severe economic difficulties. For this reason, the UNSC requested states to 
give aid to Zambia because of the special economic problems it may have suffered as a result of the 
sanctions. '39 A task force was later sent out to assess the needs of Zambia in light of its decision to 
sever all trade and communication links with Southern Rhodesia. . 140 In early 1973, South Africa 
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militarily intervened in Southern Rhodesia and also deployed forces on the border with Zambia. The 
regime in Southern Rhodesia also committed acts of provocation against Zambia. The UNSC 
condemned this action. 34 Further appeals were made to states to give aid to Zambia in light of the 
difficulties it faced as a result of it diverting trade from Southern Rhodesia. 342 The UNSC threatened 
action under Chapter VII in light of Southern Rhodesia's continued hostile acts in UNSC Resolution 
424. '3 Finally the UNSC called for compensation to be paid to Zambia for damage to life and 
property. '44 
In early 1976, Southern Rhodesia began to commit aggressive acts against the People's 
Republic of Mozambique, which had gained its independence from Portugal on 25 June 1975. '45 The 
UNSC condemned those acts and requested other states and the relevant UN organisations and 
programmes to give assistance to Mozambique 
. 
34" The situation did not improve and the UNSC 
demanded that it cease and reiterated its request for aid in 1977. "ý7 Botswana was also subjected to 
hostile acts by Southern Rhodesia. 34" The UNSC demanded the cessation of those acts and requested 
that states give assistance to Botswana. 349 This was reiterated in UNSC Resolution 406.350 In 1979 
Southern Rhodesia undertook armed invasions in to Angola, Mozambique and Zambia. 35, The UNSC 
condemned those acts and requested aid for frontline states. 152 
2.4.1.5 Other Resolutions 
In September 1977, the UNSC requested that the Secretary-General appoint a representative to enter 
into discussions with the British Resident Commissioner designate and all parties, concerning military 
and associated arrangements necessary to effect the transition to majority rule in Southern Rhodesia 
and to report on these discuss ions. 353 It also called on all parties to co-operate with the 
representative. 354 This was followed by a related resolution on 14 March 1978 whereby the UNSC 
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declared any internal settlement concluded under the illegal regime would be both illegal and 
unacceptable and requested states not to recognise any such settlement. '" It stated that the first 
prerequisite for the restoration of legality in Southern Rhodesia was the termination of the illegal 
regime and replacement of police and military forces so that there might be a transition to genuine 
majority rule and independence in 1978, which would include the holding of free and fair elections 
under UN supervision.; Sb It considered that the UK, with the assistance of the Secretary-General, 
357 
should enter into consultations with the parties concerned 
The illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia had announced that there would be elections in April 
1979, which it was clear had the aim of extending minority rule. 158 The UNSC condemned the 
elections, declared any such elections and their results null and void and stated that no state would 
recognise them. 359 It also urged states not to send observers to observe the elections. 360 Those elections 
were ultimately held and the UNSC then reaffirmed resolution 445.361 
Economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia were finally lifted on 21 December 1979 when 
a constitution for a free and independent Zimbabwe had been agreed upon and the UK had committed 
to the decolonisation of Southern Rhodesia on the basis of free and fair elections. 162 
2.4.2 Initial Difficulties with Sanctions 
Economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia were in place for more than a decade, which indicates 
that at minimum they did not paralyse the economy of Southern Rhodesia and could have been more 
effective. The two main difficulties seen with economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia related to 
enforcement and to the extent to which Southern Rhodesia's economy was able to modify itself to 
avoid the worst effects of economic sanctions. This section discusses how these difficulties may have 
impacted on the effectiveness of sanctions. 
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2.4.2.1 Enforcement 
From the very outset of economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia their enforcement was an issue. 
There were constant breaches of sanctions by various states and no repercussions when sanctions were 
breached. This section discusses breaches by South Africa and Portugal, the UK and the US, and 
Zambia. These states have been grouped together based on their reasoning for breaches of the sanctions 
regime. This section also looks at the role of the Committee established pursuant to UNSC Resolution 
253363 and discusses the various breaches before discussing why these breaches resulted in enforcement 
problems for sanctions against Southern Rhodesia. 
2.4.2.1.1 South Africa and Portugal 
- 
Breaches for Political Reasons 
South Africa and Portugal consistently breached sanctions against Southern Rhodesia and, in fact, 
UNSC Resolution 320 expresses concern at their `refusal... to co-operate with the United Nations in 
the observance and implementation of sanctions against Southern Rhodesia'. "4 Both states had 
considerable strategic interests in the outcome of the Southern Rhodesian case. Not only were both 
states geographically close to Southern Rhodesia, 
365 with the resulting economic ties that come with 
that proximity, they also shared a common ideology at that time. McKinnell in 1969 stated that 
-relations between Southern Rhodesia and her allies, South Africa and Portugal, have grown ever 
closer' and as a result the continent of Africa was being divided into two, the black dominated north 
and the white colonialist south. 366 
It is not surprising that South Africa and Portugal wanted sanctions against Southern Rhodesia 
to fail due to fear that they would be subjected to economic sanctions themselves if they were seen to 
be effective against Southern Rhodesia. Both states were criticised by the UNSC for failing to 
implement the sanctions . 167 and it is likely that their failure to adhere to sanctions impacted on the 
length of time it took for sanctions to take effect. One of the clearest examples of this can be seen in the 
fact that when the overt supply of petroleum to Southern Rhodesia was cut off it began to use 
alternative sources routed through Mozambique and South Africa. 368 This is particularly relevant 
""3 UNSC Resolution 253 (n 314). 
'64 UNSC Resolution 320 (n 336). 
-115 Portugal through its, then, colony Mozambique. 
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(JNSC Resolution 320 (n 336) and UNSC Resolution 328 (n 337). 
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because petroleum was a commodity without access to which Southern Rhodesia would have been 
completely paralysed and it is the one commodity that if completely boycotted could lead to total 
paralysis of a state's economy given its importance for both manufacturing and transportation. 
In 1974, the Portuguese colonial regime finally collapsed and Mozambique gained its 
independence in 1975. As such, the Mozambique-Rhodesia border was closed in 1976 and in August 
and September 1976 South Africa briefly imposed economic and military sanctions on Southern 
Rhodesia to compel acceptance of the Kissinger formula for transition to majority rule. 369 Anglin has 
identified these as occasions when both states adhered to the UNSC resolutions and has stated that the 
impact of South African and Portuguese breaches can be seen in the fact that sanctions had a much 
tighter grip on Southern Rhodesia during this period. 370 
2.4.2.1.2 UK and US 
- 
Breaches for Economic Reasons 
The fact that the UK and the US were breaching sanctions is of far more concern than any of the other 
breaches. Both states are members of the P-5 and so could simply have decided to veto sanctions. 
Whilst the UK had the highest number of prosecutions of individuals and organisations for breach of 
sanctions, for fear of upsetting its precarious economy it did not force British-based companies to shut 
down subsidiaries in Southern Rhodesia and was willing to largely ignore the breaches by other 
states. 371 
Whereas Portugal and South Africa were allowing for the transportation of oil over their 
territories, the UK was responsible for much of the oil itself. Given that Southern Rhodesia had no oil 
reserves and little oil stockpiled prior to sanctions, sanctions had to be breached continuously in order 
to ensure that Southern Rhodesia had sufficient oil. "' At that time, there were five major oil companies 
in Southern Rhodesia. 373 Jardim states that these oil companies exported similar quantities of oil during 
economic sanctions as they did prior to their imposition and that generally each maintained its market 
share in Southern Rhodesia during that period 
. 
374 Two of those companies, namely Shell and BP, had at 
least 40 per cent of their shares owned by UK shareholders. In 1973 it was suggested that British- 
The Kissinger formula included a simultaneous ending of sanctions and the war, a transition period during 
which the white population would retain control of law and order before a move to majority rule in two years, see Wills (n 190). 436. 
Anglin (n 178), 39. 
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owned companies were providing 56 per cent of the oil transported by rail from Mozambique to 
Southern Rhodesia. 37' Whilst breaches in the UK could be considered to have been covert and 
committed largely by individuals or organisations rather than by the state itself, it has been argued that 
the UK was aware of potential breaches having been warned that oil was being exported to Southern 
Rhodesia by British companies and that, despite these warnings, the state failed to investigate any 
breaches of sanctions until 11 years after UDI and the resulting sanctions breaches commenced. "6 
The US on the other hand simply implemented legislation circumventing the sanctions. The 
Military Procurement Act of 1971was amended by what became known as the `Rhodesian Chrome 
Statute'. 377 It allowed for the importation of `material determined to be strategic and critical'. Although 
neither Southern Rhodesia nor chrome is mentioned it was enacted to allow for the importation of 
Southern Rhodesian chrome. 378 Additionally it allowed Ian Smith and other members of the regime 
entry into the US when they were subject to travel bans. 379 Obviously this gave legitimacy to the 
breach of sanctions both by the US and by other states. 
2.4.2.1.3 Zambia 
- 
Breaches for the Purpose of Self-Preservation 
Zambia (formerly Northern Rhodesia) relied heavily in economic terms on Southern Rhodesia and 
breached sanctions in an attempt not to sink into economic crisis itself. Prior to the imposition of 
economic sanctions on Southern Rhodesia, Zambia provided a market for more than 25 per cent of 
exports from Southern Rhodesia and was itself reliant on Southern Rhodesian railways to transport 65 
per cent of its imports and 95 per cent of its exports.; 80 Southern Rhodesia also supplied all of its oil 
and coal and 69 per cent of its electricity. 38' As McKinnell commented, it simply could not cut such 
strong economic ties overnight. 382 
However, despite the difficulties it faced, Zambia remained committed to economic sanctions 
throughout their duration. It refused Smith's offer to spare Zambia if it did not enforce sanctions and 
slowly tightened its enforcement until Southern Rhodesia closed its northern borders in 1973. The 
375 Bailey (n 275), 59. 
'76 ibid. 69. 
"' Pub. L. No. 92-156 (Nov 17,1971). 
"g Further discussion of the justifications given for the Rhodesian Chrome Statute are available in: *Notes: The 
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borders remained closed until Zambia, under threat of starvation, reopened them in 1978 by which time 
it is estimated this action had cost Zambia $800 million. 383 Zambia clearly needed economic support 
from the international community and although it made no official application under Article 50384 of 
the UN Charter both Zambia itself and the UNSC made repeated calls for assistance. 385 Despite these 
requests, support was slow and inadequate. 386 
2.4.2.1.4 The 253 Committee387 
A committee of the UNSC was established under UNSC Resolution 253 ('the 253 Committee') with a 
limited mandate to examine reports on the implementation of the resolution as had been submitted by 
the Secretary-General and to seek from Member States or specialised agencies information on trade or 
any other activity by states that might constitute breach of the sanctions. "' This mandate was expanded 
slightly in UNSC Resolution 277 to include the examination of reports submitted under that resolution, 
the study of methods that could improve the implementation of UNSC decisions regarding sanctions 
against Southern Rhodesia and to make recommendations to the UNSC. 389 This section will offer a 
brief overview of some of the work undertaken by the 253 Committee. 
During its existence the 253 Committee released a number of reports on compliance with 
resolution 253 
. 
3"0 Three issues arise with these reports. Firstly, the 253 Committee did not undertake 
any of the initial investigations itself but instead simply collected information from states, which was 
""Anglin (n 178). 40. 
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then used to compile statistical data. 391 Under this system there is no mechanism in place to check the 
accuracy of the information being relied upon and that states were not under-reporting their trade with 
Southern Rhodesia. Additionally, the 253 Committee used trade figures provided by Southern 
Rhodesia, which had reason to over-estimate its trade. This was highlighted in the 253 Committee's 
third report where it acknowledged that there was a large discrepancy between the figures provided by 
Southern Rhodesia and those provided by other states as to the trade between them. '`" 
Secondly, states were reporting on an inconsistent basis. From the outset some states failed to 
report393 By the time of the second report, 33 states, of which 29 were UN Member States, had not 
responded 
. 
394 The third report showed that 31 states had yet to report. 395 Those states that did report 
appear in some cases to have made different assumptions about what compliance with the reporting 
requirements entailed. Initially states failed to separate specific figures for Southern Rhodesia from 
their exports and imports. 396 In 1970, in the 253 Committee's second report, some states suggested that 
they were adhering to sanctions but saw no need to take specific measures to ensure compliance, others 
responded with detailed outlines of measures taken and a minority of states were not in compliance 
with sanctions at all. 397 
Thirdly, whilst the 253 Committee did investigate some of the information provided by states, 
which prompted it for example to redistributed some reported exports by states, which had been 
reported as exports to neighbouring countries but which the 253 Committee felt on examination were 
in fact destined for Southern Rhodesia, 398 it is unclear how these investigations were conducted. 
However, given that it commented in relation to the investigation of suspected breaches of economic 
sanctions that it had received `no further information on case No. 4... on case No. 10... reply was 
received from Switzerland', it seems that even where information on suspected violations was provided 
by states heavy reliance was once more placed on state reporting.; ' 
The 253 Committee did provide some useful services to states. It acted as a point of contact 
where states could report suspected violations in the knowledge that at a minimum they would be 
published and thus brought to the attention of other states. It also provided information to states both 
391 Report ot'tlºe 253 Committee (n 390). 5,10. 
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through its published reports and directly to states via the Secretary General. However it failed to reach 
its full potential as an effective monitoring body as it failed to take an active role in the investigation of 
suspected violations instead relying on information provided by states, which limited its utility. This 
failure as an effective monitoring body means that it was also unlikely to encourage states to comply 
with sanctions. In addition it failed to suggest suitable methods of enforcing the sanctions thus negating 
any possible enforcement benefit they might have had. 
2.4.2.1.5 Breaches of Economic Sanctions 
It must be stated at this juncture that some breaches of sanctions are inevitable. There will always be an 
individual or corporate entity willing to breach sanctions for personal gain. The salient point with 
respect to the case of Southern Rhodesia and its `leaky sanctions policy'40° is that the breaches were 
either being committed by states or with the acquiescence of states. The fundamental problem that 
linked breaches of economic sanctions to a lack of enforcement was that there was no attempt made by 
the UNSC to punish those who breached economic sanctions, this goes to a lack of accountability with 
respect to the implementation of UNSC economic sanctions. 
It was suggested in UNSC Resolution 320, that sanctions might be imposed on those who 
breached economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia in order to force compliance with the UNSC's 
previous resolutions 401 However, that suggestion did not ultimately come to fruition. As there were no 
repercussions for breaches at any level, comprehensive enforcement of economic sanctions against 
Southern Rhodesia became impossible and Southern Rhodesia and South Africa were given confidence 
to commit acts of aggression against neighbouring states. 
2.4.2.2 Economy Modification 
The second major factor that impacted on the effectiveness of economic sanctions against Southern 
Rhodesia was the extent to which the economy was modified in order to protect itself following the 
invocation of economic sanctions. The Southern Rhodesian economy shifted its production so that 
sanctions did not cause as much damage as they might otherwise have done. A good example can be 
seen in relation to tobacco, which was at the time a major export of Southern Rhodesia. Initially the 
government bought and stockpiled tobacco before imposing quotas on the amount to be grown and 
"w Mchinnell (n 366). 572. 
J0' UNSC Resolution 320 (n 336). 4. 
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ultimately compelling farmers to switch to other crops that were no 
longer being imported. 412 
Essentially this made Southern Rhodesia far more self-sufficient than would have previously seemed 
possible given its heavy reliance on imports and exports. 
403 There are three reasons why this 
modification was possible: the response of the white elite, the speed at which sanctions were 
imposed 
and the cessation of debt repayments. Each will be considered in turn. 
2.4.2.2.1 The Response of the White Elite 
An unexpected consequence of sanctions was their role in uniting the white settler community. Two 
accounts quoted by Galtung are worth stating in full: 
Q. How do you manage with so little petrol? 
A. Oh, that is easy enough. You know, if a family has two cars and receives some petrol for 
both, to put one car in the garage is not very much of a sacrifice. Besides, some of us who live 
in the countryside and have offices in Salisbury join our rations and form a car pool and go in 
together. It is strange to see how much better friends one becomes with one's neighbours in 
such situations 
- 
we really did not know them before. And if even this should not work, this 
may be the great impetus that forces the city to develop adequate collective transportation, and 
if even that does not work, doctors are almost unanimous that walking is good for you... 
Q. But what about all kinds of luxury goods, or household appliances? 
A. You must remember that very many families here are quite well off. They have a 
refrigerator, maybe even two. They work. If refrigerators cannot be bought, well, some will be 
without and others will not have the latest models. But most will have refrigerators, and they 
will last 
- 
our technicians are not so bad that they cannot improvise some spare parts. And as 
to luxury goods 
- 
we have been without them during two world wars when we helped Britain, 
the same Britain that attacks us today, and we can do without them again. Besides, one family 
has some and another family will borrow from it. That was also the pattern during the war'. 404 
Gattung describes this as a `rally-around-the flag effect'. McKinnell also highlights the behaviour of 
the white population and attributes some of the economic modification to their willingness to increase 
their savings, which made it easier for the regime to raise loans and allowed commercial banks to make 
402 McKinnell (n 366), 564. 
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short-term loans to the government. 405 Put simply, the white population of Southern Rhodesia was 
prepared to sacrifice as a reaction to what it perceived as the unjust sanctions being imposed on it. This 
was exacerbated by the fact that Southern Rhodesia had provided troops to the allies during the two 
world wars and thus saw the actions of the UK as a betrayal. They had helped the UK when they were 
needed and now they felt they were being abandoned in their hour of need. 
2.4.2.2.2 The Slow Speed at Which Sanctions were Imposed 
What is striking in reading the resolutions themselves and the various commentaries offered is the 
general acceptance that economic sanctions were invoked in stages rather than comprehensively. 
Economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia expanded gradually as initial action failed to have the 
desired effect. Sanctions commenced in 1965,406 were not compulsory until 196640' and even then were 
not comprehensive. 
UNSC Resolution 232 prohibited the importation and exportation of certain key commodities, 
the importation of military equipment and prohibited states from giving financial or economic aid to 
Southern Rhodesia. Two years later this was expanded to all goods, trade and consular representation, 
recognition of passports and other travel restrictions and a prohibition on the transfer of economic 
resources to Southern Rhodesia or commercial entities therein. 408 UNSC Resolution 277 prohibited all 
diplomatic, consular, military, trade and other relations with Southern Rhodesia. 1976 saw the 
invocation of sanctions prohibiting the insurance of commodities within Southern Rhodesia. 40° Finally 
in 1977 the use or transfer within a state of funds by the illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia was 
prohibited 410 
In light of the time that Southern Rhodesia had as a result of the slow implementation of 
sanctions to switch its production and stockpile certain commodities it is unsurprising that it was able 
to modify its economy. As Anglin states: `piecemeal implementation of sanctions... provided the 
country with a valuable breathing space during which to adapt economically and psychologically to its 
`` new circumstances' 
. 
ýý 
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2.4.2.2.3 The Cessation of Debt Repayment 
The third factor that allowed the Southern Rhodesian economy to adjust to sanctions was that it 
stopped repaying its debts. Southern Rhodesia had considerable external debt owed to the UK, the 
World Bank and other creditors and by not repaying those debts it made considerable financial 
resources available to prop up the economy. McKinnell takes an expansive view of the effect this had 
when he states: "[t]he interruption of external payments from Britain was more than offset by the 
repudiation of all liability to service external debt". 
412 This reflects the statistics of Hawkins who 
indicated that by refusing to service its debts Southern Rhodesia saved £8.8 million in 1966, whereas in 
the same year the 'blocking and freezing of dividends, profits and interest payable to Rhodesians by 
Britain and Zambia reduced Rhodesia's income by £5.1 million'. 413 Bond indicates that the non- 
repayment of debt facilitated what he terms `dramatic economic restructuring' by making the money 
that would have been spent on debt repayments available for other uses. ' 14 
2.5 The Legacy of Economic Sanctions Against Southern Rhodesia 
The sanctions regime put in place against Southern Rhodesia was the UNSC's first attempt at using the 
sanctions provisions in Article 41. It is therefore unsurprising that some difficulties were experienced 
with sanctions in this instance. The key issues were: the slow move to comprehensive sanctions, which 
resulted in the modification of the country's economy; the breaches of sanctions by states; and the 
ineffectiveness of the 253 Committee. However, teething problems were to be expected in the initial 
case of economic sanctions in order for economic sanctions to be more effective going forward these 
difficulties should have been addressed in the next episode of economic sanctions. That next episode of 
binding UN economic sanctions was taken against Iraq, which is discussed in the next chapter. 
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3 
Iraq 
-A Humanitarian Crisis 
The case of Iraq has been described as the `single most important issue' the UN Security Council dealt 
with in the I990s. 415 This chapter examines economic sanctions against Iraq, which stretched from 
1990 until December 2010.416 It considers the developments to the UN economic sanctions regime that 
took place during this time and establishes that, regardless of the ultimate suitability of such measures, 
the regime was reactive to the situation as it developed. It also argues that the use of economic 
sanctions against Iraq constituted a turning point for UN economic sanctions in that they paved the way 
for the move towards targeted economic sanctions. The chapter begins with an overview of why Iraq 
has been selected as one of the case studies for the purpose of this thesis before briefly outlining the 
historical and political background of Iraq. It then considers the various resolutions that were taken by 
the UNSC and whether such resolutions were effective. The humanitarian impact of economic 
sanctions on the Iraqi population and attempts to rectify that impact are examined. Finally, the impact 
of economic sanctions against Iraq on targeted sanctions is explored. 
3.1 Why Iraq? 
The 1990's has been termed the `sanctions decade'417 as it heralded a new era for the development of 
economic sanctions within the UN framework. In the 1990's the UN instigated twelve economic 
sanctions regimes418 compared with only two cases419 prior to 1990.420 As a result of the increase in the 
number of cases of economic sanctions, UN practices, in relation to such sanctions, became refined. 
Iraq was to become, and still remains, the most comprehensive system of sanctions invoked by the 
UNSC. Economic sanctions against Iraq, as they developed, reflected how the UN was dealing with 
economic sanctions. There are two reasons why Iraq has been selected. Firstly, the humanitarian 
problems and attempts at rectification of those problems. Secondly, the combination of military and 
a" l3ardo Fassbender, 'Uncertain Steps into a Post-Cold War World: The Role and Functioning of the UN Security 
Council after a Decade of Measures against Iraq' (2002) 13 EJIL 273. 
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economic sanctions. The case of Iraq is also used as a contrast with the first case study in this thesis, 
that of Southern Rhodesia. The development of UN economic sanctions is shown by contrasting the 
two regimes. By comparing the two regimes the consistent elements of UN economic sanctions during 
the period are also shown. 
3.1.1 The Humanitarian Difficulties 
UNSC economic sanctions against Iraq commenced on 6 August 1990.421 Since then, they have had a 
devastating impact on the Iraqi population. In March 1991, less than a year after their inception, Mr 
Martti Ahtisaari, UN Under-Secretary-General for Administration and Management who led a UN 
mission into the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi population, stated that, as a result of the combined 
effect of military action and economic sanctions, `Iraq has, for some time to come, been relegated to a 
pre-industrial age, but with all the disabilities of post-industrial dependency on an intensive use of 
energy and technology 
., 
-422 it has, in fact, been argued that economic sanctions against Iraq have caused 
more civilian deaths than were caused during the Gulf Conflict of 1990 to 1991 423 The full 
humanitarian impact of economic sanctions on Iraq will be discussed further in the latter stages of this 
chapter but suffice it to say at this juncture that commentators have attributed deaths in the civilian 
population of Iraq to economic sanctions 424 
The humanitarian situation makes Iraq a suitable case study for the purpose of this thesis for 
three reasons. Firstly, neither Southern Rhodesia nor South Africa had experienced the sort of 
significant humanitarian problems that were experienced in Iraq. There was no indication in either of 
those cases that the civilian population was starving or dying as a result of economic sanctions. As 
indicated in chapter 2, Southern Rhodesia continued largely unscathed by sanctions for a decade and in 
many respects the main impact of economic sanctions in that case was their symbolic force, that is to 
say how other states viewed Southern Rhodesia as a result of the fact that it was subjected to economic 
421 UNSC Resolution 661 (n 44). 
422 Martii Ahtisaari, 'The Impact of War on Iraq', Report to the Secretary General on humanitarian needs in Iraq in 
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sanctions, which forced Smith to remain in negotiations. As such, the fact that economic sanctions had 
a humanitarian impact in the case of Iraq makes an exploration of that case both novel and of particular 
importance. It calls into question how the necessity or desirability of taking economic sanctions should 
be balanced against the wellbeing of citizens, which did not arise in previous cases. 
Secondly, economic sanctions were not the only UN action taken against Iraq, there was also 
a period of military intervention. Two issues arise as a result of this two-faceted action. Firstly, it has 
been argued that economic sanctions in this case compounded the effects of the hostilities. 425 This 
suggests that economic sanctions may not be a suitable tool for use if military force has already been 
used. Secondly, it raises the question as to what type of sanctions should be used in a given case. In the 
first stage of the sanctions taken against Iraq economic sanctions were used, 426 then, in the second 
phase, military force was invoked 
, 
4`' before, in the third stage, economic sanctions were used again. 'ZS 
Neither economic nor military force should be used in a given case without full consideration of the 
implications of whichever form of sanctions is selected. 
The third reason why the humanitarian situation in Iraq justifies its inclusion as a case study is 
that it forced the UNSC to be more reactive in its treatment of economic sanctions. When Southern 
Rhodesia was under consideration it was noted that economic sanctions were extremely slow to 
respond whenever flaws in the system of economic sanctions, such as breaches by states, arose. 129 This 
was not true in the case of Iraq and it led to such innovations as the Oil-for-Food Programme. 
3.1.2 The Combination of Economic and Military Sanctions 
Sanctions against Iraq were taken in three phases, firstly, economic sanctions (from 6 August 1990), 
then military sanctions (from 16 January 1991) 130 and finally further economic sanctions (from 3 April 
1991). The use of military sanctions distinguishes the case of Southern Rhodesia from that of Iraq. In 
the case of Southern Rhodesia, full-scale military sanctions were never seriously contemplated, 
although permission for the use of limited force to stop oil arriving at Beira was given to the UK 13' 
However, given that it annexed another state, it is of little surprise that military sanctions were 
425 Simons. The Scourging of Iraq (n 423) xviii. 
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considered against Iraq 432 The most controversial aspect of the move toward military sanctions was the 
speed at which the transition occurred 
433 Having been in place for less than six months, economic 
sanctions were given very little time to work before the commencement of military force. This 
contention is made on two grounds. Firstly, economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia and South 
Africa had been in place for considerably longer than six months before they forced the respective 
governments to fully amend their behaviour so it would seem unlikely that economic sanctions could 
rectify the situation in Iraq in a much shorter period of time. Secondly, Iraq had some stocks of food 
available to it in the initial stages of sanctions estimated to be sufficient for between three and six 
months434 and the true effect of economic sanctions would not have been felt until those supplies were 
extinguished. 
The three broad types of UNSC sanctions can be seen as hierarchical with mere 
condemnations of action as the lowest level of sanction, economic sanctions somewhere in the middle 
and military sanctions as the highest. This follows the schemata of the UN Charter, which does not 
require a threat or breach of the peace or act of agression to have occurred for an action to be 
condemned, and requires that the UNSC decide that measures short of force provided for under Article 
41 could be considered inadequate before force is invoked 435 As such, it would be logical to progress 
from economic sanctions, if they did not work, to military sanctions, if the UNSC assesses that they 
might be more suitable, and indeed Chapter VII allows for that situation. However, questions must be 
raised about maintaining economic sanctions after military sanctions 
- 
the most serious action 
available to the UNSC - have achieved their aims and been dropped as occurred in this case. Military 
sanctions cause destruction to a state. Economic sanctions cut off a state's access to the economic 
resources necessary to rebuild following such destruction thus retarding re-development and 
compounding the destruction caused by military sanctions. Equally, military sanctions, by destroying 
key resources, compound the effect of economic sanctions. For that reason, it is not desirable to have 
the mixture of economic and military sanctions of the type that occurred in Iraq. 
4 12 See for example statement of Mr Wilenski of Australia in the Security Council: The Security Council was 
compelled to authorize the use of military force by the action of the Government of Iraq. Hostitlies began not on 
16 January, as some seem to suggest, but on 2 August last year, when Iraq invaded Kuwait, later purporting to 
annex it. ' UNSC Verbatim Record (15 February 1991) S/PV/2977. 
;" Fconomic sanctions were first taken under UNSC Resolution 661 (n 44) and military action began in January of 
1991. 
4" John Simpson. From the House of'War (Hutchinson 1991) 180 ('Simpson. From the House of War'); Peter 
Passeil. 'Confrontation in the Gulf; how Vulnerable is Iraq? ' New Fork Times (New York 20 August 1990). 
"" Articles 39 
- 
42.1 IN Charter. 
75 
3.2 The Historical and Political Background to Economic Sanctions 
This section outlines how the political situation that ultimately prompted the invocation of economic 
sanctions against Iraq developed. It will be divided into two sections: the rise to power of Saddam 
Hussein and the invasion of Kuwait. 
3.2.1 The Rise to Power of Saddam Hussein 
From the end of World War 1, when due to its decision to align with the Central Powers the territory 
now known as Iraq was under British control, 436 until Saddam Hussein's rise to power there was 
considerable political instability in Iraq. 
Initially, following World War I the mandate over territory now known as Iraq was granted to 
the UK. 437 The intention was that it, like other mandated territories, would eventually become 
independent self-governing nations but that it would only do so under the tutelage of the UK. 438 In 
order to minimise its costs in the region the UK created a monarchy and arranged for an ally of the 
British, Hashemite Amir Feisal, to be crowned king on 23 August 1921. '39 Once Feisal was made king 
he pushed for independence from the UK and Iraq was responsible for its own defence by 1928440 and 
became a member of the League of Nations independently in 1932 4" Following independence the 
monarchy suffered a number of attempted military coups until it was overturned by a group known as 
the Free Officers' Movement on 14 July 1958.442 
The Free Officers Movement remained in power until on 17 July 1968, in a bloodless coup, a 
coalition of the Baathist Party and non-Baathist commanders seized Broadcasting House, the Ministry 
of Defence and the headquarters of the Republican Guard and the leadership of Iraq. 443 On 30 July of 
that year the Baath party expelled all others from the coalition and assumed full control of Iraq. 444 
Saddam Hussein initially played a minor role in the new government having been made made deputy 
secretary of the party, vice-president of the RCC, the highest government authority, and responsible for 
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establishing an internal security apparatus445 whilst General Hassan al-Bakr acted as president, prime 
minister, secretary-general of the Baath Party and president of the RCC 446 
From the outset, however, Saddam Hussein set about achieving power. His most strategic 
decision in seeking power was his involvement in the oil situation. Prior to his involvement, oil 
production had been controlled by the British dominated IPC, which shared revenues with Iraq. 
Saddam Hussein realised that in order for Iraq to get the most benefit from its oil it needed to control 
production and, as a result, in June 1972 Iraq nationalised the IPC. 447 In September 1977 Saddam 
Hussein took control of all aspects of Iraq's oil thus giving him control over Iraq's key asset. 448 It has 
been said that he was president in all but name449 and in July 1979, citing ill-health, al-Bakr resigned 
naming Saddam Hussein his successor. 45° Within hours Saddam Hussein was sworn in as president of 
Iraq. 451 
As Saddam Hussein was taking control of Iraq, a new Islamic regime was taking control of 
Iran. Saddam Hussein viewed the new Iranian regime with suspicion and felt that a limited war with it 
would be an opportunity to exert Iraq's power in the region. 452 It seemed that Iraq could have been 
swiftly successful in hostilities with Iran at that point. Iran had purged its officer classes and the regime 
was being subjected to challenge by its citizens. 453 The US had also c; " off its supply of weapons to 
Iran. 454 In contrast Iraq had invested heavily in its military since the mid-1970s and had more 
international support than Iran. 455 On 17 September 1980, in front of the National Assembly, Saddam 
Hussein abrogated the agreement, 456 reached five years earlier, between Iraq and Iran with respect to 
their disputes at OPEC over borders, water and navigation rights. 457 This was followed by pre-emptive 
attacks on Iran's military airfields on 22 September and by the invasion of some of Iran's territory. 458 
Unfortunately for Iraq it did not have the advantage over Iran that it had estimated. Iraq ended the war 
with a debt of between $100 and $120 billion, having entered it with a reserve of $35 billion and facing 
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a reconstruction cost in excess of $400 billion 
. 
459 An estimated 400,000 Iraqis were killed. 460 The war 
ultimately ended both as a result of Iraq's use of chemical weapons, 461 and because the US made a 
policy decision to support Iraq 162 In July 1988, Iran expressed its willingness to concede to a 
'63 ceasetire. 
Despite being bolstered by American support, Iraq achieved nothing by going to war with the 
situation ultimately reverting to its previous status. In fact, the war brought about unfortunate 
consequences for Iraq. Firstly, it left Iraq financially devastated, which would be one of the triggers in 
Iraq's later hostilities with Kuwait. It also meant that Iraq was in a weak initial position when economic 
sanctions commenced, which would impact on the humanitarian situation. Secondly, US support gave 
Iraq a false confidence that such support would be forthcoming in other situations. It allowed Iraq to 
believe that should it get embroiled in further regional conflict it would have the support of the US and 
its allies. This undoubtedly hastened the Kuwait crisis that would follow. 
3.2.2 The Invasion of Kuwait 
As outlined previously, Iraq had suffered great financial losses during its war with Iran. 4M Saddam 
Hussein believed that Kuwait and Saudi Arabia were in a position to help with Iraq's post-conflict 
refinancing. He sought three concessions: firstly, that they would restrain their production of oil thus 
ensuring the price remained high; secondly, that they would declare loans given to Iraq during the war 
with Iran as grants; and, finally, that they would offer money towards reconstruction. 465 Such 
concessions were not forthcoming. 
Even after the war, Iraq had emerged as the strongest military power in the region. " That 
strength was combined with the misguided belief that other states would ultimately acquiesce should 
Saddam decide to invade Kuwait. 4O7 During June and July 1990, Iraq complained to OPEC that Kuwait 
was violating its exportation quotas and driving down the price of oil. 468 On 2 August 1990, Iraqi 
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troops invaded Kuwait. 469 Within 24 hours Kuwait was under Iraqi control 470 This left Iraq in control 
of a significant proportion of the world's oil reserves. 471 
Unlike the situation in Southern Rhodesia, which could be termed an internal conflict, the 
annexation of Kuwait by Iraq reflected more closely the interstate conflicts envisaged by the drafters of 
the UN Charter that drove the creation of Chapter VII of the Charter. 472 Within a matter of hours, the 
UNSC would condemn the invasion and within days economic sanctions would be in place. The next 
section of this chapter looks at the UNSC resolutions invoked against Iraq. 
3.3 UNSC Resolutions Relating to Iraq (1990-1996) 
The UNSC has released an unprecedented number of resolutions dealing with the situation in Iraq. It is 
not, therefore, intended that this section should go through each resolution in detail, rather it is intended 
that the key resolutions in relation to economic sanctions and the UNSC discussions surrounding their 
implementation will be outlined. This will exclude consideration of more recent UNSC sanctions 
resolutions dealing with Iraq as they post-date the issues under consideration here. 
3.3.1 UNSC Resolutions Taken During the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait 
UNSC Resolution 661, taken 4 days after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, was the first resolution to impose 
economic sanctions on Iraq. 473 It was sponsored by a number of states474 but largely drafted by the 
US. 475 It imposed comprehensive economic sanctions on Iraq from the outset, which can be contrasted 
with the piecemeal fashion in which economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia were imposed 
, 
476 
This demonstrates a willingness on the part of the UNSC to try to avoid the problems associated with 
the slowness at which the implementation of economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia took place, 
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leading inter alia to a change in the economy of Southern Rhodesia. It may also be reflective of how 
seriously the UNSC took the threat made to international peace and security by Iraq's invasion of 
Kuwait. 
UNSC Resolution 661 prohibited the importation from or exportation to Iraq and Kuwait of 
all products, save for those products intended strictly for medical or humanitarian purposes 
4" The 
resolution also prohibited the provision of economic resources. 478 UNSC Resolution 661 established a 
committee ('the 661 Committee') comprising all members of the UNSC to examine reports and seek 
further information from states concerning the implementation of the resolution and report to the 
UNSC with its observations and recommendations X79 Two later resolutions developed the UN position 
in relation to humanitarian aid. UNSC Resolution 666 clarified what would constitute humanitarian or 
medical aid. 48° Furthermore, in UNSC Resolution 669, the 661 Committee's ambit would later be 
expanded to include the examination of requests for humanitarian aid. 48' 
At the UNSC meeting, debating whether UNSC Resolution 661 should be adopted, Mr Al- 
Anbari, the representative of Iraq argued that Iraq had already begun withdrawing from Kuwait in 
accordance with UNSC Resolution 660.482 This, he suggested, made the proposed resolution 
inconsistent with its aim, which was, he submitted, to ensure implementation of UNSC Resolution 
660.483 Whilst it ultimately abstained from voting, Cuba criticised the mooted resolution on three 
grounds. Firstly, it accepted that Iraq had stated that it would withdraw troops from Kuwait and had in 
fact begun doing so. 484 Secondly, it argued that the resolution was merely a means of getting the UNSC 
to approve and geographically expand `specific sanctions that [had] already been imposed unilaterally 
by the principal developed Powers of the world. '485 Finally, it stated that the resolution was being 
justified on spurious grounds, in that it had purported to be a response to a failure to comply with 
UNSC Resolution 660 and, yet, since it had been circulated for the first time Iraq had made moves to 
comply with UNSC Resolution 660, which were not now being considered. 486 
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Whilst generally other members of the UNSC487 voted in favour of the resolution 
'488 two 
points were noted by some of the participating states. Firstly, Malaysia and Canada acknowledged that 
such expansive sanctions would cause some humanitarian difficulties but suggested that the suffering 
was a necessary sacrifice in order to maintain international peace and security. 489 Secondly, both 
Malaysia and the UK stated that the proposed resolution should not be seen as a prelude to military 
sanctions, rather economic sanctions were being taken so that military sanctions would not be 
necessary. 490 It should, however, be noted that the US, as the main drafter of the resolution, 
concentrated largely on the motivation for economic sanctions and made no promise that military 
sanctions would not ultimately follow. 491 
Despite the economic sanctions outlined in UNSC Resolution 661, and reiterated in later 
resolutions, 492 Iraq failed to comply with the demand to withdraw from Kuwait. This failure resulted in 
the creation of quasi-military sanctions in UNSC Resolution 665.493 It called on Member States 
deploying maritime forces in support of Kuwait to use such measures as were necessary to halt all 
inward and outward maritime shipping, in order to inspect and verify their cargoes and destinations and 
ensure strict implementation of UNSC Resolution 661.194 These sanctions were strengthened by the 
UNSC's confirmation that they applied to aircraft. 495 
UNSC Resolution 665 is indicative of the speed at which the UNSC was approaching 
sanctions against Iraq. Despite its previous assertion that UNSC Resolution 661 would not be used as a 
prelude to military sanctions, the UK was amongst those states that tabled the draft resolution. 496 Its 
representative at the UNSC, Sir Crispin Tickell, argued that the force contemplated was minimal and 
would only be used if necessary. 497 In opposition to the resolution, Yemen and Cuba argued that UNSC 
Resolution 661 had been given insufficient time to work prior to the invocation of further measures. 498 
117 Canada, China, Cote d'lvoire, Colombia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, United Kingdom, Malaysia, Romania, 
USSR, United States and Democratic Republic of the Congo voted in favour of the resolution. Yemen joined Cuba in abstaining from voting on the grounds that it sought conciliation through negotiation. 488 For example the French representative, Mr Blanc, stated that the measures envisaged were, justified 'because of 
the unacceptable nature of Iraq's military aggression, which is a major violation of international law and a serious 
threat to international peace and security. ' 
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Furthermore, Cuba argued that the proposed resolution was ambiguous as to its ambit as it did 
not specify exactly what states should provide troops nor offer any explicit limitation on what `inward 
and outward maritime shipping' should be halted. 499 The response to criticism that the resolution was 
ambiguous, offered by Mr Razali, the Malaysian representative was that: `[a]t this time no one can give 
any definitive assurance on the action contemplated in the resolution. The litmus test, therefore, will be 
its implementation. '500 France justified the invocation of the proposed resolution on the grounds that 
Iraq had been attempting to violate UNSC Resolution 661 and, as a result, further measures were 
needed in order to ensure compliance. 501 The resolution was adopted with thirteen votes in favour; 
Cuba and Yemen abstained. 
It can be seen from the above that UN economic sanctions against Iraq were responsive from 
the outset in that the UNSC sought to rectify inadequacies in implementation such as Iraq's attempted 
breaches. This answered criticisms levelled against economic sanctions in relation to Southern 
Rhodesia that the UNSC acted slowly and failed to deal adequately with Southern Rhodesia's own 
breaches of the sanctions system. 
However, if the UNSC failed to react when sanctions against Southern Rhodesia were in place 
it could be said that it reacted too quickly when sanctions against Iraq were enacted. Mr Penalosa, the 
representative of Colombia, vocalised this concern when he stated that `the haste imposed on [the 
drafting of the proposed resolution] has deprived non-permanent members of adequate time and leisure 
to negotiate improvements in it. 002 The ambiguity in relation to whom exactly the resolution would 
apply in terms of providing troops and in terms of what ships should be stopped was also a matter of 
concern in terms both of ensuring that it was properly implemented and ensuring that those states that 
voted to support it did so fully cognisant of its ramifications. 
3.3.2 UNSC Resolutions Taken Following the Gulf Conflict 
Despite the statements of the UK and Malaysia to the contrary, 503 it is clear that from the very outset of 
economic sanctions that military sanctions were being contemplated, 504 and shortly after the 
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implementation of UNSC Resolution 661 a military coalition of 34 countries began to form. 515 The US 
very much drove the coalition and provided 75 per cent of the troops. 
506 The use of force was 
authorised by UNSC Resolution 678 in November 1990507 and the allied attack began on 16 January 
1991 with an aerial bombardment which would continue for six weeks before a ground offensive. 508 
Once the ground offensive against Iraq commenced on 24 February, Kuwait was liberated within a 
matter of days and Iraq sought a cease-fire. 509 Iraq had lost somewhere between 94,000 and 281,000 
people, 510 whereas, the coalition had lost 126 troops. 511 Iraq began withdrawing its troops from Kuwait 
on 27 February 1991512 and ultimately agreed to a ceasefire on 28 February 1991.313 The terms of the 
ceasefire were set out in UNSC Resolution 687 514 
3.3.2.1 UNSC Resolution 6875'5 
Despite the ceasefire and withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait, which meant that the aims of UNSC 
Resolution 661 had been achieved, UNSC Resolution 687 did not rescind any of the previous UNSC 
resolutions. Force could still be used under UNSC Resolution 678 because it authorised Member States 
to use all necessary means to uphold and implement Security Council resolution 660 (1990) and all 
subsequent relevant resolutions. 'S16 In fact both the UK517 and the US518 invoked UNSC Resolution 
687 in justifying their military intervention into Iraq in 2003. Furthermore, the scope of UNSC 
Resolution 687 was not limited to the situation between Iraq and Kuwait but also referred to Iraq's 
weapon policy and to the possibility of Iraq committing terrorist acts. It required Iraq to cease 
production or acquisition of and destroy previously produced or acquired chemical and biological 
s weapons, nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles within 45 days. i9 
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Under the resolution the UNSC held Iraq responsible for all damages caused as a result of 
its 
occupation of Kuwait. 52° In light of those responsibilities the UNSC directed that the 
Secretary-General 
create a fund to pay compensation to the relevant parties ('the Compensation Fund'). 521 
UNSC Resolution 687 did advance the situation in relation to humanitarian exemptions. It 
provided, in paragraph 20, that the sanctions would not apply to food notified to the 661 Committee, 
522 
to materials and supplies notified for essential civilian needs under the `no-objection' procedure to the 
661 Committee or to any further findings of need by the 661 Committee. 
523 The paragraph 20 
provisions were subject to review every sixty days. 52' The 661 Committee could also allow exceptions 
to the ban on the importation of commodities and products originating in Iraq if such activity was 
needed to finance any action under paragraph 20.525 The economic sanctions would come to an end 
when the UNSC had approved the plan for a payment fund with respect to Iraq's debts and when Iraq 
had complied with the various weapons provisions. 526 
UNSC Resolution 687 was a punitive resolution. Ahtisaari had by the time the resolution was 
tabled produced a report on Iraq that indicated that the civilian population had been heavily impacted 
by both the hostilities and economic sanctions. 527 At the UNSC meeting discussing the resolution, the 
representative of Iraq, Mr Al-Anbari, argued that civilians had suffered greatly during the hostilities, 
both as a result of directly being bombed and also through the destruction of key water, sewage and 
electricity facilities. 528 He further criticised the proposed resolution on three grounds. Firstly, that it 
imposed reparations on Iraq whilst not awarding reparations for the damage that Iraq suffered. 
Secondly, that other states in the Middle East had weapons of the nature of those being prohibited in 
Iraq. Finally, that the maintenance of previous resolutions was unjustified in light of the progress Iraq 
had made on conforming to their requirements. 529 
Yemen reiterated many of Iraq's concerns in its own criticism of the resolution. Its main 
difficulties were that the prohibition on arms would merely create a `military imbalance' in the region 
making Israel, a state which Yemen submitted challenged the Security Council and the intern ational 
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community whenever it [felt] it had sufficient military power... to act without fear of competition from 
anyone else', more powerful. It also argued that the humanitarian crisis would be worsened by 
economic sanctions and that the resolution was being used to justify the behaviour of certain states. 5: 0 
The representative of Cuba, Mr Alarcon de Quesda, accused the UNSC of selectivity in its approach to 
the proposed resolution stating that it was taking responsibility for the maintenance of boundaries, 
which went beyond its legal powers and it was banning Iraq from keeping, producing or acquiring 
weapons whilst aware that other states in the region had such weapons. 53' Cuba ultimately voted 
against the resolution. 
Other states were willing to support the resolution, with Zimbabwe calling it a `justified 
response to a unique situation' and Zaire stating that it addressed the humanitarian problems being seen 
in Iraq. 532 France, too, saw the resolution as materially changing the situation with regard to the 
importation of foodstuffs and other commodities, which it stated could be imported once notified to the 
661 Committee 533 The UK justified the arms provisions by arguing that Iraq was far more advanced in 
terms of arms production than other states in the region and had in fact used them against its own 
population and against neighbouring states. 534 It also stated that the resolution sought a balance 
between ensuring Kuwait received reparations for damage and not crippling the Iraqi economy because 
the resolution did not insist on excessive payments. India on the other hand attempted to adopt a 
reasonably moderate approach when it voted in favour of the resolution whilst also saying that it would 
seek for the commodities listed in the Martti report to be freely exportable to Iraq. 535 The resolution 
was passed with twelve states in favour, 536 one against, 537 and two abstentions. 538 
UNSC Resolution 687 is flawed for four reasons. Firstly, it failed to offer any real 
consideration to the inroads that Iraq had made towards complying with earlier resolutions. There was 
therefore no incentive for Iraq to concede to future demands if it seemed that such concessions would 
bring with them little benefit. Secondly, it could, and in fact did, prove almost impossible to 
demonstrate that Iraq had divested itself of the listed weapons. Thirdly, the weapons requirements were 
only imposed on Iraq and not on other states that also possessed weapons. Finally, any increase in the 
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export of goods required for humanitarian purposes to Iraq was dependent on the opinion of 
the 661 
Committee rather than on objective criteria, given that its permission had to be sought for such export. 
3.3.2.2 UNSC Resolution 778`39 
Despite the humanitarian provisions in UNSC Resolution 687, when it was adopting UNSC Resolution 
778 the UNSC noted that there were concerns about the nutrition and health of the civilian population 
of Iraq and that the humanitarian situation might worsen. The UNHCR 
had released a report the 
previous December indicating that by that date more than 700,000 Iraqis were 
internally displaced. 540 
In February 1992, the Special Rapporteur on Human Rights had reported that human rights violations 
were being committed in Iraq by both the Government of Iraq and by other parties and 
deemed the 
situation so grave as to warrant 'a response that would have to be considered as disproportionate 
in 
most other cases of human rights violations' with the presence of human rights monitors in Iraq until 
such time as the human rights situation improved. 54' By 30 July 1992, the UN Special Rapporteur 
stated that there was no reason to assume that the situation of human rights [had] improved' since the 
February report. 542 
Whilst Iraq may have had significant debts following the hostilities with Iran in the 1980's, as 
an oil producing state, it was in a position to raise money. The UNSC had attempted to formulate a 
means for Iraq to do this within the sanctions framework by creating resolutions allowing for an escrow 
account from which the various provisions of UNSC Resolution 687 would be financed. 
543 The funds 
for the account were provided for in UNSC Resolution 778. 
The UNSC decided that all states that held Iraqi state funds, representing the proceeds of sale 
of Iraqi petroleum or petroleum products, paid on or after 6 August 1990, would transfer those funds to 
the escrow account. 544 This transfer was subject to a limit of 200 million dollars or more than fifty per 
cent of the total funds transferred by all states. 545 Furthermore, all states which were in possession of 
such petroleum products were to take `all feasible steps' to purchase or arrange for the sale of such 
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products at fair market price and transfer the proceeds as soon as possible to the escrow account 
. 
546 it 
also urged states to contribute funds from other sources to the escrow account. 547 The Secretary- 
General was to monitor the whereabouts of petroleum products and the sale of same. 5'8 He was also to 
ensure that the money from the escrow account went to the Compensation Fund and towards the costs 
of UN activities concerning the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, provision of humanitarian 
relief in Iraq and other UN operations. 549 
The UNSC was prepared to suspend the operative paragraphs of the resolution outlined above 
once oil exports took place pursuant to the system in UNSC Resolutions 706 and 712, or until the 
eventual lifting of sanctions pursuant to UNSC Resolution 687, and all proceeds of those oil exports 
would immediately be transferred to the escrow account. 55° Iraq had, however, been unwilling to 
implement UNSC Resolutions 706 and 712 as it perceived them to be unreasonable encroachments on 
its sovereignty. 551 UNSC Resolution 778 was to have no effect on the debts owed by Iraq. 552 Foodstuff 
and essential materials and supplies were to be financed from the escrow account going forward 
. 
ss3 
These measures raised $101.5 million. 554 They were, however, short-term measures, which 
would not be sustainable in the medium to long-term, as they relied on petroleum products already 
having reached third states. In order to provide adequate funds in the escrow account in the future, an 
agreement would have to be reached, acceptable to Iraq, whereby Iraq could export oil and the money 
received would be used to finance the escrow account. 
3.3.2.3 UNSC Resolution 986555 
By April 1995 the UNSC expressed concern that there was a serious nutritional and health situation in 
Iraq, which could worsen. 556 In order that Iraq be given an opportunity to rectify the humanitarian 
situation itself, UNSC Resolution 986 established a system that became known as the Oil-for-Food 
Programme. The UNSC authorised the importation of petroleum and petroleum products from Iraq and 
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essential transactions relating to them, up to a total of one billion US dollars every 90 days, provided 
they received approval from the 661 Committee and paid the full amount of each purchase directly into 
the escrow account established by the Secretary-General for this purpose. ss7 
The funds in the escrow account were to be used predominately for humanitarian purposes 
and the UNSC delineated a number of necessary actions. It requested the Secretary-General to use the 
funds deposited to finance the export to Iraq of medicine, health supplies, foodstuffs and materials and 
supplies for essential civilian needs. 558 There were some criteria that needed to be met before this could 
take place. 559 Each export had to be requested by the Government of Iraq, which also had to guarantee 
their equitable distribution on the basis of a plan approved by the Secretary-General. 56° He had to 
receive confirmation that the exported goods concerned had arrived in Iraq and ensure that the 
Government of Iraq distributed relief equitably by providing between 130 and 150 million US dollars 
every 90 days to the UN Inter-Agency Humanitarian Programme operating within the sovereign 
territory of Iraq or a proportionate amount if less than one billion US dollars worth of petroleum or 
petroleum products was sold during any 90 day period 
. 
561 Furthermore, a percentage of the funds had 
to be transferred to the Compensation Fund. 562 The money in the escrow account would also be used 
for administrative purposes, to meet the costs of the UN associated with implementation of the 
resolution, the current operating costs of the Special Commission and any reasonable expense 
determined by the 661 Committee to be directly related to the export by Iraq of petroleum and 
petroleum based products as permitted. 563 Finally the sum of up to 10 million US dollars had to be 
made available every 90 days for the payments to states envisaged under paragraph 6 of UNSC 
Resolution 778.564 
UNSC Resolution 986 was in one respect a significant improvement upon previous 
resolutions in that it allowed Iraq's oil reserves to be used to improve the humanitarian situation in 
Iraq. More extensive consideration will be given to the implementation of the Oil-for-Food Programme 
later in this chapter, however three problems on the face of the resolution should be mentioned here. 
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Firstly, the importation from Iraq was only allowed for a thirty-day period. This was a short 
period of time given that the system could not function beyond that date without a further mandate. 
Whilst it ensured the system was constantly under review, a longer period of permitted importation, 
which had a review period at thirty days but could function beyond that, would have been more 
efficient in that it would have allowed for implementation problems to be seen and rectified without 
there being a risk that the exportation of oil would be forced to stop. 
Secondly, the money in the escrow account was being spread too thinly. The primary aim of 
the escrow account and of the resolution was to resolve the humanitarian crisis in Iraq. All of the 
money raised should have been placed in an escrow account and used by Iraq, albeit under supervision, 
for humanitarian aid, which would be a strong response to any potential criticism by Iraq that such 
resolutions impacted on its sovereignty. Other issues such as compensation and administrative costs 
should have been treated as subsidiary. The former costs could have been frozen until a point at which 
Iraq could sustain itself and there was a stable humanitarian situation and the latter could, with the 
agreement of the UNGA, have been serviced from the general UN budget. 
The second issue was compounded by the third 
- 
that there were no provisions to allow other 
states to fund humanitarian programmes if oil exportation failed to raise sufficient funds to resolve the 
humanitarian situation. The assumption of the UNSC seems to have been that Iraq would be able to 
wholly finance itself once oil exportation recommenced. If this did not prove to be case, as it ultimately 
did not, there was no suggestion that other states might donate funds for humanitarian purposes. This 
was a significant flaw in UNSC Resolution 986. 
A process to monitor exports and imports was later established under UNSC Resolution 1051, 
which required notification by states to a joint unit comprised of a Special Commission and the 
Director of the IAEA. 565 States were required to notify exports and potential breaches of economic 
sanctions. 
3.3.3 Further Resolutions 
The resolutions outlined in detail in this chapter do not cover all of the resolutions that Iraq was 
subjected to between 1990 and 1996. Iraq's denial on occasion to allow weapons inspectors access, or 
%S UN SC Res 1051 (27 March 1996) UN Doc S/RES/1051. 
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to refuse to export petroleum, prompted further UNSC resolutions. s66 The humanitarian situation also 
remained unsatisfactory and regular reviews of it and of the Oil-for-Food Programme took place. The 
resolutions outlined here, however, form the basis of the next sections of this chapter. They are relevant 
because they outline the policies that had the greatest impact on the Iraqi situation as time progressed. 
3.4 Were Economic Sanctions Taken Against Iraq Effective? 
There are two aspects to the question of effectiveness that may be important in considering a system of 
sanctions. In Southern Rhodesia, we saw the first of them - the actions taken by the UNSC that 
influence the effectiveness of sanctions, for example the move to more targeted economic sanctions as 
time went on. 
The second aspect of effectiveness is raised in Iraq. What impact does the effectiveness of 
economic sanctions have on the state against which they are implemented? For example, does the 
effectiveness of a sanctions regime increase compliance sufficiently that any deficiencies within that 
regime may be disregarded? These two aspects of effectiveness remain important because they give 
guidance as to how economic sanctions should develop. They offer an indication as to the UNSC 
policies that have and have not worked and the impact of those policies on the community on which 
they have been implemented. 
This section offers a brief analysis of the effectiveness of economic sanctions in achieving 
their intended goals in Iraq. It discusses the notion of effectiveness in the Iraqi context. It questions 
whether the situation in Iraq was such that Iraq was a good target for economic sanctions, that is to say 
were there indications that economic sanctions should have been effective. Finally it examines whether 
economic sanctions were in fact effective. 
3.4.1 How to Define Effectiveness in the Iraqi Context 
The decision as to whether a system of economic sanctions has or has not been effective is based upon 
the degree to which a given system of economic sanctions achieves the goals for which it was 
established. Many systems of economic sanctions have multiple goals as each state will have its own 
interest in mind when voting to implement sanctions. Iraq presents a difficult analysis because as 
s('(' UNSC Res 1060 (12 June 1996) UN Doc S/RES/I060, UNSC Res 1 115 (21 June 1997) UN Doc S/RES/I 115. 
UNSC Res 1129 (12 September 1997) UN Doc S/RES/I 129. 
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economic sanctions progressed the goals of economic sanctions expressed on the face of the UNSC 
resolutions expanded. 
The initial goal of UN economic sanctions against Iraq was the withdrawal of Iraq from 
Kuwait. 567 However once that goal was reached, albeit through the use of military sanctions, the 
parameters of economic sanctions were shifted to include commitments in relation to weapons and the 
prevention of terrorism. 568 This section will look at two issues in order to ascertain the difficulties in 
measuring the effectiveness of economic sanctions against Iraq - selection of sanction-type and the 
issue of multiple goals before concluding with a summary of what economic sanctions would need to 
achieve in order to be considered effective in the Iraqi context. 
3.4.1.1 Selection of Economic Sanctions 
Save for the limited British naval actions, 569 military sanctions were never seriously considered against 
Southern Rhodesia. Iraq presented a very different situation than had been at issue in Southern 
Rhodesia in that annexation of another territory had occurred. States were quick to suggest the use of 
force. 570 This use of both economic and military sanctions is important when considering the 
effectiveness of economic sanctions in two respects. 
Firstly, the speed at which the UNSC moved from economic sanctions to military sanctions 
may be seen by states as proof that the UNSC sees economic sanctions as insufficient in their own right 
to force change. This may have impacted on the effectiveness with respect to both Iraq itself and other 
states. Iraq may have believed that it could outlast economic sanctions because it to began to perceive 
economic sanctions as a weak tool, which would diminish their effectiveness in practice. Other states 
may have been willing to breach economic sanctions in the belief that this would have little impact on 
whether the overall aim of economic sanctions was or was not achieved as economic sanctions would 
not in any case be effective. 
Secondly the use of both military and economic sanctions may make any assessment of 
sanctions difficult. This manifests itself in two ways in the case of Iraq. Firstly, following Iraq's 
invasion of Kuwait, economic sanctions were taken by the UN with the aim of coercing Iraq to 
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withdraw from Kuwait, but before an assessment had been made as to whether economic sanctions 
had 
worked, military force was taken as a result of which Iraq withdrew from Kuwait. Based on this 
fact 
pattern it would be very difficult to assess whether or not economic sanctions were in any way 
effective because it is unclear to what extent they, as opposed to the military sanctions that followed, 
could be considered responsible for Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait. 
The second phase of economic sanctions also serves to illustrate the difficulties in assessing 
economic sanctions when military sanctions are also in use. In that phase economic sanctions 
followed 
military sanctions. The military sanctions against Iraq had caused damage to it. Most significantly, 
material damage had been caused to its key resources such as the water and electrical supply. 
57 ' As it 
was subject to economic sanctions Iraq was not in a position to rebuild those resources. In that situation 
it is very difficult to separate the damage caused by economic sanctions from that arising as a result of 
military sanctions. As such, it is possible that subsequent economic sanctions could be assessed as 
being effective, in the sense of forcing change, when, in fact, part of that effectiveness is due to the 
devastation perpetrated on the state by military sanctions. 
3.4.1.2 Multiple Goals 
Over the course of their existence economic sanctions against Iraq had more than one clearly defined 
goal. UNSC resolutions alone indicated that economic sanctions against Iraq were being implemented 
to force Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait, 572 to refrain from developing nuclear or chemical weapons and 
weapons of mass destruction and not to commit acts of terrorism. 573 Additionally, states were also 
motivated by other, more individual, concerns. It has been suggested that the economic sanctions were 
being used opportunistically against Iraq as they got wider support than military force would have done 
and that their goals shifted with the circumstances. 574 The goals of states beyond those delineated in the 
UNSC resolutions are briefly considered before addressing the impact of multiple goals on the 
effectiveness of economic sanctions. 
511 Ahtisaari Report (n 422). 
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The US led the way with regard to both economic and military sanctions against Iraq and has 
been described as the `principal architect' of UNSC Resolution 661.575 The US backed its intervention 
into Iraq with a far-reaching agenda. A State Department spokesperson, Margaret Tutwiler, indicated 
that the US, in addition to goals outlined in the resolutions, 576 was seeking to ensure all of its citizens in 
the region were safe, that there was freedom of navigation in the Persian Gulf and the continued 
production of oil. 577 Additionally, it has been suggested that the US wished to re-establish its status 
internationally, as a country that was capable of successfully fighting a war, following the war in 
Vietnam. 578 Finally, it has been suggested that the US saw involvement in Iraq as an ideal opportunity 
to get a strategic military constellation in the Middle East, which would have economic, political and 
geo-strategic benefits. 579 
Aside from the US, only France and the UK have played any significant role in the 
formulation of policy in relation to Iraq. 580 Both France and the UK found their loyalties divided 
between Iraq and Kuwait. France was an `instinctive opponent of Iraq' and the UK had colonial ties 
with Kuwait but both also had significant economic interests in Iraq. 581 Despite being faced with a 
similar dilemma, the UK decided to aggressively align itself with the US whereas France found its 
government divided and ultimately focused on attempts to reach agreement through conciliation. 582 
Other states had various interests in the situation in Iraq. Japan and Germany found 
themselves constrained constitutionally with regard to any military action and largely failed to voice 
opinions on the situation as it unfolded. 583 The USSR, and its successor, Russia, had strong economic 
links with Iraq and Iraq was indebted to it. It was therefore hopeful that economic sanctions would not 
remain in place for an extended period of time. 584 The Gulf States generally were opposed to Iraq, if for 
no other reason than out of fear for the consequences should it be successful in its annexation of 
Kuwait. 585 Iran had slightly broader motivations. It wished to bring its war with Iraq to a formal 
conclusion and win favour with the Western countries whose support was needed to rebuild the Iranian 
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economy. 586 Iran and the UK were not the only states that could see the strategic value attached 
to their 
choice to support either Iraq or Kuwait, states such as Turkey were motivated 
by the possibility of 
currying US favour and in Turkey's case the opportunity to expedite European Union membership. 
587 
The multiple goals of economic sanctions against Iraq can cause difficulties in assessing the 
effectiveness of that system of economic sanctions. This difficulty is amplified as the goals set out 
in 
the UNSC resolutions have both short-term and long-term elements. The withdrawal of Iraq 
from 
Kuwait was certainly a short-term goal whereas the goals in relation to weapons and terrorism, whilst 
couched as short-term goals, were in practice long-term goals since Iraq was required not only to 
destroy weapons but also to refrain from developing more in the future. On the other hand, even states 
seeking the same goal, for example, those seeking peace between Iraq and Kuwait, may have had very 
different opinions as to over what time period they expected that to occur. For example, the US may 
not have felt that a speedy resolution to the difficulties was necessary as long as it stayed in occupation 
and had economic control over Iraq, whereas a state like Russia had an economic motivation to ensure 
that sanctions did not stay in place long-term. 
3.4.1.3 Effectiveness in the Iraqi Context 
In order to consider effectiveness in the Iraqi context, the time period needs to be divided in two, as 
occurred with the discussion of UNSC resolutions. Francois Mitterrand, the French prime minister, had 
indicated, prior to the military intervention, that Iraq could avoid being subjected to military sanctions 
if it released the hostages it had taken and withdrew from Kuwait. 588 It is reasonable, in light of that 
statement, to assume that the same criteria would have applied at that point to a cessation of economic 
sanctions. In other words economic sanctions would have been effective had they exerted sufficient 
pressure on Iraq that it released the hostages and withdrew from Kuwait. 
The second period of time under consideration started on 3 April 1991, following the ceasefire 
between Iraq and Kuwait signed on 28 February 1991. This assessment would necessarily take place 
over a longer time period, as the goals set out during this phase of sanctions were not achievable in a 
short time period. For economic sanctions to be considered effective for this period, Iraq would have 
needed to destroy and cease production of chemical and nuclear weapons and all other weapons of 
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mass destruction. lt would also have had to refrain from involvement in terrorist activity. It is more 
difficult to prove these goals than the goals of the first phase of economic sanctions. Unlike the end of 
unrepresentative rule in Southern Rhodesia or the withdrawal of troops from Kuwait, it would prove 
difficult if not impossible for a country to establish that it did not have certain types of weapons on its 
territory. 
Whilst it is accepted that Iraq did not fully cooperate with the UN missions, which sought to 
verify that it was complying with the weapons requirements contained in UNSC resolutions, 589 it is 
submitted that even full cooperation would not have provided sufficient evidence for economic 
sanctions to be lifted. This is because, even if weapons inspectors, with full right of access to Iraqi 
territory, stated that there were no weapons in Iraq it would not be possible for those weapons 
inspectors to maintain a simultaneous presence across all of Iraq, both urban and rural. As such, other 
states would always be in a position to suggest that Iraq did have weapons in a region not yet inspected 
or had moved storage and production to a region that had already been cleared by the weapons 
inspectors. This meant that Iraq would never be able to prove that it did not have weapons. This goal 
would only be satisfied if the UN or its Member States chose to believe that Iraq had decommissioned 
all of its weapons and was not developing more as Iraq would never be in a position to physically 
prove these contentions. 
The other goal of economic sanctions during the second phase was the prevention of acts of 
terrorism. The achievement of this goal would cause difficulties of proof for three reasons. Firstly, acts 
of terrorism are not always attributable to or supported by states. 59o It is unlikely, particularly in light 
of its history of uprisings, which have been briefly outlined in this chapter, that Iraq would have 
absolute control over acts of terrorism on its territory. Secondly, a legal definition for the term 
terrorism has not yet been agreed upon in international law. 59' This allows other states flexibility in 
deciding whether Iraq had or had not adhered to this requirement. Thirdly, it would be difficult to 
establish when the prevention of terrorism acts has been achieved. It is, of course, possible to prove 
that acts of state-supported terrorism have not occurred to date. However the fact that a terrorist act has 
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not occurred by a given date does not mean that one will not occur 
in the future. As such, it would be 
difficult to establish at what point the absence of terrorist acts is sufficient to justify the lifting of a 
system of sanctions because such an act might still occur in the future. 
3.4.2 Should Economic Sanctions Have Been Effective in this Case? 
This section considers whether Iraq was a good target for economic sanctions. It 
does so by looking at 
whether Iraq had characteristics such that economic sanctions were likely to 
be effective at forcing 
change. It considers the effectiveness of economic sanctions in relation to the two phases of economic 
sanctions against Iraq. 
3.4.2.1 Effectiveness of the First Phase of Economic Sanctions 
Economic sanctions taken during the first phase were given less than five months to work before 
military force was initiated. Furthermore, preparation for military sanctions began to take place 
considerably earlier than the actual initiation of military sanctions as a result of the `failing' of 
economic sanctions. 592 
As evidenced by the case study of Southern Rhodesia, UN economic sanctions should not be 
considered a short-term solution to a problem. Economic sanctions take time to paralyse the economy 
of a state. 593 Regardless of how reactive to economic sanctions a state might be in the medium- to long- 
term, a state will be in a position to cope with economic sanctions in the short term. In the case of Iraq, 
whilst it was heavily reliant on imported food, it had sufficient supplies to last for a number of months 
in the initial stages of sanctions. 594 As economic sanctions were given so little time to work in the 
initial phase it is very difficult to predict whether they could have been effective. The indicators 
discussed below in relation to the second phase of economic sanctions would of course have been 
present. 
However, Iraq would also have been aware that states were considering further action in the 
form of military sanctions. The action taken by UK and US naval forces to enforce UNSC Resolution 
661, which included US warships `firing across the bows of two Iraqi tankers' and the deployment of 
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US and other troops to the Gulf, 595 was a clear indication that military sanctions were imminent. The 
move towards military sanctions would have belied any attempt to convince Iraq that there was a belief 
amongst the implementing states that economic sanctions would work. This alone could serve to 
increase Iraq's belief that it would be largely unaffected by economic sanctions, which might in turn 
decrease their effectiveness. Furthermore, states that were not initially involved in the plans for military 
action might be discouraged from strict adherence to economic sanctions if they believed that military 
sanctions were, in any case, imminent. 
3.4.2.2 Effectiveness of the Second Phase of Economic Sanctions 
One of the difficulties with economic sanctions against Iraq is the UNSC's uncertainty surrounding 
their effectiveness. The first phase of economic sanctions was considered by the UNSC to have failed, 
which is why under UNSC Resolution 678 the UNSC authorised those Member States that were co- 
operating with Kuwait `to use all possible means to uphold and implement' UNSC Resolution 660 and 
subsequent resolutions. 596 Despite this, once military sanctions were completed economic sanctions 
continued 
. 
197 This suggests that the UNSC may have believed that economic sanctions could have been 
successful in the first phase had they been given adequate time to work. This section examines the 
second phase of economic sanctions against Iraq. The second phase refers to the period following the 
end of the Gulf war commencing with UNSC Resolution 687 taken on 3 April 1991.598 It will briefly 
consider four indicators for the success of economic sanctions 
- 
the reliance on imports, facilities for 
transportation, the actions of other states and oil. 
3.4.2.2.1 The Importation of Goods 
One of the key factors in whether economic sanctions can be confident of success is the 
degree to which a state subject to sanctions can rely on its own resources as opposed to requiring that 
goods and commodities be imported from other states. As discussed in the last chapter, South Rhodesia 
initially managed to mitigate the impact of economic sanctions by modifying its behaviour, 599 
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The economy of Iraq was such that it was unlikely to be in a position to follow Southern 
Rhodesia's success in mitigating the effects of economic sanctions. Iraq had from the 1960's seen a 
shift in the economy which had resulted in a drastic reduction in the number of people employed in the 
agricultural sector from 56 per cent in 1960 to 12 per cent in 1990`i0°and it was importing 70 per cent of 
its food needs from other states by the time that economic sanctions were instigated. `i01 These figures 
indicate that Iraq was heavily reliant on obtaining its food from other states. 
Furthermore, because of the low percentage of workers involved in agriculture, Iraq would not 
have found it easy to modify its production output in order to decrease this reliance on imported food. 
It should also be noted that, unlike the situation in Southern Rhodesia, where white citizens were 
supportive of the Smith government and resentful of economic sanctions, 602 some commentators have 
suggested that the citizens of Iraq, whilst forced not to criticise the government regime, did little to 
support the government in overcoming the effects of economic sanctions. `i03 In fact, between February 
1991 (immediately after the cessation of military sanctions) and 1997, it is estimated that 2 million 
Iraqis fled Iraq. 604 This too would impact on the effectiveness of economic sanctions against Iraq. 
As Iraq was heavily reliant on the importation of basic foodstuffs, economic sanctions limiting 
the exportation of such products to Iraq should have had severe consequences for the Iraqi population 
and encouraged Iraq to amend its behaviour. 
3.4.2.2.2 Facilities for Transportation 
By the time it was subjected to economic sanctions, Iraq's economy was largely driven by its 
exportation of oil. By 1980, oil was responsible for up to 98 per cent of foreign currency earnings 
amounting to 90 per cent of state revenue. 605 Despite this, Iraq's export facilities were limited as it is 
almost completely land-locked. Iraq had attempted to develop the port facilities in the south of the 
country, '06 but these facilities were targeted during the military offensive and in many cases 
destroyed. 607 As such, like Southern Rhodesia before it, Iraq relied on other states to enable the 
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exportation of oil. Iraq's only export pipelines ran through Saudi Arabia and Turkey. 008 These were 
closed immediately following sanctions. 
Iraq's limited facilities for exporting oil should have made it an ideal target for economic 
sanctions as it provided an easy way of controlling Iraq's access to foreign currency. This would cause 
Iraq particular difficulties when combined with its reliance on imported food. 
3.4.2.2.3 The Position of Other States 
As discussed in relation to Southern Rhodesia, a key factor in the effectiveness of a given system of 
economic sanctions is how states choose to react to that system. 609 In the initial phases of economic 
sanctions taken against Iraq, states seemed willing to enforce the sanctions. Simpson contrasted the 
situations of Southern Rhodesia and Iraq when he stated that: `[sanctions against Iraq] were as fierce as 
the United Nations had voted against Rhodesia... the difference this time was that no one was likely to 
break them. '610 This was confirmed by Greenwood who stated that `resolution 661 was almost 
universally applied' and specifically that it was applied by `all the major trading states. '6 1 
Even where there was a risk of sanctions being breached, the repercussions were not in those 
initial phases as significant as similar situations that had arisen in the Southern Rhodesian context. For 
example, both Zambia in the Southern Rhodesian context and Jordan in the Iraqi context relied heavily 
on the target state for the survival of its own economy. However, Zambia and Southern Rhodesia's 
economies were interlinked to the extent that if Zambia breached sanctions it was in a position to prop 
up the Southern Rhodesian economy. Whereas, whilst the full implementation of economic sanctions 
against Iraq would have devastated Jordan's economy, bringing it almost to a standstill, 612 despite 
causing estimated losses in excess of half a billion dollars to Jordan's economy, `6'3 whether Jordan did 
or did not implement economic sanctions would not make an appreciable difference to Iraq's economy 
or military status. 614 
It should, however, be noted that as sanctions against Iraq progressed breaches did occur. 
These breaches occurred both through trade with neighbouring states and by breaching the Oil-for- 
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Food Programme. " 15 For example, sanctions were breached by AWB. Ö16 There are two significant 
differences between these breaches and the breaches against Southern Rhodesia. 
Firstly, states showed considerable willingness in the initial stages to implement economic 
sanctions, which might have meant that economic sanctions alone would have been effective had 
military sanctions been not implemented so quickly after economic sanctions. Secondly, the breaches 
of sanctions against Iraq, particularly with respect to the Oil-for-Food Programme, were 
comprehensively investigated, both at state-level and by an independent inquiry, 617 which did not occur 
in the case of Southern Rhodesia. 
The position of other states in relation to economic sanctions against Iraq was an indicator that 
economic sanctions were likely to be effective for two reasons. Firstly, states were generally prepared 
to implement economic sanctions. Secondly, where a state, such as Jordan, could not implement 
economic sanctions its breaches were insufficient to impact on the viability of the Iraqi economy. 
Furthermore, when breaches did occur there was a willingness to investigate such breaches, albeit that 
the investigations could have taken place earlier. This too is an indication that the economic sanctions 
regime against Iraq reacted to difficulties as they emerged. 
3.4.2.2.4 Oil 
Oil is a key commodity and had proven to be of significant importance during sanctions against 
Southern Rhodesia. In the Iraqi context it was also important although Iraq, as an oil producing state, 
presented different problems from Southern Rhodesia. These issues were exacerbated by Iraq's 
annexation of Kuwait, which is another oil-producing country. 
Prior to the instigation of economic sanctions, oil had provided Iraq with 61 per cent of its 
GDP and in excess of 90 per cent of its export earnings. `'' Iraq was relying on oil to provide foreign 
currency, which it needed to purchase basic commodities, and, as such, restricting exports of oil would 
negatively impact on the economy of Iraq. If states strictly enforced the requirement not to import oil 
"s Charles Duelfer. 'Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's WMD' (Washington DC: 
Central Intelligence Agency, 2004) (`Dueller Report'). 
616 Daniel Stewart, `Who's responsible? Justiciability of private and political decisions' in ' in Jeremy Farrall and 
Kim Rubenstein (eds). Sanctions. 'Iccountability and Governance in a Globalised World (Cambridge University 
Press 2009) 313. 
017 Duelfer Report (n 615); Paul A Volcker (Chairman), Independent Inquiry Committee into the United Nations 
Oil-for-Food Programme, The Management of the United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme ('The Vockler 
Report'); The Honourable Terence RH Cole AO RFD QC, 'Report of the Inquiry into certain Australian 
companies in relation to the UN Oil-for-Food Programme' (November 2006) ('Cole Report'). 
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100 
from Iraq, its economy would have suffered significant damage and Iraq would have been forced to 
amend its behaviour in the hopes that sanctions would be lifted. However, other states relied on Iraq to 
supply them with oil. 
This raises a question 
- 
is oil too valuable a commodity to allow its exportation to be 
restricted? The number of oil-producing states in the world is a small percentage of the number of 
states that require oil. As such, can those states that need oil ever sanction the exportation of oil and 
risk being left with a deficit of a vital commodity as a result? In the case of Iraq, it was estimated that 
75 per cent of the deficit could be replaced in the short-term. 619 It would remain the case, however, that 
there would be a shortfall and it is unclear as to what that shortfall would be in the medium- to long- 
term and the impact of that on compliance with economic sanctions. 
It should, however, be noted that states seemed willing to apply economic sanctions against 
Iraq regardless of the fact that Iraq was an oil-producing country. This willingness to apply economic 
sanctions would mitigate the desire to purchase oil from Iraq. It would therefore become a question of 
whether Iraq, or the other states involved, would be more reactive to the effect of economic sanctions. 
Commentators have suggested that Iraq would have been prepared to suffer the effects of economic 
sanctions considerably longer than the other states involved, with G Henry M Schuler from the Center 
for Strategic and International Studies stating that the question is who feels the pain first, who flinches 
or blinks first. I am not sure it will be Iraq. We [the US] are feeling the pain already. I'll bet Iraqis are 
still dancing in the street. 020 This is despite economic indicators suggesting that Iraq should have been 
more sensitive to economic sanctions than the US. 62' It is submitted here that oil would remain an issue 
that could impact on the effectiveness of economic sanctions against Iraq and would need to be 
followed closely. 
On balance, it would seem that Iraq was a good target for economic sanctions. It required the 
importation of basic goods for survival, had little control over facilities required to transport its main 
commodity and states supported economic sanctions in a manner that had not been seen in the case of 
Southern Rhodesia. The issue most likely to impact on the effectiveness of economic sanctions was the 
fact that Iraq was an oil producing country. 
619 ibid. 
1'20 Stuart Auerbach, 'Iraq Seen as Vulnerable to Economic Warfare' Washington Post (Washington 8 August 1990). See also Douglas A Borer `Inverse Engagement: Lessons from US-Iraq Relations, 1982-1990' Summer 2003. Available at http: //www. car[isle. army. mi1/usawc/parameters/Articles/03summer/borer. pdf [last accessed 20 June 20091: Simpson, From the House of War (n 434) 215. 
o2 l Borer. 
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3.4.3 Were Economic Sanctions Against Iraq in Fact Effective? 
In the initial stages of economic sanctions an accurate assessment of the efficacy of economic sanctions 
proved very difficult. Greenwood argues that economic sanctions were at least universally applied. 
22 
However, there were a multitude of issues raised during economic sanctions against Iraq that limited 
any comprehensive assessment of the efficacy of economic sanctions. These included: the 
interjection 
of military sanctions shortly following economic sanctions; the complexity of the goals being sought; 
the extended period over which economic sanctions have ultimately been in place; and the focus on 
humanitarian issues. 
Shortly after economic sanctions began. Hufbauer, Schott and Elliot suggested that they were 
optimistic that sanctions would be effective against Iraq and would prompt the withdrawal of Iraqi 
troops from Kuwait, the release of all hostages, and the restoration of a credible, independent 
government in Kuwait 
- 
but not the complete defeat of Saddam Hussein. 623 Equally, Simons argues 
that economic sanctions significantly impacted on the Iraqi economy shortly after their 
implementation. He states that within two weeks of the instigation of economic sanctions, Iraq had 
become isolated from the outside world, had lost a significant amount of revenue and was fast 
exhausting its food supplies. 624 lt was, however, also suggested that whilst economic sanctions were 
effective in the sense that they were being implemented, it remained unclear as to whether they would 
in fact force Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. 625 In any case, military sanctions soon replaced economic 
sanctions as the means of achieving the initial goals with the result that whether or not economic 
sanctions were effective remains impossible to quantify. 
One of the more contentious issues of recent times relates to whether the second phase of 
economic sanctions against Iraq was effective because its invasion in March 2003 was justified on the 
premise that Iraq had significant weapons caches. George W Bush, in an address from the White House 
stated: `[i]ntelligence gathered by this and other governments leaves no doubt that the Iraq regime 
continues to possess and conceal some of the most lethal weapons ever devised... '626 British Prime 
Minister, Tony Blair, had also stated `[Saddam's] weapons of mass destruction programme is active, 
b22 Greenwood (n 570), 160. 
623 Gary Clyde Hufbauer. Jeffrey J Scott and Kimberley Ann Elliot, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 
Supplemental Case Histories (2"d edn, Institute for International Economics, Washington, DC 1990) 298. 
°'-a Simons, The Scourging of Iraq (n 423) 38. 
"25 Oscar Schachter, 'United Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict' (1991) 85 AJIL 452. 
`'26 George W Bush, White Ilouse Address, 17 March 2003. Full text available at: 
http: //www. cbsnews. com/stories/2003/03/17/iraq/main544377. shtml I last accessed 9 May 20091, 
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detailed and growing. The policy of containment is not working. The weapons of mass destruction 
programme is not shut down; it is up and running now. '`'27 
Whilst it had been suggested, prior to the 2003 invasion, that Iraq, by the late 1990's, did not 
have nuclear weapons, had largely eliminated its ballistic missile programs and had disposed of its 
chemical weapons under supervision, 628 there still remained concerns over whether Iraq had biological 
weapons. 629 The reality, of course, is that Iraq did not have weapons of mass destruction at the time of 
the 2003 invasion. The reports received by the US prior to the invasion had been equivocal. "O Post- 
invasion searches were undertaken without success. 63' And, ultimately, the coalition was forced to 
concede that there were no weapons in Iraq 
. 
6-32 As Blix has stated: `the UN and the world had 
succeeded in disarming Iraq without knowing it. '633 Economic sanctions forced Iraq to admit 
inspectors, drastically reduced the income available to Iraq to re-arm once inspectors destroyed 
weapons and prevented the importation of goods that might have been used to develop weapons. 634 As 
such, Iraq economic sanctions against Iraq achieved their aim to disarm Iraq. 
The second phase of sanctions against Iraq demonstrates the difficulty with some of the goals 
of economic sanctions against it. Following the invasion, in March 2003, it seems clear that economic 
sanctions against Iraq did impact on its weapons procurement and production. However, it seems 
equally clear that some states were unwilling to believe that this had occurred and that Iraq was unable 
to prove that it had complied with the goals set out in the relevant resolutions. As such, military 
sanctions were justified on the erroneous ground that economic sanctions had not been successful with 
serious repercussions for Iraq. 
3.5 The Humanitarian Impact of Economic Sanctions Against Iraq 
Economic sanctions taken against Iraq, whilst arguably successful, were predominantly associated with 
the humanitarian problems that emanated therefrom. Prior to the implementation of economic and 
military sanctions, Iraq had become a relatively advanced society relying heavily on energy and 
627 Hansard [IC vol 390 col 3 (24 September 2002). 
'''a Cortright and Lopez. The Sanctions Decade (n 72) 53. 
629 ibid. 
630 Thomas E Ricks, Fiasco The American Afilitarv Adventure in Iraq (Allen Lane 2006) 40-41. 
`' ibid. 147. 
6; 2 ibid. 375. 
b" E3lix (n 589). 259. 
634 David Cortright and George A Lopez, 'Containing Iraq: Sanctions Worked' (2004) 83 Foreign Affairs 90 
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technology. 6'5 The combination of economic and military sanctions devastated Iraq, destroying the 
advances made 
. 
636 Furthermore, the imposition of economic sanctions in the immediate aftermath of 
military sanctions gave Iraq no opportunity to rebuild any of the infrastructure destroyed by military 
sanctions thus exacerbating the impact of economic sanctions. 637 The impact of these factors combined 
led to such significant humanitarian problems in Iraq that some human rights advocates have charged 
the UNSC with genocide639 and even some branches of the UN itself criticised the imposition of 
economic sanctions. 639 
This section examines four aspects of the humanitarian crisis in Iraq: nutrition; disease and 
death; children; and access to goods for humanitarian purposes. 
3.5.1 Nutrition 
Iraq was importing 70 per cent of its food prior to sanctions. 640 It is therefore unsurprising that the 
provision of adequate nutrition to the population caused concern from the early stages of sanctions. 
Ahtisaari stated in March 2001 that: `the flow of food through the private sector has been reduced to a 
trickle... many food prices are already beyond the purchasing reach of most Iraqi families... 
widespread starvation conditions are a real possibility. i641 Food for one month for a family increased in 
price from 100 dinars in July 1990, to 2,500 dinars in January 1993, to almost 100,000 by July 1995 
despite rising unemployment and an average salary of only 3,000 to 5,000 dinars. ` 2 As families could 
not afford to purchase food, they relied on the government's rationing programme, which provided less 
than 50 per cent of a person's average daily nutritional requirements. 643 
The right to adequate food has been accorded special consideration by the CESCR in General 
Comment 12 644 It states that states parties to the ICESCR must `refrain at all times from food 
embargos or similar measures which endanger conditions for food production and access to food in 
other countries' and that `food should never be used as an instrument of political and economic 
`; 5 Ahtisaari Report (n 422). 
;' Cortright and Lopez, The Sanctions Decade (n 72) 43. 
63' Hoskins (n 600), 106. 
`''R Mary Ellen O'Connell, 'Debating the Law of Sanctions' (2002) 13 EJIL 63 at 72. 
`''" Karima Bennoune, "Sovereignty vs. Suffering'? Re-examining Sovereignty and I luman Rights through the 
Lens of Iraq' (2002) 13 EJIL 243 at 251,253. 
640 Ahtisaari Report (n 422). 
"' ibid. 
`'442 Hoskins (n 600), 112. 
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pressure. 645 The UNSC is not obliged to follow General Comment 12, as it is neither a state nor a party 
to the ICESCR. However, by choosing to do so the UNSC could reduce the impact of economic 
sanctions on the general population of a state subjected to economic sanctions. Such action would not 
affect the effectiveness of an economic sanctions regime because the general population are usually not 
in a position to force the change necessary for economic sanctions to be lifted. 
It should be noted that sanctions restricted not only the importation of food but also of 
agricultural machinery, which could have be used to make Iraq more self-sufficient. 64" The result was 
that Iraq's own, admittedly limited, food production also decreased during economic sanctions. 647 The 
most economically efficient manner of obtaining food was the importation of products past their sell-by 
date or unfit for human consumption. 648 
3.5.2 Disease and Death 
One of the most significant causes of disease and ultimately death in Iraq was the destruction of clean 
water sources as a result of the military sanctions of January and February 1991.649 By February 1991, 
the piped water supply in Baghdad was less than 5 per cent of the pre-hostilities levels. 650 Furthermore, 
waste treatment plants were also impacted, with the result that raw sewage was being pumped into the 
Tigris, which was the main source of Iraq's drinking water. 651 Certain diseases such as cholera, 
diarrhoea and typhoid increased, as did death as a result of those ordinarily imminently treatable 
v52 diseases. 
Problems were not limited, however, to certain types of disease. Only 25 per cent of medicine 
was produced locally. 6i53 In 1997 the Secretary-General estimated that Iraq had received only 4 per cent 
of the medicine it needed, 654 the result of which was inadequacies in the treatment of any illness or 
disease and ultimately an increase in the mortality rate. 
645 ibid, para 37. 
646 Pellett (n 25), 187. 
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3.5.3 Children 
Normand underlines the suffering experienced by children in Iraq as a result of economic 
sanctions stating that `in simple terms, more Iraqi children have died as a result of sanctions that the 
combined toll of two atomic bombs. "55 The CESCR has noted that economic sanctions can have a 
disproportionate impact on vulnerable groups. 656 Children are considered especially vulnerable under 
human rights law and have been granted special protection under human rights law, including under the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child. 657 This was reflected during economic sanctions against Iraq 
where children were particularly affected. A German doctor visiting Iraqi hospitals in March 1991 
found a significant number of cases of children suffering from malnutrition and vitamin deficiencies 
and dying from colds and flu. Returning four months later she found hospitalised children being fed 
only water and sugar. 658 A 1996 report indicated that 4,500 children under five were dying every month 
in Iraq from preventable hunger and disease. 659 By 1998, it was reported that 27 per cent of Iraqi 
children were suffering from chronic malnutrition, 9 per cent from acute malnutrition and 24 per cent 
were underweight. `i6° 
Infant mortality rates in Iraq were 120 per 1000 live births in 1960, had decreased to 45 by the 
late 1980's and increased to more than 100 by 1998.661 1997 statistics produced by the Iraqi Ministry of 
Health, with UNICEF support, made clear that sanctions had caused the death of 878,856 children up 
to that point. 1,62 Results produced separately from both the Iraqi Ministry of Health and the UN suggest 
that, to March 1998, between 100,000 and 227,000 children died with 75 per cent of those deaths 
attributable to economic sanctions. 663 
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3.5.4 Access to Goods for Humanitarian Purposes 
Segall notes that `sanctions may adversely affect not only the humanitarian situation of the population 
of the target State but also the delivery of humanitarian assistance. '664 In Iraq the negative impact of 
economic sanctions was exacerbated by some of the seemingly illogical restrictions on the admittance 
of goods. The 661 Committee, which decided what goods could be imported in Iraq, refused access to 
goods that might be considered by many as serving a humanitarian purpose. They refused pencils, 
sharpeners, erasers and school notebooks, water purification chemicals, cotton for medical use and 
communication links for hospital use. 665 The US was also charged with restricting food and medical 
supplies, which constituted material exempted from economic sanctions, from being exported to 
Iraq. 666 lt should, however, be noted, that, by the mid-1990's, the 661 Committee had decided that 
foodstuff and material and supplies that the Secretary- General had identified as essential, 607 once 
notified to or approved by the Committee, would be allowed to be exported to Iraq on a no-objections 
basis. 668 
These more than anything are a damning indictment of economic sanctions against Iraq. States 
are limited in what action they can take with respect to economic sanctions. Under Articles 25 and 103 
of the UN Charter they are obligated to apply UNSC resolutions, regardless of the impact of those 
resolutions. Within the Iraqi sanctions framework they did, however, have some control over 
humanitarian exemptions because they could make an application to export goods to Iraq that could 
qualify for such status. However, even when states or entities were fully cognisant of the repercussions 
of economic sanctions they chose not to fully utilise the powers that they did have to lessen the effects 
of sanctions on the civilian population of Iraq. The UNSC itself did take steps to rectify the 
humanitarian impact of economic sanctions, which will be discussed in the next section. 
61'4 Anna Segall. 'Economic sanctions: legal and policy constraints' (1999) 836 International Review of the Red Cross. 
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3.6 Attempts to Rectify the Humanitarian Impact of Economic Sanctions 
Economic sanctions against Iraq are renowned for two things. Firstly, as discussed, they are 
known for the humanitarian crisis that ensued. Secondly, they are known for the actions that were taken 
in an attempt to stem that crisis. This part examines those attempts. 
3.6.1 The Oil-for-Food Programme 
One of the difficulties with humanitarian exemptions is that in drafting such measures it is assumed 
that the state the target of sanctions has the resources to purchase the goods in question and the 
infrastructure to delivery them. 6iG9 This may not always be the case. However, Iraq was in a unique 
position when it came to economic sanctions. On one hand, as mentioned previously, it had suffered 
considerable infrastructural damage during the Gulf Conflict and was also suffering significant 
humanitarian difficulties. As a result of the severity of economic sanctions it was not in a position to 
rebuild its infrastructure or to provide humanitarian aid. On the other hand, Iraq was in possession of 
one of the most valuable commodities in the world 
- 
oil. The Oil-for-Food Programme was an attempt 
to enable Iraq to use oil to resolve some of their humanitarian problems. 
The initial resolutions that sought to make use of Iraq's oil resources, UNSC Resolutions 706 
and 712, were never used because of Iraq's criticisms that they breached its sovereignty, 670 which in 
Bennoune's words `[reflects] a typical government misuse of the notion of sovereignty. '67 ' Those 
criticisms were made on three grounds: that there was no precedent for economic sanctions of the 
nature of those used against Iraq; that the UNSC required that the UN rather than Iraq be responsible 
for Iraq's oil revenues; and that compensation payments in relation to Kuwait were to be made. 672 
UNSC Resolution 778 requested that states that held Iraqi assets transfer those assets to an escrow 
account`67' but ultimately only two states indicated that they had assets for transferral 
. 
674 Finally UNSC 
Resolution 986 was implemented. 75 It acknowledged both Iraqi sovereignty and the temporary nature 
of the proposed arrangements. 676 It allowed for the sale of up to $I billion of Iraqi oil every three 
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`'70 Niblock (n 551). 117. 
671 13ennoune (n 639), 251. 
`''' Von Sponeck (n 579), 7. 
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months and gave Iraq some control over the distribution of humanitarian aid. " although the UN would, 
of course, monitor imports under the programme. 678 
The Oil-for-Food Programme should have afforded Iraq the possibility of resolving some of 
the humanitarian issues that had arisen. Ultimately the administration of the programme was widely 
criticised and breaches of sanctions against Iraq were attributed to it. 679 However, it is relevant to this 
thesis for three other reasons. 
Firstly, the amount of money ultimately available for humanitarian purposes under the Oil- 
for-Food Programme was insufficient. An immediate problem was that only 50 per cent of the money 
generated through the sale of oil was used for humanitarian purposes because UNSC Resolution 986 
required that the money also be used to pay for other expenses such as the cost of UN inspections and 
the servicing of the Compensation Fund. ciS° The money was divided: 50 percent for use for 
humanitarian purposes by the Iraqi government for the territory of Iraq; 15 per cent for use by the UN 
for humanitarian purposes in three Kurdish territories outside of Iraqi control; 30 per cent for payment 
into the Kuwaiti Compensation Fund; and 5 per cent for UN administration expenses. 68' Normand 
notes that the amount actually available for use as humanitarian aid in Iraq 
- 
being $2 billion a year 
- 
fell far short of either the 1989 import bill for food, medicines and preventive water sanitation 
purification or the estimates of needs prepared by various UN agencies. 682 Sponeck states that, despite 
earning $44.4 billion of oil revenue from 16 December 1996 to 13 July 2001, only $13.5 billion worth 
of humanitarian aid arrived in Iraq during that time period. 683 The result was that the Oil-for-Food 
Programme was not in a position to rectify the humanitarian problems in Iraq. 
This was compounded by the fact that, whilst under previous resolutions states were urged to 
contribute money to the escrow account from other sources, 684 under the Oil-for-Food Programme 
there were no such provisions. The result was that Iraq's only source of humanitarian aid at that point 
was the exportation of oil and `the source of funding was entirely Iraqi. '685 This resulted in a short fall 
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in the money being received compared with what was needed for Iraq to recover and, in fact, it 
has 
been suggested that the gain that Iraq made from breaches of sanctions was probably used to address 
that shortfall 
. 
686 As time passed, and the humanitarian situation did not improve, the UNSC decided 
that it was necessary to allow Iraq to export more oil. However, Iraq did not have the capacity to do so 
because of its damaged infrastructure. 687 The UNSC also attempted to improve Iraq's capacity by 
allowing some of its sanctioned imports to be comprised of spare parts and equipment relating to oil 
production. ` ' This did not however serve to increase oil production in the short term 
. 
6'9 The third 
difficulty with the oil for food programme relates to the 661 Committee and will be discussed in the 
next section. 
The second reason that the Oil-for-Food Programme was an important development for UN 
economic sanctions is that it was an attempt by the UNSC to address the humanitarian problems in Iraq 
by using the resources that Iraq had available to it. The Oil-for-Food Programme was not successful. 
As well as difficulties in relation to providing adequate resources as outlined, it was beset with reports 
of `waste, inefficiency, and corruption, even within the United Nations itself. '690 Had it been successful 
the Oil-for-Food Programme would have alleviated Iraq's humanitarian concerns without requiring 
humanitarian aid from other states. Whilst it was unsuccessful the UNSC should be praised for 
attempting to use Iraq's resources to resolve the humanitarian problems prevalent in the state at that 
time. 
The final reason that the Oil-for-Food Programme is important for the purpose of this thesis is 
that it underlines the lack of accountability in UN economic sanctions regimes. The Volcker Report 
attributes the problems in the Oil-for-Food Programme to five key issues»9' Firstly, the parameters, 
policies and administrative responsibilities were not adequately defined by the UNSC. Secondly, the 
administrative structure and personnel practices of the UN were not suitable to deal with the challenges 
posed by the Oil-for-Food Programme. Thirdly, there was an absence of auditing and management 
controls. Fourthly, corruption extended to the top of the administration in the Oil-for-Food Programme. 
Finally, there were difficulties in effective cooperation between UN Agencies, with no means of 
tracking expenditure across the various agencies. All of these issues go to accountability in the UN at 
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that time. The accountability of the UNSC in its dealing with economic sanctions has already been 
raised with respect to the failure to deal with breaches by states, including P-5 states, of sanctions 
against Southern Rhodesia. 692 The Volcker report provides evidence that accountability remained a key 
issue during economic sanctions against Iraq and one that would require resolution. 
3.6.2 The 661 Committee 
It is clear that `humanitarian exemptions, [in the case of Iraq], have not adequately protected the 
population from the impact of comprehensive economic sanctions. "'93 This is due in no small part to 
the inadequacies of the 661 Committee. The purpose of the 661 Committee was, firstly, to facilitate the 
exportation of approved humanitarian goods and commodities and secondly, to ensure that the money 
that Iraq was getting for exporting oil was not abused. The 661 Committee should have been in a 
position to direct the importation of goods for humanitarian purposes in such a way that the general 
Iraqi population suffered as little as possible whilst economic sanctions were in place. This did not 
happen as the 661 Committee became involved in hotly debating every application for exemptions, 694 
thus preventing the system working efficiently and preventing acceptable items from being granted 
exemptions. 
Furthermore, as outlined above, when decisions were taken sometimes goods were illogically 
refused a humanitarian exemption. This micro-management of decisions as to what would be allowed 
to be imported into Iraq continued once the Oil-for-Food Programme was established, which left the 
system less efficient than it might otherwise have been. G95 The system could have been made more 
efficient by either the creation of a comprehensive list of items that could be exported to Iraq without 
the need for notification, or by allowing states some autonomy as to what could be exported to Iraq. 
3.6.3 Proposals for Ending Economic Sanctions 
By 1999, Iraq was still subjected to economic sanctions. In order that Iraq might get the opportunity to 
have economic sanctions lifted, a new system of monitoring whether it was complying with the 
weapons provisions in UNSC resolutions was required. 
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This ultimately culminated in UNSC Resolution 1284.6% It should be noted that only two P-5 
Member States (UK and US) affirmed this resolution. Under this resolution, the UNSC established, as 
a subsidiary body of the Council, the UNMOVIC, which would replace the Special Commission, 
established pursuant to paragraph 9(b) of Resolution 687.697 It decided that the UNMOVIC would, 
undertake the responsibilities mandated to its predecessor with regard to the verification of compliance 
by Iraq with its obligations under UNSC Resolution 687 and other related resolutions, as well as 
establishing and operating a reinforced system of ongoing monitoring and verification and identifying 
additional sites in Iraq for such monitoring. 698 
The UNSC expressed its intention to suspend the economic sanctions provisions in relation to 
goods imported from Iraq and delivery to Iraq of civilian commodities and products with the 
fundamental objective of improving the humanitarian situation in Iraq and securing the implementation 
of the UNSC resolutions. '99 Its criteria for allowing for the suspension of economic sanctions against 
Iraq was that the reinforced system of monitoring had to be in place for 120 days and the Executive 
Chairman of UNMOVIC and Director General of the IAEA had to report that Iraq had cooperated in 
all respects with them over this period. 700 The suspension would last for a period of 120 days 
renewable by the UNSC, and subject to measures to ensure that Iraq did not acquire prohibited items. It 
decided that if at any time the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC or the Director General of the IAEA 
reported that Iraq was not cooperating in all respects or that Iraq was in the process of acquiring any 
prohibited items the suspension would terminate on the fifth working day following the report, unless 
the UNSC decided to the contrary. 701 
Ultimately this measure was not a success. The absence of weapons was too difficult to prove 
and the UNMOVIC and IAEA had too much subjective decision-making power as to what would 
constitute compliance. 
Iraq, as a state that had its own natural resources, offered the UNSC an unparalleled 
opportunity to develop systems for situations in which there were significant humanitarian problems. 
Equally, there should have been a clear system in place under which economic sanctions could have 
been lifted upon compliance with certain requirements by Iraq. Despite creating the most 
`'`"' UNSC Res 1284 (17 December 1999) UN Doe S/RES/1284. 
"" ibid. I. 
`'"a ibid, 2. 
61'9 ibid. 33. 
700 ibid. 33. 
7111 ibid. 35. 
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comprehensive system of economic sanctions, which was significantly impacting on the civilian 
population of Iraq, the UNSC failed on both counts. 
3.7 Issues for Future Consideration Arising Out of Iraq 
The situation that arose in Iraq raised different issues to those that had arisen during sanctions against 
Southern Rhodesia. Whereas sanctions against Southern Rhodesia were ineffective and had relatively 
little impact on the civilian population, economic sanctions against Iraq were largely effective (being 
both generally implemented by states and resulting in Iraqi compliance with their weapons 
requirements) but also devastated the civilian population of Iraq and sparked a worldwide debate on the 
use of economic sanctions by the UNSC. 702 Mary Ellen O'Connell suggests that the case of economic 
sanctions against Iraq was the point at which agreement was reached by international commentators 
that some legal standard must apply to the application of UN economic sanctions 
. 
7113 
Economic sanctions cannot easily be subjected to any absolute limits that might impact on 
their effectiveness, O'Connell, therefore, suggests that economic sanctions should be applied in a 
proportionate manner. 704 Taking an approach rooted in proportionality when dealing with economic 
sanctions would mean that ensuring that sanctions are effective must be balanced against the impact of 
the sanctions themselves. In the Iraqi context this would have meant seeking to achieve a balance 
between paralysing the economy, such that economic sanctions would be effective, and ensuring that 
humanitarian suffering is minimised. It would have meant that economic sanctions could still have 
been applied even though there was some measure of humanitarian suffering. 
The AFSC has made a number of useful observations in relation to achieving a balance 
between economic sanctions and the wellbeing of civilian populations. 705 Firstly, they suggest that 
whether or not to take economic sanctions in a given situation is directly related to the context. They 
have supported economic sanctions in situations where they seemed unlikely to work and failed to 
support systems that would have been effective but would have caused unjustifiable humanitarian 
suffering. Sanctions against Iraq clearly demonstrate this. Economic sanctions should be approached 
with caution. It may be that, in certain circumstances, as illustrated by the humanitarian suffering in 
Iraq, they cause too much damage to a state and its citizens to be justified. The UNSC should explore 
702 O'Connell (n 638), 67. 
703 ibid. 79. 
704 O'Connell (n 638), 64. 
70S Patterson (n 574), 90-94. 
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all of its options. In some situations, a short period of military sanctions may be preferable to economic 
sanctions and the UNSC should ascertain whether that is the case before instigating any system of 
sanctions against a Member State. 
Secondly, there is a responsibility on those implementing economic sanctions to monitor the 
effects of those sanctions to ensure they are not significantly impacting on the civilian population. In 
this case these effects were known but were not being adequately addressed. 
Thirdly, economic sanctions must be implemented in a way that is sensitive to the 
humanitarian needs of the population against which they are implemented. At a minimum, in Iraq 
economic sanctions should not have been allowed to impact on commodities needed for humanitarian 
purposes. As will be demonstrated in the next chapter, targeted sanctions address this issue but the 
UNSC should also consider a blanket exemption on foodstuffs. Equally, where the UN, the ICRC or 
other designated. international organisation have people in a state subject to economic sanctions the 
UNSC should consider a blanket exemption on medical supplies to that organisation, which would be 
responsible for their distribution within the targeted state. 
What became apparent from sanctions taken against Iraq was that the UNSC was developing 
its economic sanctions regimes in a reactive fashion. Sanctions against Iraq sought to resolve the 
difficulties seen with economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia in that they were put in place 
faster and they were more comprehensive. Furthermore, the UNSC was willing to move to force when 
it felt that economic sanctions were being ineffective. However, in so doing other difficulties emerged, 
which reflects Charlesworth's concern that by being so reactive international law concentrates on 
individual events at the risk of missing the larger picture. 706 For example, the comprehensive nature of 
economic sanctions created a humanitarian crisis and the combination of military and economic 
sanctions worsened that crisis. This reactive response would continue throughout sanctions against 
Iraq, as for example the Oil-for-Food Programme, which was an attempt to address humanitarian 
difficulties that arose within the sanctions against Iraq, and would also result in the move to targeted 
sanctions, which will be discussed in the next chapter. 
70' Charlesworth (n 2), 384. 
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4 
The Development of UN Targeted Economic Sanctions 
The use of targeted economic sanctions (also known as smart sanctions) by the UN is rooted in an 
attempt to make UN economic sanctions a more proportionate measure. 707 The situation in Iraq had 
two facets that prompted the development of targeted economic sanctions. Firstly, unlike earlier 
economic sanctions, as economic sanctions against Iraq progressed it became clear that the ordinary 
citizens of Iraq were suffering significant humanitarian problems as a consequence of the sanctions. 
Secondly, those ordinary Iraqi citizens, despite their suffering, had no control over the actions of the 
state that had prompted the invocation of economic sanctions. Sponeck notes that the assumption that 
`economic pressure on the population would lead to political change at government level... turned out 
to be a fallacy with significant human costs. '708 As such, subjecting them to sanctions could not be 
justified because they would not prompt regime change. The use of targeted economic sanctions would, 
in light of these difficulties, have been a more proportionate measure as they would have been applied 
only on the individuals who could force change in Iraq and would therefore have reduced, if not 
eliminated, the humanitarian suffering experienced by the general population. 
This chapter traces the initial development and solidification of targeted economic sanctions 
within the UN framework. It opens by discussing the various types of targeted economic sanction that 
are used by the UNSC. It considers how targeted economic sanctions could have been developed by the 
UN before discussing the method chosen, the European Conferences. It identifies the principal 
recommendations made at the Conferences and analyses their suitability for implementation as the use 
of targeted economic sanctions by the UN unfolded. 
4.1 What are Targeted Economic Sanctions? 
In seeking to rectify the problems experienced by the citizens of Iraq the UNSC had to reconcile two 
conflicting aims of economic sanctions. Firstly, economic sanctions need to be sufficient to impact on 
the decision makers in a target state. Secondly, economic sanctions should not adversely impact on the 
people within a state who are not in a position to rectify the cause of the sanctions. 
707 O'Connell (n 638), 70. 
70R Sponeck (n 683). 84. 
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Targeted economic sanctions offered the UNSC the opportunity to reconcile those goals. Such 
sanctions have a focused, negative impact on those in control of the behaviour being targeted whilst 
also allowing for the free movement of goods and funds necessary for the survival of the citizens of a 
state. Targeted economic sanctions had already been used piecemeal by the UNSC in conjunction with 
broad economic sanctions against states. 709 
There are two types of targeted economic sanctions. Firstly, economic sanctions can be 
targeted at certain assets or resources of a state. Common examples include arms7° and oil or 
petroleum products. "' Secondly, economic sanctions can be targeted at specific people or groups of 
people. These will usually be against government officials and their families712 or opposition or rebel 
forces, 7 " although recently economic sanctions have also been targeted against individual S. 714 
This section explores the two broad categories of targeted economic sanctions in more detail. 
It also discusses travel sanctions, which are a hybrid of economic sanctions against identified assets or 
resources and economic sanctions against identified entities or individuals. 
4.1.1 Targeted Economic Sanctions Against Identified Assets or Resources 
Both Southern Rhodesia 75 and South Africa76 were subjected to targeted economic sanctions against 
arms and oil. As such, the concept of targeted economic sanctions against assets or resources was not a 
new phenomenon for the UNSC in the 1990's. However, previous use of economic sanctions in this 
manner had occurred either, in the case of South Africa, because broader measures could not be agreed 
upon'" or, in the case of Southern Rhodesia, in conjunction with extensive broad economic sanctions. 
Furthermore, as they developed, the UNSC began to use targeted economic sanctions against a wide 
range of resources that were of strategic importance to the state against which sanctions were invoked. 
709 Southern Rhodesia had been subjected to sanctions targeted at the exportation of oil to Southern Rhodesia (UNSC Resolution 232 (n 123)) and the Iraqi government and state entities had been subjected to targeted 
economic sanctions whilst the state of Iraq was under broad economic sanctions (UNSC Resolution 778 (n 539)). 710 For example arms have been targeted during sanctions against: Afghanistan, UNSC Res 1333 (19 December 
2000) UN Doc S/RES/1333) ('UNSC Resolution 1333): Haiti, UNSC Resolution 917 (n 89); and Liberia, UNSC 
Res 1343 (7 March 2001) UN Doc S/RES/1343 ('UNSC Resolution 1343') amongst others. 
'11 For example: Haiti UNSC Resolution 841 (n 42): Sierra Leone UNSC Res 1132 (8 October 1997) UN Doc 
S/RES/l 132 ('UNSC Resolution 1132'); and Southern Rhodesia UNSC Resolution 232 (n 123) amongst others. 712 For example, economic sanctions against Iraq, UNSC Resolution 778 (n 539). 
71' For example, economic sanctions against UNITA in Angola, UNSC Res 864 (IS September 1993) UN Doc 
S/RES/864 (`UNSC Resolution 864'). 
714 For example, economic sanctions against those persons considered a threat to international peace and security 
. 
UNSC Resolution 1373 (n 164). 
715 UNSC Resolution 232 (n 123). 
716 UNSC Res 418 (4 November 1977) UN Doc S/RES/418. 
717 Anglin (n 178), 45. 
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This part looks at the categories of assets and resources that have been subjected to sanction 
by the UNSC. 
4.1.1.1 Arms Embargoes 
Arm embargoes, which take the form of a prohibition on the exportation of arms and related material to 
a target state, are the most common kind of targeted economic sanctions. 718 They have two advantages 
over broader economic sanctions. 
Firstly, where sanctions are adopted because of the use of force or aggression by a state or 
unrest within a state, arms embargoes specifically restrict the means of that behaviour and thus stifle its 
continuance. For example, sanctions were invoked against UNITA because of the hostilities caused by 
its refusal to accept the parliamentary and presidential elections in Angola. "`' Over the course of two 
years UNITA used force to seek control of a number of government-controlled areas causing mass 
destruction. 720 The UNSC put an arms embargo in place in order to force a ceasefire. 72' The assumption 
was that a properly implemented arms embargo would inhibit UNITA's engagement in hostilities 
because it would vastly restrict the number of arms available to it. 
Secondly, arms embargos are not of themselves going to have unintended humanitarian 
consequences. Arms have no humanitarian purpose and restricting their exportation to an area will not 
restrict the exportation of items with a humanitarian purpose, such as food and medicinal products. 
Furthermore, a reduction in arms in a state should correlate to a reduction in the number of civilian 
deaths from the use of arms. 
Despite their advantages arms embargoes have experienced difficulties in implementation 
with the result that they have not yet become a decisive tool in the arsenal of the UNSC. As the use of 
targeted economic sanctions by the UNSC expanded three main problems became prevalent in the use 
of arms embargoes. 
The most significant issue with respect to arms embargoes is that, like other types of 
economic sanctions, they are frequently breached. It has been stated that `the nature of today's armed 
conflicts, which are fuelled primarily by internal rivalries and disputes over territory and resources, has 
718 David Cortright and George A Lopez, Sanctions and the Search for Security: Challenges to UN Action (Rienner 2002) 153 ('Cortright and Lopez, Sanctions and the Search for Security'). 
71" Meredith (n 287). 608. 
720 ibid. 610-611. 
'2' UNSC Resolution 864 (n 713), 17,19. 
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triggered an unchecked proliferation of arms, particularly of light weapons, cascading from war zone to 
war zone (often through illicit channels)' 
. 
722 As the use of arms embargos has increased, those states 
that have been subject to sanctions have discovered a variety of ways of circumventing them. 
States may strategically breach arms embargoes in order to support one side over another in 
hostilities. Both the US and the UK have been accused of giving covert support to private security 
companies who supplied arms in breach of UN arms embargoes. 723 The UNSC is cognisant of these 
breaches and has made one attempt to address them when the arms embargo imposed on Liberia in 
UNSC Resolution 1343724 was established as a result of Liberia's `support for armed rebel groups in 
neighbouring countries, and in particular its support for the RUF in Sierra Leone. '725 Given, however, 
that the P-5 Member States are both the world's largest arms producers and are also protected from 
being subjected to arms embargoes the case of Liberia may not be a suitable roadmap for punishing or 
preventing breaches by states generally. 
The availability of arms in a state has also been attributed to the proximity of that state to 
other states that are engaged in hostilities and that may even have been subjected to arms embargoes 
themselves. 726 Prendergast describes the Horn of Africa727 as an integrated conflict zone stating that the 
cross-border flow of arms between, inter alia, Sudan and insurgent groups in Ethiopia, Eritrea and 
Uganda and the main rebel groups in Sudan has served to deepen conflict within each of those states 
. 
711 
Weapons may also be obtained from opposition forces during hostilities. 729 Finally, the Conventional 
Armed Forces in Europe Treaty70 placed restrictions on the number of weapons that could be held by 
Eastern European States. Mollander, in his report to the UNSC, indicated that the resulting disposition 
72 , 
" Loretta Bondi, `Arms Embargoes: In Name Only? ' in David Cortright and George A Lopez, Smart Sanctions. 
Targeting Economic Statecraft (Rowman & Littlefield 2002) 110. 
72 ibid. 1 1. I 
72; UNSC Resolution 1343 (n 710). 
725 ibid. 
''' Cortright and Lopez 
, 
Sanctions and the Search for Security (n 679) 158: Letter from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 864 (1993) concerning the situation in Angola 
addressed to the President of the Security Council, 4 June 1999, S/1999/644, para 7. 
727 The Horn of Africa is a region in the North East of Africa often taken to cover the states of Djibouti, Ethiopia, 
Eritrea and Somalia, but sometimes, as in this study, also taken to include Kenya. Sudan and Uganda. 
"K John Prendergast, Building for Peace in the Horn of Africa: Diplomacy and Beyond (United States Institute of 
Peace 1999) 2. 
'2' Anders Mollander, `Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against 
UNITA', attached to Letter dated 10 March 2000 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee 
Established Pursuant to Resolution 864 (1993) Concerning the Situation in Angola Addressed to the President of 
the Security Council, (10 March 2003) S/2000/203 para 39 ('Mollander Report'). 
70 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (19 November 1990) 2443 UNTS 3. 
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of surplus weapons by those states, in order that they comply with the limitations set by the Treaty, 
flooded the international markets with arms. "' 
The second problem that has arisen as a result of UNSC arms embargoes occurs when a 
blanket arms embargo against a state is put in place. Such a blanket embargo may mean that the effects 
of that embargo ultimately apply very unequally. This phenomenon was clearly illustrated during 
economic sanctions against the FRY. 732 Due to conflict in the region during the dissolution of FRY, 
UNSC Resolution 713733 placed an arms embargo on all of the SRs that formed part of FRY. 734 By 25 
June 1991, when Croatia and Slovenia declared independence from FRY, Serbia had effective control 
of the JNA. 75 The JNA was at that time one of the strongest military forces in Europe. 736 Since the 
arms embargo prevented the exportation of arms to any of the states that had formed part of FRY it 
served to preserve this military status quo to the advantage of Serbia and to the detriment of the other 
states. 737 The result of the arms embargo was that Bosnia, which had just become an independent state, 
had its opportunity for self-defence against Serbia limited although the arms embargo had been 
intended to impact on all of the FRY SRs equally. 738 Ultimately the impact of the arms embargo had 
nothing to do with the culpability of the states involved. 
The third problem that will be briefly examined here is the selection of arms embargoes as a 
form of targeted economic sanctions. Arms embargoes are implemented against a state or entity that is 
involved in conflict. As such, they must be instigated in situations where they can be effective. In the 
case of Ethiopia and Eritrea a non-binding arms embargo was put in place in February 1999739 but a 
binding resolution was not established until 15 months later in May 2000. '40 By December 2000, it was 
estimated that between 75,000 and 100,000 people had been killed as a result of the hostilities 
. 
741 Both 
states had spent a `staggering' amount on arms. 742 In fact, so great was expenditure on arms that the 
731 Mollander Report (n 729), para 39. 
7" Cortright and Lopez, The Sanctions Decade (n 72) 63-65. 
"' UNSC Resolution 713 (n 85). 
74 The states within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia were: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia. Macedonia, 
Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia. 
"` Morowitz, (n 143) 197. 
736 Reneo Lukic and Allen Lynch, Europe from the Balkans to the Urals: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia and the 
Soviet Union (Oxford University Press 1996) 295. 
717 Horowitz (n 143), 173. 
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7'9 UNSC Res 1277 (10 February 1999) UN Doc S/RES/1277. 
70 UNSC Res 1298 (17 May 2000) UN Doc S/RES/1298 (`UNSC Resolution 1298'). 
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IMF suspended its program in Ethiopia. 743 The delay in taking decisive UN action, which allowed arms 
to flow freely into Ethiopia and Eritrea, therefore created a situation in which by the time a binding 
arms embargo was imposed there were already too many weapons in both states for it to be effective. 
The unsuitability of the use of an arms embargo, as opposed to other sanctions, in order to 
effect change in Rwanda, in light of the situation that was unfolding there, may also have had fatal 
consequences. Despite intelligence from Romeo Dallaire, Commander of the UN Assistance Mission 
for Rwanda, in January 1994, that there was a significant build up of weapons and indications that they 
would be used to exterminate the Tutsi population in Rwanda, the UN refused to seize these arms and 
failed to put an arms embargo in place. 744 On 6 April 1994 the assassination of President Juvenal 
Habyarimana saw the Hutu population take up arms against the Tutsis. 745 In the 100 days that followed, 
800,000 members of the Tutsi population of Rwanda would be slaughtered by their fellow 
countrymen. 746 
The UNSC put in place an arms embargo prohibiting states from exporting arms to Rwanda 
on 17 May 1994.74' By the time the UNSC invoked the arms embargo, it was wholly insufficient to 
effect change in Rwanda. The crisis had reached a point where the only chance for the resolution of the 
genocide that was unfolding would have been military sanctions. An arms embargo would not have 
overcome the `propaganda and hate that had already developed' in Rwanda. 74' A further flaw with the 
concept of using an arms embargo in an attempt to combat the genocide in Rwanda was that much of 
the killing was being undertaken by the use of machetes and other unsophisticated arms, which did not 
come within the remit of a UNSC arms embargo. 749 Such weapons are unlikely to ever be captured by a 
UN arms embargo because they do not come within the traditional understanding of `arms' and 
because they have a wide range of legitimate uses. 
One further issue should be noted in relation to arms embargoes. Arms embargoes can be very 
difficult to monitor. They necessitate the presence of monitoring personnel on the ground in a state 
subject to economic sanctions. This has cost implications and, as mentioned in the previous chapter in 
relation to Iraq, may in any case fail to produce evidence that sufficiently satisfies the UNSC that the 
74' Jane Perlez. 'U. S. Did Little to Deter Build-Up as Ethiopia and Eritrea Prepared for War' The New fork Times 
(New York 22 May 2000). 
744 Meredith (n 287), 504. 
745 ibid, 507. 
746 Samantha Power, "A Problem From Nell" America and the Age of Genocide (Flamingo 2003) 334. 
74' UNSC Resolution 918 (n 91), 3. 
"ft Cortright and Lopez, The Sanctions Decade (n 72) 196. 
749 Jean Hatzfeld. 
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arms embargo has been successful. 75° However, it should also be noted that the presence of monitoring 
personnel may have unpredicted benefits. Owen, in discussing the arms embargo in Bosnia- 
Herzegovina, notes that the UN observers sent under UNSC Resolution 758751 saved hundreds of 
thousands of lives by using the access they had to the territory for humanitarian purposes. 752 
4.1.1.2 Commodity Sanctions 
The other type of targeted economic sanctions on assets or resources that will be briefly outlined here 
is commodity sanctions. Commodity sanctions typically take the form of a prohibition on the 
importation of key resources from a targeted state. The purpose of this type of sanction is to prevent 
states from raising funds, which would be used for further illicit actions, through the sale of natural 
resources. Targeted economic sanctions against a key commodity reflect the fact that some states rely 
heavily on the exportation of a limited number of key resources to provide foreign currency. An 
example of this has already been mentioned with respect to Southern Rhodesia, which relied on 
tobacco and asbestos for almost fifty per cent of its exports prior to the instigation of economic 
sanctions. 75' 
Oil aside, the most common type of commodity sanction invoked by the UNSC has been 
sanctions against diamonds, which were used against Angola, 754 Sierra Leone... and Liberia. 756 Angola 
was, when it was subjected to UNSC sanctions, and remains today, amongst the world's largest 
diamond producing states. '" During the conflict in Angola, UNITA controlled much of Angola's 
diamond industry. 758 UNITA's estimated revenue from the sale of diamonds between 1992 and 1998 
was $3.72 billion. 759 Diamonds are the ideal currency for war. They have a high value and are small in 
size, which makes them easy to transport. They are also untraceable. UNITA used its dominant 
position in Angola's diamond production cleverly. Diamond revenues allowed UNITA to pay inflated 
70 Section 3.4.3. 
7 51 UNSC Res 758 (8 June 1992) UN Doc S/RES/758,3. 
'52 David Owen, Balkan Odyssey (Indigo 1996) 382. 
753 Section 2.1.3. 
'sa UNSC Res 1173 (12 June 1998) UN Doc S/RES/I 173,12 ('UNSC Resolution 1173'). 
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75' Cortright and Lopez, The Sanctions Decade (n 72) 151. 
"S Joseph Ilummel, 'Diamonds are a Smuggler's Best Friend: Regulation, Economics, and Enforcement in the Global Effort to Curb the Trade in Conflict Diamonds' (2007) 41 International Lawyer 1145. 
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1997. available at http: //www. globalwitness. org/media_library_detail. php/90/en/a_rough_trade [last accessed 27 August 20091 ('Global Witness Report') 
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arms prices. 760 It also stockpiled diamonds prior to handing over two key trading centres 
to the 
government of Angola. 761 UNSC sanctions on Angola's diamonds commenced 
in June 1998 and 
prohibited the importation of diamonds from Angola that did not have a Certificate of 
Origin from 
Angola's government. 762 
Economic sanctions, which target a resource like diamonds, allow resources that have a 
humanitarian value such as food or medicine to remain freely available to a targeted state. The 
certification programmes, which were developed alongside commodity sanctions, allowed the 
legitimate government of a state to export a targeted commodity and thus raise money. 
There are however some disadvantages to commodity sanctions. This was demonstrated 
during the period of economic sanctions targeted at the exportation of diamonds from Sierra Leone, 
763 
where, much like the situation in Angola, an opposition force, the RUF, was funding a war against the 
government through the sale of diamonds. 7M Diamonds are, like most natural resources including 
timber, which has also been subject to targeted economic sanctions, 765 not easily traceable. In relation 
to sanctions against UNITA, both Cote d'Ivoire and Zambia, as well as private companies, were 
prepared to provide false certification766 although, as Global Witness indicated in 1997, at that time 
only diamond producing nations subject to sanction required certification of origin. 767 
In Sierra Leone, the RUF breached UNSC sanctions on diamonds by exporting them to third 
countries in exchange for food and arms. 768 In large part, they were moved to Liberia, although they 
were also exported to Guinea and Gambia. 769 Once exported to these states there was no means of 
ensuring that these diamonds did not enter the official export systems in those states and that they were 
not exported on to other states, which were either unaware of or disregarded their origin. It has been 
noted for example that in reporting their diamond imports states frequently confuse the terms `country 
of origin', which is the state that the diamond was mined in, and 'country of province', which is the last 
state through which a diamond has transited. The result is that states frequently name as a `country of 
760 Cortright and Lopez, The Sanctions Decade (n 72) 159. 
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origin' a state that does not mine diamonds 
. 
770 This demonstrates that states may not be cognisant of 
the origin of diamonds that they are importing. 
Targeted economic sanctions against oil or petroleum would come within the category of 
commodity sanctions. Sanctions against oil have been discussed in chapter 2 in relation to Southern 
Rhodesia and chapter 3 in relation to Iraq and will not be discussed in detail here. There are, however, 
two distinctions between sanctions against oil and those against other commodities that should be 
noted. Firstly, whereas generally commodity sanctions apply to imports from a targeted state, sanctions 
on oil may also apply to exports to a targeted state, as they did in relation to Southern Rhodesia. 771 
Secondly, the general purpose of commodity sanctions is to prevent the targeted state from raising 
money through sale of the sanctioned commodity but this is not the only purpose of sanctions against 
oil. The sanctioning of oil may also limit the state from functioning in other respects as oil is used for 
transportation, both of goods and of people, and is also a component in the manufacture of many other 
products. 
4.1.2 Targeted Economic Sanctions Against Identified Entities or Persons 
Unlike targeted sanctions against identified assets, targeted sanctions against identified entities or 
persons are a relatively new phenomenon. This type of UNSC sanction was introduced during 
economic sanctions against Iraq when funds of the sale of petroleum by Iraqi Government and state 
bodies, agencies and corporations were to be transferred to an escrow account. 772 They were 
established in order to address the fact that in some cases regime leaders and their loyal supporters 
escape virtually unscathed' from broad economic sanctions. "' This is because those people are in a 
position to hide their own assets whilst retaining the majority of the limited commodities that are 
available during economic sanctions. As such, broad economic sanctions have a disproportionate 
impact on the general population of a state, which is subject to sanctions, whilst leaving those 
responsible for the action that necessitated the invocation of sanctions largely unscathed. 
Economic sanctions taken against identified entities or persons can be broad, restricting the 
importation or exportation of assets to or from a specific entity, for example economic sanctions 
770 ihid, para 115-121. 
771 UNSC Resolution 232 (n 123). 
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against UNITA. They may also be narrow, freezing the assets of named individuals. Both will be 
outlined here. 
4.1.2.1 Targeted Economic Sanctions Against Identified Entities 
Targeted economic sanctions against identified entities, in their initial stages, have been taken as part 
of wide-sweeping sanctions against states. For example, as mentioned in the introduction to this 
section, whilst there were comprehensive economic sanctions in place against Iraq, targeted sanctions 
were taken against the proceeds of the sale of Government oil and oil produced by state bodies, entities 
and corporations. 774 
As the 1990's progressed, however, economic sanctions were increasingly being targeted at 
specific regimes within states. Two notable instances have previously been outlined in this chapter. UN 
sanctions were taken against UNITA in Angola 775 and the RUF in Sierra Leone. 776 In both cases, 
economic sanctions were taken, in the midst of civil wars, against groups that were engaged in 
hostilities against the legitimate government of the state. In this political situation, economic sanctions 
that target the rogue group whilst allowing the legitimate government to operate as normally as 
possible offer advantages over broad economic sanctions against the entire state. 
Firstly, by targeting those who are causing unrest whilst leaving the government free from 
sanctions they ensure that key resources such as food and medicine can remain available to the general 
population. On the assumption that those commodities remain available to the legitimate government 
of a state and that the government in question is prepared to distribute them, this type of economic 
sanction addresses the situation that arose in Iraq, whereby there was widespread humanitarian 
suffering as a result of insufficient food and medical care. "' 
Secondly, as well as allowing access to goods necessary for the humanitarian well-being of a 
state, this type of sanction allows other goods to flow to and from a state. Because the sanctions only 
apply to certain entities and people, the state itself (when it is not the target of sanctions) can still raise 
money through exports and other states can export goods to it, which avoids the situation in FRY 
74 UNSC Resolution 778 (n 539). 
775 UNSC Resolution 864 (n 713). 
776 UNSC Res 1171 (5 June 1998) UN Doc S/RES/I 171. 
"' Ahtisaari Report (n 422); Simons, The Scourging of Iraq (n 423) xviii: LaRae-Perez (n 424). 161: Pilger (n 
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whereby the blanket arms embargo maintained a weapons imbalance, which favoured the perpetrators 
of the unrest. "g 
Thirdly, this type of sanction sends a clear message to those who have been subject to it that 
their behaviour specifically, rather than the broader issue, of for example, hostilities within a state, is 
considered worthy of being subjected to economic sanctions. It is also a strongly symbolic gesture, 
which may serve to discourage other states from supporting the rogue regime. 
Despite their benefits, economic sanctions targeted against identified entities also present 
some difficulties. Firstly, as previously discussed in relation to arms embargoes and, as with broad 
sanctions against states, breaches of economic sanctions targeted at entities such as UNITA still 
occur. 77' Secondly, groups may be able to circumvent the supposed benefits of economic sanctions. In 
its attempts to gain control of Sierra Leone the RUF physically tortured the citizens of Sierra Leone, 
including through the use of sexual exploitation. 780 It also sought to starve the citizens of that country 
by disrupting shipments and destroying crops. 781 The destruction of food has also been described as a 
weapon during hostilities in Somalia. 782 This prevents the general population of a state from obtaining 
the supposed benefit of targeted economic sanctions, i. e. that food and other essential commodities are 
still available. 
Thirdly, this type of economic sanction may be labour-intensive to monitor because it affects 
some imports to and exports from a state whilst not impacting on others. It, therefore, requires close 
attention to ensure that no breaches take place. Monitoring difficulties are compounded in a state like 
Sierra Leone, which had varying factions seeking power without any true governance of the state. 783 
There the dispersal of essential commodities to the general population could not be done by the 
government and required the presence of humanitarian agencies in the state to do so. 
Fourthly, in some respects targeting a person because of his or her membership of a certain 
group may be inequitable. This is because such measures apply equally to the leader of an organisation, 
who makes decisions with regard to the functioning of the group and takes full benefit of the financial 
position of the group, as it does to an ordinary solider in the organisation, who has no power over the 
7 78 and Lopez, The Sanctions Decade (n 72) 63-65. 
"`' Bondi (n 722), 109-123. 
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movement of the group and may not have joined of his or her own volition. For example, the RUF in 
Sierra Leone forcibly recruited children, drugging them and teaching them how to kill. 784 It is difficult 
to see how such a child solider is culpable and economic sanctions will have no impact on his or her 
behaviour, which is controlled by a senior member of the army. This creates a similar difficulty to 
sanctions taken against states, in that the sanctions may impact on persons who have little to do with 
the behaviour being sanctioned. In those cases it is necessary to target sanctions even more specifically 
at the leadership of the group in question. 
4.1.2.2 Targeted Economic Sanctions Against Identified Individuals 
Economic sanctions taken against identified individuals are even more narrowly targeted than those 
against identified entities. The individuals may be senior members of a government or rebel group or 
may be associated with a certain type of behaviour that contravenes international law such as terrorist 
activity. Such measures directly address the problem of collateral suffering by citizens of a state or 
members of an organisation that have no control over the decisions being made. 
The first UN system of economic sanctions targeted at identified individuals was taken during 
economic sanctions against Haiti. 785 Economic sanctions against Haiti had been in place, in the form of 
a fuel and arms embargo, 786 for almost a year before UNSC Resolution 917 was invoked in May 1994. 
The resolution set out three groups of people who would come within the ambit of the assets freeze: all 
officers of the Haitian military and their immediate families; 787 the major participants in the coup d'etat 
of 1991 and the illegal governments since that coup d'etat together with their immediate families; 788 
and those employed by or acting on behalf of their immediate families. 789 The committee created under 
UNSC Resolution 841 (the 841 Committee')790 was responsible for keeping a list of the individuals to 
be subject to sanction. 791 
Targeted sanctions against identified individuals offer the same potential benefits outlined in 
relation to targeted sanctions against identified entities. Furthermore, in two respects they offer 
advancement from the position of targeted sanctions against identified entities. Firstly, they are 
784 ibid. 563. 
785 UNSC Resolution 917 (n 89). 
78' UNSC Resolution 841 (n 42). 
'R' UNSC Resolution 917 (n 89), 3(a). 
788 ibid. 3(b). 
789 ibid. 3(c). 
790 Created under UNSC Resolution 841 (n 42), 10. 
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absolutely targeted towards those responsible for the behaviour being sanctioned. Secondly, they are a 
symbolic tool in that they communicate that a specific person's behaviour is not acceptable to the 
UNSC. Since they identify the individuals responsible for undesirable behaviour they express a level of 
censure that cannot be achieved through the use of economic sanctions previously outlined. 
Although Haiti was the first instance of targeted economic sanctions against identified 
individuals it offers no useful lessons as to the implementation of that type of sanction. This is because 
military force was sanctioned by the UNSC less than three months after the adoption of economic 
sanctions. 792 And, on 19 September 1994, the sanctioned regime agreed to step down when threatened 
with military intervention by US forces. 793 A multi-national force peacefully entered Haiti that day and 
the UNSC announced on 29 September that economic sanctions would end the day after President 
Aristide returned to Haiti. 794 Following Aristide's return to Haiti UN sanctions were lifted on 15 
October 1994.795 
In another case, five years after sanctions against UNITA in Angola were initiated the UNSC 
froze the assets of designated796 members of the regime. 797 The reports of the committee established 
pursuant to UNSC Resolution 864 ('the 864 Committee'), record the main difficulties with this type of 
economic sanction, which relies heavily on its implementation by states and reporting of that 
implementation to the relevant sanctions committee. 798 Six months after sanctions were to be 
implemented only 35 states had reported to the 864 Committee. 799 A year later, only thirteen further 
states had reported. 800 Although six states reported that they had found sanctioned assets in their 
jurisdiction, it is possible that assets were held in other states that did not report to the 864 
Committee. " 
This problem is linked to another difficulty with this type of economic sanctions, and that is 
that its implementation assumes that the individuals subject to sanctions act within a sophisticated 
792 UNSC Resolution 940 (n 90), 4. 
'`'3 Douglas Jehl, `Showdown in Haiti: The Overview; Haiti's Military Leaders Agree to Resign; Clinton Halts 
Assault. Recalls 61 Planes: Troops in Today' The New York Times (New York 19 September 1994). 
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Report of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 864 (1993) concerning the situation 
in Angola (3 February 2000) S/1999/83. para 11(c) ('Report of 864 Committee, February 2000'). 
7`'9 Report of 864 Committee, February 1999 (n 798), para 2. 
"0° Report of 864 Committee, February 2000 (n 798), para 5. 
ß01 Supplementary Report of the Monitoring Mechanism on Sanctions against UNITA (12 October 2001) 
S/2001/966, para 223. 
127 
banking system, which will be capable of freezing their assets. For example, the 864 Committee's 
report of 1999 proposes that states `enlist the assistance of banks and sources of financial information 
and expertise to identify and track the financial flows of UNITA and those of its senior officials and 
adult members of their immediate families. ' 802 However, if an individual does not act within a formal 
banking system his or her financial movements will not be easily traceable. Of the six states that 
reported holding assets of the designated individuals, five were developed states. 803 Given that the 
majority of those states are geographically distant from Angola and, assuming that states that did not 
report are less likely to be implementing sanctions, it would seem likely that not all assets that should 
have been frozen under UNSC Resolution 1173 were being reported. 
This links to the final difficulty with this type of economic sanction, the problem of tracing 
breaches that do occur. When the exportation of a particular commodity to a state is prohibited, the 
presence of that commodity in the state indicates that sanctions have been breached. When personal 
assets are sanctioned their presence in a state is less visible. Equally, if the sanctioned assets remain 
unfrozen in other jurisdictions that fail to report their presence, either because those states cannot trace 
them or because they choose not to, the 864 Committee will be unaware of their existence. 
4.1.3 Travel Sanctions 
Travel sanctions can take two forms. Firstly, they can be a prohibition on flights to and from a state. 
Secondly, they can be a prohibition on identified people travelling. Travel sanctions have been a facet 
of UN economic sanctions since the outset. Sanctions against Southern Rhodesia included a prohibition 
on the admittance of persons travelling on Southern Rhodesian passports and the operation of aircraft 
to it. 804 They have been used frequently as part of UN sanctions regimes since then although they have 
yet to be taken in isolation. 805 
Travel sanctions have a high symbolic value. They send a message that the state or person 
sanctioned is considered to be acting outside of the international system. When implemented against a 
state, they prevent participation in sporting and cultural events as well as limiting educational 
opportunities. They also strengthen the implementation of other sanctions by preventing sanctioned 
802 Report of 864 Committee, February 1999 (n 798), para 7(a)(iv). 
. 03 Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Switzerland and USA. Cote D'Ivoire is the sixth state. 
804 tJNSC Resolution 253 (n 314). 5(b), 6. 
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goods being transported to a state. For example, UNITA was being supplied with weapons that were 
being transported to Angola by air. 806 Prohibitions on flights to or from a state should also, 
theoretically, be easy to monitor, if not to enforce, through the use of technology, such as radar and 
satellite systems. 
Travel sanctions do, however, have some potential flaws. Broad prohibitions on flights may 
inhibit the provision of humanitarian assistance. This is generally addressed by providing for 
humanitarian exemptions to travel sanctions. However, these exemptions do not always full rectify the 
issue in a given state. For example, during travel sanctions imposed against Haiti 
, 
807 many asylum 
seekers were stranded in Haiti because the regime refused to allow evacuation flights in retaliation to 
the travel sanctions that had been put in place. 808 
Such sanctions are also difficult to monitor when applied against identified individuals. False 
documentation is available to those with sufficient money, which is, ironically, more likely to be the 
elite members of a state who are likely to be the intended targets of a UN travel ban. In Angola, the 
problem that arose was that many members of UNITA were not Angolan but were citizens of European 
and other African states, which made it more difficult to restrict their travel as they would not be 
travelling on Angolan passports. 809 
The most comprehensive set of UN travel sanctions was established against Libya on the basis 
of its involvement in the bombings of Pan Am flight 103 ('the Lockerbie bombing') and Union de 
transports aeriens flight 772 ('the UTA bombing'). 810 Travel sanctions were initially taken in March 
1992.8 ßI UNSC Resolution 748 demanded that Libya return hostages and cease both terrorist action and 
the support of terrorist action. 81' It ordered states to refuse permission to any aircraft, destined for or 
coming from Libya, to land, take off or over-fly their territory. 813 Furthermore, states were to prohibit 
the supply or servicing of aircraft or aircraft components, the certification of airworthiness and the 
provision of aircraft insurance or any payment under any such insurance in relation to Libya. 814 These 
sanctions were strengthened the following year in UNSC Resolution 883, which contained four new 
806 Mollander Report (n 729), para 164. 
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provisions in relation to travel. S15 In relation to Libyan Arab Airlines, it ordered that states require the 
immediate closure of its offices in their territories and prohibit transactions with it including the 
honouring of its tickets. 816 States were also to prohibit the supply of goods or services destined for the 
construction, improvement or maintenance of civilian or military airfields or associated facilities. 
817 
Finally, UNSC Resolution 883 prohibited the assistance and training of any personnel associated with 
the operation of aircraft within Libya. 818 
From the outset it was clear that Libya was willing to reach a solution to the problems that 
were motivating economic sanctions. It offered to hand over those suspected of the UTA bombing to a 
French court and those suspected of the Lockerbie bombings to an international tribunal in order to 
avoid being subject to UN sanctions. S19 The UK and US refused. Instead they demanded that the 
suspects be handed over for trial on their territory, 820 which was in turn rejected by Libya. 82' 
Throughout the period during which Libya was subject to UN sanctions it continued to press for a trial 
on neutral territory, including, in February 1994, a suggestion that the two suspects should be tried 
under Scottish law, in front of Scottish judges at the ICJ. 822 
lt has been suggested that Qaddafi's willingness to hand over the suspects was out of concern 
about the impact of sanctions 
. 
823 However, Libya's stance remained consistent from when the initial 
accusations, that it was harbouring persons suspected of committing the bombing, were made through 
to the end of sanctions so it is difficult to attribute too much persuasive power to sanctions at that point. 
That said, once sanctions commenced Libya suggested that sanctions were effective, indicating that it 
had suffered losses running to billions of dollars as a result of them. 824 Niblock, however, argues that 
these losses maybe more properly attributed to a combination of sanctions, mismanagement of the 
economy by Libyan authorities and the prevailing global economic climate. 125 
In any case, in terms of using behaviour modification as the measurement of the effectiveness 
of sanctions, Libya remained steadfast in its refusal to hand over the suspects of the terrorist bombing 
R15 UNSC Res 883 (1 1 November 1993) UN Doc S/RES/883. 
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throughout the period during which it was subject to UNSC sanctions. As sanctions against Libya 
continued, the OAU supported the Libyan position that the bombing suspects be tried in a neutral 
country and called on the UNSC to lift economic sanctions in light of Libya's willingness to cooperate 
on this issue. 826 By June 1997, the OAU decided that it would cease to implement economic sanctions 
against Libya unless a trial in a neutral country was agreed upon. 827 
UNSC Resolution 1192 welcomed the initiative agreed by the UK, US and Netherlands 
whereby the Lockerbie suspects would be tried before a Scottish court sitting in the Netherlands at 
Camp Zeist, a disused US Air Force base, which was made part of Scottish territory for the duration of 
the trial. 828 It further stated that sanctions under UNSC Resolutions 748 and 883 would be suspended 
against Libya once the accused arrived in the Netherlands for trial or had appeared before an 
appropriate court in either the US or UK and once the French government was satisfied with the 
response to the bombing of UTA 772.829 The suspects were delivered for trial in April 1999,830 
although, due to questions over compliance with UNSC Resolution 748, sanctions against Libya were 
not ultimately terminated until September 2003 831 
Given that the US and UK ultimately conceded to Libyan demands and held a trial of the 
suspects on neutral territory it is difficult to see that travel sanctions were very effective. In fact, Aust 
attributes the ultimate agreement on the trail to `stubbornness, imagination, political will 
- 
and the right 
timing. '832 It remains the situation following sanctions against Libya that travel sanctions are still seen 
as a largely symbolic gesture. 83; 
4.1.4 Continuation of Humanitarian Problems 
This chapter so far has focused on the type of targeted sanctions available to the UNSC and both the 
advantages and disadvantages of the use of each of those instruments. It has not addressed whether 
targeted sanctions, in their initial stages, were an improvement, in terms of humanitarian impact, 
compared with broad sanctions against states. Craven suggests that `it is barely credible to suggest that 
826 OAU. Resolution on the Crisis between the Great Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France (27 January 1995) CM/Res. 1566 (LXI). 
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in directing measures against the government, the civilian population will be immunized from harmful 
effects. '834 This section briefly examines the humanitarian impact of the targeted economic sanctions. 
The humanitarian problems that prevailed in Somalia and Sierra Leone as a result of 
economic sanctions, as previously discussed, 835 were reflected in other cases of targeted economic 
sanctions. Despite the short period during which UNSC sanctions against Haiti were in place, 
it has 
been suggested that they, together with the sanctions taken by the Organisation of American States 
over a more extended period (from October 1991), were responsible for humanitarian problems in that 
state. The most tangible impact of UNSC targeted economic sanctions against Haiti came as a result of 
the petroleum embargo, which was imposed in October 1993.836 As oil became more scare its price, 
and thus the price of transportation, was driven up. 837 This had the effect of driving up the price of 
food, 838 medicines and other humanitarian items. The difficulties experienced as a result of these 
increased prices were compounded by a drop in Haiti's manufacturing industry as states prevented 
Haitian made products from being imported to their territory thus resulting in job losses. 839 
Whereas previously Haiti had been given development assistance, as sanctions progressed 
humanitarian assistance became a necessity. 84° Whilst humanitarian assistance was provided for under 
the resolutions, the interpretation of what constituted humanitarian assistance was left open to states to 
interpret841 with the result that it was narrowly defined by some states. For example, as outlined in the 
Nicaragua case, the US had previously accepted that the provision of humanitarian assistance would 
include `the provision of food, clothing, medicine, and other humanitarian assistance', 842 whereas in the 
case of Haiti the US's provision of humanitarian assistance was limited to `medicines and medical 
supplies, as authorized by the Secretary of the Treasury, and rice, beans, sugar, wheat flour, cooking 
oil, corn, corn flour, milk, and edible tallow'. 843 The resulting impact on the population was widespread 
malnourishment, 844 with half of the children in Haiti suffering to some extent from malnourishment by 
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the end of 1994,845 increased mortality rates, including one of the highest rates of maternal mortality in 
the world, 846 and the outbreak of epidemics of ordinarily controllable diseases such as measles, 
meningitis and rabies. 847 
Targeted sanctions against the former Yugoslavia also caused significant humanitarian 
suffering amongst the population. As previously noted, the arms embargo maintained an unequal 
distribution of weapons across the parties involved. 848 This inequality resulted in the Serb army of 
80,000 troops capturing 70 per cent of Bosnian territory, which was defended by a potential 200,000 
troops because the Serb army was heavily armed whereas only two thirds of the Bosnians were. "' 
Bosnians citizens were then left with a choice of fleeing or risk being raped and murdered by the Serb 
aso 
army. 
Additionally, Yugoslavia experienced a period of hyperinflation, which led to the collapse of 
the dinar. 851 As a result, similar to Haiti, prices of commodities rose significantly with the cost of 
staples like bread doubling in price in a matter of days. 852 Unemployment also rose, with estimations as 
early as September 1992 that between 50 and 80 per cent of the working population would be without 
work within three months. 853 And the cost of staples like bread doubled in price in a matter of days. 
These effects of sanctions were not, however, being felt by the elites, who were in fact said to be 
profiting from sanctions, but rather by the ordinary people. It was said that `their practical effect has 
been to devastate the middle class'. 954 
It can be seen, therefore, that Craven's feargss that simply targeting economic sanctions would 
not address the humanitarian difficulties that had been seen during economic sanctions against Iraq. As 
such, modifications to targeted sanctions were required to address this situation and the other problems 
previously outlined. The next section of this chapter will consider the potential routes that the 
development of targeted economic sanctions could have taken. 
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4.2 Potential Modifications to the Targeted Sanctions Framework 
In August 1998, Kofi Annan, in his report as Secretary-General, succinctly described the problem 
being faced by the UN and its Member States with regard to targeted economic sanctions: '[t]he 
international community should be under no illusion:... humanitarian and human rights policy goals 
cannot easily be reconciled with those of a sanctions regime. It cannot be too strongly emphasized 
that 
sanctions are a tool of enforcement and, like other methods of enforcement, they will 
do harm. This 
should be borne in mind when the decision to impose them is taken, and when the results are 
subsequently evaluated. '856 
This section looks at three ways in which the UN could have attempted to reconcile these two 
goals. Firstly, it looks at the possibility of economic sanctions working within the legal framework of 
the law of armed conflict. Secondly, it looks at largely maintaining the status quo but providing 
increased humanitarian aid where necessary. Finally, it looks at the possibility of regulatory 
intervention. 
4.2.1 Economic Sanctions as Part of the Law of Armed Conflict 
The possibility that when economic sanctions regimes are taken in armed conflict that the rules 
applicable to armed conflict should also applied to the sanctions was mooted by both Reisman and 
Stevick857 and Anna Segall858 in the late 1990s. Segall was motivated by her belief that any regime of 
sanctions which is capable of affecting the civilian population, must provide for humanitarian 
exceptions'. She suggested that adherence to the rules of armed conflict would mean ensuring that 
economic sanctions regimes complied with: the prohibition on starvation of the civilian population; the 
right to humanitarian assistance; the provision of access to relief supplies in naval blockades; and the 
provision of relief supplies for occupied territories! " Reisman and Stevick stated that the commonly 
accepted criteria that any use of force should be `demonstrably necessary, proportional to the necessity, 
and capable of discriminating between combatants and non-combatants' could be applied to the use of 
economic sanctions by the UN Rbo 
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There would have been certain advantages for the UN in adopting this approach for its 
treatment of economic sanction. Primarily, because these criteria are so well established with regard to 
the law of armed conflict, their application to economic sanctions would have been relatively 
straightforward. The law of armed conflict, unlike the application of economic sanctions, accepts that 
sanctions cause damage, including collateral damage. This is why it is required that any military 
sanctions imposed are both necessary and proportionate. The consideration of economic sanctions on 
those terms would force states and the UN to consider and seek to reduce any potential damage. 
Furthermore, despite the Charter not treating them as such, there is often a distinction made in 
practice between military and economic sanctions taken under Chapter VII of the UN Charter with the 
latter being more readily adopted than the former, as can be seen in the initial stages of economic 
sanctions against Iraq 
. 
861 However, the humanitarian problems seen as a result of economic sanctions 
have demonstrated that collateral damage is not limited to military sanctions. By treating the invocation 
of economic sanctions as akin to military sanctions some of these issues could be resolved. Firstly, all 
sanctions taken by the UNSC under Chapter VII would be treated similarly. This would clarify that 
economic sanctions are not to be taken lightly, or somehow seen as a lesser measure than military 
sanctions. Secondly, it would require that any possible damage caused by economic sanctions would be 
evaluated prior to sanctions being invoked. 
O'Connell, however, criticises the suggestion that the law of armed conflict can be applied to 
economic sanctions. 862 She notes particularly that if the proportionality as applied to economic 
sanctions was to be considered through the lens of the law of armed conflict that it would create 
unintended consequences. She further notes that, in the context of the law of armed conflict, the 
principle of proportionality allows force to escalate if the military aim sought cannot be achieved with 
less force. 863 In terms of economic sanctions, this would allow economic sanctions to be increased in 
circumstances where their use is already causing significant humanitarian suffering. As such, the 
application of the laws of armed conflict to economic sanctions might not ameliorate the humanitarian 
situation. 
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4.2.2 Maintenance of the Status quo whilst Providing for Supplementary Humanitarian 
Aid 
Rather than using the law of armed conflict to pre-plan the invocation of sanctions the UNSC could 
have sought to address humanitarian problems in the application of economic sanctions in a wholly 
reactive manner. It may have been the case that the main problem was not that economic sanctions 
were causing significant humanitarian problems but that those problems were not being rectified 
adequately. Based on that premise, the deficiencies could be addressed by improving upon the 
humanitarian aid given to states during and after the imposition of sanctions. The predominant 
advantage to this type of action would be that it would have no impact on the effectiveness of sanctions 
because it would not interfere with sanctions until they had already been implemented. 
In any case this position is more reflective of the measures that were being invoked by the 
UNSC. Sanctions against FRY saw developments in both the provision of humanitarian aid and the 
monitoring of the implementation of economic sanctions that could form the basis of future 
developments in this area. 
The committee established in UNSC Resolution 724 ('the 724 Committee') with respect to 
sanctions against FRY was established less than three months after the implementation of UNSC 
economic sanctions. 864 The 724 Committee was sent in the region of 140,000 applications for the 
shipment of exempted goods. 865 lt was criticised for delays in processing these applications, which 
resulted in delays to the resolution of humanitarian problems in the region. " This has, however, been 
perceived as a turning point for the provision of humanitarian aid during sanctions. 867 The most 
significant advancements were the development of institution-specific sanctions exemptions to major 
UN humanitarian organisations and the automatic approval of designated humanitarian items. 868 As 
well as the exemptions granted to organisations such as the ICRC and the UNHCR, the 724 Committee 
fast-tracked the applications of other recognised humanitarian organisations. This eliminated the 
backlog of applications and allowed humanitarian aid to get through to those who needed it in a timely 
fashion. 
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Perhaps more important than the advances in the provision of humanitarian aid was the 
improvement in the monitoring of economic sanctions which came about as a result of the cooperation 
between regional organisations in implementing sanctions. Alongside the UN, organisations such as the 
OSCE, the EU, the WEU, NATO and the ICFY cooperated at an unprecedented level in order to assist 
states in their observance of the sanctions. 869 Initially the OSCE and EU formed a sanctions liaison 
group. This group dispatched customs officials to the states in close in proximity to FRY, which 
became known as SAMs. 870 SAMCOMM was established in Brussels, funded by the European 
Commission and began operating on 5 October 1992. $" SAMCOMM communicated between the 
SAMs and the national authorities of the host countries, to ensure that suspected breaches of economic 
sanctions were followed up and established evaluation reports for the attention of the UN, the EU and 
the OSCE. 872 A computerised satellite communications system was established and maintained by the 
US and linked the SAMCOMM headquarters with the UN in New York allowing for information to 
pass between the UN and customs officials based at the SAMs and facilitating verification of possible 
breaches. 873 
Meanwhile, NATO and the WEU, supported by fourteen states, established a combined 
operation to check all vessels in the Adriatic Sea, inspecting their cargo and documents where 
necessary. 874 Whilst this system was praised as being the first time in history, major regional 
organizations stepped in to assist the United Nations in providing staff and financial resources for the 
implementation of UN sanctions', it is also noted that the `requisite resources for establishing such 
arrangements, however, are likely to be available only in cases where the interests of the wealthiest 
states are at stake. '875 What is, however, clear is that the developments brought about in the monitoring 
of economic sanctions could be replicated in the provision of humanitarian aid if the same level of 
cooperation between regional organisations, the UN and those monitoring sanctions on the ground 
could be achieved. 
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4.2.3 Regulatory Intervention 
The third way in which targeted economic sanctions could have been modified was through regulatory 
intervention. Regulatory intervention would involve both the establishment of some framework 
legislation in relation to implementation, which could be used by all states, and also the drafting of 
sanctions resolutions that could, with minor modifications, be used for all instances of economic 
sanctions. In this way regulatory intervention would ensure consistency both between the various 
resolutions and during the implementation of economic sanctions. 
Regulatory intervention would be something of a compromise position between the two other 
suggestions of dealing with economic sanctions as part of the law of armed conflict or maintaining the 
status quo whilst providing for supplementary humanitarian aid. It would require significant forward 
planning in order to draft the initial legislation. However, once the basic framework has been 
developed, each economic sanction regime would only require slight modification. Equally, in terms of 
implementing and monitoring sanctions it would share characteristics with the humanitarian aid 
approach as suggested above. It could also allow for safeguards to be built into the framework itself 
thus reducing the reliance on action during and following sanctions. 
4.3 Towards a Regulatory Intervention Framework 
During his position paper on the fiftieth anniversary of the UN former Secretary-General, Javier Perez 
de Cuellar, acknowledged that sanctions were somewhat of a `blunt' instrument and identified some of 
the problems that were inherent in their application. 876 lie said that the UNSC should, when instigating 
sanctions, define objective criteria by which their effectiveness could be assessed, that experience was 
being gained with respect to monitoring the implementation of sanctions although difficulties remained 
and that humanitarian agencies in targeted states should be offered support, as should applications 
made under Article 50877 of the Charter. 878 
Two years later the UNGA adopted Resolution 51/242 879 This resolution emphasised 
coordination between the UN, Member States, regional organisations and non-governmental 
876 Report of the Secretary General on the Work of the Organisation, 'Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: 
Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations' (3 
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organisations as a means of progressing economic sanctions in the UN framework 
. 
880 It also made a 
number of recommendations with regard to how sanctions should be established and implemented. Key 
issues noted included the consideration of both the short-term and long-term effects of economic 
sanctions, the minimisation of side effects on the civilian population of a target, especially with regard 
to the humanitarian situation and the uniform application of sanctions by all states. 881 Emphasis was 
placed on the development of humanitarian assistance, with it being noted that: it should be `provided 
in an impartial and expeditious manner'; the assistance of concerned parties should be sought in 
assessing humanitarian needs; guidelines for formulating exemptions and a list of exempted goods 
should be developed; and that the concept of `humanitarian limits of sanctions' should be researched 
further. 882 The resolution also sought standardisation of the approach to be followed by the sanctions 
committees. 883 
4.3.1 The European Conferences and Suggestions for Reform 
The European Conferences were developed, by concerned governments, in direct response to these 
issues. They provided a forum in which various parties concerned with the implementation of 
economic sanctions could discuss how they should develop going forward. The first hosted by the 
Government of Switzerland (Interlaken, 1998-1999) focused broadly on targeted economic sanctions, 
the second hosted by the German Government (Bonn-Berlin, 1999-2000) focused on arms embargoes 
and travel sanctions and the third hosted by the Government of Sweden (Stockholm, 2002) focused on 
how implementation might be strengthened. What emerged out of these talks was the suggestion for a 
regulatory framework. 
The Conferences took place over a five-year period and made numerous recommendations. At 
the outset of the Interlaken Conference proceedings the Chairman of the conference, Rolf Jeker, 
identified two problems with UN sanctions that had motivated that conference as being the 
-humanitarian effects on the civilian population in the target country' and `economic effects on third 
countries. '884 However, whilst they may have motivated the establishment of the Conferences they 
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were not considered in detail in any of the Conferences. Instead, the Conferences focused on the 
creation of a regulatory framework and over the course of the Conferences four innovative categories 
of recommendations became apparent: the creation of standardised UNSC resolutions; the development 
of model domestic sanctions legislation; the expansion of support mechanisms for implementation; and 
a focus on greater communication. Each category will be considered individually in this section. 
4.3.1.1 The Creation of Standardised UNSC Resolutions 
UNSC resolutions are unique. They create binding obligations for Member States that were not 
involved in their drafting or negotiation. 885 These obligations have significant repercussions for those 
states and individuals targeted by sanctions as well as for those states that are implementing them. As 
such, the resolutions must be clear as to the precise ambit of the measures being put in place. 
As Wood has stated about UNSC resolutions: `[i]n an ideal world, each resolution would be 
internally consistent, consistent with earlier Council action on the same matter, and consistent with 
Council action on other matters. Each resolution would be concise, and avoid superfluous or repetitive 
material. '886 The tendency has been, however, to draft UNSC resolutions on a case-by-case basis with 
varying degrees of reliance on previous resolutions dealing with the same issue. This is because there is 
no standard procedure for drafting UNSC resolutions and there is generally no input from the UN 
Secretariat, which includes the Office of the Legal Counsel. 887 
Instead, the drafting of resolutions is a political process with draft documents circulated 
amongst various states for comment, revision and re-circulation. Furthermore, as Boyle and Chinkin 
state, the UNSC is `a seriously deficient vehicle' for the creation of binding resolutions, which they 
perceive as being akin to legislation, because it lacks accountability, transparency and procedural 
fairness and because a limited number of states participate in its decision-making. "" The result is that 
the various UNSC resolutions do not have the consistency or conciseness that Wood suggests is 
desirable. 
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The seminal decision on the interpretation of UNSC resolutions was given by the ICJ in the 
Namibia Advisory Opinion 889 It dealt specifically with whether a resolution could be said to have 
binding effect and held that, in order to ascertain whether that was the case, the language of the 
resolution, the discussions leading to the resolution, the UN Charter provisions invoked in its 
implementation and any other circumstances that might assist should be considered. 890 When, however, 
resolutions dealing with economic sanctions are under analysis this process may be less useful. This is 
because not only does much of the discussion leading to sanctions resolutions take place in private but 
also because sanctions resolutions, by their nature, have to be applied quickly by states, which may not 
leave time for the type of analysis suggested by the ICJ. 
The introductory paper at the first Interlaken Conference considered that `[m]ore standardized 
wording of resolutions is a possible first step to facilitate implementation into national law. '89' This, it 
suggested, would address the difficulties in interpretation of economic sanctions, namely the ambiguity 
of language, which arises as a result of a lack of definitions and of common terminology. This 
difficulty is compounded when dealing with targeted economic sanctions as the persons or entities to 
be targeted are also listed in the resolution, or in a related instrument, with the result that they too are 
unclear. 
The second working group at the first Interlaken Conference was charged with considering the 
wording of resolutions. It stated that `uniformity of interpretation and enforcement of sanctions 
resolutions is a precondition to avoid the exploitation of ambiguities in the implementation. '892 The 
Chairman's Report of the same meeting concluded that this issue should be addressed through the use, 
in sanctions resolutions, of plain standard language, of defined technical terms consistent throughout 
resolutions and of building blocks of language that could be used in all resolutions. 893 
The second Interlaken Conference built on these suggestions and developed both building 
blocks of language dealing with the financial aspects of sanctions in UNSC resolutions and a set of 
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definitions as used in the building blocks. 894 Whilst the prohibitions and exemptions contained in the 
text were extensive it was not intended that the building blocks be treated as a draft resolution, rather 
that different blocks could be chosen, as necessary, to form the basis of UNSC sanctions resolutions. 
The building blocks dealt with: asset freezing; the provision of financial services; calling on 
international organisations to take measures where they could; reporting by states; assessment and 
support by the Sanctions Committee and Secretariat; and non-liability for compliance with sanctions. 
For both asset freezing and the provision of financial services, options were given as to what could be 
prohibited under sanctions resolutions and also what could be exempted from those prohibitions. 
None of the provisions in the building blocks were particularly innovative of themselves and 
they reflected the language used in previous resolutions, but as a whole, the concept of the building 
blocks was progressive. They were stated in clear language and were comprehensive. They could easily 
be adapted as necessary but would ensure broad consistency between the various sanctions resolutions. 
If UNSC economic sanctions resolutions were consistent it would be hoped that the implementation of 
economic sanctions by Member States would also be consistent. The inclusion of a definitions section 
was, on the other hand, novel. In domestic legislation it would be common to have a definitions section 
to explain key terms. This sadly has not been a feature of UNSC resolutions with interpretation being 
left in the hands of states and thus considerable inconsistency in interpretation. The proposed 
definitions were not exhaustive since they only included: assets; assets freeze; funds or other financial 
resources; and assets owned or controlled, directly or indirectly. They also were very broad and so did 
not cover a situation where, for example, an arms embargo or sanctions against a specified product was 
to be put in place. However, they were a starting point, which presumably could be amended should it 
be necessary to do so. 
The concept of model resolutions was further explored at the Bonn-Berlin Conference with 
respect to arms embargoes and travel/aviation sanctions. '" Three model UNSC resolutions were 
proposed for arms embargoes, travel sanctions and aviation sanctions respectively. These resolutions 
were more comprehensive than the building blocks previously proposed at the Interlaken Conferences. 
"9q 
'Working Group 3: Building Blocks and Definitions'. 2"' Interlaken Seminar on 'T'argeting United Nations 
Financial Sanctions. 29-31 March. 1999 available at 
http: //www. seco. admin. ch/themen/00513/00620/00639/00641/index. html'? lang=cn: last accessed 4 December 
20091. (`Report of Working Group 3.2°d Interlaken Conference') 
xn` Design and Implementation of Arms Embargoes and Travel and Aviation Related Sanctions Results of the 
Bonn-Berlin Process' (Bonn International Center for Conversion, 2001). available at: 
http: //www. watsoninstitute. org/tfs/CD/booklet_sanctions. pdf [last accessed 4 December 20091 (*Report of the 
Bonn-Berlin Conference') 
142 
The three resolutions shared some common clauses, for example, a preamble setting out the legal basis 
for sanctions and stating that the behaviour of the target constitutes a threat to international peace and 
security, and provisions relating to the role of the sanctions committee. Each resolution also had some 
clauses unique to the specific type of sanction it related to. So, for example, in relation to travel 
sanctions the option of either returning a person subject to a travel ban to their home state or detaining 
such a person was given. Once more it should be noted that the resolutions broadly reflected previous 
resolutions. 
The Bonn-Berlin Conference took the opportunity to rectify some of the deficiencies of 
language that had previously been seen with similar resolutions but largely it was an exercise in 
consolidating the best aspects of previous resolutions. A useful innovation was, however, that the 
resolutions came with commentary. Wood notes that, whilst they are not treaties, UNSC resolutions 
should be interpreted in light of their objects and purposes, as the Vienna Convention requires for the 
interpretation of treaties. 896 Commentary could be a source of such information and should therefore be 
included in economic sanctions regimes going forward. 
Either the building block model proposed at the Interlaken Conference or the more 
comprehensive model resolutions suggested during the Bonn-Berlin process would have been a 
welcome innovation with respect to UNSC economic sanctions resolutions. Economic sanctions should 
be implemented quickly once they have been decided upon, which gives less opportunity to consider 
their drafting than is desirable. The drafting of such standardised language would therefore give the 
drafters the opportunity to carefully consider what is to be included in UNSC resolutions thus ensuring 
the use of language that is both clear and comprehensive. 
The use of common language across all sanctions resolutions would provide consistency and 
facilitate in the interpretation of sanctions. Furthermore, the addition of either definitions for key terms, 
or commentary as an aid to interpretation, would offer less opportunity for states to interpret UNSC 
economic sanctions resolutions as they see fit, thus ensuring consistency in interpretation across 
Member States. 
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4.3.1.2 The Development of Model Domestic Sanctions Legislation 
Aligned to the difficulties that resulted from inconsistencies between UNSC resolutions were the 
problems caused by states implementing sanctions resolutions by the use of their own 
domestic 
legislation. The application of economic sanctions against a given state, person or entity both in terms 
of the transfer of assets and the punishment for those who breached sanctions is wholly reliant on 
the 
state administering sanctions in a given situation. For example, as discussed earlier 
in this chapter, the 
US has tended to take a hard-line approach to the implementation of economic sanctions particularly 
with respect to granting exemptions from sanctions. Other states, such as Zambia, which was a 
neighbouring state in the Southern Rhodesian sanctions situation, found itself forced to take a more 
lenient approach toward the implementation of sanctions. 897 However, sometimes states simply have 
insufficient domestic legislation in place to deal with the implementation of UNSC sanctions 
resolutions. The difficulties that result from insufficient legislation are compounded by the speed at 
which states are required to implement sanctions resolutions. 
As the Chairman at the first Interlaken Conference stated: `[a1II States should have in place a 
law from which resolutions imposing financial sanctions can be implemented without delay. Such 
national laws should lead to sanctions being applied with uniform effect (when compared with other 
States) rather than the application of sanctions through uniform ways and means. '898 At that stage, 
however, a proposal for a universal model law was mooted but not universally accepted. 
By the time of the second Interlaken Conference the participants had decided that a model or 
framework law that could be implemented by all states was necessary. " The second working group, 
which dealt with the model law, stated that this was because when UNSC sanctions resolutions are put 
in place they often have to take immediate effect but they will not be transferred into domestic law 
automatically. States, therefore, have to rely on whatever legislation they already have in place to 
transpose the UNSC resolutions into their domestic law. Some states have specific legislation in place 
for this purpose but the majority do not, leading them to rely on implementing legislation originally 
drafted for another purpose. 900 
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The working group felt that if every state implemented a model law, which led to the 
consistent application of UNSC sanctions, those targets of sanctions would be treated, and more 
importantly would be aware that they would be treated, equally in all states. Thus the UNSC could 
target sanctions more specifically. A draft model or framework law was proposed. 90' The law would: 
give a relevant authority within the implementing state the power to enact domestic measures to 
implement UNSC sanctions resolutions; allow for the domestic measures to be applied retroactively 
without liability attaching to those applying the measures; and make the domestic measures applicable 
within the territory and to nationals of the territory and entities incorporated within the territory. Breach 
of the domestic measures would be an offence punishable by a fine or imprisonment and domestic 
sanctions measures would have supremacy over other domestic legislation in cases of conflict. 
The primary difficulty with this suggested legislation is that it gives the 'relevant authority' in 
each state power to enact secondary legislation without specifying what those secondary measures 
should be. What could in fact materialise is the maintenance of the status quo whereby some states 
have suitable domestic legislation and processes in place and others, even amongst those who do adopt 
this proposed model law, do not. 
The need for a draft model law was reiterated during the Bonn-Berlin process. 902 The 
proposed model was similar to the model previously outlined at Interlaken. However, the Bonn-Berlin 
process provided more focus on how this model law would be translated into practice. It outlined some 
of the issues that states would need to resolve prior to the implementation of the model law such as, 
whether there were resources available for implementation of economic sanctions and to what extent 
there were already sufficient domestic measures in force to allow for the implementation of sanctions. 
The Stockholm Conference considered the draft models produced both at Interlaken and 
Bonn-Berlin and produced a consolidated model law. 903 Although the language is slightly more 
nuanced than previously, the consolidated model law contained the same provisions as were in the 
Interlaken model. 
Whilst inconsistencies in domestic systems relating to the application of UNSC sanctions 
resolutions are problematic, the model law proposed during the European Conferences is not a viable 
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solution. It fails to address the main issue, which is how states are to actually 
implement UNSC 
sanctions resolutions in practice. Its focus instead was very much on the selection of a 
domestic 
authority that could be empowered to enact domestic measures to implement UNSC sanctions. 
Furthermore, despite it being acknowledged that `the concept of any "model" or "framework" law 
which appeared to be based on the practice of a handful of developed States might be dissuasive or 
unpalatable to some governments'904 the proposed model because of the limited participants at the 
European Conferences is a construct of a small number of Western states. 905 Those states that were not 
present at the European Conferences may not be prepared to implement the measures because they 
were excluded from the process. Furthermore, there are simply too may variables amongst domestic 
systems to imagine that any global framework legislation would work in all jurisdictions. 
In order for a framework domestic law to have any impact on the implementation of UNSC 
sanctions resolutions it would firstly have to address the actual implementation of economic sanctions, 
and secondly it would require careful tailoring to each individual jurisdiction - an issue that was not 
adequately considered by the Conferences. This would be extremely resource intensive, but would pay 
dividends in the long-term as UNSC sanctions became more comprehensively implemented by all 
Member States. 
4.3.1.3 The Expansion of Support Mechanisms for Implementation 
As the use of economic sanctions by the UNSC developed some support structures, such as the 
sanctions committees, also developed. However, the support offered by the sanctions committees was 
not comprehensive and there was also a lack of central coordination of sanctions implementation at the 
UN level. The European Conferences also discussed the development of UN institutions to deal with 
the implementation of sanctions. 
The idea of creating an independent `Sanctions Unit' within the UN was first proposed during 
the Bonn-Berlin process 
. 
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Unit within the UN Secretariat... to assist the Secretary-General, the various sanctions committees and 
the Security Council in establishing and overseeing effective targeted sanctions. ""? 
The Unit would develop an institutional memory, which would provide greater support than 
relying on a variety of external experts. It would also be objective, politically neutral and would 
operate independently. Whilst largely administered by the Secretary-General and reporting to either 
him or the sanctions committees, it was intended that the Sanctions Unit would have the freedom to 
report directly to the UNSC. It would also liaise with other UN entities and with states, as well as with 
regional organisations and non-state actors. 
Generally speaking, the mandate of the Sanctions Unit would be the gathering of information, 
its collation and analysis and the transmission of its conclusions. It was recommended that the 
Sanctions Unit develop a standard questionnaire for the purpose of getting states to report and should 
also promote the creation of national focal points, which would be responsible for overseeing sanctions 
implementation nationally and regionally. Furthermore, the Sanctions Unit would be charged with 
establishing reporting channels and procedures for the reporting of sanctions breaches. It was intended 
that the Unit could deploy both monitors and full investigative teams where necessary. The Unit would 
set up a central depository to store both the information it gathered and also the information that states 
forwarded to it. It was also intended that the Sanctions Unit would provide expert technical advice 
where necessary so, for example, it would be in a position to advise on keeping new weapons out of 
conflict zones. 
The Sanctions Unit would be staffed by a core staff, supplemented by experts, and it was 
suggested that a roster of experts, who would be available at short notice, should be maintained. It 
would minimally need expertise in customs, transport, police and intelligence, finance, weapons, 
weapons flow and military assistance and `diamonds, petroleum and other commodities and resources 
that provide the revenue to sustain fighting. '" It was recommended that the Sanctions Unit be funded 
largely from the regular budget of the UN with the possibility of recourse to additional financing for 
extraordinary activities where necessary. 
The Stockholm Process refocused the consideration of support mechanisms to the 
consideration of the existing UN structures. 909 It stated that `the goal of enhancing implementation of 
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UN targeted sanctions should proceed, wherever possible, by rationalizing and upgrading current 
capacities and working methods, rather than by the creation of a new and elaborate 
institutional 
apparatus. '910 Measures for reinforcing the roles of the sanctions committees, the UN 
Secretariat and 
the expert panels with respect to the implementation of UNSC sanctions resolutions were 
recommended. 
The participants identified sanctions committees as having the primary responsibility for the 
monitoring and implementation of UNSC sanctions resolutions. However, it was also noted that 
because the sanctions committees did not have an institutional support system they struggled to deal 
with some of their remit such as broad coordination of sanctions regimes and the dissemination of 
information. The suggested solution was the development of a standard framework with respect to the 
work of sanctions committees, which would apply to all such committees, supported by individually 
drafted mandates to deal with specific economic sanctions committees. 
Coordination between the sanctions committees and other actors within the sanctions 
framework was also considered to be sporadic with the result that some entities, particularly non- 
UNSC states, felt excluded from the sanctions process. This could be addressed by increased 
communication from the sanctions committees indicating at a minimum: the reason for sanctions in a 
given case; the role of states in their implementation; the difficulties of implementing targeted 
sanctions; attempts by the UNSC to reduce the humanitarian and economic impacts of sanctions; and 
breaches of sanctions. The CTC91' was held out as a good example, for other sanctions committees to 
follow, particularly in the areas of reporting requirements, assistance to states, engagement with other 
organisations and technical expertise. 
The sanctions committees could also follow through on recommendations made by the expert 
panels. It was acknowledged that pre-sanctions assessments might not always be appropriate and it 
was, therefore, recommended that the sanctions committees should be engaged in ongoing assessments 
of the collateral effects of economic sanctions. The final recommendation was that the periodic 
monitoring visits to states by the sanctions committees were insufficient and should be reconsidered by 
the UNSC and Secretariat. 
With respect to the role of expert panels it was noted that there had been a recent streamlining 
of the selection process for panel members with the establishment of a roster of possible members. Due 
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to insufficient information sharing between the various expert panels, work was needlessly replicated. 
As a result, it was recommended that common procedural guidelines be established together with a 
depository for information where expert panels could share information. Expert panels could receive 
information from a variety of sources and for that reason the participants recommended that a universal 
system of categorising the information by source reliability and validity of information be put in place. 
Finally, the role of the UN Secretariat in sanctions implementation was discussed. it was 
recommended that the Secretariat focus its attention on the creation of a retrievable database for the 
storage of information, which could in future be made available to relevant parties through the use of a 
password protected web-portal. The Secretariat could, if its human and economic capacity was 
strengthened, provide institutional support to the Expert Panels and Monitoring Mechanisms. 
The Bonn-Berlin and Stockholm processes took divergent approaches as to how the support 
mechanisms for the implementation of sanctions should be developed. In one sense, the approach 
suggested at Stockholm, whereby existing systems would be strengthened, was a more sensible 
approach. It could take immediate effect and was relatively cost effective. However, in the long-term 
the implementation of UNSC sanctions needs to be supported by an appropriate centralised institution, 
in the same way that the implementation of peacekeeping missions are supported by the Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations. This is to prevent the needless replication of material, the use of divergent 
methodologies between various different implementing bodies and the comprehensive collation and 
dissemination of information. Whilst the establishment of a Sanctions Unit, such as that proposed 
during the Bonn-Berlin Process, would be costly and would require significant administrative 
organisation it may ultimately be necessary to ensure consistent and comprehensive implementation of 
UNSC sanctions resolutions. 
4.3.1.4 A Focus on Greater Communication 
The implementation of UNSC economic sanctions involves a large number of interested parties that 
need to coordinate their action in order to ensure that there is effective implementation of sanctions. 
This coordination requires communication between the various parties. As sanctions have become 
more targeted, this is even more relevant. Targets have to be clearly identified by the UNSC and 
communicated to states and to the targets themselves. Equally, when states actually implement 
sanctions against a target they need to communicate this with other states and with the UN. 
149 
Historically, however, the implementation of sanctions has been characterised by 
insufficient 
communication between the various actors. As has been mentioned previously the 
decision to take 
sanctions is part of an opaque process within the UN, the results of which are not generally publicly 
available. 912 Equally, it has been noted that states are not fully reporting, or in some cases not reporting 
at all, on their implementation of economic sanctions to the UN. 
913 The European Conferences sought 
to address this issue and encourage actors within the UN sanctions system to communicate with each 
other. 
The variance in reporting by states was criticised at the first Interlaken Conference. 
914 It stated 
that at a minimum three elements were necessary in relation to reporting by states. Firstly, states need 
to make clear what domestic provisions are being used to implement sanctions. Secondly, the 
authorities within a state responsible for ensuring compliance should be identified. Thirdly, states 
should report on the effect of sanctions on their territory. Whilst these suggestions are an improvement 
on the reporting up to that point, which was extremely uneven across states, they do not go far enough 
because they fail to suggest how to deal with states that do not report. The working group stated that 
`steps should be taken to make the reporting requirements of member States to the Secretariat more 
meaningful' but failed to address either exactly what that meant or how it could be achieved. "15 
The role of states in reporting their implementation of sanctions was also a focus during the 
Stockholm Process. 916 The creation of a focal point in each state, which would communicate with the 
UN in New York and coordinate the sanctions implementation of the state, was recommended. It was 
also recommended that states should make information about relevant sanctions publicly available. 
The initial suggestion that reporting by states should take the form of a questionnaire was 
made during the Bonn-Berlin Process. " 17 This idea was further developed during the Stockholm 
Process. ` 18 A draft form for reporting on implementation was created. It took the form of a list of 
questions covering all targeted sanctions, arms sanctions, financial sanctions, travel bans, targeted trade 
sanctions and additional measures. The questions mooted would, if answered accurately, provide a 
' I2 Wood (n 886), 82. 
01 See discussion of reporting to the 864 Committee in section 3.4.2.2. 
414 Report Working Group 1: Preconditions Jor Success/u! Implementation, Expert Seminar on "f argeting UN 
Financial Sanctions, March 17-19,1998. Interlaken, Switzerland (available at 
http: //www. seco. admin. ch/themen/00513/00620/00639/00641/index. html? lang=en: last accessed I December 
20091. 
ibid. para 9. 
Report of the Stockholm Conference (n 903). 
91' Report of the Bonn-Berlin Conference (n 895). 
'18 Report of the Stockholm Conference In 903). 
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comprehensive insight into the implementation of sanctions in a given state. The questions covered 
such areas as the legislative and administrative measures that have been taken by states, the penalties 
for breaches of sanctions and reporting on sanctions breaches. It is also provided that states should not 
limit themselves to the questions asked but should report as fully as possible. 
The second Interlaken Conference discussed how information should be gathered with respect 
to sanctions' targets. 919 At a minimum, information should be obtained about `traditional trading 
partners of the target, principle correspondent banks and other banks relationships', typical exports, and 
the names of members of the elite to be targeted. '92° This information could be gathered by Member 
States and held centrally by the UN. 
The participants of the Bonn-Berlin process discussed the need for both intra and inter 
government information sharing, particularly among customs officials, with respect to arms 
embargos. 92' Information sharing may be limited for some legitimate reasons, such as protection of 
sources and commercial sensitivity, but the `effective enforcement of embargoes relies to a great 
degree on information. '` 22 A filter system could be used whereby high-level information was only 
shared between selected states, some information was shared broadly and some information was shared 
only on the basis of bilateral agreements. States could also be encouraged to make information on arms 
embargoes available to the public. The creation of an international list of arms dealers and brokers, a 
sanctions website and a register of experts were also mooted. 
The Bonn-Berlin process also identified a number of external organisations that could 
facilitate the implementation of arms embargos such as the International Civilian Aviation 
Organization, the World Customs Organization, the EU and the OAS. At that time, it was envisaged 
that information gathering and sharing would take place within the framework of the Sanctions Unit, 
which could be used to gather confidential information and could be responsible for centralizing and 
storing all of the information gathered about sanctions. 
Finally, the participants noted that information sharing was important not only for the purpose 
of implementing sanctions but also for the purpose of punishing those who failed to implement 
sanctions. The publication of reports of missions, especially where breaches of economic sanctions had 
')19 Working Group 1: The Targeting of'Financial Sanctions, 2nd Interlaken Seminar on Targeting United Nations 
Financial Sanctions, 29-31 March, 1999 [available at littp: /hvww. seco. admin. ch/themen/00513/00620/00639/00641/index. htmI? lang=en, last accessed 4 December 
20091. 
')20 ibid. 17. 
921 Report of the Bonn-Berlin Conference (n 895). 
°''' ibid. 101. 
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taken place, and lists of those involved in sanctions busting would be useful for the purpose of naming 
and shaming those involved in sanctions violations. 
A number of recommendations with respect to communication between the various UNSC 
sanctions actors were made during the Stockholm Process. 923 The sanctions committees were 
considered responsible for keeping states informed of the reasons for sanctions and their role in the 
implementation of sanctions. They could also assure the targets of sanctions that their due process 
rights would be protected. Coordination between the UN and other actors was seen as a key issue with 
suggestions that more communication with regional and sub-regional organisations, non-government 
organisations and private sector actors would be desirable. It was further suggested that relations with 
the media should be strengthened in order to increase sanctions implementation, promote transparency 
and communicate information on sanctions implementation to the public. The Stockholm participants 
also recommended the creation of two centralised information depositories. One for information 
sharing by Expert Panels and another to be operated by the UN Secretariat and to take the form of a 
security protected web-portal, which could be accessed by other actors. 
In order that sanctions be implemented more effectively communication between the key 
actors is important. The recommendations made at the European Conferences go someway to 
improving communication. Reporting by states is an important issue and the recommended creation of 
a sanctions questionnaire is to be welcomed in this regard. The questionnaire provides states with an 
indication of the type of information they should be providing to the UN and allows for comparisons 
both in terms of reporting and in terms of implementation to be drawn between states. 
The concept of a centralised database should also be welcomed. As it stands, information with 
respect to sanctions is being held in a variety of places, which results in both the duplication of some 
material and the absence of other material. This makes sanctions implementation more difficult, if only 
because of the difficulty in obtain comprehensive information about sanctions. Whilst information 
sharing, between the various actors and particularly with the public, is desirable, the Stockholm 
Conference failed to address how this could be achieved choosing instead to simply identify the 
importance of communication and the fact that should involve the various actors. Nor, were the 
potential security issues that could arise with such systems, which could make states reluctant to share 
information in this form, adequately considered. 
92' Report of the Stockholm Conference (n 903). 
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4.4 Difficulties with the Methodology of the European Conferences 
The purpose of the European Conferences was to seek solutions to some of the problems that had 
manifested themselves with respect to UNSC economic sanctions. However, there were deficiencies in 
the methodology and this next section discusses the main ones. 
4.4.1 Theoretical Approach 
The approach taken to UNSC sanctions by each of the Conferences was theoretical rather than 
practical. This manifested itself in two ways. Firstly, aside from the issue of providing funds, little 
consideration was given to the practicalities of the recommendations made. Secondly, the Conferences 
did not take time to reflect on any economic sanctions regime with the result that some of the most 
important issues arising in sanctions were not addressed by the Conferences. 
From the outset of UNSC sanctions, the utility of the abstract analysis of economic sanctions 
has been called into question. In the initial case of sanctions against Southern Rhodesia, it was 
estimated that Southern Rhodesia was the `perfect' target for economic sanctions, 924 whereas, in 
reality, sanctions remained in place for more than a decade and were not wholly effective in behaviour 
modification. Why then was it assumed that a theoretical approach would work in this instance? In fact, 
what materialised was that some of the more practical elements of implementing the recommendations 
made at the Conferences were not considered. For example, in relation to the implementation of a 
model law, minor changes were suggested based on whether a state had a civil or common law legal 
system, 925 but no one questioned whether all states did, in fact, have a legal system capable of enacting 
this type of legislation. If states did not have the capacity to implement the suggested model law the 
Conferences should have considered how best to build that capacity rather than concentrating solely on 
the development of a model law, which could not be implemented by states. 
Similarly, with respect to the creation of focal points in each state, 926 it was assumed that all 
states implementing UNSC economic sanctions were structured in such a fashion as to make it feasible 
to have a sole administrative body for the implementation of economic sanctions within their territory. 
lt was also assumed that states would have the capacity to establish focal points without consideration 
"'; See section 2.1.3. 
'25 Report of the Stockholm Conference (n 903). 
')2(, ibid. 
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of how they would develop the personnel skills necessary to operate such an organisation. 
If a state like 
Iraq, which is still being rebuilt following the 2003 invasion, had been considered it should 
have been 
clear to participants that the creation of a focal point in that territory is currently an unrealistic 
expectation. Furthermore, in some areas the Conferences addressed problems in relation to sanctions 
but failed to offer workable solutions to those problems. This was particularly true of the 
recommendation that the various actors within the sanctions system should communicate more with 
each other. 
By not focusing on a specific sanctions regime the European Conferences offered a way to 
develop UN economic sanctions in a less reactive fashion. However, in practice, rather than benefiting 
the Conferences, this lack of focus resulted in a failure to discuss some of the most significant issues 
that had arisen with sanctions. Despite the chairman of the first Interlaken Conference identifying 
`humanitarian effects on the civilian population in the target country' and `economic effects on third 
countries' as the key difficulties with economic sanctions and stating that the Conference had 
developed out of the desire to make sanctions a less blunt instrument, 927 there was little focus on the 
humanitarian issues that had plagued Iraq and subsequent sanctions regimes. Although of considerable 
concern, to states and to the UN itself, humanitarian issues were only considered during the drafting of 
the model resolutions. 92' And, during those parts of the Conferences, the focus was on the language of 
the building blocks rather than on the humanitarian issues themselves. If however, the Conferences had 
looked to some of the UNSC sanctions that had been put in place they would have provided more focus 
on the humanitarian crises that had ensued. 
4.4.2 Exclusion of Previously Targeted States from the Conferences 
Despite the participation of almost fifty states in at least one of the Conferences, South Africa aside, 
there was a notable absence of participants that had been subjected to sanctions. 929 This has two 
927 Chairman's Report. IS` Interlaken Conference (n 884). 
028 Annex I and 2. Report of Working Group 3 'Building Blocks and Definitions'. 2nd Interlaken Conference (n 
894): Report of the Bonn-Berlin Conference (n 895). 
°"' The states that were represented at the first Interlaken Conference were: Argentina. Australia, Bahrain, 
Belgium, Brazil. Canada. Egypt, France, Germany, India, Japan. Netherlands. Portugal. Russia. Singapore. South 
Africa, Sweden. Switzerland. United Kingdom, United States of America: The states that were represented at the 
second Interlaken Conference were: Bahrain, Belgium, China. Cyprus. Egypt. France. Germany. Namibia, 
Netherlands. Portugal, Russia, Singapore, South Africa. Switzerland. United Kingdom, United States of America: 
The states that were represented at the Bonn-Berlin process were: Brazil. Canada. China. Colombia, Denmark, 
France, Gambia, Germany. Ireland. Jamaica. Japan, Malaysia. Mali, Mauritius, Namibia. Norway, Pakistan, 
Portugal. Russia. South Africa. Sweden, Switzerland, Togo. Tunisia. Ukraine. United Kingdom, United States of 
America: The states that were represented at the Stockholm Process were: Argentina. Brasil, Bulgaria. Cameroon, 
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impacts on the development of a framework for regulating targeted economic sanctions. Firstly, it 
reinforces the idea espoused by some of the targets of UNSC sanctions that sanctions are a colonialist 
construct and that they are an unlawful breach of sovereignty 
930 This is not only relevant to states that 
were former colonies (for example Southern Rhodesia) but also those states that have desirable 
resources (for example Iraq's oil reserves). Ultimately this encourages the rally-round-the-flag etTect, 
which was most prevalent during sanctions against Southern Rhodesia and Yugoslavia. 93 As such, 
sanctions are less likely to be implemented effectively than might otherwise have been the case. As 
sanctions are a tool of the UN all Member States should feel engaged in the development of policy in 
that area. 
Secondly, the failure to include states that had been subject to sanctions in the Conferences 
meant that the benefit of the experience of those states was not brought to the Conferences. If states 
that had suffered the consequences of economic sanctions (either as targeted states or indeed as 
neighbouring states) had been engaged with at the Conferences key issues, such as the humanitarian 
effects of economic sanctions, were more likely to have been discussed. 
It should also be noted that few of what are termed `failed states' or `failing states' 
participated in the Conferences 932 Failed states are states that share three characteristics: they are 
experiencing the internal collapse of law and order'; there is no functioning government that can 
represent the state internationally or which will be influenced by other states; and these problems are 
being created by internal rather than external forces. 933 Thürer states that `[f]rom a legal point of view, 
it could be said that the "failed State" is one which, though retaining legal capacity, has for all practical 
purposes lost the ability to exercise it. A key element in this respect is the fact that there is no body 
which can commit the State in an effective and legally binding way, for example, by concluding an 
agreement. 0.34 Failed and failing states are precisely the states that will lack capacity to implement 
economic sanctions given their reliance on other states for `nation-building'. 935 Their inclusion might 
Canada. China. Colombia, Costa Rica. Egypt. Finland, France, Germany, India, Ireland, Jordan. Kenya, Korea. 
Kuwait. Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Namibia, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Philippines, Russia, Singapore, 
South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Tunisia. Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States of America. 
10 See comments made by representative of Zimbabwe to the UNSC as outlined in section 1.3.3.3. 
See section 2.4.2.2.1. 
°i' For the 2010 Failed States Index see: http: //www. foreignpolicy. com/articles/2010/06/21/201 O-fai I ed-states-i ndex_i nteracti ve-map_and-ran kings [last 
accessed 26 January 20111. 
"; ' Daniel Thttrer, The "failed State" and international law' (1999) International Review of the Red Cross 836. 
`"' ibid. 
°" Fareed Zaharia, 'The failed-state conundrum' The Washington Post (Washington DC 19 July 2010). 
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therefore have prompted the discussion of how best to build state capacity where it is necessary for the 
implementation of economic sanctions. 
4.4.3 An Opaque System of Analysis 
One of the difficulties with the establishment of UNSC sanctions systems to date has been that much of 
the decision making process has taken place in private, amongst selected states. This is also true of the 
Conferences. Whilst reports of the Conferences have been published, commentary as to why certain 
decisions were reached has not. This means that the reasoning behind decisions such as the move from 
the development of a Sanctions Unit, as mooted during the Bonn-Berlin Process, to the use of existing 
UN structures by the time of the Stockholm Process remains unclear. There may be valid reasons why 
states felt that such decisions were necessary, or they could have been made as part of a political 
agenda. And, as such, the decision-making process should be revealed. Furthermore, it is clear that the 
participants in the Conferences also met in individual sessions and yet the reports of those meetings 
have not been made available. Such reports could provide a valuable insight into the decisions taken by 
states. 
The Conferences could have been a valuable opportunity to encourage more transparency in 
the area of UNSC sanctions. By failing to address this issue they remained entrenched in the opaque 
decision-making processes of the past. 
4.5 The Role of the Conferences 
The European Conferences provided the opportunity for a less reactive response to how economic 
sanctions should develop within the UN framework. They were, of course, still a reactive measure in 
that they were instigated as a result of, and attempted to deal with, problems that were apparent in UN 
economic sanctions regimes. However, they allowed participants the chance to discuss potential 
developments without the pressure of those changes being implemented immediately. This made the 
Conferences less reactive than previous ad hoc changes to sanctions regimes, which had proceeded to 
that point without any extended discussion of their benefits and disadvantages. 
The European Conferences were not the only development of this type at that time. The UN 
itself established a working group on sanctions. 936 The purpose of the UN working group was to 
Q16 Please see: http: //www. un. org/Docs/sc/committees/sanctions/ (last accessed: 30 December 20091. 
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'develop general recommendations on how to improve the effectiveness of United Nations sanctions... 
through open and informal dialogue with interested Member States, as well as international, regional, 
intergovernmental and other relevant organizations'. 937 In that regard it produced a number of reports, 
as well as collating the material from other sources including from the European Conferences, which it 
published on its website. 
As such, it is clear that the UN, its Member States and other interested parties were taking a 
more reflective approach to economic sanctions. The reason why the European Conferences, as 
opposed to the UN working group, were selected for discussion in this thesis is that they sought to 
come up with comprehensive recommendations for sanctions. The model resolutions and domestic 
legislation suggested by the Conferences reflected an innovative approach to UN economic sanctions 
and the Conferences were comprehensive in that they took place over an extended period of time and 
covered all aspects of UN targeted sanctions. 
However, despite their innovative approach and the practical suggestions made at the 
European Conferences their recommendations were not implemented by the UN. As such, they 
suffered from the same deficiencies as the UN monitoring bodies that have been created alongside 
economic sanctions regime, which will be discussed in chapter 5.938 They have, at some expense, fully 
considered targeted economic sanctions and their deficiencies and made recommendations, which have 
not been implemented. If targeted economic sanctions within the UN framework are to progress the 
UN must take cognisance of the recommendations of groups established to make recommendations. 
Note by the President of the Security Council' (29 December 2005) S/2005/841. 
Section 5.1.2.2.1.1. 
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S 
Targeted Economic Sanctions Within the UN Framework 
As previously outlined, there have been a number of systems of UN economic sanctions which have 
encompassed some level of targeted sanctions. 939 However, since 1999 the UNSC has developed two 
systems of wholly targeted economic sanctions, firstly, in relation to Afghanistan and secondly, 
following the attacks on the World Trade Center. 940 This chapter outlines the innovations to UN 
economic sanctions that occurred as a result of those systems and considers the problems that became 
prevalent with targeted economic sanctions as they progressed. 
5.1 UNSC Systems of Wholly Targeted Economic Sanctions 
The two sanctions regimes being discussed in this chapter emanated from the heightened global 
concern of terrorist activity during the late 1990's and early 2000's. Economic sanctions had been used 
as a counter-terrorism measure in the early 1990's against Libya. "1 However, the true value of 
targeted economic sanctions in the fight against terrorism became clear as that decade progressed with 
the realisation that targeted economic sanctions, which were traditionally employed against persons 
associated with states, for example government or opposition personnel or rebel forces, could be 
employed against actors who were not linked to a particular state. 
The importance of this disconnect can be seen in the two regimes being discussed here. 
Firstly, in relation to the 1267 Regime targeting the Taliban and AI-Qaida, 942 the use of targeted 
economic sanctions allowed sanctions to be put in place against behaviour that the UNSC considered 
threatened international peace and security without designating Afghanistan as a state-sponsor of 
terrorism, 943 amidst fears that such designation would constitute a de facto recognition of the Taliban as 
`'4'` the legitimate government of Afghanistan. Secondly, following 9/11, the world was faced with an 
939 See Chapter 4. 
040 UNSC Resolution 1267 (n 164) and UNSC Resolution 1373 (n 164). 
94' UNSC Resolution 748 (n 41). See section 4.1.3. 
)42 UNSC Resolution 1267 (n 164). 
04' In the case of Libya states were willing to consider Libya as a state-sponsor of terrorism and thus attribute the 
acts ultimately to the state and the US had previously designated it as such in the Export Administration Act. 29 
December 1979. 
044 Mary Pat Flaherty, David B Ottaway and James V Grimaldi, 'How Afghanistan Went Unlisted as Terrorist 
Sponsor' The Washington Post (Washington DC 2 November 2001). 
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enemy that Ignatieff described as having `no face and no name' . 
9`35 This conceptualisation of the enemy 
as a person rather than as a state illustrates the difficulty with terrorism since the turn of the new 
millennium 
- 
the actions of the perpetrators of terrorism are not easily aligned with a particular state. 
The sanctions regime that followed 9/1l addressed this difficulty by targeting economic sanctions 
specifically at those involved or suspected of being involved in terrorist activities. 946 
This section gives a brief overview of the form that targeted economic sanctions initially took 
and then examines the changes to economic sanctions that came about in resolutions relating to the first 
two UN wholly targeted sanctions regimes. 
5.1.1 Overview of UN Targeted Sanctions Regimes 
This section briefly outlines the main UNSC resolutions provisions with respect to the two regimes 
under discussion although it is not intended to be a comprehensive guide to all of the provisions of the 
resolutions. 
5.1.1.1 The 1267 Regime 
According to the preamble of UNSC Resolution 1267, economic sanctions were initially instigated 
against the Taliban for three reasons. 947 Firstly, the Taliban had used areas of Afghanistan under its 
control to harbour and train terrorists. Secondly, there were concerns over the humanitarian situation, 
breaches of international law, discrimination against women and children and the production of illicit 
opium in that territory. Thirdly, the Taliban was offering safe harbour to Usama bin Laden and his 
associates who had been indicted by the US, and whose surrender for trial had been requested, 948 for 
their involvement in the bombings of two US embassies in August 1998 and for conspiring to kill US 
nationals outside of the US. The UNSC demanded that the Taliban cease providing sanctuary and 
training to terrorists and turn over Usama bin Laden to appropriate authorities, in a country in which he 
had been indicted. 949 The resolution provided that sanctions would terminate once Usama bin Laden 
was turned over. 50 
"a` Michael Ignatietl. `Paying for Security with Liberty' Financial Times (13 September 2001). 
946 UNSC Resolution 1373 (n 164). 
"a' UNSC Resolution 1267 (n 164). 
)48 Letter dated I October 1999 from the Deputy Permanent Representative of the United States of American to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary General (4 October 1999) S/1999/1021. 
"''0 IJNSC Resolution 1267 (n 164), 1-2. 
Qio ibid. 14. 
159 
The actual sanctions put in place took the form of a flight ban on aircraft owned or operated 
by or on behalf of the Taliban and the freezing of funds and other financial resources of the Taliban, 
including the assets of entities owned or operated by the Taliban as designated by the committee 
established in the resolution ('the 1267 Committee'). 95' The 1267 Committee was given similar 
responsibilities to sanctions committees established under previous sanctions regimes. It was required 
to seek information with respect to states' implementation of sanctions, to consider information on 
violations of sanctions, to consider requests for humanitarian exemptions and to report to the UNSC on 
the implementation, humanitarian impact and violations of sanctions. 952 Similarly, akin to previous 
sanctions regimes, the 1267 Committee was also made responsible for designating aircraft and assets 
owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by the Taliban to be frozen under the sanctions regime. 
However, as the targets of the 1267 Regime were expanded, 953 to include those associated with the 
Taliban and Al Qaida, this power of designation also expanded because these targets were not an easily 
identifiable homogenous group. Moreover, by deciding what assets were to be targeted, the 1267 
Committee was also deciding who should be subject to sanctions. Furthermore, by leaving the 
designation process in the hands of the 1267 Committee, there would be no consideration or public 
debate of those individuals and entities that could find themselves subject to sanctions under this 
regime. 
States had reporting obligations under the 1267 Regime and were also called upon to bring 
proceedings against those who violated the sanctions provisions. 154 The Taliban was given until 14 
November 1999 to hand over Usama bin Laden before sanctions would be imposed. `55 The Taliban did 
not comply with this deadline and sanctions came into force. 56 
Further sanctions were put in place the following year. 1157 They contained an arms embargo on 
the territory of Afghanistan under Taliban control and a prohibition on training, advising or assisting 
Taliban-controlled armed personnel. 958 The UNSC extended the flight ban and ordered the closure of 
Taliban and Ariana Afghan Airlines offices and also extended the asset freeze to Usama bin Laden and 
`°`' ibid. 4. 
`)52 ibid. 6. 
953 UNSC Resolution 1333 (n 710), 8-11. 
1)54 UNSC Resolution 1267 (n 164), 7,10. 
"s` ibid. 3. 
1146 UNSC Press Release, 'Security Council Announces Measures Against Talihan for Failure to I land Over Usama 
hin Laden' (15 November 1999) SC/6756: Pamela Constable, T. N. Imposes Air. Economic Sanctions on 
Afghanistan. Taliban still Refuses to (land Over Bin Laden' The Washington Post (Washington D. C. 14 
November 1999). 
"`' UNSC Resolution 1333 (n 710). 
')ig ibid. 5. 
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individuals and entities associated with him as designated by the 1267 Committee. '59 With respect to 
the freezing of the assets of Usama bin Laden and his associates the 1267 Committee was required to 
maintain a list of such persons ('the Consolidated List'), which will be discussed later in this chapter. 
The production of opium in Taliban-controlled regions was also addressed. The Taliban was required 
to work towards the elimination of the cultivation of opium and a ban was put in place on the 
exportation of the chemical acetic anhyride (which is used in the processing of opium) to the Taliban 
controlled territory of Afghanistan. 960 
Despite some minor relaxation of economic sanctions, such as the 2002 lifting of sanctions 
against Ariana Afghan Airlines, 96 I the 1267 Regime remains in place to this day. 962 It is due to be 
reviewed by 17 June 201 1963 
5.1.1.2 The Counter-Terrorism Regime 
In the immediate aftermath of 9/11 the UNSC adopted UNSC Resolution 1373, which contained broad 
anti-terrorism economic sanctions. 964 The Counter-Terrorism Regime required states to prevent and 
criminalise the funding of terrorist acts and actors and to freeze the direct or indirect funds, assets and 
resources of those involved in terrorist activity. 965 States were also required to refrain from offering 
support or safe haven to those involved in terrorist activity and to subject such persons to criminal 
sanctions. Whilst a travel ban was not put in place, states were required to maintain effective border 
controls, issue identity papers and travel documents and put in place measures preventing the 
counterfeiting of same. 9 
UNSC Resolution 1373 also established the CTC to monitor implementation of the 
resolution 
. 
967 The CTC was later requested to consult with international, regional and sub-regional 
organisations, as well as with UN bodies, to develop a set of best practices to assist states in 
9"' ibid. 8.1 1. 
ibid. 9-10. 
')61 (JNSC Res 1388 (15 January 2002) UN Doc S/RES/1388. 
'"'Z UNSC Res 1455 (17 January 2003) UN Doc S/RES/1455 ('UNSC Resolution 1455); UNSC Res 1526 (30 
January 2004) UN Doc S/RES/1526 ('UNSC Resolution 1526'); UNSC Res 1617 (29 July 2005) UN Doc 
S/RES/1617 ('IINSC Resolution 1617'); UNSC Res 1735 (22 December 2006) UN Doc S/RES/1735 (`UNSC 
Resolution 1735'): UNSC Res 1822 (30 
. 
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implementing the provisions of UNSC Resolution 1373.968 It was also directed, when necessary, to 
visit states, when states agreed and in cooperation with any relevant organisations, for the purpose of 
monitoring the implementation of UNSC Resolution 1373.69 However, in a notable departure from the 
1267 Regime, the CTC was not responsible for the identification of those who should be subjected to 
targeted economic sanctions. This, instead, was left in the hands of the states themselves. 
Sanctions were later expanded, in UNSC Resolution 1540, to encompass the prohibition on 
the provision of any form of support to non-state actors that attempt to `develop, acquire manufacture, 
possess, transport, transfer or use chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery' 970 A 
committee ('the 1540 Committee') was established to monitor the implementation of those provisions. 
5.1.2 Developments in UN Economic Sanctions 
The development of the 1267 and Counter-Terrorism regimes caused some changes in the UNSC 
sanctions framework. This section considers two areas that have developed since the instigation of 
these regimes and the significance of those changes. 
5.1.2.1 Time Limits 
There are two ways in which time limits are now being applied to UNSC sanctions regimes, by way of 
sunset clauses971 and by means of allowing the target a period of time to fulfil its obligations under an 
adopted resolution before the sanctions provisions contained therein become effective. 
When the UNSC first adopted binding economic sanctions resolutions against Southern 
Rhodesia, in 1966,972 there was no requirement that the sanctions provisions be reviewed by the UNSC. 
They could have remained in place indefinitely and did, in fact, remain in place for more than a decade, 
until they were terminated in UNSC Resolution 460, when their stated aim was achieved and the 
sanctioned regime had made a commitment to change leading to majority rule. "" In the absence of 
sanctions being subject to time limits sanctions could not be lifted if even one P-5 member objected. 
This caused significant problems during economic sanctions against Iraq, when, in 1998, France, the 
° UNSC Res 1566 (8 October 2004) UN Doc S/RES/1566.7 ('UNSC Resolution 1566'). 
ibid. 8. 
10 UNSC Res 1540 (28 April 2004) UN Doc S/RES/I 540, I. 
°71 A sunset clause is a stipulation that a regulatory or legislative regime he disbanded or terminated at the end of a fixed period unless it is formally renewed. 
"' UNSC Resolution 232 (n 123). 
073 1 NSC Resolution 460 (n 174). 
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Russian Federation and China found themselves unable to ease or lift sanctions because of the 
unwillingness of the UK and the US. 
974 This had two repercussions. 975 Firstly, the UNSC could have 
used the easing of economic sanctions as an incentive for the Iraqi government to comply more fully 
with economic sanctions. Secondly, it also weakened the commitment of those states that believed that 
economic sanctions should be eased or lifted to implement sanctions against Iraq. 
Sunset clauses with respect to economic sanctions were not seen until mid-2000 during the 
arms embargo against Ethiopia and Eritrea, 
` 76 reference to which was made in the last chapter. The 
purpose of a sunset clause with respect to economic sanctions is to ensure that the UNSC remains 
seized of the matter. As such, they allow for sanctions to be lifted after twelve months unless the 
UNSC, having reviewed the sanctions, considers that they should remain in place. France, Russia and 
other UNSC members had pressed for the inclusion of this type of time limit in economic sanctions 
resolutions. 977 
As UN targeted sanctions developed the inclusion of this sort of time limit and of limits in 
relation to other aspects of sanctions within resolutions has become commonplace. The inclusion of a 
sunset clause in UNSC Resolution 1333,978 which was adopted for the purpose of strengthening the 
1267 Regime, was praised during UNSC discussions prior to its adoption 
. 
`79 The use of sunset clauses 
in sanctions regimes, by ensuring that such regimes are reviewed regularly by the UNSC, results in 
sanctions being more adaptive. They ensure that if economic sanctions against a particular target are to 
continue beyond the review date they only do so if a majority of the UNSC agree that they should, 
which in turn ensures that the majority of UNSC members support economic sanctions in the form that 
they are in thus increasing their legitimacy. 980 Whilst such reviews have allowed economic sanctions 
under the 1267 Regime to `[increase] their strength over time', 981 they may in the future be used to 
reduce or refocus, rather than increase, economic sanctions. Their use should result in UN economic 
sanctions becoming more focused measures that are more suitable for achieving the aim being pursued. 
974 Lutz nette, 'A Decade of Sanctions against Iraq: Never Again! The End of Unlimited Sanctions in the Recent 
Practice of the UN Security Council' (2002) 13 EJIL 93 at 95. 
`"` Fassbender (n 415). 282. 
976 IJNSC Resolution 1298 (n 740). 
' Barbara Crossette. 'Arms Embargo Ordered for Eritrea and Ethiopia' The New York Times (New York 19 May 
2000). 
`"R UNSC Resolution 1333 (n 710), 23. 
"'`' See the comments of France, Malaysia. the Ukraine and the Russian Federation in UNSC Verbatim Record (19 
December 2000) UN Doc S/PV/425 I. 
"ao Mette (n 974), 100. 
Jane Boulden, The Council and Terrorism' in Vaughan Lowe, Adam Roberts, Jennifer Welsh and Dominik 
Zaum (eds). The United Nations Security Council and War (Oxford University Press 2008) 611. 
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Oette notes that there was concern when sunset clauses were first introduced that they might 
impact on the effectiveness of economic sanctions as targets might feel that they could simply wait 
until the sanctions were reviewed and hope that that review would result in the lifting of sanctions 
rather than actively seeking to amend their behaviour. 982 However, he notes that one of the purposes of 
time limits was to encourage members of the UNSC to support economic sanctions in circumstances 
where, without such time limits, they would not otherwise have been prepared to agree to economic 
sanctions. 983 Secondly, he argues that, in any event, the effectiveness of economic sanctions seems to 
lessen with the passing of time. 984 Despite this potentially difficulty, therefore, sunset clauses should be 
seen as a welcome progression of economic sanctions. 
The second category of time limit being imposed in targeted sanctions regimes, has been the 
decision not to impose economic sanctions until a set period of time, typically a month, has elapsed 
after the adoption of the relevant resolution. 985 The reason for such a decision is that the use of that 
type of time limit gives the targets of economic sanctions the opportunity to rectify whatever behaviour 
has caused the invocation of sanctions before they are actually imposed. 
The difficulty with such pre-emptive time limits is that they afford the targets of sanctions 
regimes the opportunity to modify their behaviour in such a manner as to defeat the purpose of 
economic sanctions. To return to the example of Southern Rhodesia, the initial sanctions in that case, 
adopted in 1965, were not binding`18' and when binding sanctions were adopted the following year they 
were not comprehensive. 1187 It was not until 1968 that fully comprehensive sanctions were adopted. "' 
As previously stated, this enabled the government to switch its production and to stockpile certain 
commodities thus diminishing the effect of economic sanctions on that state. vsn Whilst the time periods 
being allowed for in targeted economic sanctions are undoubtedly shorter than those that occurred 
during sanctions against South Rhodesia, the targets too are smaller. In the case of individuals, money 
and other assets can easily be transferred to jurisdictions or converted to forms that impede their being 
frozen. For that reason, targeted economic sanctions need to be implemented entirely without warning 
in order to be effective. 
982 Oette (n 974), 101. 
' ibid. 102. 
°sa ibid. 
"s UNSC Resolution 1267 (n 164). 3: UNSC Resolution 1333 (n 710) 22. 
°g6 UNSC Resolution 217 (n 43). 
987 UNSC Resolution 232 (n 123). 
988 UNSC Resolution 253 (n 314). 
"s" See section 2.4.2.2. 
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5.1.2.2 The Devolution of Power from the UNSC 
The most significant change in the UN economic sanctions system caused by the regimes under 
discussion in this chapter was the devolution of power with respect to economic sanctions away from 
the UNSC and towards other UN institutions and to the states themselves. This occurred in two ways. 
Firstly, through the creation of institutions and, secondly, through the delegation of powers relating to 
who is selected to be subject to sanctions. 
5.1.2.2.1 The Creation of Institutions 
The two regimes discussed in this chapter have resulted in the proliferation of UN institutions that 
support the implementation of economic sanctions and the increase in powers given to such 
institutions. These regimes will be discussed under two headings: Monitoring Groups and the Focal 
Point. 
5.1.2.2.1.1 Monitoring Groups 
As outlined above, both regimes had sanctions committees attached to them in the form of the 1267 
Committee and the CTC. Such committees are typical of all sanctions regimes990 and are usually 
entrusted with the same basic functions. They are responsible for monitoring the implementation of 
economic sanctions, collating and investigating information provided by states, reporting to the 
Secretary-General or UNSC, reviewing requests for humanitarian exemptions and, where necessary, 
selecting targets or assets to be frozen. 991 The members of these committees are not, however, experts 
in the field of economic sanctions or related matters but diplomats, who do not devote themselves to 
the committees on a full-time basis. 992 It may be for this reason that institutions, led by experts, have 
been created at UN level, which broadly perform the same functions as the committees. 
For example, under UNSC Resolution 1363 a monitoring mechanism (`the 1363 Monitoring 
Group') was established `to monitor the implementation of measures imposed by resolutions' 1267 and 
1333, to assist states bordering the Taliban-controlled territory of Afghanistan and to `collate, assess, 
490 For example, with respect to sanctions against Sierra Leone a sanctions committee was established pursuant to 
I, INSC Resolution 1132 (n 711). 
'°' UNSC Resolution 1267 (n 164). 6: UNSC Resolution 1 132 (n 711), 10. UNSC Resolution 1373 (n 164), 6: 
UNSC Resolution 1566 (n 968). 7-8. 
°"'' Eric Rosand, 'Current Development: The Security Council's Efforts to Monitor the Implementation of Al- Qaeda/Talihan Sanctions' 98 AJIL 748.753. 
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verify wherever possible, report and make recommendations on information regarding violations' of 
economic sanctions. 993 The 1363 Monitoring Group was to remain in existence, with a mandate to 
monitor the implementation of sanctions under the 1267 Regime, 994 until January 2004.9"5 The 1363 
Monitoring Group was immediately replaced by a new Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring 
Team established under UNSC Resolution 1526 (`the 1526 Monitoring Group'). )96 The establishment 
of the 1526 Monitoring Group was in part due to criticisms that had been levelled at the 1363 
Monitoring Group that it had no clear mandate and failed to communicate and seek approval for its 
actions, which some states believed were outside of its powers.? For that reason, UNSC Resolution 
1526 included an annex containing a clear mandate for the group and more precise reporting 
requirements in the hopes of addressing those criticisms. "" However, ultimately, in all material 
respects, the mandate of the 1526 Monitoring Group was identical to that of the 1363 Monitoring 
Group in that it was required to monitor the implementation of economic sanctions under the 1267 
Regime, consult with states and report to the 1267 Committee. 999 
Equally under the Counter-terrorism Regime, alongside the CTC, the 1540 Committee was 
established with responsibility for monitoring sanctions in place against nuclear, chemical and 
biological weapons. A working group was also established, in 2004, to consider and submit 
recommendations to the UNSC on practical measures to be imposed upon individuals and entities 
involved in or associated with terrorist activities other than those designated by the 1267 
Committee. 1°°° This was to include the freezing of their assets, more effective procedures for 
prosecution, preventing movement through territory and preventing the supply of arms. 
On an intuitive level, there appears to be significant value in the provision of support for 
diplomat-led sanctions committees through the use of expert-run monitoring bodies. However, in 
practice, the proliferation of UN institutions charged with monitoring the implementation of economic 
sanctions is problematic. Four predominant difficulties arise in this respect. 
Firstly, there is a risk of a significant duplication of work. Monitoring bodies and sanctions 
committees, both within specific regimes and across sanctions regimes generally, are being given over- 
`"" UNSC Res 1363 (30 July 2001) UN Doc S/RES/1363 (`UNSC Resolution 1363'). 3. 
`'Oa UNSC Res 1390 (28 January 2002) UN Doc S/RES/1390,9. 
995 UNSC Resolution 1455 (n 962). 8. 
1)116 UNSC Resolution 1526 (n 962), 6. 
`"" Rosand (n 992), 753-755. 
'0g UNSC Resolution 1526 (n 962), Annex. 
ibid. Annex. 
""O UNSC Resolution 1566 (n 968), 9. 
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lapping or complementary mandates. As the location and collation of information will generally be 
labour intensive and include visits to different states, the duplication of this work comes at a significant 
economic cost to the UN and reduces any potential synergy that could be achieved if information was 
shared across institutions. It also contributes to the confusion and fatigue experienced by states as a 
result of the `seemingly endless reporting' requirements. 10°' Furthermore, once collated such 
information is then scattered amongst various committees and monitoring bodies throughout the UN. 
Secondly, the proliferation of UN monitoring institutions, by creating another layer of 
monitoring responsibility, has shifted accountability a step further from both the states and the UNSC. 
As power is spread throughout the UN each entity views its own remit in a more limited, narrow 
fashion and does not feel obliged to take responsibility for difficulties that arise with economic 
sanctions. An example of the problems caused by the lack of accountability can be seen in AWB's 
contravention of the Oil-for-Food Programme. AWB had paid kick-backs to Saddam Hussein's regime 
in exchange for contracts to export wheat to Iraq. The Australian government claimed that it was not 
responsible for ensuring the accuracy of information provided to it by AWB with respect to wheat 
exports to Iraq because AWB was a private company outside of its control and other monitoring bodies 
within the UN framework were obliged to verify the information. 1002 In making this claim, Australia 
was refusing to take any responsibility for the implementation of sanctions within its territory. 
However, ultimately when the breaches came to light it was Australia itself and not the UN that 
investigated them. 10°' This also goes to Australia's accountability for the breaches because it removed 
the possibility of Australia being censured. A 2006 report of the Informal Working Group on Economic 
Sanctions has also indicated that the integrity of the reports produced by the monitoring groups needs 
to improve, as does the implementation of the recommendations made by those groups. '°°4 
Thirdly, the monitoring bodies are not endowed with sufficient powers to amend sanctions 
regimes, they only have powers to monitor and make recommendations. Even powers with respect to 
listing and de-listing remain vested in the sanctions committees. This means that often necessary 
recommendations are not implemented by the UNSC in later regimes and the monitoring bodies 
repeatedly make the same recommendations. This will be demonstrated later in this chapter. 
"x" Comments of Ms Lo. j (representative of Denmark at the 5601` meeting of the UNSC. UNSC Verbatim Record 
(20 December 2006) UN Doe S/PV/5601. 
1102 Stewart (n 6I6). 313. 
10°= Cole Report (n 617). 
1004 
'Report of the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions' (22 December 
2006) S/2006/977,7. 
167 
Lastly, these new monitoring bodies are not facilitating the development of an institutional 
memory with respect to the monitoring of economic sanctions as they are being developed on an ad 
hoc basis. The working group on economic sanctions has stated that they were developed `through a 
system of trial and error'. 1005 Even at the level of the sanctions committees themselves, information is 
not being shared inter-committee. 1006 The development of numerous separate monitoring groups, 
without clear guidelines for the sharing of information between them, inhibits the benefits that could 
accrue from the sharing of expertise learnt through the monitoring of economic sanctions. Anzar- 
Gomez has commented that having multiple sanctions committees upsets the uniform interpretation of 
the sanctions regimes as required by a normally uniform wording of sanctions in the Council's 
resolutions. ' 100' It also demonstrates that the recommendations made by the European Conferences, 
held in relation to the development and refinement of UN targeted economic sanctions, 1 ' have not 
been adopted at UN level. 
The ideal solution to these problems would be the creation of the Sanctions Unit proposed 
during the Bonn-Berlin process, the benefits of which will be discussed in chapter 7.1009 However, if 
that proposal is not implemented an alternative would be the cessation of the creation of new 
monitoring bodies. There is no reason why sanctions committees, which in any case receive 
administrative support from the Secretariat, should not be entitled to seek the support of experts in the 
performance of their mandate. This would mean that, at a minimum, each sanctions committee would 
have full control of any information with respect to the implementation of its specific sanctions regime. 
These newly strengthened sanctions committees should then be encouraged to cooperate with each 
other in the sharing of information and of institutional memory so that work is not being duplicated and 
any new sanctions committees formed have the benefit of previous sanctions committees' experience. 
Furthermore, the UNSC must begin to incorporate the recommendations made by the monitoring 
bodies and sanctions committees. 
1005 ibid, para 9. 
10°6 See Rosand (n 992), page 762 commenting that, despite the obvious value in the 1267 Committee and the CTC 
sharing information and their being located in the same building, little formal or informal cooperation occurs 
between the two. 
1007 Mariano J Aznar-Gomez, `A Decade of Human Rights Protection by the UN Security Council: A Sketch of 
Deregulation? ' (2002) 13 EJ IL 223 at 230. 
'`08 Section 4.3. 
1009 Section 7.2. 
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5.1.2.2.1.2 The Focal Point 
The Focal Point was developed, in UNSC Resolution 1730, within the UN Secretariat for the purpose 
of dealing with applications for de-listing from the lists maintained under various economics sanctions 
regimes. 1°'° Whereas previously those subject to economic sanctions could only apply through their 
state of citizenship or residency to the relevant sanctions committee, the Focal Point can receive 
requests for de-listing directly from a target. 1°" 
UNSC Resolution 1730 put in place a delisting process. A person subjected to sanctions 
applies to the Focal Point, which then communicates its procedures to the applicant and forwards the 
request to the governments of designation, residency and citizenship. 10'2 The states of residency and 
citizenship are encouraged to communicate with the designating state but this only occurs if the latter 
concedes to allow it. 1013 If any of the governments recommend de-listing they are required to forward 
their recommendation and their reasoning either through the Focal Point or to the relevant sanctions 
committee, and it is then put on to the committee's agenda. 1014 If any of the governments oppose de- 
listing this too is forwarded to the relevant sanctions committee. 1°'5 Other governments are encouraged 
to engage in the de-listing process and share information that they might possess in support of a request 
for de-listing. 1016 If, after three months, none of the consulted governments comment or request further 
time for consideration the Focal Point notifies the relevant committee, any member of which can, 
following consultation with the designating government(s), recommend de-listing. 1017 If within one 
month no committee member recommends de-listing then the request is deemed to have been 
rejected. 1°18 The Focal Point is required to inform the applicant of the outcome of the process. '°'9 
Given that until the creation of the Focal Point there was no means for a person subjected to 
economic sanctions to make a direct application to be de-listed there was a clear need for such a de- 
listing process to be established. However, the Focal Point does little to advance such a person's 
opportunity for actually being de-listed and serves only to add an extraneous administrative institution 
to the de-listing process. The Focal Point process encourages maintaining the status quo because one of 
1010 UNSC Res 1730 (19 December 2006) UN Doc S/RES/1730 ('UNSC Resolution 1730'). 
101 ibid, I. 
101' ibid. 4-S. 
1013 ibid. 5. 
1014 ibid, 6(a). 
EWS ibid. 6(b). 
ibid. 6(b). 
10" ibid. 6(c). 
1`ß18 ibid. 6(c). 
1010 ibid. 8. 
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the sanctions committee members has to actively request that a person be de-listed or such a person 
will remain subject to economic sanctions. It also allows the designating state to become a judge in its 
own case given its significant role in the review of a person's designation. The Focal Point is not 
substantively involved in the de-listing process but rather provides administrative support for the 
sanctions committees. The result is that the process becomes quite disjointed as parties communicate 
through the Focal Point, which then communicates with the sanctions committee, rather than with each 
other. 
The UNSC is clearly aware of the Focal Point's deficiencies because, following its 
establishment, the 1267 Committee was directed to continue its work considering applications for de- 
listing and to conduct an annual review of individuals on the Consolidated List who were reported to 
be deceased. 1020 The Focal Point's role could be performed in a more efficient manner by allowing 
those subject to sanctions to appeal directly to the relevant sanctions committee. The sanctions 
committee is in possession of knowledge as to why a person was sanctioned and when it receives 
appeals each member should be required to assess whether an individual should remain subject to 
sanctions and to internally circulate their decision and the reasoning behind that decision. The silence 
of sanctions committee members should not equate to a person remaining subject to economic 
sanctions indefinitely. This issue will be discussed further in the next chapter when the possibility of 
creating a new institution to deal with de-listing requests on an active rather than administrative level 
will be outlined. 
It should be noted that provision has been made for the creation of an independent and 
impartial Office of the Ombudsperson to assist with the consideration of de-listing requests with 
respect to the Consolidated List. 102' The first Ombudsperson, Kimberley Prost, a former Canadian 
judge, took office on 12 July 2010. She is to be responsible for presenting a comprehensive report to 
the 1267 Committee laying out the principal arguments, in light of the information available to her, and 
her observations with respect to any request for de-listing presented to her. 1022 In order to achieve this 
she will undertake information gathering and enter into dialogue with the person seeking de-listing and 
with the relevant states. She is to be facilitated by the Monitoring Team in performing her role. 
1020 UNSC Resolution 1822 (n 962). 21-22. 
1021 UNSC Resolution 1904 (n 962), 20. 
10" UNSC Press Release 'Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee Welcomes Appointment of' Judge Kimberley Prost to Serve as Ombudsperson' (7 June 2010) SC/9947. 
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Kimberly Prost made her first report on 21 January 2011, which was disseminated by the 
UNSC on 24 January 2011.1023 To date she has focused on meeting with various parties involved with 
UN economic sanctions, including sanctions committees, states, intergovernmental organisations, UN 
bodies and NGOs as well as publicising her office and engaging in outreach programmes. " In the six 
months since she took office she has received seven requests for de-listing, six of which she accepted 
and has been working on developing methods and standards to ensure fairness and clarity in 
sanctions. 1025 She has noted in her report that states have cooperated in providing information where 
requested. 1026 She criticises, however, the fact the sanctions committees are not mandated to provide 
factual reasons for a de-listing and that designating states may keep their anonymity. 1027 
Although it remains too early to assess the impact of the Ombudsperson on the 1267 Regime, 
in light of the creation of institutions discussed in this section it would seem that a consolidation rather 
than a diversification of power is necessary. Of particular note is that the Ombudsperson is only 
entitled to make recommendations but not decisions with respect to de-listing. At a minimum, if UN 
sanctions institutions are going to continue to proliferate such proliferation should not occur without 
new institutions being given responsibility as opposed to merely fulfilling an advisory role. The 
ombudsperson's report, limited as it was to her first six months in office, confirmed this. 
5.1.2.2.2 The Selection of the Targets of Economic Sanctions 
The targets of economic sanctions against states are known and discussed when the relevant UNSC 
sanctions resolutions are being adopted. Targeted economic sanctions operate in a different manner. 
Firstly, UNSC resolutions are adopted against a category of persons and entities. Then, typically, the 
sanctions committee attached to each regime has responsibility for deciding who should be considered 
as coming within that category. 1028 In so doing the UNSC's power is reduced with respect to targeted 
economic sanctions and the process by which the targets are selected becomes more opaque. This 
devolution of power is even more pronounced in the case of the two regimes under discussion in this 
chapter because neither the UNSC nor the sanctions committees are responsible for target selection. 
1025 Report of the Office of the Ombudsperson pursuant to Security Council resolution 1904 (2009) S/2011/29. 
1024 ibid. 
"'`S ibid. para 20-21. 
1026 ibid. para 47. 
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With respect to the 1267 Regime, the 1267 Committee was initially requested to designate 
territory that should be subject to travel sanctions and assets that should be frozen. '°29 This was later 
followed by a request that the 1267 Committee `maintain an updated list, based on the information 
provided by states and regional organizations, of the individuals and entities designated as being 
associated with Usama bin Laden, including those in the Al-Qaida organization., '('30 This puts the 
responsibility for the selection of those to be subjected to economic sanctions in the hands of individual 
Member States. Whilst the 1267 Committee does consider the suggestions of states prior to a person's 
designation it has been stated that the time frame between notification of a proposal and the actual 
designation, being only 48 hours, is too short to allow even those states with vast intelligence 
communities to properly consider such suggestions. 1031 This has two potential impacts on targeted 
economic sanctions. 
Firstly, it risks a person being designated in the absence of sufficient information or where 
there is information to the contrary available but not accessible within such a short timeframe. 
Secondly, it risks certain states using the designation process excessively or in a spurious manner. In 
light of the number of entries on the Consolidated List compared with the number of people arrested or 
detained by various countries on the basis of links to Al-Qaeda, there is evidence that some states are 
reluctant to nominate persons and entities for inclusion on the Iist. 10.12 Cameron has also stated that in 
light of the covert nature of organisations like the Taliban and AI-Qaeda some states may lack the 
necessary resources to identify those persons or entities that are associated with them and should 
therefore be added to the Consolidated List. '()13 
As the 1267 Regime has developed some amendments to the listing procedures have been 
made. UNSC Resolution 1617 outlined what would constitute association with the Al-Qaida, Usama 
Bin Laden or the Taliban. 10'4 It stated that: `participating in the financing, planning, facilitating, 
preparing or perpetrating of acts or activities by, in conjunction with, under the name of, on behalf of, 
or in support of; supplying, selling or transferring arms and related material to, recruiting for; or 
otherwise acts or activities of, Al-Qaida, Usama bin Laden or the Taliban, or any cell, affiliate, splinter 
101' UNSC Resolution 1267 (n 164), 4. 
""') UNSC Resolution 1333 (n 710). 8(c). 
10}" lain Cameron, Targeted Sanctions and Legal Safeguards, Report to the Swedish Foreign Office (2002) 9-10 
(-Report to the Swedish Foreign office') available at: http: //resources.. jur. uu. se/repository/5/Pdt`/staff*/sanetions. pdf [last accessed 1 August 20101. 
"32 Rosand (n 992), 751. 
103' Cameron. Report to the Swedish Foreign Office (n 1031), 10-11. 
104 UNSC Resolution 1617 (n 962). 2 
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group or derivative thereof would constitute association. 
'035 It also required that states seeking to add 
names to the Consolidated List, submit a statement of case to the 1267 Committee indicating their 
reasons for the addition. 103' This was further elaborated in UNSC Resolution 1735, which indicated 
that states should provide specific information as to why a person meets the requirements for 
designation 1037 and also contained a cover sheet for Member State submissions outlining the 
information required in relation to a proposed designee in annex I. 1038 UNSC Resolution 1822 
requested that states provide sufficient information to allow for the positive identification of 
persons. 1039 
States that do decide to seek to have a person or entity added to the Consolidated List are 
protected from revealing their own identity and from making public the reasons why such a designation 
is being sought. 104' Although they can, of course, opt to make public their rationale, the evidence is that 
they are choosing not to do so. 1041 
Difficulties with the process by which those to be designated under the 1267 Regime are 
selected are even more significant with respect to the Counter-Terrorism Regime where there is no 
central list created of those to be sanctioned. Instead, each state must subject those who come within 
the criteria set out in UNSC Resolution 1373 to economic sanctions. 
Ideally all those subject to sanction would be evaluated by the UNSC. This is because that 
would allow for proper consideration as to whether sanctions are suitable in a given instance. This 
discussion would be, as has been the practice with respect to sanctions invoked against states, open not 
only to UNSC members but also to other interested states. However, it is accepted that such a process 
is not feasible given the number of people and entities subject to economic sanctions, the need to 
sanction people urgently and the length of time such consideration would take. It is therefore 
imperative that the 1267 Committee and the CTC provide clear guidance and assistance to states in 
relation to the identification and selection of those who should be subject to economic sanctions. 
This section has discussed the devolution of power with respect to economic sanctions away 
from the UNSC and towards other entities or institutions. The proliferation of institutions and the 
heavy reliance on states for the operation of sanctions regimes has not been accompanied by an 
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acceptance on their part that responsibility, rather than simply the monitoring of the implementation of 
economic sanctions and the selection of those to be subjected to them, must attach to these institutions 
and states. 
5.2 Problems with UN Targeted Economic Sanctions 
The previous sections in this chapter have outlined the 1267 and Counter-Terrorism Regimes and 
discussed the impact that they have had on economic sanctions within the UN framework. This section 
moves on to discuss some of the difficulties that have emerged with respect to UNSC targeted 
economic sanctions. It discusses three broad categories of difficulty experienced with UN targeted 
economic sanctions namely: implementation, assets and human rights. 
5.2.1 Implementation 
As outlined previously in relation to economic sanctions against states, the policies of third party states 
(that is to say states that are not targets of the sanction system in place) and the way in which they 
choose to implement the sanctions in their domestic systems impacts on the effectiveness of 
sanctions. 104' This is also true of UN targeted economic sanctions. 
It has been commented that `[m]any states do not implement targeted sanctions properly, or 
implement them at all'. 104' There are a variety of reasons why such breaches occur. To take the 
previous example of the breach of sanctions against Iraq by AWB and therefore by Australia, the state 
in which it was based, it is worth mentioning three of the reasons given by Australia as to why 
sanctions were breached in that case. Firstly, AWB did not keep Australia fully appraised of its 
activities. '044 Secondly, when Australia did seek a legal opinion from its Department of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade on aspects of the exportation of wheat it was assured that such action did not contravene 
international law. '°45 Thirdly, Australia argued that, in any case, the relevant monitoring group should 
have undertaken the verification of the information provided to it by AWB rather than Australia itself. 
The purpose of this example is to show that sanctions may be breached simply because of the manner 
in which states interpret their obligations, in a situation where the state itself would not believe that it 
1042 See section 2.4.2.1. 
1043 Cameron, Report to the Swedish Foreign Office (n 1031), 14. 
1044 Cole Report (n 617). Volume 4, Findings, 30.241. 
10'5 Stephen Tully, 'International legal advisers and transnational corporations: Untangling roles and 
responsibilities for sanctions compliance' in Jeremy Farrall and Kim Rubenstein (eds).. Sanctions. accountability 
and Governance in a Glohalised World (Cambridge University Press 2009). 
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was breaching economic sanctions. However, it also raises the question to what extent states are 
breaching sanctions, as they were when sanctions were taken against Southern Rhodesia. '04" By 
choosing not to monitor AWB, when it was aware that it was engaging in contracts with a sanctioned 
regime, it could be said that Australia was complicit in the breach of sanctions. Furthermore, when 
these breaches came to light, the Australian government itself, rather than a UN entity, took 
responsibility for the investigations that ensued. 
There are, however, two aspects of targeted economic sanctions that make full implementation 
by states and its verification by the UNSC or the relevant sanctions committees or monitoring groups 
difficult. Firstly, the identification of those to be subjected to targeted economic sanctions, because the 
targets involved are individuals and entities rather than states, may prove difficult. Secondly, 
particularly in light of the heavy reliance placed on banks and financial institutions to freeze the assets 
of the targets of sanctions, states may lack the capacity to implement sanctions effectively. 
5.2.1.1 The Identification of Individuals 
One of the key issues in ensuring that targeted economic sanctions are effective is that those subjected 
to such measures need to be easily and accurately identifiable by states. The 1526 Monitoring Group 
has succinctly described the difficulties inherent in having insufficient information with respect to the 
targets of economic sanctions. It stated: `inadequate entries [on the Consolidated List] serve no useful 
purpose: sanctions cannot properly be applied against them, unintended members of the public with 
similar names suffer real consequences, the private sector and officials at borders and elsewhere waste 
valuable time and effort trying to identify matches which can never be confirmed, and the sanctions 
regime as a whole loses support. ' 1047 Despite this rhetoric there is evidence of significant deficiencies 
with respect to the information available on the Consolidated List. 
The reports of the 1363 and 1526 Monitoring Groups are instructive as regards to the 
significance of this problem. In its second report the 1363 Monitoring Group, in stating that the 
Consolidated List is `only as strong as its weakest link', acknowledged that the `predominant 
shortcoming of the list continues to be insufficient identifiers, which actually deters States from posting 
1046 See section 2.4.2.1. 
10" Tenth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Implementation Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to 
resolution 1822 (2008) concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban and associated individuals and entities, 2 October 
2009. S/2009/502. para 13 (*10"' Report of the 1363/1526 Monitoring ream'). 
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listed individuals on their watch lists. ' 1048 The report outlined some of the difficulties being 
experienced by states. A number of states commented in broad terms that more detailed and precise 
information was required. 1049 Liechtenstein indicated that it would require birth dates in order to freeze 
a person's bank accounts and that there was confusion in relation to aliases. Portugal had found in one 
instance that a name on the sanctions list was identical to those of in the region of 50 individuals who 
held assets in a particular financial institution. There were also complaints that the transliteration from 
Arabic to English was proving problematic as names could be spelt in a variety of ways upon 
translation to roman characters. '°5° A newspaper report at that time gave the example of the name 
'Mohammed' which, despite having only one spelling in Arabic, could be spelled over 200 ways in 
English. 1051 Therefore, if a person with that name is to be sanctioned successfully all variants will have 
to be searched. 
Subsequent Monitoring Group reports showed little by way of improvement with respect to 
the information available regarding individuals on the Consolidated List. Complaints included: the fact 
that there were 34 individuals on the Consolidated Listed identified by only a single name; ' 052 the 
absence of a full address in 51 per cent of entries on the Consolidated List by mid-2005; 1°5 and the 
lack of distinction between family names and forenames. 1054 By 2008, there were 57 individuals listed 
without a full name and date of birth, 5 with only a full name and date of birth and 26 with only a 
name, date and place of birth, '°55 Such entries are lacking other key identifiers such as nationality, 
address and country of residence. 
In mid-2009 the Chairman of the 1267 Committee, Thomas Mayr-parting, Permanent 
Representative of Austria to the UN, indicated that there was insufficient information with respect to 
X048 Second Report of the Monitoring Group established pursuant to resolution 1363 (2001) and extended by 
resolutions 1390 (2002) and 1455 (2003), on sanctions against Al-Qaida. the Taliban and individuals and entities 
associated with them, 2 December 2003, S/2003/1070. Annex V. 30 ('Second Report of the 1363 Committee'). 
1049 See comments of Serbia and Montenegro. Portugal and Pakistan, ibid. Annex V. para 31. 
1"0 ibid. Annex V, para 32. 
10`i Sarah Milstein, 'Taming the Task of Checking for Terrorists' Names' The New York Times, (New York 30 
December 2002). 
1152 Report of the Monitoring Group established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1363 (2001) and extended 
by resolutions 1390 (2002) and 1455 (2003), 8 July 2003, S/2003/669. para 74. 
103 Third Report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring'l earn appointed pursuant to resolution 1526 
(2004) concerning AI-Qaida and the Taliban and associated individuals and entities. 9 September 2005, 
S/2005/572, para 65 ('Third Report of the 1526 Committee'). 
104 Report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team appointed pursuant to Security Council 
resolutions 1617 (2005) and 1735 (2006) concerning Al-Qaida and the "Talihan and associated individuals and 
entities, 29 November 2007, S/2007/677, para 30. 
1D" Report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team pursuant to resolution 1735 (2(X)6) 
concerning AI-Qaida and the'faliban and associated individuals and entities. 2 April 2008. S/2(9)8/324. para 24. 
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approximately one third of the entries on the Consolidated List at that time. 
1056 He stated that the 1267 
Committee was reviewing all entries on the list and in the process of doing so was requesting further 
information from states with respect to those listed. He also noted that the requirement for `narrative 
summaries' to be included on the Consolidated List's website setting out the reasons for the listing was 
an improvement. 1057 But, he argued, that there was ultimately only two possible solutions to these 
difficulties 
- 
either the information was improved or the entry was removed from the list as, in any 
case, those listed on entries with insufficient information were not being subjected to sanctions. 
Following this press release the 1526 Monitoring Group released its tenth report. 10" It 
indicated that the requests for further information from states had received support but had not 
achieved much by way of data gathering, which it suggested might be due to a lack of further 
information on official files or a lack of resources. 1059 It also acknowledged that the Consolidated List 
included the names of 27 individuals who were known or believed to be dead, which it accepted 
impacted on the credibility of the list. The 1526 Monitoring Group set its target as being that `a new 
listing with inadequate identifiers [becomes] virtually unthinkable. "° In order to achieve this, it 
recommended that it and the 1267 Committee should develop guidelines for minimum listing 
information, that those current entries that do not meet the standard are identified, that the states of 
designation, residency and citizenship are informed and that they are given three months to provide 
sufficient information or those entries will be removed from the Consolidated List. 1061 
The collation of inadequate information with respect to those who are to be subjected to 
targeted economic sanctions is problematic not only because it obviously impacts on the efficacy of the 
sanctions themselves but also because of the signal it sends out to implementing states. The inclusion 
of entries that have insufficient information for the implementation of targeted economic sanctions, as 
well as, the inclusion of persons who are known, or presumed, to be dead calls into question the 
integrity of all of the information contained on the Consolidated List. The suggestion of the 1526 
Monitoring Group that, in a situation where insufficient information is currently held, states be forced 
to justify the entry on the Consolidated List is a welcome move towards states taking accountability for 
their actions with respect to targeted economic sanctions. However, such a recommendation, almost 
1 "' Press Conference on Activities of the Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee. 14 July 2009. 
1 IJNSC Resolution 1822 (n 962). 13. 
1('" Ioh Report of the 1363/1526 Monitoring Team (n 1047). 
10"' ibid. 13. 
10r'" ihid. 14. 
1)"' ibid. 14. 
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exactly a decade after the adoption of UNSC Resolution 1267 and following repeated reports 
identifying the issue, should also serve as a harsh reminder of the deficiencies of the current monitoring 
process, whereby the recommendations of the monitoring groups have no binding force and are not 
being implemented by the UNSC. 
5.2.1.2 State Capacity 
Targeted economic sanctions rely heavily on the ability of states, and institutions within those states, to 
implement them. Unfortunately, as will be examined in this section, not all states are endowed with the 
same capacity to do so. 
Firstly, in order for UNSC sanctions resolutions to be implemented fully domestically states 
must have adequate legislation in place. In reality, states are implementing measures using a variety of 
methods some of which are not sufficient. 1062 For example, some states such as Andorra and Sierra 
Leone, rely on their anti-money laundering provisions for the purpose of sanctioning individuals. '063 
However, the peculiarity of terrorism financing is that it often takes place not so much via criminal 
activities but rather by the misuse of non-profit and charitable associations as well as by means of 
alternative money remittance agencies or informal banking systems such as hawala. ' 1064 As such, these 
legislative provisions are not sufficient for the implementation of UN economic sanctions. 
Sierra Leone, for example, defines the offence of money laundering by reference to `property 
that is the proceeds of a crime'. 1065 It is questionable whether such a definition would encompass 
money that is being transferred with the intention of it being used for terrorist activity but which has 
not been used for that purpose to date. The legislation also concentrates on identifying money 
laundering by reference to the transfer of unusually large cash transactions. This may not be a suitable 
means of locating assets being used for terrorist financing, which could be transferred in small amounts 
or through informal channels. Finally, the legislation makes no reference to UN sanctions. 
1062 Andrea Bianchi, `Assessing the Effectiveness of the UN Security Council's Anti-Terrorism Measures: The 
Quest for Legitimacy and Cohesion' (2006) 17 EJIL 881,893-894. 
"° Report of the Principality of Andorra pursuant to paragraphs 6 and 12 of Security Council resolution 1455 (2003). 3 May 2004, S/AC. 37/2004/(1455)/35: Report of the Czech Republic in fulfilment of United Nations 
Security Council resolution 1455 (2003), 15 July 2003, S/AC. 37/2003/(1455)/59: Report of the Republic of Sierra 
Leone pursuant to paragraphs 6 and 12 of Security Council resolution 1455 (2003) concerning Al-Qaida and the 
Taliban, 29 September 2005, S/AC. 37/2005/(1455)/11. 
"064 Bianchi (n 1062). 896. Hawala is an informal means of transmitting money between two parties that will be 
discussed further in section 5.2.2.2. 
1 0" Section 2. The Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2005, Being an Act to suppress money laundering and to provide 
for other related matters, Sierra Leone. 21 July 2005. 
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lt should be noted that this difficulty was addressed during the European Conferences and 
recommendations for the implementation of consistent and sufficient legislation were made. Again this 
points to a disconnect between the reports being made by bodies established for the purpose of making 
recommendations and the willingness of the UNSC to implement such recommendations. lt calls into 
question the purpose of making resources available to such groups if their recommendations will not 
ultimately be implemented. 
Secondly, even where it has adequate domestic legislation, a state may not have the necessary 
infrastructure to implement targeted economic sanctions sufficiently. States, such as Samoa, have 
indicated that they lack capacity to even honour their reporting obligations, 1066 let alone to actually 
implement sanctions. The 1526 Committee has acknowledged that the issue of capacity is significantly 
increased when the role of banks and financial institutions in the implementation of targeted economic 
sanctions is considered. 1067 Since UNSC resolutions require that all of a target's assets are frozen, the 
actual administration of such measures is undertaken by the banks and financial institutions that block 
access to those assets. This requires that such institutions are sophisticated enough to be able to locate 
the relevant assets. 
In some states the majority of the population do not even have bank accounts, which makes 
the freezing of their assets extremely difficult. For example, in Afghanistan only three per cent of the 
population have bank accounts. 1068 Other states, such as Somalia, are listed as the state of residency of 
entrants on the Consolidated List but have neither a central authority capable of implementing 
economic sanctions, nor a banking system able to freeze assets. 1069 Even states, such as the US, which 
have sophisticated systems of banking and financial services struggle when analysis of the monetary 
amounts involved in financing terrorism is considered. 107° With respect to the 9/11 attacks, $200,000 
had been transferred to fund the attacks over the course of several months using the New York 
InterBank system. This figure needs to be compared to the 200,000 payments totalling $1.1 trillion 
transferred through that system every day in order to understand the difficulties inherent in tracing and 
freezing such assets. 1°" A further point is that some states that do have the means to freeze bank 
1°66 Bianchi (n 1062), 897. 
06' S/2007/677 (n 994). para 66. 
°`'8 Christina Lamb, In Love and War. ' The Sunday Times Maga: ine (London 2 July 2010). 16,22. 
1°"Third Report of the 1526 Committee (n 1053), para 65. 
107° Cameron. Report to the Swedish Foreign Office (n 1031), 21. 
1071 ibid. 
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accounts have indicated that they do not have the capacity or authority to freeze other business or 
tangible assets associated with the target. 1072 
The ultimate aim of UNSC resolutions dealing with economic sanctions should be consistent 
implementation at the highest level by all states. The repercussions of the absence of such consistent 
implementation are significant because, as the UKSC has stated, `terrorists may... choose to live or 
operate in states which are too weak to take effective action against them. ' 1073 This compromises the 
efficacy of economic sanctions. The difficulties of state capacity outlined above, will therefore, need to 
be addressed at UNSC level so that targeted economic sanctions can be implemented in a consistent 
and effective manner. 
5.2.2 Assets 
Targeted economic sanctions impact on the assets of those subjected to them in two ways. Firstly, they 
freeze the assets of those sanctioned. Secondly, they prohibit the transfer of certain types of asset to 
those sanctioned. This section will only deal with the former situation. This is because the latter, which 
relates to states or entities breaching sanctions by providing items to those sanctioned that are 
prohibited by the resolutions, do not change depending on whether the sanctions are against a state or 
against an individual. 
The functionality of UN targeted sanctions relies on the premise that the assets of those 
subjected to them can be frozen. This relates to how and where the asset is held rather than the 
capabilities of the formal banking system within states, which has been discussed in the previous 
section. As targeted UN sanctions have progressed this assumption has been called into question. 
Terrorism, and therefore terrorists, requires and receives significant financial resources in order to 
survive. 1074 The basic assumption with respect to terrorism is that the key is to break the capacity of 
the economy to sustain the war. ' 1075 Targeted economic sanctions attempt to break this capacity but, in 
doing so they assume that assets will be held in a way that makes them easily locatable. When dealing 
with sanctions against states this may have been a reasonable assumption as the financing of one state 
107' Second Report of the 1363 Committee (n 1048). para 82. 
107 a K, Al v HA4 Treasury (No 1) (n 26). 
1074 For a discussion of the various ways in which terrorist activity is financed see. Loretta Napoleoni. Terror Inc. 
Tracing the ; Honey Behind Global Terrorism (Penguin 2003). 
1075 Joaquin Villalobos. The War in El Salvador, Current Situation and Outlook Jr othe Future (Solidarity 
Publications 1990) 17. 
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is generally intertwined with those of other states and the monetary value of the assets in question is 
high. 
However, when targeted economic sanctions are put in place against individuals and entities 
which may not hold significant assets and which may not hold assets in a manner that makes them easy 
to locate the situation may be different. Furthermore, if those persons and entities are aware that there 
is a possibility that they will be subjected to sanctions they may transfer any assets that they are 
holding prior to sanctions being put in place. ' 076 This section discusses three means of holding and 
transferring assets that impact on the implementation of UN targeted economic sanctions. 
5.2.2.1 Offshore Banking 
Different states have different laws in relation to banking. These range from what might be considered 
unregulated systems, for example Afghanistan, to heavily regulated countries like the US. Within that 
range there are also what are known as `offshore' jurisdictions. These jurisdictions have varying levels 
of regulation however their commonality is that the banks and financial institutions within them are not 
required to reveal information about their customers. These jurisdictions have always been used for 
illicit purposes ranging from tax evasion to money laundering. '077 And now they provide a perfect 
opportunity for those involved in terrorist activity to secrete their monetary assets and thus avoid the 
effects of economic sanctions. 
The traditional example of an offshore jurisdiction was Switzerland, which, by virtue of the 
Swiss Banking Law of 1934, guaranteed absolute secrecy to its banking customers. However, the IMF 
now lists more than 20 jurisdictions as offshore financial centres. 1078 There is great variance as to how 
offshore jurisdictions operate. For example, Nauru's offshore banking sector arose in an attempt to 
resolve the state's near bankruptcy in the mid-1990s and, despite at one point having in excess of 400 
non-resident banks, it has been stated that if there ever were any legitimate offshore banks in Nauru 
- 
a big if 
- 
they could be counted on one hand. ' 1079 This can be contrasted with the position in the 
Cayman Islands, which, despite being listed as an offshore financial centre by the IMF, is the fifth 
1076 lt should be noted that whilst, as previously discussed in relation to UNSC Resolution 1267 (n 164), in the 
initial stages of targeted sanctions there was a period between resolutions being adopted and sanctions being 
implemented. now with the 1267 Committee taking responsibility for adding those to be sanctioned to the 
Consolidated List there is less opportunity for prior knowledge that sanctions will be implemented. 
1077 Jeffrey Robinson, The Sink, How Banks. Lawyers and Accountants Finance Terrorism and Crime 
- 
And Why 
Governments ('an't Stop Them (Constable & Robinson Ltd 2003) 151. 
""" List available at: http: //www. imf. org/external/np/ofca/ofca. asp [last accessed 5 May 20101. 
107') Robinson (n 1077), 151. 
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largest financial centre in the world and is home to 47 of the 50 top banks in the world. 
1080 What is 
clear, however, is that these offshore jurisdictions tend to be small in terms of population with the 
financial sector being the primary industry. 
Prior to 9/11 the emphasis in addressing offshore banking was rooted in attempts to combat 
money laundering and tax evasion whereas it is now acknowledged that 
it is also necessary for the 
purpose of addressing terrorism financing. 
1081 The FATF has established 25 criteria that identify rules 
and practices that impede international cooperation in the global fight against money 
laundering. These 
include such points as the operation of financial institutions without authorisation or registration and 
the existence of anonymous accounts or accounts in obviously fictitious names. 
1082 These elements also 
clearly impede attempts to combat terrorist financing. The 1363 Monitoring Group has acknowledged 
that the holding of assets in offshore jurisdictions, particularly through the use of shell companies and 
offshore trusts, is a difficult problem to resolve in the context of identifying assets that should be 
subject to sanctions. 1083 However, the secrecy that underpins offshore banking means that it is difficult 
to establish the precise role offshore financial centres have played in the financing of terrorist activity. 
What is clear is that the eradication of offshore jurisdictions would provide a safeguard 
against them being used for such purposes. This would likely prove impossible in practice. However, 
there has been movement towards tightening control over these jurisdictions. The naming and 
criticising of states that are considered to fall within the category of offshore jurisdictions, has led to 
some progress being made towards the tightening of regulations in those jurisdictions. 1084 However, in 
order for controls to be tightened more significantly in offshore financial centres further measures will 
need to be taken. 
The difficulty, of course, with attempts to restrict offshore jurisdictions is that there is little 
incentive for the jurisdictions themselves to concede to any external restrictions that would impede 
their economies. The matter is further confused by the attempts of states, such as the UK, to restrict 
I080 Allison S Bachus, From Drugs to 'Terrorism: The Focus Shifts in the International Fight Against Money 
Laundering After September 11,2001' (2004) 21 Arizona Journal of International & Comparative Law 835. 
1081 ibid. 
1082 Financial Action Task Force, Annual Review of Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories 2006-2007: Eighth 
NCCT Review (12 October 2007). 
'"R; Second Report of the 1363 Committee (n 1048), pars 67. 
1084 David Jolly, '2 Nations Agree to Ease Bank Secrecy Rules' The New York Times (New York 13 March 2009); 
S/2002/1070, para 67: The FAFT also recognises that progress has been made by states with respect to the 
implementation of anti-money laundering legislation, see http: //www. fatf- 
gati. org/pages/0,34I7, en_32250379_32236992_1_1_1_l_1.00. html blast accessed 6 August 20101. 
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their own citizens from using offshore banking centres for the purpose of tax avoidance. 10"5 For this 
reason, it is recommended that states put in place legislation that focuses on the use of offshore 
jurisdictions for money laundering and terrorist financing. An example of the possible measures that 
could be taken is demonstrated by the US Patriot Act, which allows for the imposition of sanctions on 
foreign jurisdictions and financial institutions that are of `primary money laundering concern'. 1086 The 
use of such measures by other states may provide further incentive for states subjected to them to 
introduce suitable legislation to restrict the possibility of their territory being used for illicit purposes. 
5.2.2.2 Informal Banking 
Aside from banking off-shore those involved in terrorist activity may also choose to bank using another 
opaque method of banking knowing variously as chitty banking, hundi, chop, fai Chen but most 
commonly, under in its Muslim name, as hawala. 1087 Hawala is an informal method of transmitting 
funds between two parties. A person approaches a hawalader in one country with cash that they request 
to be transferred to a person in another state. This money (minus fees and commission) is dispensed to 
the intended recipient by a hawaldar in the other state. 1088 The middle transaction 
- 
i. e. between the two 
hawaladers 
- 
does not involve the physical movement of money and relies on the two parties trusting 
that the other will settle his debts. This settlement of debts is done periodically and may be done by 
cash, cheque or wire transfer. 11189 In some instances, however, it may take place through what is known 
as under-invoicing, whereby one party sends goods to the other, for which he either over or 
undercharges for, the difference being the amount owed. 109° 
Ilawala does have legitimate uses and is most typically used by immigrants to transfer money 
to their home states. 1091 lt allows for money to be transferred from and to people who do not have 
access to western banking systems. This is important in states, like Afghanistan, where a low 
X085 Nick Mathiason, `Penalties doubled in crackdown on offshore tax havens' Guardian Online (9 December 
2009) available at: http: //www. guardian. co. uk/money/2009/dec/09/tax-haven-penalty-doubles [last accessed 2 
October 20101. 
1086 Uniting and Strengthening American by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct 
Terrorism (l1SA PATRIOT) Act of 2001 § 106,50 U. S. C. § 170 (2001), section 311. 
1087 Alan Lambert, `Underground Banking and Financing of Terrorism' in Fletcher N Baldwin, Jr, 'Organized 
Crime, Terrorism, and Money Laundering in the Americas' (2002) 15 Florida Journal of International Law 3. 
1088 John DG Waszak, ` The Obstacles to Suppressing Radical Islamic Terrorist Financing' (2005) 37 Case Western 
Reserve Journal of International Law 673. 
X08" R Colgate Selden, 'The Executive Protection: Freezing the Assets of Alleged Terrorists, the Constitution, and Foreign Participation in U. S. Financial Markets' 8 Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law 491. 10"0 Charles B Bowers, 'Flawala, Money Laundering and Terrorism Finance: Micro-Lending as an End to Illicit 
Remittance' (2009) 37 Denver Journal International Law & Policy 379. 
'x'' Waszak(n 1088). 
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percentage of citizens hold bank accounts. 1092 Hawala has also proven useful in the transmission of 
money to a state for humanitarian purposes and has been used by both international organisations and 
by NGOs for that purpose. 1093 
Despite these benefits, Hawala is a system that has been described as having six advantages 
over wire transfers: cost, speed of transaction, trust, availability, less bureaucracy and the absence of a 
detailed paper trail, 1094 Some of these features, specifically the trust, absence of bureaucracy and lack 
of a detailed paper trail make Hawala the ideal method of transferring money that has been obtained 
through illegitimate channels. It is impossible to exactly quantify the amount of money contained in 
hawala systems worldwide. It has, however, been estimated that in 1998 India's hawala system 
contained $680 billion, approximately 40 per cent of GDP. 1095 In Pakistan estimates range from $2-5 
billion per annum. 1096 Again the secrecy involved in the transfer of money using hawala makes an 
accurate assessment of how much money is transferred through it by targets of UN economic sanctions 
regimes impossible. The freezing of one such Somali hawala, Al Barakaat, from 2001 11197 to 2009108 
proves, however, the belief of states that such organisations are used to transfer money for terrorist 
purposes. The 1363 Committee also confirmed its belief that Al-Qaida and those associated with it 
frequently moved assets using informal remittance systems such as hawala. 1099 
In order to address this problem some states, such as France, India, the Islamic Republic of 
Iran, Malaysia, Portugal, Spain, Venezuela and Sierra Leone, 1100 have made alternative remittance 
systems illegal and others, such as Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, Paraguay, Qatar, the Republic 
of Korea, Singapore, Sweden, the Syrian Arab Republic, the UK and the US, have subjected them to 
regulatory control. 11°' However, it is agreed by commentators that these restrictions have little, if any, 
impact on the amount of money actually contained within or transferred via such systems. "°2 This 
1092 Lamb (n 1068), 22. 
1093 Samuel Munzele Maimbo, The Money Exchange Dealers of' Kabul 
.4 Study of the I/awala System in Afghanistan (The World Bank 2003) 11-13. 
1094 Joseph Wheatley, `Ancient Banking, Modem Crimes: [low Ilawala Secretly Transfers the Finances of Criminals and Thwarts Existing Laws' (2005) 26 University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic 
Law 347. 
1095 ibid. 
ions ibid. 
1097 'Security Council Established Pursuant to Resolution 1267 (1999) Concerning Afghanistan Issues a New Consolidated List'. 26 November 2001, AFG/169 SC/7222. 
""8 
-Security Council Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee Removes Names of Four Entities from 
Consolidated List'. 22 October 2009, SC/9773. 
10tß Second Report of the 1363 Committee (n 1048), para 85. 
1100 See Second Report of the 1363 Committee (n 1048). para 87: The Anti-Money Laundering Act. 2005. Being 
an Act to suppress money laundering and to provide for other related matters, Sierra Leone, 21 July 2005. 
101 See Second Report of the 1363 Committee (n 1048). 
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again returns to the fact that such systems are by their very nature shrouded in secrecy. Banning or 
regulating such a system requires knowledge that it exists, which may not be apparent in all situations. 
Additionally it should be noted that the total prohibition on such systems may also have the 
consequence of preventing money needed for basic expenses getting to those who need it either from 
their own families living and working abroad or from the relief agencies that are currently using these 
systems. 110' 
5.2.2.3 Non-Cash Assets 
As mentioned earlier, a key assumption of targeted economic sanctions is that the individuals and 
entities subjected to them will hold their assets in a manner that allows them to be easily frozen. It has 
already been noted that states have difficulty freezing non-cash assets. Of further concern are the assets 
held by targets in illegal forms. It is clear that terrorists launder money through gold, diamonds and 
other commodities and obtain it in the first place through the sale of drugs and weapons. ' 104 
Afghanistan, which, as discussed previously, has had some of its citizens subjected to UN 
targeted economic sanctions, is a producer of heroin. It has been suggested, by the US Drug 
Enforcement Authority, that Usama bin Laden financed his terrorist activities through the heroin trade 
in Afghanistan-' 105 And, it has also been argued that the Taliban financed their terrorist activities 
through a tax on opium production. ' 106 This caused difficulties from the outset of economic 
sanctions. 1107 
Afghanistan's heroin production was addressed in UNSC resolutions in relation to the 
Taliban. The UNSC demanded that the Taliban work to eliminate the cultivation of opium and that 
states prevent the sale, supply or transfer of the chemical acetic anhyride (which is used in the 
processing of opium) to the Taliban-controlled territory of Afghanistan. ' 108 UNSC Resolution 1373 
103 For example the Staff Report to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States has 
stated that the freezing of Al Barakaat is estimated to have cut remittances to Somalia in half and all of the money 
held by the organisation was frozen which represented for many Somalis 'their life savings and an economic 
lifeline to an impoverished country. ' J Roth, D Greenburg, S Wille, Staff Report, National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Monograph on Terrorist Financing 81-82. Available at http: //www. 9- 
I statements/91 I_TerrFin_Monograph. pdf [last accessed: 7 August 20101. 
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1105 Don Barnard, `Narco-i'errorism Realities: The Connection Between Drugs and Terror' (2003) 9 Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International 31. 
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Pace International Law Review 77. 
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noted with concern the connection between `international terrorism... and 
illicit drugs... '109, which 
was followed by UNSC Resolution 1363 creating a monitoring group to include an expert group versed 
in drug-trafficking. 11° Despite these resolutions and attempts to curb production, "" Afghanistan 
continues to produce heroin. It was estimated as recently as 2008 that, despite efforts by troops to curb 
production, 90 per cent of heroin on UK streets originated in Afghanistan and that 
it was the state's 
biggest 12 
The problem for both the UN and states in dealing with assets in the manner and form 
discussed in this chapter is that they are incredibly difficult to locate and freeze. Whilst 
recommendations can be made to minimise the opportunities for targets of sanctions to hold their assets 
in these means, it must be accepted they may be an inherent difficulty with targeted economic 
sanctions as it is entirely legitimate for individuals and entities to hold assets in a myriad of ways and 
there are also legitimate uses of both offshore jurisdictions and informal banking systems such that it 
would be impossible to entirely eradicate them. The result is that, despite the best efforts of states, 
targets of economic sanctions have ample opportunity to hide their assets and thus avoid the 
consequences of economic sanctions regimes. 
5.2.3 Human Rights 
This section discusses the impact of targeted economic sanctions on those subject to them. As outlined 
in chapter 1 Member States of the UN are obliged to implement economic sanctions, "" a fact which 
underpins much of the discussion of economic sanctions throughout this thesis. When a binding 
sanctions resolution is adopted by the UNSC, Member States must enforce the measures it outlines. 
This obligation is not changed by any other obligation on the state and applies irrespective of the 
impact of sanctions on the target. As such, if economic sanctions are to offer any protection to a 
target's rights the UNSC itself must incorporate this protection when the resolution is being drafted. 
For this reason, before considering the impact of targeted economic sanctions on individuals and 
entities, this section considers whether the UNSC is in any way bound by human rights considerations 
in adopting resolutions. 
1 109 UNSC Resolution 1373 (n 164). 
1110 UNSC Resolution 1363 (n 993). 4. 
.... James Risen, 'Poppy Fields Are Now a Front Line in Afghan War' The New York 'l'imes (New York 16 May 
2007). 
1112 Tulip Mazumdar, 'inside Afghanistan's Heroin Fields' BBC News Online (I May 2008) available at 
http: //news. bbc. co. uk/newsbeat/hi/newsheat/newsid_7376000/7376269. stm [last accessed 7 May 20101. 
1113 See section 1.5.1 
. 
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5.2.3.1 Is the UNSC Bound by Human Rights in taking its Decisions? 
The extent to which the UNSC is required to adhere to human rights norms in adopting its resolutions 
is contentious. The UN is not, to date, a party to any treaties under which it could be obliged to 
consider human rights norms in its actions. The CESCR has argued that the UNSC can indirectly be 
bound to adhere to the obligations placed on its members and on other UN Member States in 
international conventions, specifically the ICESCR. 114 lt states that `the [UN] has an obligation "to 
take steps, individually and through international assistance and cooperation, especially economic and 
technical" in order to respond to any disproportionate suffering experienced by vulnerable groups 
within the targeted country. "' 15 
The rationale behind this suggestion is that states have undertaken to comply with the 
provisions of the ICESCR and this obligation is not lifted simply because they are sitting as part of the 
UNSC. 116 If this argument had validity it would have significant repercussions for UN economic 
sanctions. To consider an analogous convention, if the UNSC was bound to comply with the provisions 
of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, ' 11 which is the most ratified human rights treaty albeit it 
with significant reservations, " 18 the humanitarian situation with respect to children in Iraq would have 
treated considerably different. For example, it is clear that during economic sanctions against Iraq 
certain obligations of states parties in articles 6, in relation to the right to life of the child, 24(2), in 
relation to ensuring the implementation of the right to life, including the provision of medical 
assistance, and 27, in relation to the provision of an adequate standard of living, were breached. "' 
However, the UN is not a state party to the Convention of the Rights of the Child or to any other treaty 
or convention. Furthermore, the UN itself has legal personality separate from its Member States. 1120 As 
an organ of the UN the acts of the UNSC are those of the UN and not of the individual Member States 
that comprise the UNSC. Its obligations are therefore separate from the obligations of its individual 
Member States. This is clear when you consider that often some but not all of the UNSC Member 
States will have signed or ratified a convention or treaty as is the case with both the ICESCR and the 
114 CESCR, General comment 8 (n 656), para 7 
115 ibid. para 8. 
""' ibid. 
1117 CESCR, General Comment 8 (n 656), para 8. 
"'" William Schabas. 'Reservations to the Convention on the Rights of the Child' (1996) 18 Human Rights 
Quarterly, 472. 
1"() See section 3.5.3. 
1120 Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations. ICJ Rep. 1949,174 at 179 ('The 
Reparations C'ase'). 
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Convention on the Rights of the Child. In that circumstance, if Member States were required to comply 
with their treaty obligations whilst acting in the UNSC, Member States may find that their obligations 
are in conflict with each other with no certainty as to which state's obligations should prevail. 
There does, however, seem to be a growing consensus amongst commentators that the UNSC 
cannot be considered as completely unbound by human rights in its decision-making process but, as 
yet, there is no agreement on the precise ambit of the human rights by which it may be bound, with 
some focusing on the application of jus cogens norms12' and some extending the obligation further. 
For example, de Wet argues that subsidiary organs of the UNSC have to adhere to basic principles of 
procedural justice, "22 Geiss comments that the UNSC must be required to adhere to the rule of law"23 
and Segall has gone even further and stated that `it is evident and generally accepted that the Security 
Council is bound to observe the principles of human rights law and international humanitarian law 
when designing, monitoring and reviewing sanctions regimes. ' 124 It is also unlike where, in the 
absence of a requirement that the UN adhere to conventions and treaties that it is not a party to, this 
obligations emanate from. 
This section focuses on three possible sources of an obligation on the UNSC to adhere to 
human rights in taking decisions. 
5.2.3.1.1 The UN Charter 
The UNSC derives its powers from the UN Charter and, as such, for the purpose of ascertaining 
whether it is obliged to act in accordance with human rights or other international norms a review of its 
obligations under the Charter is necessary. 
Under Article 24 of the UN Charter the UNSC is required to discharge its duties under the 
Charter in accordance with the purposes and principles of the UN. 125 The seminal text on the UN 
Charter edited by Bruno Simma suggests that the purposes contained in Article I of the Charter, '' 26 
which include `promoting and encouraging respect for human rights', " 27 were intended as a loose and 
'21 Bianchi (n 1062): Reinisch (n 40). 851. 
11" De Wet (n 124) 143. 
1123 Geiss, (n 175) 173. 
1124 Segall (n 664). 
ý'` Article 24(2), UN Charter. 
ý`6 Together with the principles contained in article 2. 
X127 Article 1(3), UN Charter. 
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flexible guide for the conduct of the UN organs, which would include the UNSC. 1128 He notes, 
however, that it is not clear whether it was intended that these purposes would be legally binding, 
although the US delegation expressed a belief that they were»29 nor how any conflict between the 
different purposes should be resolved. The latter point is of particular relevance in the context of 
targeted economic sanctions in light of another purpose of UN 
-the maintenance of international peace 
and security. 1130 Targeted economic sanctions have the potential to bring those two purposes into direct 
conflict. 
Other commentators on the creation of the UN offer unsympathetic explanations for the 
inclusion of human rights in the Charter. Schlesinger indicates that the inclusion of references to 
human rights was a result, not of a desire on the part of any of the major powers but, of the suggestion 
of some of the forty-two consultants recognised by the US, who attended the San Francisco 
Conference. This statement contradicts the report of the US Secretary of State that indicates that the 
inclusion of human rights was at the proposal of the four Sponsoring Powers and was reflective of the 
desires of people both within the US and throughout the world. ' 132 It may be seen, perhaps, as a 
proposal of the consultants that was judged by the Sponsoring Powers to be a popular and politically 
savvy suggestion and thus adopted by them. However, the origins of the suggestion cast a shadow as to 
whether human rights were perceived at that time to be anything other than peripheral to the other 
concepts contained in the Charter that had been suggested by and discussed by the major powers. This 
is born out by Claude's suggestion that the pressures to endow the UN with competence in the field of 
human rights were met with multiple references to human rights in the Charter rather than by 
providing clear authority and effective means for the development of an international guarantee of the 
rights of man. " 133 He also proposes that the inclusion of the respect for human rights in the Charter 
was a reaction to World War 11 and the view that the danger of war emanates from totalitarian 
governments, that war is caused by the diabolical plots of ruthless dictators who are contemptuous of 
human rights. ' 1134 
'"8 Rüdiger Wolfrum, 'Chapter I. Purposes and Principles' in Bruno Simma (ed), The Charter of'the United 
Nations: a commentary (2"d cdn, Oxford University Press 2002) 40. 
112" 
'Charter of the United Nations', Report to the President on the Results of the San Francisco Conference by the 
Chairman of the United States Delegation The Secretary of State, June 26,1945,36. 
11'0 Article 1(1), UN Charter. 
.. '. Schlesinger (n 147). 125-126. 
"2 Charter of the United Nations, Report to the President on the Results of the San Francisco Conference by the 
Chairman of the United States Delegation 'fhe Secretary of State, June 26,1945,38. 
Claude (n 151). 64. 
ý'a ibid. 78 
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It is difficult from this analysis to distil any obligation on the UNSC to act in accordance with 
human rights norms in taking decisions for the purpose of maintaining peace and security. 
It should 
also be noted that discussions on the development of a comprehensive human rights document, which 
ultimately led to the UDHR, 135 were postponed to be considered at a latter point 
by the UNGA. 
Furthermore, the possibility that the promotion and encouragement of the respect for human rights 
could be seen as binding on the UNSC is also called into question by some of the literature 
in the early 
years of the UN, which suggests that there was no widespread belief in the existence of 
human rights in 
a concrete rather than aspirational form. 
In contrast to contemporary texts on international law, the fourth edition of Brierly's text The 
Law of Nations, published in 1949, does not refer to human rights at all although it does give 
consideration to what he terms `the Law of Nature'. ' 136 Additionally, in his 1950 address to the Grotius 
Society, the Rt Hon Lord Radcliffe referred to the UDHR as endowing man with extensive rights, 
which he hoped would be taken up by individuals `in due time' but which he considered to be 
ineffective at that point in time. ' 37 In a reply to this address, it was argued that there could be no 
human rights, as rights could only be enjoyed by societies and there was no world society of 
individuals and that, therefore, human rights should be conceived of as duties of governments towards 
the individuals that they govern. ' 138 Six years later, it was commented that the UDHR was not a source 
of law but was tending towards becoming such a source. ' 139 Furthermore, at that time it was argued that 
there were significant differences of opinions between states with little or no common ground on 
common and fundamental rights recognised by all states. ' 140 
In order to consider that the UN Charter intended to place an obligation on the UNSC to 
adhere to human rights in its actions there must have been a coherent, identifiable, applicable or 
binding concept of human rights at that time. It is clear from the comments of Sauer, the discussions at 
the Grotius Society and Brierly's work that no such concept existed when the Charter was being 
drafted, or for a number of years following its adoption. It must be considered that the absence of such 
1115 Universal Declaration of Human Rights(] 948) UNGA Res 217A(111) (10 December 1948). 
1136 JL Brierly, The Law of Nations (4`h edn, Clarendon Press 1949). 
11'' Rt lion Lord Radcliffe, 'The Rights of Man' (1950) 36 Transactions of the Grotius Society for the Year 1950 
7-8. 
1138 Reply of Mr. F. N. Keen. 
1; 9 E Sauer. 'Universal Principles in International Law' (1956) 42 Transactions of the Grotius Society for the Year 
1956,189. 
'"') ibid. 191. 
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a concept, albeit that such a concept was developing, excludes the possibility that the references to 
human rights in the Charter were intended to be binding upon the UNSC in its actions. 
However, the UN is an evolving institution and the next two sections discuss occurrences 
since the founding of the UN that may give credence to the idea that the UNSC is obliged to adhere to 
human rights norms. 
5.2.3.1.2 Rulings of the ICJ 
The ICJ has, in some of its rulings, commented on various aspects of the UN, these comments will be 
analysed for the purpose of ascertaining how the ICJ views the UNSC and its obligations. 
There appears to be no definitive acceptance by the ICJ of the exact responsibilities on the 
UNSC to act within any legal framework. However, it seems clear that to varying degrees there is a 
belief that the UNSC is not free to act with total disregard for international law. A conservative 
example of this belief may be seen in the statement that `when the [UN] takes actions which warrants 
the assertion that it was appropriate for the fulfilment of one of the stated purposes of the United 
Nations, the presumption is that such action is not ultra vires the [UN]. ' 114 1 Although this was an 
advisory opinion referring specifically to the practice of the UNGA, on the assumption that it would 
equally apply to the UNSC, because the UNSC is an organ of the UN that `takes actions', this decision 
shows some support for the proposition that the UNSC may not act completely unbound by law 
because it offers the possibility that the UNSC may, in some circumstances, act ultra vires the UN 
Charter. This implies that the UNSC, when it takes action, is subject to some restriction in order that it 
ensures that it acts intra vires the UN Charter. However, it must be emphasised that in this analysis the 
presumption is that the UNSC is when it takes action acting intro vires the Charter. 
The ICJ has also ruled that the UN `is a subject of international law and capable of possessing 
international rights and duties, and that it has capacity to maintain its rights by bringing international 
claims. ' 1142 It has been argued that if the UN is accepted to have rights and claims then it must also 
1141 Certain Expenses of'the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter) (Advisory Opinion) [1962] 
ICJ Rep 168. 
11422 The Reparations Case (n 1120). 
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have duties. "43 Whilst this conclusion is logical, it is of limited value in that it is accepted that the 
exact delineation of those duties remains unclear. 
' 144 
Sir Elihu Lauterpacht offered some clear limitation on the ambit of UNSC power with respect 
to the drafting of resolutions in the Bosnia Case. "45 Bosnia argued before the ICJ that to construe 
UNSC Resolution 7131146 as imposing an arms embargo on Bosnia would serve to assist the 
commission of genocide in Bosnia. Lauterpacht did not ultimately rule on that specific 
issue stating 
that `as between the Applicant and the Respondent, the continuing validity of the embargo in its 
bearing on the Applicant has become a matter of doubt requiring further consideration by the Security 
Council'. However, he did state that jus cogens norms are superior to both customary international law 
and treaty law in the hierarchy of norms and that, as such, Article 103 has no relevance in a conflict 
between UNSC decisions and jus cogens norms because the latter will prevail. He underlined that 
statement by indicating that one only has to look at the opposing position - that a UNSC resolution 
may require participation in genocide 
- 
for its unacceptability to be apparent. "47 Although this clearly 
demonstrates the belief that the UNSC is constrained in some respects by human rights it is a very 
limited judgment in the sense that it limits the human rights obligations of the UNSC to adherence with 
jus cogens norms. Jus cogens norms, being those norms from which there is no possible derogation, 1148 
stretch only to certain norms, such as, the prohibition against torture, genocide and apartheid. 
Requiring that the UNSC adhere only to jus cogens norms leaves it free to violate other human rights, 
such as those rights that form part of customary international law but do not rise to the level of jars 
cogens, in adopting its resolutions. 
The pronouncements of the ICJ indicate that the UNSC may not act completely without 
adherence to human rights norms. However, where it has chosen to delineate those norms it has done 
so in such a limited manner as to be almost meaningless. Further ICJ consideration of the limits that 
should be placed on the UNSC is needed to clarify this issue. 
1143 Andrew Clapham, 'Sanctions and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights' in Vera Gowlland Debbas (ed) 
United Nations Sanctions and International Law (Kluwer Law International 2001) 133. 
1144 ibid. 
145 Case Concerning the Application of the Genocide Convention (Bosnia und Iler_egovina v Yugoslavia) [19931 
ICJ Rep 3, at 440 ('The Bosnia Case'). 
1146 UNSC Resolution 713 (n 85). 
1147 The Bosnia Case (n 1145). 
1148 Article 53. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) 1 155 UNTS 331. 
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5.2.3.1.3 UN Practice 
The final reason why it is submitted that the UNSC may be obliged to adhere to human rights norms in 
adopting resolutions is the practice of the UNSC itself. The traditional stance of the UN was that it saw 
itself as a benevolent promoter of human rights at a distance from the responsibility for human rights 
protection, which was seen as an obligation of states. ' 149 However, the UN is an evolving institution 
and there is a strong argument that by attempting to address human rights concerns in its actions and by 
engaging in action traditionally undertaken by states it has become obligated to act in accordance with 
human rights. 
Michael Byers espouses a doctrine of legitimate expectation, which he states forms part of all 
rules of international law. 15° He explains the doctrine as the belief of states that other states will 
behave in a particular way, for example by abiding by their treaty obligations. He says that such an 
expectation `may be considered as legitimate 
- 
i. e., legally justifiable 
- 
because States usually behave 
accordingly and regard their behaviour as having legal relevance. 15' He further states that the doctrine 
`should also be relevant to international regimes and institutions more generally, and in particular to 
how those regimes and institutions are developed, maintained and changed. '' 52 
lt is suggested here that the actions of the UNSC with respect to economic sanctions have 
created a legitimate expectation that the UNSC will not ignore human rights in adopting its resolutions. 
Firstly, the UNSC has taken it upon itself to adhere, in some circumstances for the benefit of 
individuals, with human rights norms. For example, with respect to the humanitarian crisis in Somalia 
the UNSC authorised the use of all necessary means to `establish a secure environment for 
humanitarian relief measures'. 1113 Furthermore, with respect to economic sanctions against Iraq, where 
it became clear that sanctions were causing difficulties for the general population of Iraq the UNSC 
moved to modify the sanctions regime to limit such difficulties. The proposition is that the UNSC may 
not back away from this obligation, which it has itself adopted, to adhere to human rights norms, as far 
as it can, simply because it may prove more difficult to implement those norms with respect to targeted 
economic sanctions. 
114" Frederic Megret and Florian Hoffman, `The UN as a Human Rights Violator? Some Reflections on the United 
Nations Changing Human Rights Responsibility' (2003) 25 Human Rights Quarterly 315. 
"`0 Michael Byers, Custom. Power and the Power o Rules: International Relations and Customarv International 
Law (Cambridge University Press 1999) 107. 
''s' ibid. 
ibid. 107-108. 
15' l1NSC Res 794 (3 December 1992) UN Doc S/RES/794.10. 
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Secondly, the UNSC has acted beyond its remit to the extent that human rights protection is a 
necessary implication of its action. For example, typically human rights are owed by those who control 
a territory and in some instances, such as East Timor and Kosovo, the UN has taken control of a 
territory and, therefore, it has submitted to a higher kind of human rights obligations, traditionally 
associated with states. " 54 The UNSC having taken control of these territories, without specifically 
exempting itself from adherence to human rights norms cannot, at a later stage, preclude such 
adherence based on the fact that the UN itself is not a state as there is a legitimate expectation that such 
rights will be protected by whatever entity controls the territory. 
The development of UNSC practice with respect to economic sanctions, which serves to 
strengthen the suggestion that the UNSC has taken action that requires that it now be considered 
subject to human rights, is discussed in more detail in the next section. It should be noted that this view 
does not require the exact norms to which the UNSC must adhere to be specified. Absolute adherence 
to human rights may not always be possible, as reflected in the past action of the UNSC, 1155 but regard 
to rights in excess of the baseline jus cogens norms has been attempted in the past and therefore this 
practice must continue in the future. 
5.2.3.2 The Impact of Targeted Economic Sanctions on an Individual 
Given that it has been established that the UNSC is obliged, based on its past actions, to take economic 
sanctions in a manner that attempts to protect the human rights of those sanctioned, this section now 
focuses on the implication of this premise for targeted economic sanctions. Firstly, it outlines what it 
actually means to be subject to targeted economic sanctions. Secondly, it considers how targeted 
economic sanctions may potentially breach due process rights. Thirdly, it discusses the amendments to 
targeted economic sanctions and how they demonstrate the UNSC focus on human rights in taking 
targeted economic sanctions. 
1S4 Megret and Hoffman (n 1149); Ralph Wilde, international territorial Administration, /low trusteeship and 
the Civilizing Mission Never Went Away (Oxford University Press 2008) 144-146,178-188. 
"" To take again the example of Iraq, despite the actions of the UNSC in allowing for humanitarian exemptions to 
economic sanctions and in instigating the Oil-for-Food Programme there was still humanitarian suffering and breaches of human rights however the UNSC continued to attempt to resolve the issue and ultimately moved to 
targeted sanctions to do so. 
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5.2.3.2.1 Day-to-Day Life 
Targeted economic sanctions are intended to restrict a person or entity's access to their assets in order 
that they not be in a position to engage in action that the UNSC has decided is undesirable, like the 
financing of terrorist activity. This section discusses how such measures actually impact those 
subjected to them. 
UN targeted economic sanctions preclude their targets from receiving money from any source. 
In one UK case a person received food, accommodation and clothing from his wife who was receiving 
welfare benefits subject to a Financial Sanctions Basic Expenses Licence granted by the Treasury. 
Under that licence she was required to account for all expenditure and provide receipts on a monthly 
basis. Breach of the licence, including failure to report expenditure, was a criminal offence as was the 
provision of money to the targeted person without permission of either Treasury or the 1267 
Committee. These effects were described, by the English High Court, as draconian. 1156 
In another example, three sanctioned individuals were required to provide full details of their 
assets, which was to include details of their wives' assets and employment status. Following the 
freezing of their assets, licences were granted to allow them to receive social security although in only 
one case was that money paid directly to the target. In the other two cases the money was paid to the 
wife of the target who could only provide food and accommodation and no more than £10 a week in 
cash to the target, all of which had to be accounted for to Treasury. 1 157 
It has been commented that it is very difficult for members of the family of a target to know 
when a licence is needed, which led in once instance to Treasury receiving in excess of 50 separate 
applications for licences to provide economic resources to a target»58 In that case, Mr Justice Collins 
described as absurd an application made with respect to allowing a target to borrow a car to go to the 
supermarket and get the family's groceries, although he noted that Treasury had, having obtained 
ministerial consideration, decided that a licence was needed because a car `was an economic resource 
and could be used to obtain or deliver goods or services. ' 159 
The UK House of Lords has indicated the reasoning behind the tight control of the assets of 
the spouse of a target. 1160 It stated that Treasury takes the view that 'money spent by [the target's 
"6 flay v HAI Treasury [20091 EW}IC 1677 (Admin), para 6. 
11 `7 A. K. A1. O&Gv HAI Treasury [20081 EWCA Civ 1 187 para 27. 1 "8.1. K. Al. 0&Gv HAI Treasury [20081 EWHC 869 (Admin), para 42. ll "' ibid. para 42. 
16'3 R(AI) v HAI Treasury (Note) 120081 UKt{L 26. 
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spouse] on the running of the family household will be for the benefit" of [the target]... So, for 
example, if she buys food for a communal meal in which he participates, the money will have 
been 
expended for his benefit. ' In order to ensure that she did not benefit him beyond the permitted levels, 
which would include basic expenses such as food and shelter, the spouse was required to have her 
benefits paid into a bank account, she had to use a debit card to make payments out of the account save 
for the withdrawal of £10 in cash for each member of her household. As with the earlier case she was 
required to send a monthly account to Treasury, enclosing a copy of her bank statement, a detailed 
account of expenditure and receipts for goods purchased. This issue was, however, sent to the ECJ for a 
preliminary hearing. The ECJ held that social welfare payments, being the minimum on which the state 
has decided a person can sustain himself, do not come within the assets that must be frozen in order to 
attain the objective of the economic sanctions because it is difficult to `imagine how those funds could 
be turned into means that could be used to support terrorist activities' given that they are fixed at such a 
low level. 1161 The full implications of this decision, and how it is likely to be implemented in the UK is 
not yet clear. 
One of the more severe restrictions on the movement of persons who are subjected to sanction 
was seen in the case of Nada v State Secretariat for Economic Affairs. 11G2 In that case the claimant, 
Nada, was a resident of Campione d'Italia, which is a small Italian enclave, half a square mile in size 
surrounded by Swiss territory. Following his addition to the Consolidated List, as well as having his 
assets frozen, Nada was prohibited from entering Swiss territory and was thus confined wholly to 
Campione d'ltalia, a situation which the court described as being close to house arrest. 
From the above cases, it is clear that economic sanctions cause severe restrictions to the lives 
of those subjected to them. Such persons have their bank accounts and other assets frozen or, in the 
case of non-liquid assets, made inaccessible by them. Their only source of income is social welfare 
payments and those are limited to covering the basic cost of living. This position is ameliorated by the 
loosening of the regime, within the EU, with respect to social welfare payments. Cameron, considering 
economic sanctions through the lens of the European Convention on Human Rights, further suggests 
"' Case C-340/08, Reference for a preliminary ruling under l1 rticle 234 EC from the /louse o/ Lords (United 
Kingdom), The Oueen. on the application of Al and Others v Her Majesty's Treasury. 30 April 2008. 
162 Bundesgericht [BGerl [Federal Courtj November 14.2007,133 Entscheidungen des Schweizerischen 
Bundesgerichts I BGEj II 450 (Switz) as discussed in Johannes Reich, `Recent Development: Due Process and 
Sanctions Targeted Against Individuals Pursuant to U. N. Resolution 1267 (1999)' 33 Yale Journal of International 
Law 505. 
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that targeted economic sanctions can also infringe on other rights such as: freedom of movement; 
family life; reputation and access to court; and privacy. 1163 
The range of rights that can be breached by economic sanctions that it could be argued the 
UNSC is obliged to consider in adopting economic sanctions is considerable. However, UNSC targeted 
economic sanctions are taken in circumstances where fundamental breaches of international law are at 
stake. It is, therefore, suggested that the legal standard that should be applied to targeted economic 
sanctions is, like economic sanctions against states, proportionality. ' 164 In those circumstances, the 
rights of the individual cannot be considered absolute and it may be necessary for his assets to be 
frozen. As such, the main criticism of economic sanctions with respect to their impact on human rights 
is not that they cause hardship on the individual that is being sanctioned, although they do, but that they 
are taken in a manner that breaches due process rights. A balance must, therefore, be struck between 
taking efficient action and safeguarding the rights of those against whom such action is being taken. 
This could be accomplished by ensuring that the due process rights of those sanctioned are adhered to. 
Due process rights and how economic sanctions impact upon them are discussed in the next section. 
5.23.2.2 Potential Breaches of Due Process Rights 
Due process rights are a class of rights that apply to those subject to criminal charges as well as to the 
determination of rights and obligations in civil proceedings. Although, there is no requirement that 
those subject to targeted economic sanctions be also subject to criminal measures, it has been noted 
that the sanctions themselves `practically amount to criminal sanctions. ' 165 lt is reasonable that 
economic sanctions, given the severity of their effects, be treated as akin to criminal sanctions, and thus 
necessitate those sanctioned being given comparable rights to those subjected to criminal sanctions. 
Furthermore, assuring the protection of the due process rights of those subject to sanctions would strike 
a balance between the implementation of economic sanctions and the human rights of those sanctioned 
and thus fulfil any obligation on the part of the UNSC to adhere to human rights in adopting 
resolutions. This section considers the extent to which targeted economic sanctions breach due process 
norms. 
' "" Cameron, 'UN Targeted Sanctions, Legal Safeguards and the European Convention on human Rights' (n 
129). 
"64 See section 3.7. 
I(, 5 Johannes Reich, 'Recent Development: Due Process and Sanctions Targeted Against Individuals Pursuant to U. N. Resolution 1267 (1999)' 33 Yale Journal of International Law 505. 
197 
Due process rights are discussed in this chapter through the lens of the obligations on states 
contained in the ICCPR. This framework has been chosen for two reasons. Firstly, the ICCPR contains 
comprehensive due process rights, which allow for a number of points of contrast with the current 
economic sanctions regime. Secondly, the human rights committee has stated that the `fundamental 
requirements of fair trial' protected by the ICCPR must not be derogated from by states in a state of 
emergency. ' 166 This underlines the binding nature of such obligations. It should be noted that the 
Human Rights Committee, in Sayadi v Belgium has considered the application of the provisions of the 
ICCPR to an individual subjected to UN targeted economic sanctions holding that the sanctioning did 
not breach due process rights as set out in article 14 of the ICCPR. 1167 However, this decision can be 
distinguished from the consideration of the ICCPR in this thesis. The Human Rights Committee 
considered the application of the ICCPR to targeted economic sanctions in a domestic context. The 
individuals who made the application (the authors) were resident in Belgium and took their application 
against it. They had already applied to the domestic courts in relation to their sanctioning where the 
Court of First Instance had held that Belgium was required to make an application to have them 
removed from the Consolidated List due to lack of evidence against them. 1168 Belgium had complied 
with that judgment. The Human Rights Committee, in its consideration of whether article 14(1) had 
been breached, was therefore satisfied that `the authors did have an effective remedy, within the limits 
of the jurisdiction of the State party, which guaranteed effective follow-up by submitting two requests 
for de-listing. ' 169 It is consistent to consider that Belgium complied with its obligations under article 
14(1), as far as it could given the restrictions placed on states with respect to their obligations to 
implement UN economic sanctions, whilst also stating that UN economic sanctions themselves do not 
adhere to due process norms. As such, the decision does not preclude the consideration of the UN 
economic sanctions through the lens of ICCPR due process rights. 
Under the ICCPR provisions it is clear that due process rights are not currently being 
protected under the UN economic sanctions provisions. Article 14 of the ICCPR states that `in the 
determination of any criminal charge against him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit at law, 
everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial 
"' General Comment No. 29, CCPR/C/21 /Rev. I /Add. ] I. para 16 
111,7 
. 
V'abil Savadi and Patricia i'inck v Belgium Communication No 1472/2006 
- 
CCPR/C/94/D/ 1472/2006 
(Decision of 22 October 2008). 
Savadi v Belgium (n 1167). para 4.3. 
16`' ibid. para 10.9 
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tribunal established by law'' 10 and that `everyone charged with a criminal offence shall have the right 
to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. ' 1171 Currently economic sanctions 
measures do not adhere to these requirements as, once listed, a person's assets are automatically frozen 
without there being a prior right of hearing. " 72 Furthermore, there is no provision in any of the 
resolutions for consideration of the implementation of economic sanctions against an individual by any 
tribunal either domestic or international. The method of appealing against the imposition of economic 
sanctions is through application to the Focal Point. However, once such an application is made, the 
state that initially requests the listing becomes a judge in its own case and is given responsibility for 
reviewing the decision to subject the individual to economic sanctions. 
Article 14 also sets out the rights that a person has in determining any criminal charge against 
him. It states that a person has the right to be informed promptly and in detail in a language which he 
understands of the nature and cause of the charge against him. ' 1 173 It might be posited that the 
provision that requires states to inform people placed on the list within a reasonable time after their 
notification by the Secretariat"74 constitutes prompt notification. However, the current limitation on 
the requirement that states provide information to the 1267 Committee as to why a person is being 
listed, "75 which allows the state to limit the publication of that information, ' 176 surely falls foul of the 
requirement that a person be in a position to understand the nature and cause of the charge against him. 
A person is also entitled, under the provisions of the ICCPR, to legal counsel of his choosing 
for the preparation of his defence without payment in circumstances where an individual cannot afford 
to pay for counsel and `where the interests of justice so require'. 1 77 When economic sanctions are put 
in place and an individual's assets are frozen they will be unable to finance legal counsel. There are no 
provisions in relation to the financing of applications to the Focal Point. ' 178 UNSC resolution 1452 
does allow for the possibility of frozen funds being released in order to pay legal fees. 1179 A sanctioned 
individual must inform the state in which their assets are frozen that they need funds to be released `for 
the payment of reasonable professional fees' in relation to the provision of legal advice. If the state 
1170 Article 14(1), ICCPR. 
"" Article 14(2), ICCPR. 
1172 
. 
1. K. Af v /IAf Treasury (No l) (n 26), paras 1-3. 
1173 Article 14(3)(a). ICCPR. 
114 UNSC Resolution 1735 (n 962). 11. 
' "' ibid. 5. 
' l1NSC Resolution 1822 (n 962), 12. 
1177 Articles 14(3)(h) and 14(3)(d). ICCPR. 
1178 l1NSC Resolution 1730 (n 1010). 
'' ° UNSC Res 1452 (20 December 2002) UN Doc S/RES/1452. I(a) ('UNSC Resolution 1452'). 
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determines that such legal advice is necessary it notifies the 1267 Committee of the intention to 
authorise the release of funds associated with `the provision of legal services'. The state then applies to 
the 1267 Committee and unless a negative response is received within 48 hours may release the 
requisite funds. ' 180 This means that those who can afford legal counsel may have access to it, however, 
it remains at the discretion of the state as to whether an application will be made for the release of 
funds, which limits the entitlement. 
UN targeted economic sanctions also breach the provision in article 14 of the ICCPR that a 
person be allowed `to examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him and to obtain the 
attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against 
him. ' States are not required to reveal the reasons why a person is to be targeted under a UN sanctions 
regime. This prevents a person who is targeted from gaining any information about why they have been 
targeted and seeking to have the freezing order overturned in situations where it occurs on the back of 
misinformation. ' 181 
Finally, article 14 contains a right to be `tried without undue delay'. 1182 In the case of 
economic sanctions those targeted do not have the right to be tried at all. The freezing of assets is not a 
decision taken by a court but one taken by the committee to which the UNSC has delegated the 
responsibility or by the state itself and which is implemented by the state. 
It should also be reiterated that when a person does apply to the Focal Point to be de-listed 
neither the states nor the UNSC have to justify the fact that the person is to remain listed. ' 183 It is only 
if they recommend a person to be de-listed that either entity has to reply to the Focal Point, a system 
which is strongly biased towards preserving the status quo and leaving a person on the Consolidated 
List based on heresay or intelligence that the listed person has no opportunity to challenge. In October 
2009 the UK Government, which sits on the 1267 Committee and is a member of the UN SC, admitted 
that there is still scope for the improvement of the transparency of decisions made by the 1267 
Committee and with respect to the de-listing process. ' 184 
1180 ibid, I (a). 
Article 14(3)(e), ICCPR. 
1182 Article 14(3)(c), ICCPR. 
18' UNSC Resolution 1730 (n 1010), 6. 
1184 The Government Reply to the Nineteenth Report from the House of Lords European Union Committee Session 
2008-09 HL Paper 132, 'Money laundering and the financing of terrorism' presented to Parliament by the 
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Clearly, therefore, due process rights are not currently adhered to with respect to the 
invocation of economic sanctions by the UNSC. There are of course difficulties inherent in any real 
attempt to apply due process rights to sanctions regimes. 
Firstly, the right itself must be subject to some limitations. It would stifle the utility of 
economic sanctions if targets were entitled to a right of hearing prior to asset freeze provisions taking 
effect as it would give them the opportunity to move such assets. Furthermore, when national or 
international issues are at stake there is likely to be a reluctance to fully outline the reasons why an 
individual has been targeted. These issues have been addressed before the US courts, where it has been 
held that individuals and entities whose assets are frozen under domestic anti-terrorism measures are 
entitled to the protection of domestic due process rights. 1185 However, the courts have also accepted 
that due process rights are not unlimited with respect to the implementation of such measures. ' 186 For 
example, it has been held that, whereas ordinarily a person must be notified before being subjected to 
criminal sanctions, in the case of freezing provisions notification could take place following 
designation. 1187 Equally, the court was prepared to allow that some of the reasons as to why a particular 
entity was subject to such measures remain classified, and thus not available to that entity, although it 
expected that such information be presented in camera and on an ex parte basis to the court and that 
the entity designated be given access to any non-classified information immediately. 1188 
These modifications to the right to due process could equally be adopted with respect to UN 
economic sanctions. This acceptance of limited due process rights should not be seen as a belief that 
such rights do not apply but as a requirement that the UNSC adhere to due process norms as far as 
possible with respect to targeted economic sanctions whilst acknowledging that absolute adherence 
may not be possible. For example, the right to legal counsel should not be restricted in any manner and 
states should be obliged to forward all requests for the release of funds to pay legal expenses to the 
relevant committee. 
Secondly, when discussing the protection of due process rights, in the context of economic 
sanctions, it is unclear what entity or institution, within the current framework would be responsible for 
1185 National Council of'Resistance of Iran and National Council of Resistance of'/ran. U. S. Representative Office. 
Petitioners v Department of State and Madeleine KAlbright, Secretary of State, Respondents 251 F. 3d 192. 1196 People's 
. 
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11"7 National Council of Resistance of /ran v Department q/ State (n 1112). para 67. 
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ensuring their protection. The creation of a new institution, which would take that responsibility, is 
discussed in the next chapter. 
5.2.3.2.3 Moves Towards Conformity with Human Rights 
It was observed earlier in this chapter that although the UNSC is not formally bound by human rights it 
has begun to adopt measures that preclude it from relying on this fact to avoid adherence to human 
rights in taking its decisions. This development was, as observed by Segall, visible with respect to 
sanctions against states. ' 189 She notes that during economic sanctions against Iraq supplies intended 
strictly for medical purposes were excluded from economic sanctions and that during economic 
sanctions against FRY a good working relationship developed between the ICRC and the sanctions 
committee such that the ICRC `was granted a blanket exemption for all items used in its humanitarian 
programme. ' 190 The field of targeted economic sanctions is also an area in which the UNSC has, of its 
own violation, moved towards conformity with human rights norms. ' 191 
At the most basic level, targeted economic sanctions themselves resulted, at least in part, from 
a move towards conformity with human rights in that they were an attempt to minimise the 
humanitarian suffering experienced by the general population of states subjected to economic 
sanctions. 
Right from the first instance of targeted economic sanctions they demonstrated a move 
towards conformity with human rights. The initial phases of UNSC targeted economic sanctions' 192 did 
not contain humanitarian exemptions equivalent to those that had been prevalent during sanctions 
against states. 193 This was rectified in UNSC Resolution 1452, which provides that the 1267 Regime 
does not apply to assets or resources that the relevant states have determined are necessary for basic 
expenses which includes 'foodstuff, rent or mortgage, medicines and medical treatment, taxes, 
insurance premiums, and public utility charges' as well as legal expenses and fees or charges for the 
holding and maintenance of frozen funds. 1194 Necessary extraordinary expenses (examples of which are 
1189 Anna Segall (n 664). 
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not given in the resolution but might include the funeral expenses of a family member) may also be 
paid out of frozen accounts. ' 95 
The UNSC has also adopted other measures in the field of targeted economic sanctions that 
offer protection to human rights. The creation of the Focal Point' 196 has allowed for an, admittedly 
limited, right of appeal for those listed. The requirement that states support an application to add a 
person to the Consolidated List with specific information as to why that person should be 
sanctioned"" can be seen as a move towards the protection of those designated. Going forward the 
newly appointed Ombudsperson will also investigate de-listing requests. ""' 
Furthermore, the UN organs have become more vocal in requesting that states adhere to 
human rights both in respect of the adoption of economic sanctions and in the terrorist arena. Firstly, 
with respect to economic sanctions, the UNGA has commented on the fact that such measures should 
be taken in accordance with human rights stating that it also `[calls] upon the Security Council... to 
ensure that fair and clear procedures exist for placing individuals and entities on sanctions lists and 
removing them, as well as for granting humanitarian exemptions. ' 1199 
In the realm of counter-terrorist activity, the UNSC has adopted a non-binding resolution 
requesting that states ensure that any measures they take to combat terrorism are taken in accordance 
with their obligations under international law, particularly human rights law, refugee law and 
humanitarian law. 1200 This has been interpreted as meaning that the CTC is obliged to consider whether 
states' counter-terror measures are compatible with human rights. 1201 lt also goes to demonstrate that 
the UNSC is cognisant of protecting human rights even in difficult circumstances, such as where 
terrorist acts may have been committed. 
These developments show that the UNSC is moving towards the protection of human rights in 
the targeted economic sanctions field and must continue to do so. Economic sanctions are used as a 
weapon by the UNSC and, as such, some collateral damage, in the form of interference with the human 
rights of those subjected to them, may be inevitable. ' 202 However, this should not prevent the UNSC 
19s ibid. l(b). 
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from attempting to limit that interference as far as is possible. It has acted in accordance, as much as 
possible, with human rights and international law norms in the past and should do so in the future. 
204 
6 
Jurisprudential Challenges to UN Targeted Economic 
Sanctions 
Given the severe consequences of UNSC targeted economic sanctions for those subjected to them, as 
discussed in the previous chapter, 1203 it is unsurprising that court challenges have arisen in relation to 
them. This chapter discusses two such cases. '204 It will commence by considering why this focus has 
been chosen. It then offers a critical analysis of the decisions looking at what issues the courts should 
have considered in reaching their decisions, the consequences of those decisions and why those 
decisions were made. Finally, it offers a proposal for the development of a system to deal more 
satisfactorily with the issues raised by these jurisprudential challenges to UN targeted economic 
sanctions. 
6.1 Why This Focus? 
In the previous chapter it was submitted that any movement towards UN economic sanctions being 
brought into compliance with norms of international law had to occur at the level of the UN. 1205 This is 
because, one of the difficulties that arises with UN economic sanctions is that once they are adopted by 
a binding UNSC resolution states are obliged to implement them. '206 This means that, whilst 
governments and regional institutions'207 are willing to question the legality of economic sanctions 
during debates at the UNSC before any resolution is passed, once resolutions have been adopted states 
are constrained by their international obligations and by political considerations in any action that they 
can take. 
The UKSC case of A, K, Al v HM Treasury (No 1) clearly demonstrates circumstances in 
which a state found itself obliged to implement economic sanctions against an individual who that state 
did not believe should be subjected to them. One of the appellants to this case 
- 
Hani El Sayed Sabaei 
Youssef (`HAY') 
- 
had been added to the Consolidated List in 2005 and subjected to economic 
1203 See section 5.2.3.2. 
'204 Kadi (Decision of the ECJ) (n 26); A, K, A! v Hitt Treasury (No 1) (n 26). 
1205 See section 5.2.3. 
'206 See section 1.5.1. It should be noted that since the latter stages of sanctions against Southern Rhodesia all l1NSC economic sanctions resolutions have been binding (section 1.2.1). 
'207 See the statements of the Russian Federation and of the African Union during UNSC discussions on a 
proposed economic sanctions resolution against Zimbabwe: UN Doc S/PV/5933. 
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sanctions in the UK, where he was resident, as a result. The reasons for his inclusion on the list were 
not made available to him, at the behest of the designating state, but as the UK is P-5 member and, 
therefore, a member of the 1267 Committee, it had full access to the information that was relied upon 
in adding HAY to the Consolidated List. 1208 The UK Foreign Secretary had requested that HAY be 
removed from the Consolidated List on 26 June 2009 on the basis that he no longer thought that HAY's 
inclusion was appropriate. '209 However, despite the Foreign Secretary's belief that HAY should not be 
subjected to targeted economic sanctions under the 1267 Regime, HAY remained subjected to 
sanctions for an additional six months until the UKSC decision was handed down. This illustrates 
Wood's comment that UNSC resolutions are political in nature. ' 210 
The behaviour of the UK in this instance reflects its belief that UNSC resolutions, once taken, 
are binding on it irrespective of its own opinion. Therefore, despite the argument that the ultimate test 
of the legitimacy of the UNSC's action remains the level of acceptance of its practice by the UN 
Member States', '. " governmental reaction with respect to targeted economic sanctions may not be 
revelatory of true challenges to UN sanctions. It is therefore necessary to look at the action of another 
organ of the state or institution 
- 
the court 
- 
in order to gain insight into the level of acceptance of UN 
economic sanctions. 
The judicial function of a state or institution has a freedom that a state's executive may not 
have as it is not bound by the political framework, which restricts governments from questioning their 
international obligations. Furthermore, by and large and certainly in the cases being discussed here, the 
decision of a court is made in public. This contrasts with the criticisms being levelled at the UN 
economic sanctions regime that applications for delisting are considered in private without any 
requirement that the reasoning behind a decision be disclosed. '212 It is for these reasons that it is 
necessary to consider judicial decisions with respect to challenges to targeted economic sanctions. 
6.1.1 The Focus on These Cases 
The two aforementioned cases of Kadi and A, K, Al v HM Treasury (No !) have been chosen for two 
reasons. Firstly, the background to the cases is similar. In both, the court was dealing with an appeal of 
1208 A. K. Al v HAf Treasury (No 1) (n 26). para 35. 
ibid. para 36,82. 
'210 Wood (n 886). 73. 
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a number of joined cases that had been taken by individuals or entities subject to economic sanctions. 
Those individuals or entities had been subjected to domestic or (in Kadi) regional legislation put in 
place for the purpose of implementing UNSC sanctions resolutions taken either under the 1267 or the 
1373 regime. They challenged their subjection to such legislation on a number of grounds including, 
most importantly for the purpose of this thesis, that it breached their fundamental rights. 1213 This allows 
for a comparative study as to how the two courts dealt with the issues that arose. 
Secondly, there is an interesting contrast between the courts in which the two cases were 
taken. One of the cases, A, K, Al v HM Treasury (No I), was taken in the UK courts. The UK, as a 
Member State of the UN, is obliged to apply UNSC resolutions. As P-5 member, it has a primary role 
in the drafting of UNSC resolutions and has the ability to shape sanctions resolutions. 1214 Furthermore, 
as noted above, it has access to full information as to a request was made for a given person or entity be 
subject to economic sanctions. '2t5 This is in sharp contrast with the European Court to which the Kadi 
case was taken. The European Court deals with matters of EU law. The EU, in contrast to the UK, is 
not a member of the UN and is therefore not bound by UNSC resolutions. Nor, other than through its 
Member States, does the EU have any influence over the drafting of the resolutions or access to the 
material justifying a person's inclusion in a sanctions regime. The EU, unlike its Member States, has 
made a decision to adopt legislation to implement UNSC resolutions though it is not obliged to do so. 
Furthermore, the European Court followed the decision in Kadi in a subsequent decision so that it is 
becoming established as an accepted practice under EU law. 1216 As such, this chapter allows for an 
insight into how two different court systems, subject to different obligations, have dealt with UN 
economic sanctions. 
6.2 What Issues Should the Courts Have Considered? 
On the basis of the issues that have been discussed throughout this thesis so far, it is submitted 
that there are two key matters that the courts should have considered with respect to these challenges to 
UNSC targeted economic sanctions. Firstly, given the binding nature of UN economic sanctions, the 
courts were obliged to consider whether they had the competence to decide these cases at all. Secondly, 
in the event that they accepted that they had such competence, the courts were obliged to consider 
Kadi (Decision of the ECJ) (n 26). para 116-117; A, K, Al v HAI Treasury (No I) (n 26), para 40. 1214 Wood (n 886). 80-81. 
12". 4, K. Al v HAI Treasury (No 1) (n 26), para 35 
'2 " Case "T-318/01. Othman v Council, 2009 O. J. (C 180) 37. 
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whether the fundamental rights of the appellants had been breached by economic sanctions. 
This 
section examines how the courts dealt with those issues. 
6.2.1 Competency 
The issue of competency that arises with respect to these decisions is whether a court may review a 
binding UNSC resolution. This issue arises quite aside from the discussion in chapter 5 as to whether 
the UNSC is constrained by human rights in adopting resolutions. 1217 Even if it is accepted that the 
UNSC must comply with human rights norms in adopting its resolutions this does not mean that any 
court, international or domestic, has the power to review this adoption. 
1218 
There is no basis in the UN Charter for the review of UNSC action by any court, save that an 
organ of the UN may request the ICJ to give an advisory opinion on the legality of certain action under 
Article 96(l) of the UN Charter. Generally, when considering judicial review of UNSC action to date, 
the focus has been on the role of the ICJ in reviewing such action rather than on the role of domestic 
courts. '219 The reason for this focus is because the ICJ, unlike the domestic courts, has a horizontal 
relationship with the UNSC. In 1971, in his separate opinion in the Namibia Advisory Opinion, Judge 
de Castro stated that the ICJ `as a legal organ, cannot cooperate with a resolution which is clearly void, 
contrary to the rules of the Charter or contrary to the principles of law' 1220 As a separate opinion, 
however, this was not binding and later cases have yet to adopt this position. 
The possibility of the ICJ reviewing UNSC action has been raised in two cases before the ICJ. 
However, unfortunately for the purpose of achieving clarity on this issue, whether or not the ICJ is in 
fact entitled to review UNSC action has not been conclusively resolved. '22' In the Loekerhie Case, the 
ICJ declined Libya's application for provisional measures, on the basis that there was a binding UNSC 
resolution in place, which was inconsistent with the application. 1222 And, in the Bosnia Case, the ICJ 
was satisfied that it could not concede to Bosnia's request to declare that a binding UNSC arms 
embargo could not be applied against the Bosnian government on the basis that it violated the right of 
1217 See section 5.2.3. 
1218 Reich (n 1165), 505. 
1219 The Nicaragua Case (n 842). 435: Eckart Klein, 'The Cuban Embargo and Human Rights: Intercultural 
Human Rights Law Review Annual Symposium: October 24.2008: International Sanctions From aI luman Rights 
Law Perspective: Some Observations on the Kadi Judgment of the European Court of Justice' (2009) 4 
Intercultural Human Rights Law Rev 111: Dapo Akande, 'The International Court of Justice and the Security 
Council: Is There Room For Judicial Control of Decisions of the Political Organs of the United Nations? ' (1997) 
46 ICLQ 309. 
170 The Namibia Case (n 36). 180. 
1221 The Lockerbie Case (n 118): The Bosnia Case (n 1145) 
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self-defence, for it held that to do so would go beyond the scope of article 41 of the ICJ statute. 
122' 
Neither case went to a full hearing on the merits. The position, therefore, remains uncertain as to 
whether even the ICJ, an institution that sits alongside the UNSC in the UN structure, can judicially 
review the latter's decisions. '224 
In the cases discussed in this chapter the courts are not parallel to the UNSC but, under article 
103 of the UN Charter, subsidiary to it. 1225 It would, therefore, be expected that the UK and EU courts 
would question their competency to hear the instant cases given that the measures being contested are 
measures which directly implement binding UNSC resolutions. For that reason, in Behrami, the ECtHR 
held that it did not have jurisdiction to hear claims over actions that were ultimately attributable to the 
UN, '226 which the court described as being `an organisation of universal jurisdiction fulfilling its 
imperative collective security objective'. ' 227 De Burca criticises this conclusion as being unconvincing 
and reflective of the ECtHR's `desire to avoid an open conflict with the' UNSC. '228 It is submitted 
here, however, that the ECtHR, following article 103 of the Charter and the obligations that UN 
Member States assume as members, was correct in its analysis that due to the hierarchy of international 
law it could not review decisions of the UNSC. In any event, neither the ECJ nor the UK Supreme 
Court followed the reasoning in Behrami in considering its competency. 
The two courts approached this question in very different manners. The ECJ, as should be 
expected of any court in this situation, directly addressed the question of competency, whereas the UK 
Supreme Court side-stepped the issue and focused on the domestic nature of the measures being 
challenged. 
At the level of the CFI, the Court held, in accordance with customary international law and 
article 103 of the UN Charter, that obligations of EU Member States under the UN Charter prevailed 
over every other obligation of domestic or international law including those under EU law. '229 This 
decision is in accordance with the understanding of the relationship between domestic or institutional 
1221 The Bosnia Case (n 1145) at 345. 
1224 Vera (; owlland-Debbas, The Relationship Between the International Court of Justice and the Security Council 
in Light of the Lockerbie Case' (1994) 88 AJIL 643; Jose E Alvarez, 'Judging the Security Council' (1996) 90 
AJIL I; Mande (n 1219), 309: Michael J Matheson, 'ICJ Review of Security Council Decisions' (2004) 36 
George Washington International Law Review 615. 
2225 See discussion of the ambit of article 103 in section 1.5. 1226 The actions at issue were those of peacekeeping forces. 
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(May 2,2007) (admissibility decision). 
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law and UN obligations to date. The CFI then, however, moved on to say that, 
despite this supremacy, 
it was entitled to consider whether the measures required under the UNSC resolution were 
in 
accordance with Jus cogens, which it stated bound all subjects of international law including the 
UNSC. '23° 
This aspect of the decision confuses two issues. Firstly, as discussed in the previous 
chapter, 123' whether the UNSC is constrained in any manner in taking action and, secondly, whether 
the CFl had competence to impose limits on the UNSC. Even if the CFI accepts that the UNSC must 
act in accordance with jus cogens and that there is no other institution willing or able to ensure that it 
does so, there is no reason that it should assume competency for the adjudication of this matter. 
On appeal, the ECJ, in giving its decision, diverged significantly from the decision of the CFI. 
lt considered that the fact that there was an obligation on Member States to implement UNSC 
resolutions did not mean that there was a basis in the EC Treaty for immunity from jurisdiction for a 
measure like the EU regulation implementing Resolution 12671232 ('the Contested Regulation') because 
derogations cannot be allowed with respect to the principles that form the foundations of the EC legal 
order and of the EU which includes the protection of fundamental rights. 1233 It further precluded 
immunity from jurisdiction on the basis of the hypothetical place that obligations under the UN Charter 
would occupy in the hierarchy of EC norms stating that the Charter would only have primacy over acts 
of secondary EC law and not over the general principles, which constituted primary law. ' 234 
In a somewhat contradictory move, the ECJ denied that a review of the Contested Regulation, 
being an EC regulation implementing an UN resolution, would amount to a review of the resolution 
itself, or of the Charter, and, in fact, suggested that its annulment of the Contested Regulation would 
not necessarily call into question the primacy of the resolution in international law. '235 The Court 
seemed to be guided in its analysis by the fact that the UNSC does not prescribe how its sanctions 
resolutions should be implemented at the domestic level. However, allowing Member States the choice 
of how economic sanctions are to be implemented does not equate to giving a domestic or institutional 
court the right to review the measures themselves, which it would be doing in circumstances where the 
implementing domestic or regional measure faithfully replicated the relevant UNSC resolution. 
'210 ibid. Para 226-227. 
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Furthermore, whilst the EU is not a member of the UN, its Member States are and, as such, have 
agreed that, in cases of conflict, obligations under the UN Charter take supremacy. 
There is a further difficulty inherent in the practical application of the ECJ's decision in that, 
regardless of its concept of the hierarchy of international law, the EU has, in implementing UNSC 
sanctions, created an unnecessary and largely ineffective'236 middle layer between its Member States 
and their obligations to implement UNSC resolutions. As such, by overturning EC regulations 
implementing UNSC resolutions, it does not remove the obligation on Member States to implement 
UNSC resolutions. 
Whereas the European Court, despite criticism of its reasoning, dealt squarely with the issue 
of competence, the UK Supreme Court largely side-stepped that issue in the case of A, K, Mv HAI 
Treasury (No 1). The joined-cases were taken as a challenge to the domestic implementing measures 
rather than the UN resolutions, which reflects the fact that the appellants accepted the legality of UNSC 
resolutions and that they would not be open to challenge at the domestic level. 1237 However, it is 
submitted that the UKSC was obliged to consider the extent to which it could challenge the domestic 
measures if ultimately those domestic measures were adopted for the purpose of faithfully 
implementing UNSC resolutions, which it was accepted were not open to challenge. 
In his opinion, dissenting on this point, Lord Brown stated that if a domestic implementing 
measure exactly fulfils the UK's obligations under the UNSC resolution it purports to implement then, 
as a UN Member State, the UK is obliged to implement it. '238 In other words the UK itself cannot 
review the resolution either at governmental or at judicial level. Despite the willingness of the courts in 
both cases to accept jurisdiction, the statement of Lord Brown more accurately reflects the hierarchical 
nature of international and domestic law with respect to UNSC sanctions resolutions. By accepting 
jurisdiction and challenging domestic measures that have been put in place to faithfully implement 
UNSC sanctions resolutions the courts are also inadvertently challenging the resolutions themselves, 
which they do not have the competence to do. For this reason it is submitted that the courts in these 
cases wrongly asserted jurisdiction. 
A proviso must be added to the discussion of competence. The designation of persons and 
entities under the Counter-Terrorism Regime, unlike under the 1267 Regime, takes place not at UN 
'2"' The purpose of the EC regulations in this field may be seen as ensuring consistency between the sanctions 
actions of EC Member States. which, whilst serving a practical purpose, does not serve to impact on the 
effectiveness of UNSC sanctions resolution. 
''" 
. 
'j. K.. 11 v IIAf reasurv (No 1) (n 26). para 217. 
'2" ibid. para 203. 
211 
level but at state level. As such, persons subjected to sanctions under that regime could seek to have 
their designation judicially reviewed by the domestic courts but only on the ground that their 
designation did not meet the criteria in the relevant UNSC resolutions and that, therefore, they were 
incorrectly designated by the state. They may not seek judicial review of the UNSC resolutions 
themselves. 
6.2.2 Fundamental Rights 
As outlined in the previous chapter UN economic sanctions, and their implementing measures, have the 
potential to significantly impact on the due process rights of those targeted. '219 Given that the courts 
were prepared to accept jurisdiction in these cases, they then had to consider the arguments made by 
the appellants in relation to the impact that being subjected to economic sanctions has on their rights. 
This thesis accepts that not all individual rights can be protected within the sanctions framework and, 
as such, has attempted to strike a balance between the rights of individuals and the necessity of UN 
action by focusing on due process rights. The courts' conception of fundamental rights however went 
beyond the realm of due process rights and varied significantly between two different courts and for 
that reason each court will be considered separately. 
6.2.2.1 The UKSC 
Although decided most recently, the UKSC decision is the most deficient with respect to its 
consideration of fundamental rights. The UK House of Lords had previously considered the conflict 
between human rights and the state's obligations under the UN Charter in Al-Jedda, a decision handed 
down in 2007.1240 In Al-Jedda the appellant, a national of both Iraq and the UK, had been detained by 
British troops at a detention facility in Iraq. '24' The detention was authorised by binding UNSC 
resolution. 1242 Amongst the arguments put forth on the appellant's behalf was that such detention 
contravened article 5(I) of the European Convention1243 on Human Rights. '244 The House of Lords 
unanimously rejected this argument holding (per Lord Bingham) that, whilst the European Convention 
has special significance as a human rights instrument, `the reference in article 103 [with respect to the 
12'9 See discussion of the impact of economic sanctions on the rights of those sanctioned at 5.2.3.2. 
1240 AI-Jedda (n 133), 58. 
1241 ibid. para I. 
1242 UNSC Resolution 1546 (n 144). 
1241 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950) 213 tINfS 222. 
1244 ibid. 
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supremacy of UN obligations] to any other international agreement" leaves no room for any excepted 
category'. 1245 As such, the House of Lords held that the UK was obliged to fulfil its obligations as a 
member of the UN and implement UNSC Resolution 1546 (and subsequent resolutions) and detain the 
appellant irrespective of its obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights. However, 
consideration of human rights in that decision was limited to the European Convention on Human 
Rights, which restricts the ambit of the decision. This allowed the UKSC in A, K, Af v HAI Treasury 
(No 1) to indicate that it was satisfied that the European Convention on Human Rights did not apply to 
UNSC resolutions but that other undefined rights could be applicable beyond the Convention, 1211 
which is consistent with the opinion of some commentators that the ambit of article 103 is limited to 
international agreements as discussed in section 1.5.1. However, as indicated in section 1.5.1, this 
concept is inconsistent with state practice to date. In any case, the UKSC did not explicitly rely on this 
distinction and in fact failed to define precisely the rights that it sought to apply. Furthermore, the 
UNKSC did not deal effectively deal with such rights by category, which left the consideration of 
potential breaches of fundamental rights quite disjointed throughout the judgment. 
Initially, judicial consideration of fundamental rights was framed in terms of whether the 
executive had the power to invoke measures implementing UNSC resolutions, which impacted 
significantly on fundamental rights, without such measures being subjected to full parliamentary 
scrutiny. Such an implementation process had been provided for in the United Nations Act 1946 ('1946 
Act') 12aß 
Lord Hope concentrated on the breach of property rights indicating that there was a point at 
which interference with such rights became so `great, so overwhelming and so timeless' that in the 
absence of any effective means of it being challenged it could only be brought about under the express 
authority of Parliament. ' 248 Lord Brown distinguished between implementing legislation that faithfully 
replicated the requirements of the relevant UNSC resolution and that which goes beyond the given 
resolution. He stated that the executive could adopt the former whereas the latter would require primary 
legislation. ' 249 
However, these decisions only suggest that parliament rather than the executive should have 
considered the implementing legislation. Therefore, the question as to whether the UK was obliged to 
1245 ibid. para 35. 
1246"j, K. A/ v HA/ Treasury (No 1) (n 26), 74. 
''47 ibid. 4. 
1249 ibid, 76. 
1249 ibid. 196. 
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implement UNSC resolutions, which would result in gross breaches of human rights, remained. This 
issue was also considered but not resolved. Lord Brown expressed his belief that the UK was obliged to 
faithfully implement UNSC resolutions irrespective of whether the regime is 'contrary to the 
fundamental principles of human rights'. '250 He suggested that his approach would not allow for gross 
human rights abuses 
- 
such as internment - unless it was specifically mandated by a UNSC resolution 
but declined to consider the matter further as it was not an approach shared by the majority. 125 ' Lord 
Mance stated that a Chapter VII regime that required an extreme restriction of individual liberty, such 
as the internment of individuals, without the right of judicial review, would require enactment by 
primary legislation. '252 Lord Phillips, took a more restrictive stance stating that he felt that at a 
minimum in order for the UK to be obliged to implement UNSC resolutions such resolutions must be 
intra vires the powers of the UNSC. 1253 He indicated that the general, though not universally accepted, 
view was that, at a minimum, measures that violate jays cogens are not intra vires the UNSC. 
Lord Mance and Lord Rodgers also each considered the necessity of judicial review of 
economic sanctions. Lord Mance accepted that the UN procedures for de-listing do not equate to a 
judicial review procedure. '254 He questioned whether, in light of the UN's commitment to promote 
human rights and the requirement in UNSC Resolution 1456 that measures to combat terrorism be 
taken in accordance with international law, 1255 it could be considered that the UNSC would have 
intended Member States to enact domestic legislation that would violate fundamental principles of 
human rights. 1256 Lord Mance noted that the basic common law right at issue was the right to access to 
a domestic court or tribunal to challenge the basis for inclusion on the Consolidated List., 257 However, 
he accepted that there was a distinction between measures directed at state or non-state actors such as 
Al-Qaida or their leaders, which are identified as threats to the peace, whom he felt would not be 
entitled to challenge their designation, and measures directed in general terms at anyone associated 
with non-state actors. 1258 
Lord Rodgers focused on the lack of judicial review procedures, noting that the 1267 
Committee is not obliged to publish more than a narrative summary of reasons for listing, there is no 
1250 ibid, 203. 
1251 ibid, 205-206. 
252 ibid. 249. 
253 ibid, 151. 
12c4 ibid, 239. 
''" UNSC Res 1456 (20 January 2003) UN Doc S/RES/1456.6. 
1256 
. 
1. K, 
. 
bf v HA1 Treasury (No 1) (n 26), 245. 
1257 ibid. 246. 
1258 ibid, 248. 
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appeal body outside of it, individuals cannot apply directly to it and all of its members must agree to 
de-listing. He submitted that the 1946 Act could not authorise the making of legislation, which so 
gravely and directly affected the legal right of individuals to use of their property, without the 
possibility of challenge. 
This decision of the UKSC is wholly insufficient. Firstly, in the eyes of the Court, it would 
appear that if parliament, rather than the executive, adopted the implementing legislation then its 
impact on the fundamental rights of those sanctioned could not be considered. It fails to address why 
such a distinction can be made when UNSC sanctions resolutions are binding on all Member States. 
Their method of implementation at a domestic level, whether by Executive Order or by an act of 
parliament, does not impact on the binding nature of UNSC resolutions. 
Secondly, in circumstances where UNSC resolutions are to be legitimately implemented by 
Executive Order, and therefore in the UKSC's view must offer some level of protection to the 
fundamental rights of those subjected to them, the decision does not identify the source of the rights 
that it proposes should be offered protection. Are these rights rooted in domestic law or customary 
international law or some unidentified legal instrument? The result is that it is difficult to ascertain on a 
more general basis, to what extent the UKSC perceives that the UNSC is bound by international or 
human rights laws in adopting resolutions. It therefore provides no guidelines for future action either 
by the UNSC or by the UK. Of further concern is the belief expressed by some members of the UKSC 
that the UK is obliged to faithfully implement UNSC resolutions, even if they totally violate 
fundamental human rights. It would have been helpful, in light of the repercussions of these sweeping 
statements, if the judges making these contentions had analysed their reasoning in more detail. 
However, the indication by Lords Mance and Rodgers that judicial review of UN economic 
sanctions is necessary demonstrates an attempt at balancin- the competing obligations of the UK, as a 
UN Member, and the fundamental rights of citizens. Judicial review will be discussed in more detail 
later in the chapter. 
6.2.2.2 The CFI 
As noted in the previous section, the CFI held that it only had competence to review UNSC resolutions 
with respect to their adherence to jus cogens norms. It, therefore, limited its consideration of the rights 
that could be affected by economic sanctions tojus cogens norms. The CFI was, however, prepared to 
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define these norms in a very expansive manner so as to include property rights as well as due process 
rights. '2 9 It noted that there was the possibility of gaining humanitarian exemptions from the 
provisions of the Contested Regulation, which it suggested demonstrated that the intention of economic 
sanctions was not to submit persons to inhuman or degrading treatment. 
1260 With respect to property 
rights, it held that they had not been breached because of the temporary nature of economic sanctions, 
which do not affect the substance of the right to respect for property of the persons concerned, the 
UNSC review procedures that are in place with respect to the entire system of sanctions and the 
possibility of submitting an individual case for review to the sanctions committee. 
126 1
Although the CFI accepted that there was no right for an individual to be directly heard with 
respect to de-listing, it was satisfied that the system then in place, which required an application 
through a state to the 1267 Committee offered sufficient protection of an individual's right to be 
heard. "" It was not swayed from that position by the fact that the applicant would not be allowed to 
hear the evidence adduced against him that had resulted in his designation. The CFI indicated that once 
the UNSC or the 1267 Committee decided that such information should be withheld for the protection 
of international security, and in light of the temporary nature of economic sanctions, the refusal to 
provide such information did not impact on a person's right to be heard. It further held that the right to 
judicial review was not an absolute right and was not breached in this instance in light of the `essential 
public interest in the maintenance of international peace and security in the face of a threat clearly 
identified by the Security Council in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. ' 1263 
The proposition being made in this chapter is that the UNSC is obliged to protect human 
rights, as far as is possible, whilst maintaining the efficacy of the economic sanctions in question. The 
CFI's conception of jus cogens norms as including property rights, due process rights and the right of 
judicial review was clearly an expansive definition when compared with the traditional position, ' 264 but 
this did not materially impact on its analysis because of its concentration on the balance to be struck 
between competing rights. 
However, the CFI clearly favoured the implementation of sanctions over the rights of those 
subjected to sanctions. For example, in considering that a review through a state to the 1267 Committee 
12"' Kadi (Decision of the CFI) (n 1229), 2005 E. C. R. 11-3649. 
12`0 ibid. para 240. 
"`'' ibid. para 243-252. 
1262 ibid. para 253-276. 
"-"' ibid, para 289. 
1264 As discussed in 5.2.3.1.2. 
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offered sufficient protection of both due process and the right to judicial review, the CFI endorsed a 
situation in which, in certain circumstances, no protection for those rights may be available. This would 
occur if a sanctioned individual could not get a state to make an application on his behalf. The CFI also 
accepted that a right of direct hearing was impossible, as it was not provided for by the UNSC, without 
questioning whether the absence of the provision of such a right impacted on the legality of economic 
sanctions. 
Thus, despite the rhetoric of the CFI, it is difficult to reconcile this decision with the belief 
that the UNSC is in any way bound by human rights if at every opportunity for the protection of such 
rights the UNSC is exempt on the grounds of maintaining international peace and security. Following 
this decision the question remains to what extent the UNSC could, in the view of the CFI, seek to 
protect human rights whilst maintaining international peace and security. 
6.2.2.3 The ECJ 
The ECJ, in finding that it could review the Contested Regulation in light of EU law, left itself more 
scope to consider how targeted economic sanctions were interfering with the rights of individuals. The 
ECJ stated that the right to be heard and the right to effective judicial review had clearly been breached 
by the measures imposed by the Contested Regulation)''5 However, it did not conceive of either of 
these rights as being absolute in the context of economic sanctions. 
The ECJ accepted that there is an obligation to communicate with a person who has been 
sanctioned under the Contested Regulation but stated that prior communication would jeopardise the 
effectiveness of the sanctions and was therefore unnecessary and that certain information, which might 
compromise safety or international relations, could be withheld. 1266 it stated, however, that restrictive 
measures imposed in those circumstances should still be subjected to review and that the EC judicature 
should balance the competing problems. '267 
In the instant case, the appellants had not been told why they had been subjected to economic 
sanctions which meant that they could not form a defence, which breached their right to be heard and 
to an effective remedy. ' 2"a This information was also not produced to the ECJ and, as such, it found 
1265 Kadi (Decision of the ECJ) (n 26). 333-335. 
1266 ibid. 336,338-340,342. 
1267 ibid. 343-344. 
126' ibid. 345-349. 
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that it was unable to decide whether the Contested Regulation could be applied to the appellants and 
could only hold that the fundamental right to an effective legal remedy had not been observed. 
1269 
The ECJ also considered Mr Kadi's claim that the Contested Regulation was a breach of the 
right to respect for property. 1270 The ECJ noted that the right to property could be restricted provided 
that the restrictions are in the public interest and are not disproportionate or intolerable. 
1271 With 
respect to economic sanctions provisions, the freezing measures were considered to be a temporary 
measure put in place for the purpose of the protection of international peace and security, which 
contained humanitarian exemptions and a re-examination procedure, and could not therefore per se be 
considered inappropriate or disproportionate. 1272 As such, the ECJ found that the restrictive measures 
imposed by the contested regulation constitute restrictions of the right to property which might, in 
principle, be justified. '1273 
However, because the restrictive measures set out in the Contested Regulation resulted in Mr 
Kadi's property rights being significantly restricted without it offering him any guarantee that he could 
put his case to the competent authorities the ECJ held that the imposition of those measures an 
unjustified restriction of Mr Kadi's property rights. '274 
It is submitted that the ECJ's decision is the most well-reasoned decision in that it truly 
undergoes a comparative analysis of the competing rights at issue and attempts to reach a balance 
between the two. 1275 Of particular note is the indication that, whilst a target of sanctions is entitled to 
information in relation to his sanctioning, this information could be provided following sanctions being 
put in place in order to ensure that the purpose of the sanctions is not defeated by prior knowledge. 
This provides a suitable balance between protecting the rights of individuals and ensuring that 
economic sanctions are as comprehensive as possible. Furthermore, it is clear that the ECJ, in 
undertaking this analysis, did not forget the significance of the over arching purpose of economic 
sanctions 
- 
the protection of international peace and security 
- 
because it allowed the Contested 
1269 ibid, 350-351. 
1270 ibid, 354. 
1271 ibid, 355. 
1272 ibid, 358,363-365. 
1273 ibid. 366. 
1274 ibid. 369-370. 
1275 Giacinto della Cananea. `Case Law: Global Security and Procedural Due Process of Law Between the United 
Nations and the European Union: Yassin Abdullah Kadi & Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council' 15 
Columbia Journal of European Law 511. 
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Regulation to remain in effect for a period of three months in order that the Council would have the 
opportunity to remedy the infringements found. '276 
6.3 The Aftermath of the Kadi Decision 
By deferring the operation of its decision the ECJ gave the EU institutions the opportunity to address 
the concerns raised by it, whilst Mr Kadi remained subject to economic sanctions. 
In the aftermath of the decision the European Commission ('the Commission') attempted to 
comply with the ECJ's decision. The Permanent Representative of France, on behalf of the EU, 
requested that the 1267 Committee make available on its website the reasons why Mr Kadi had been 
included on the Consolidated List. ''" The 1267 Committee provided a summary of reasons why Mr 
Kadi had been sanctioned, which it indicated could be provided to Mr Kadi and his legal 
representatives and which it published on its website. '278 The summary of reasons it provided were: 
that Mr Kadi was a founding trustee of the Muwafaq Foundation, which was a organisation that 
operated under an umbrella organisation founded by inter alia Usama bin Laden that was the 
predecessor to Al-Qaida and which formed part of Al-Qaida upon dissolution of the umbrella 
organisation; that he hired Mr Shafiq Mohamed Al-Ayadi, who was associated with Al-Qaida and 
Usama bin Laden, to head the European offices of the Muwafaq Foundation in 1992; that the leader of 
Al-Gama'at Al-lslamiya, an Islamic terrorist organisation, had said that the Muwafaq Foundation 
provided logistical and financial support to a mujahidin battalion in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 
mid-1990s some of the financing of which was provided by Usama bin Laden; that he was a 
shareholder in the now closed Depositna Barka in which Mr Al-Ayadi held a position and acted as 
nominee for his shares and where it is possible that planning sessions for an attack against a US facility 
took place; and that he owned several firms in Albania, which funnelled money to extremists, some of 
which were financed in part by Usama bin Laden. 
The summary of reasons is deficient in that it does not equate to evidence against Mr Kadi. In 
fact, one of the reasons was stated to have been based on the comment of a third party and another on 
the contention that planning may (or as a corollary may not) have taken place in an organisation that 
Mr Kadi held shares in. As a result of this deficiency, once Mr Kadi received the summary of reasons 
1216 Kadi (Decision of the ECJ) (n 26), 373-376. 
''" Kadi (Decision of the GC) (n 163) para 49. 
1279 ibid. para 50-51. 
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he wrote to the Commission requesting the disclosure of evidence supporting the reasons given and 
relevant documents in the Commission's file and an opportunity to comment on the evidence once 
received. He also attempted to refute the allegations in the summary, as far as possible given the 
limited information available. 1279 
On 28 November 2008 the Commission adopted a new Regulation, ' 280 which amended the 
Contested Regulation and indicated that the Commission in accordance with the judgment of the ECJ, 
having received and assessed Mr Kadi's comments was satisfied that he should remain subject to 
sanctions. '281 The Commission also wrote to Mr Kadi stating that: it had now complied with the 
judgment of the ECJ; it was not required to furnish him with additional evidence; since the measures 
against him were preventative in nature it only had to prove that it had reasonable grounds to suspect 
that he is a terrorist or that he finances terrorism; and that the Commission could disregard evidence the 
applicant had put forward in an attempt to refute allegations against -him, particularly evidence that 
related to the dropping of criminal proceedings against him as that was a different standard of proof. 1282 
On the basis of this Mr Kadi made an application to the GC'283 seeking that it: require the 
Commission to disclose all of the documentation relating to the adoption of the Contested Regulation; 
annul the Contested Regulation as far as it applies to him; and order the Commission to pay Costs. 1284 
He put forward five pleas: lack of sufficient legal basis; breach of the rights of defence and the right to 
effective judicial protection; the breach of the obligation to state reasons laid down in Article 253; a 
manifest error of assessment of the facts; and breach of the principle of proportional ity. 1285 
The GC decided on three grounds that the Contested Regulation should be annulled in so far 
as it affected Mr Kadi. 1286 Firstly, it considered the appropriate standard of judicial review in the case. 
The GC considered that, as long as the 1267 Committee failed to guarantee judicial protection, the GC 
had to ensure the `full review' of the lawfulness of the Contested Regulation in light of fundamental 
rights. '287 lt noted that, since the ECJ handed down its decision: the UNSC had not established an 
independent, impartial body responsible for hearing requests for removal from the Consolidated List 
based on law and fact; removal from the Consolidated List still required consensus; and states that 
1279 ibid. pars 55. 
1280 Regulation (EC) No 1190/2008. 
1281 Kadi (Decision of the GC) (n 163) para 57. 
1282 ibid. para 60. 
28; Previously known as the CFI. 
1284 Kadi (Decision of the GC) (n 163), para 71. 
1285 ibid. para 79. 
286 ibid. para 195. 
ibid. paras 126-127. 
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requested listing still decided what evidence may be disclosed. 1288 It, further stated, that the Focal Point 
and the Ombudsman do not safeguard the right to judicial review of decisions of the 1267 
Committee. '289 It held that the judicial review of the lawfulness of sanctions extends to the assessment 
of the facts and circumstances relied on as justifying the sanctions. ' 290 It noted that it had not been 
provided with all of the material supporting Mr Kadi's addition to the Consolidated List and that, as a 
result, it could not review the lawfulness of the Contested Regulation and the applicant's right to 
judicial review was infringed. '29' It further commented that the freezing was arguably not a `temporary 
precautionary' measure in circumstances where it had been in place for almost ten years. 12`2 
The GC then considered whether Mr Kadi's right of defence and right to effective judicial 
review had been breached. It said that his right to defend himself had been observed only in the 
strictest sense, noting that he was not given access to the evidence against him. '293 As such, he was not 
in a position to mount an effective challenge to any of the allegations against him and the Contested 
Regulation was adopted in breach of his rights of defence. '294 lt further stated that, given the lack of 
information made available to him and the link between rights of defence and the right to effective 
judicial review, Mr Kadi did not have a right to effective judicial review and that because the relevant 
evidence was not furnished to the GC it was not in a position to review the lawfulness of the Contested 
Regulation. 
Finally the GC considered the principle of proportionality. It considered that Mr Kadi's right 
to property had been unjustifiably restricted because the Contested Regulation was adopted without 
any safeguard, which would enable him to put his case to the competent authorities, in circumstances 
where, as a result of general application and duration, the restriction of his property rights must be 
regarded as significant. 1296 
Having considered the above issues the GC decided to annul the Contested Regulation, 
without considering Mr Kadi's other submissions. '297 
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The result of the GC's decisions is that Mr Kadi is not subject to economic sanctions at EU 
level. However, as was raised by the Commission during its submissions to the GC, Member States are 
still be required to freeze his assets as a result of their obligations as UN members. '298 
6.4 The Consequences of the Decisions for UN Targeted Economic Sanctions 
As jurisprudential challenges to UN targeted economic sanctions, the court cases considered in this 
chapter offer an insight as to how such measures are being viewed by states and how they might 
develop going forward. Lord Bingham stated in 2007 in the Al-Jedda decision that `the consensus of 
learned opinion' was that a state's obligations under article 103 of the UN Charter, which includes the 
implementation of binding UNSC resolutions, supersedes its obligation's under `any other international 
agreement' 1299 and at that point consideration was not given to measures outside of international 
agreements. In contrast, both the UKSC and the European Courts were prepared to allow domestic and 
regional obligations to supersede UN obligations. This shows that there has been a fundamental change 
in how states view the UNSC and its resolutions. 
It is interesting that both the ECJ and the UKSC very much focused on the clash between 
domestic or regional norms rather than on the hierarchy of norms with respect to UNSC measures. 
Given the focus of the courts on the domestic implementation of UN economic sanctions a more 
appropriate resolution may have been to consider domestic remedies for the reported breaches. This 
was the approach taken by the Human Rights Committee in the Sayadi v Belgium decision. "00 The 
Human Rights Committee found that Belgium, in implementing targeted economic sanctions against 
the authors, had breached certain provisions of the ICCPR. However, it noted that Belgium was not 
competent to remove the individuals from the Consolidated List and, therefore, required instead that it 
`do all it can to have their names removed from the list, as soon as possible, to provide the authors with 
some form of compensation and to make public the requests for removal. ' 1301 In fact, the Belgian Court 
of First Instance had handed down a decision previously with respect to the authors requiring that 
Belgium seek their removal from the Consolidated List as there was insufficient evidence to support 
their continued inclusion on it. 1302 Compliance with the decision would, therefore, not require that 
12" ibid. 100. 
1299 Al-Jedda (n 133), para 35. 
"OOSnvadi v Belgium (n 1167). 
1301 ibid. para 12. 
1302 ibid. para 4.3. 
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Belgium breach its obligations as a UN Member State to implement UN economic sanctions. The UK 
Supreme Court and the European Courts did not, however, restrict their decisions similarly, ultimately 
in both cases requiring that domestic implementing measures against the individuals who brought the 
cases be lifted. Domestic implementing measures are required with respect to the implementation of 
UN economic sanctions. However, finding such measures unlawful and lifting them has the unexpected 
consequence of circumventing a state's binding obligation to implement UNSC sanctions. 
The courts argued that their decisions did not interfere with the compulsory nature of UN 
economic sanctions. However, the ultimate impact of the decision of the UKSC does not reflect this 
position. Firstly, the UKSC rejected the request of the Treasury that it place a stay on its decision in 
order that the Treasury might put suitable measures in place. 1303 Secondly, whereas EU Member States 
were still under a UN obligation to apply sanctions following the various Kadi decisions, once the 
UKSC decision was handed down there was no domestic mechanism for the appellants to remain 
subject to economic sanctions. As such, by overturning the domestic implementing measures the 
UKSC created a situation whereby until new implementing legislation could be drafted, economic 
sanctions, despite being required by the UNSC, were not being applied against the appellants. This 
judgment was therefore a fundamental challenge to the binding nature of economic sanctions. 
However, because it was denying that it was interfering with the UNSC measures the UKSC failed to 
consider the potential implication of its decision with respect to the creation of a situation whereby the 
UK was not implementing a binding UNSC resolution. 
In the alternative, an examination of the ECJ's willingness to defer its decision offers a 
situation that is no more satisfactory in some respects. Although the decision was an attempt to adhere 
to the concept of balancing competing obligations, the ECJ acknowledged that the regime breaches the 
fundamental rights of those subject to sanctions and should therefore ultimately be overturned. Whilst 
this could be seen as a victory for the binding nature of UNSC resolutions it has significant 
consequences for those who are to remain subject to economic sanctions in breach of their fundamental 
rights. Therefore, this decision also challenges UN economic sanctions although it does so by 
questioning their interference with the fundamental rights of those sanctioned. In any event, ultimately 
the measures were overturned by the GC with the result that Member States are now prohibited from 
1103 Uer, tlajesty's Treasury (Respondent) v Alohammed Ja bar Alimed and others (FC) (Appellants) Ifer 
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applying economic sanctions to Mr Kadi under the EU framework whilst still being required to 
do so 
under the UN framework. 
De Burca suggests that Kadi decision could be used as a `striking example for other states and 
legal systems that may be inclined to assert their local constitutional norms as a barrier to the 
enforcement of international law'. 
104 lt remains too early to see whether this prophecy will prove true, 
although the handing down of the UKSC decision does lend some weight to it. If, in fact, de Burca 
is 
correct, UN economic sanctions will no longer be universally implemented by states because some will 
be prohibited from doing so by their domestic courts. This attacks the legitimacy of UN economic 
sanctions, which is defined by Boyle and Chinkin as the belief of states that they must implement them 
because they are binding. 1305 UN economic sanctions would therefore become less effective as states 
implement them on an ad hoc basis. This may ultimately raise the `possibility that an autonomous 
judgment of a state about the binding force of a resolution is appropriate to destroy the peace-keeping 
system of the United Nations and to make it, in the end, ineffective and incapable of accomplishing its 
goals. ' 1306 
These challenges need to be addressed by the UNSC and a proposal for so doing will be made 
at the end of this chapter. However, prior to consideration as to how targeted economic sanctions might 
be amended in order that they remain effective in the future, the next section will examine why the 
courts decided as they did. 
6.5 What Has Caused These Decisions? 
This discussion relates not to the legal basis of the decisions taken by the courts but to the problems at 
the institutional level that have caused such decisions to be necessary. The absence of accountability 
with respect to UNSC economic sanctions has been highlighted previously in this thesis with respect to 
both Southern Rhodesia and Iraq. 1307 In 2005 The Vockler Report said that the UN urgently needed 
reform108 to address issues of accountability. However, this did not occur and these decisions arose as 
a reaction at domestic and regional level to deficiencies within UNSC targeted economic sanctions, 
104 De Burca (n 1228). 
'; 05 Boyle and Chinkin (n 124). 24-25. 
1306 Karl Doehring, `Unlawful Resolutions of the Security Council and their Legal Consequences' (1997) I Max 
Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 91,99. 
1307 See sections 2.4.2.1.5 and 3.6. I. 
1308 The Vockler Report (n 617), Volume I. 4. 
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which is due to the vast expansion of UNSC power without a corresponding expansion of 
accountability. Each element will be considered in turn. 
6.5.1 Expansion of UNSC Power 
The catalyst for the problems that are now prevalent with UNSC targeted economic sanctions, and that 
necessitated the judicial decisions discussed in this chapter, was the expansion of UNSC action into the 
legislative arena. 
The UN is changing from a traditional inter-governmental organization to one increasingly 
entrusted with tasks of global governance. 1309 The UNSC has been at the heart of this development 
through its adoption of resolutions. A non-sanctions example of this development can be seen in the 
UN's responsibility for the administration of East Timor when the UN Assistance Mission in East 
Timor became the Transitional Administrator for the territory as it moved towards independence. 1310 In 
acting as the Transitional Administrator, the UN had the right to legislate and represent the territory in 
foreign relations, including entering into agreements with other states. 1311 Wilde accepts that this 
arrangement meant that an institution of the UN was acting as the government of East Timor for this 
period. '3t2 
Traditionally, economic sanctions were a collective action taken by states, albeit mandated by 
the UNSC, against other states that had acted contrary to desired norms. The decisions that were taken 
were, because they were taken by the UN as an institution, political in nature1313 and were widely 
debated by the UNSC both in their meetings and in less public fora. 1314 Even as targeted economic 
sanctions began to emerge in the 1990's the measures in place were still based on sanctions being 
imposed on government officials" or members of opposition or rebel forces. '3t6 
With UNSC Resolutions 1267 and 1373, however, the situation significantly changed to one 
in which it was not necessary to be linked to a territory in order to be targeted by economic sanctions 
but to be associated with a particular terrorist organisation or to engage in terrorist activity in some 
10" Megret and Hotlman (n 1149). 314. 
110 UNSC Res 1272 (25 October 1999) UN Doc S/RES/1272, preamble, 3. 
"" Wilde (n 1145), 185. 
1312 ibid, 187. 
114 David Kennedy (n 29). 910. 
1114 Wood (n 886). 80-82. 
115 For example. economic sanctions against Iraq. UNSC Resolution 778 (n 539). 
'' For example, economic sanctions against UNITA in Angola, UNSC Resolution 864 (n 713). 
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guise. The ambit of these resolutions has been described as legislative in nature. 
1317 UNSC Resolution 
1373 particularly has been singled out as meeting the criteria for legislation because it lays down 
legal 
obligations of a general character, which are unilateral in form, create or modify some element of a 
legal norm and the legal norm is general in question - that is it is directed to indeterminate addressees 
and capable of repeated application in time. 1318 
Whilst it could be argued that targeted economic sanctions are simply a more nuanced form of 
economic sanctions, and therefore come squarely within the already accepted powers of the UNSC, 
such a contention was not reflected in the commentary at the time. Andrea Bianchi states: `[n]o one 
could have reasonably anticipated at the time of drafting of the UN Charter that the subsequent practice 
of the organ would evolve to encompass a general law-making - and previously quasi-judicial - 
activity to face threats to the international legal order, the nature of which has changed remarkably 
since the mid 1940's 
. 
i13.. The ECJ in Kadi also found it necessary to consider whether sanctions could 
be taken against individuals within the EU framework, although it ultimately found that they could. 1320 
States too did not conceive of targeted economic sanctions as being equivalent to sanctions against 
states, as demonstrated by Swedish Prime Minister Goran Perrson, who stated in 2001 that targeted 
economic sanctions taken under resolution 1267 created a `conflict between principles that we have not 
previously seen. ' 1321 
These resolutions have therefore pushed the UNSC into a legislative role. 1122 
6.5.2 Absence of Suitable Institutional Development 
The expansion of UNSC action is not of itself necessarily problematic. The UN and the UNSC are 
evolving and states are willing to evolve alongside them. 1323 Additionally, the exercise of a legislative 
function by the UNSC in creating targeted economic sanctions may be a necessary measure for the 
protection of international peace and security, most notably with respect to counter-terrorism. '324 
However, in the instance of targeted economic sanctions, power has evolved without the requisite 
1317 Stefan Talmon. `The Security Council as World Legislature' (2005) 99 AJIL Law 175 at 176-177. 
ibid. 
1319 Bianchi (n 1062), 883. 
1120 Kadi (Decision of the ECJ) (n 26), 163-227. 
1121 Ove Bring, Per Cramer and Goran Lysen, `Sweden' in Vera Go%lland-Debbas, National Implementation of 
United Nations Sanctions A Comparative Study (Martinus Nijhotf Publishers 2004) 509. 
1; " The UNSC as a lawmaker is discussed in Boyle and Chinkin (n 124). 109-115. 
1123 Bring, Cramer and Lysen (n 1321). 509. 
1324 Bianchi (n 1062), 889. 
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institutional checks being put in place, or as described by De Burca there has been the `expansion of 
authority without concomitant accountability'. 1325 
This concept of authority without accountability is not new. In 1958 it was stated that the 
voting procedures of the UN produced, in the circumstances of the Cold War, a situation in which 
-power is frequently divorced from responsibility' and where `[v]oting becomes a substitute for 
negotiation rather than a measure of the amount of agreement reached or a final result when negotiation 
fails. ' 1326 
With respect to targeted economic sanctions, as discussed in the previous chapter, '327 
institutions are frequently created at the UN level. The creation of these institutions might be described 
as a 'horizontal' rather than a `vertical' development. What is meant by this is that new institutions are 
performing identical or overlapping functions with other institutions that are already established within 
the UN system. For example, a new sanctions committee is created with every new sanctions regime 
and each of these committees performs tasks broadly similar to other sanctions committees., 328 This 
proliferation of institutions needs to be addressed and it will be suggested in the next chapter that the 
most appropriate means of doing so is by the creation of a Sanctions Unit, as proposed during the 
Bonn-Berlin process. 1329 However, a key issue is that the proliferation of institutions has not resulted in 
the vertical development of institutions with the result that certain issues, such as the judicial review of 
UNSC targeted economic sanctions, which have been necessitated by the vertical expansion of UNSC 
power, are not adequately provided for at UN level. The resulting situation is that it is not clear, when 
the legal basis of targeted economic sanctions are called into question, where the ultimate authority 
lies. 
6.6 Proposal for a System of Judicial Review at UN Level 
There are many amendments that could be proposed with respect to UNSC targeted economic 
sanctions. 1.330 Indeed it is suggested that the Sanctions Unit proposed during the Bonn-Berlin 
process .; 31 should also be implemented and should be used as a means to consolidate the various 
112` De Burca (n 1228). 
'"-° Clarence Wilfred Jenks. The Common Law of'Afankind (Stevens 1958) 174. 1327 See section 5.1.2.2.1. 
1'2a See: http: //www. un. org/sc/committees/ 
l329 Section 7.2. 
""0 See for example the recommendations made in Geiss (n 175) and in Cameron Cameron. Report to the Swedish 
Foreign Office (n 1031). 
"" See section 4.3.1.3. 
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sanctions committees, monitoring bodies and other UN institutions that currently exist. However, 
whilst the consolidation of institutions would benefit the administration of UN economic sanctions, the 
most important problem currently prevalent with UNSC targeted economic sanctions, which could 
stifle their implementation going forward, is the absence of an effective judicial review system. This 
section discusses why such a system is necessary, at what level it should be implemented, and how it 
should operate. 
6.6.1 Why Judicial Review of UNSC Targeted Economic Sanctions is Necessary 
There are three reasons why a system for the judicial review of economic sanctions needs to be 
developed. Firstly, targeted economic sanctions were developed in order to prevent the breaches of 
human rights and mass humanitarian suffering that arose in some situations where sanctions were 
enacted against states. As targeted economic sanctions are now breaching the fundamental rights of 
those targeted, they are acting inconsistently with that aim. Allowing for the judicial review of 
sanctions would provide a solution to the criticism in chapter 5 that the due process rights of sanctions' 
targets are not currently being protected under the UN sanctions framework. 1332 The UN and its 
Member States should therefore welcome the judicial review of targeted economic sanctions to ensure 
that they are behaving as intended and that any breaches of fundamental rights caused by sanctions are 
proportionate to the measures. 
Secondly, an adequate system of judicial review would afford greater protection of the 
fundamental rights of those subjected to sanctions because such a system would seek to strike a balance 
between the implementation of the sanctions themselves and the rights of those sanctioned. Given the 
judicial decisions discussed in this chapter, the development of such a system may be critical to the 
continued implementation of targeted economic sanctions. These decisions are a precedent for 
domestic courts to find that because domestic implementing legislation does not protect the 
fundamental rights of those sanctioned it cannot be applied. The result of such a decision may be that 
the measures contained in the underlying UNSC resolutions are not being applied in some states. As 
Cameron has stated, without appropriate reform `it is no exaggeration to say that the very legitimacy of 
the UN targeted sanction system is at stake. 1 " For this reason, even those who are sceptical of the 
See section 5.2.3.2.2. 
Cameron, 'UN Targeted Sanctions, Legal Safeguards and the European Convention on I luman Rights' (n 129) 
181. 
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extent to which the UNSC is bound by human rights must concede that, it would be advantageous if 
there was a procedure by which UN economic sanctions could be judicially reviewed because it would 
prevent domestic courts making such findings. 1334 A system of judicial review would force the UNSC 
to allow for appeal from the imposition of economic sanctions on the grounds of fundamental human 
rights. 
Thirdly, the judicial review of economic sanctions would bring the current system closer to 
adherence with the doctrine of proportionality or, as it has previously been described in this thesis, to 
achieving balance between competing rights. With respect to targeted economic sanctions it has been 
stated that `this framework, built upon the UN Charter is, despite its deficiencies, the only one capable 
of coping with challenges such as international terrorism which exceed the reach of the nation- 
state. ' 1335 However, commentators also agree that such measures should be proportionate, '336 or in 
simple terms `the advantages associated with a regime [should] prevail over its disadvantages. ' 1337 The 
judicial review of targeted economic sanctions would allow for an independent assessment of the 
balance between a given set of sanctions in achieving its aim and the interference with fundamental 
rights that such a system entails. 
6.6.2 What Entity Should Undertake this Judicial Review? 
Although it is clear that the establishment of a system of judicial review would be desirable, it remains 
unclear what entity should be responsible for the development of such a system. States and regional 
organisations have undertaken this task thus far and could continue to do so. Equally, the UNSC itself 
could take responsibility for the development of such a system. Finally, a parallel but independent 
entity could be established. 
Although they have been criticised in this thesis for accepting competence to consider 
economic sanctions taken on the basis of binding UNSC resolutions, there is an element of practicality 
in domestic and regional courts reviewing such measures because there is currently no other means of 
such measures being reviewed. However, it is doubtful whether this situation should remain in place 
'"a See Nicolas Angelet, 'International Law Limits to the Security Council' in Vera Gowiland Debbas (ed) United 
Nations Sanctions and International Law (Kluwer Law International 2001) 71- 82, which argues that it is in the UNSC's interest to ensure that its decisions are taken in accordance with international law. 
Reich (n 1165). 
Reisman and Stevick (n 56). 94: Geiss (n 175), 176. 
''"' Geiss (n 154). 176. 
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going forward. Firstly, as previously discussed, 1338 there is no legal basis for the domestic and regional 
courts to review binding UNSC resolutions. 
Secondly, as de Burca states, it `seems inaccurate to say that the primary responsibility for 
harm caused when a wrongly-listed person's property is sequestered lies with the state that implements 
a mandatory UNSC resolution rather than with the UNSC that wrongly named the person as a terrorist 
and mandated the sequestration. ' 1339 This difficulty is amplified in the case of UNSC targeted 
economic sanctions because often information in relation to the measures is only available to the state 
that sought to have the person or entity designated and is not available to the domestic or regional 
courts. 
Finally, leaving the judicial review of UNSC resolutions in the hands of regional and domestic 
courts has led to more questions than answers. ' 340 For example, certain questions, such as to what 
extent is it permissible for targeted economic sanctions to interfere with the fundamental rights of those 
sanctioned, have not been adequately resolved by the domestic and regional courts and it is not, 
therefore, acceptable to leave the consideration of such issues in the hands of those courts. 
The UNSC itself could also take responsibility for the judicial review of targeted economic 
sanctions by strengthening existing bodies such as the Focal Point or expanding the remit of the newly 
established Ombudsman. In some respects, such a decision would seem logical because the UNSC has 
gone beyond the bounds of its historical power into the legislative realm in developing systems of 
targeted economic sanctions and such an expansion of power should be followed by a corresponding 
expansion of responsibility for the constraint of such power. However, the UNSC is not a judicial 
organ nor does it exercise quasi-judicial functions. 1; 41 Furthermore, looking to the doctrine of the 
separation of powers the underlying concept of that doctrine is that power must not be concentrated in 
one entity and must be subject to some control. '. 342 So any suggestion that the judicial review function 
should or could be performed by the UNSC must be dismissed. 
However, with respect to UN economic sanctions, as has been discussed, the information 
required for the judicial review of sanctions is held at UN level by the UNSC, the Focal Point and 
multiple sanctions committees. This means that a review of such measures must happen at UN level. It 
178 See section 6.2.1. 
113') De Burca(n 1228). 
1.140 De Wet (n 124). 161. 
"" Wood (n 886), 78. 
1342 Bianchi (n 1062), 911. 
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has been suggested that the ICJ would be a suitable forum for the review of such measures., 343 
However, individuals do not have standing before the ICJ. '344 The UNSC can request an advisory 
opinion on the legality of its actions but this measure is open to abuse in the context of economic 
sanctions because it is the UNSC, and not those who are targeted by economic sanctions, that must 
request the opinion. 
It is clear that there is currently no entity that can suitably review the actions of the UNSC. It 
has been suggested that an independent administrative mechanism be established which would review 
the listing and de-listing decisions of the sanctions committees. 1345 However, such an institution does 
not significantly advance the position as it stands. Notably, such a system would not offer a person 
subject to economic sanctions the right to appeal such measures nor would it offer more transparency 
with respect to how certain persons and entities come to be designated. 
For that reason, it is suggested that a new judicial institution be established for that purpose. 
The next section will outline the basis for the creation of such an institution. 
6.6.3 The Basis for the Creation of a New Institution 
The requisite elements of any effective remedy are that any decision be capable of being substantively 
reviewed by an organ, which: has a minimum level of independence and impartiality; is accessible to 
the individual; and has the power to indicate measures. '346 The creation of an Economic Sanctions 
Tribunal ('EST') for this purpose would be an innovation for the UN and, as such, the legal basis for its 
creation must be considered. 
As an initial point, it is conceded that the creation of an EST is premised on the fact that 
Member States, particularly the P-5, will be willing to establish such an institution. The EST would be 
established by the UNSC and it is accepted that it may be perceived to erode the powers of the UNSC 
with respect to the administration of economic sanctions. However, it is submitted that as more states 
become unable to fully implement UNSC resolutions, in light of domestic and regional judicial rulings, 
it will be within the UNSC's interest to modify the economic sanctions regime to ensure that such 
rulings cease and states are in a position to fully implement economic sanctions. 
134' Doehring (n 1306), 100. 
13,44 Article 34, Statute of the International Court of Justice( 1945) 15 UNCIO 355. 
"'s Reich (n 1165). 
346 Larrisa Van Den Herik, The Security Council's Targeted Sanctions Regimes: In Need of Better Protection of 
the Individual' (2007) 20 Leiden Journal of International Law 797,807. 
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There is no express power in the Charter for the creation of such a tribunal although the 
UNSC is entitled to establish `subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of 
its 
functions. ' 1347 There is, however, precedence for the creation of ad hoc tribunals by the UNSC, which 
are not subsidiary organs to it, because the UNSC has previously established 
both the ICTY 1338 and the 
ICTR' 349 by resolution. Shortly after its establishment, the ICTY had to deal with a challenge to its 
jurisdiction inter alia on the ground that it had not been lawfully established, as it was not within the 
UNSC's remit to establish such an institution. 150 The ICTY held it had been lawfully established by 
the UNSC because, although the UN does not have express powers to create such institutions, the 
creation of the ICTY fell `squarely within the powers of the Security Council under Article 41'. 
''S' 
This reasoning also applies to the establishment of the EST and is not affected by the intended 
permanency of the EST. The EST would use powers that the UNSC is already utilising now, in terms 
of reviewing economic sanctions implemented against individuals, but it would do so in a more 
appropriate manner because it would retain the right (currently exercised by individual UNSC 
members, as part of the de-listing process) to lift the economic sanctions against an individual where 
necessary. Because the UNSC is exercising these powers already they clearly fall `squarely within the 
powers' of the UNSC and they would simply be devolved to the EST on its creation. As such, although 
not expressly provided for, the functional powers of the EST would not be ultra vires the UNSC. 
Whilst the ICTY was prepared to accept that it was validly established by UNSC resolution 
this cannot be determinative of the UNSC's powers to create such institutions because as Alvarez 
indicates, it was predictable that the ICTY would have been prepared to accept that the UNSC had 
power to establish it, as otherwise it would have been effectively signing its own death warrant. '352 
Subsequent practice has, however, added weight to the validity of the ICTY's decision. The ICTY has, 
as of January 2011, indicted a total of 161 persons, concluded proceedings against 124 with 37 cases 
ongoing. 1153 Since the Tadic decision the UNSC has also used its power to establish a tribunal again to 
establish the ICTR. 
Furthermore, aside from the Tadic decision, the establishment of the EST would also fall 
within the implied powers of the UNSC set out in previous ICJ decisions. In the Reparations Case, the 
1347 Article 29. UN Charter. 
134' Established under UNSC Res 808 (22 February 1993) UN Doc S/RES/808. 
1349 Established under UNSC Res 995 (8 November 1994) UN Doc S/RES/995. 
1; `o Tadic Case (n 118). 
1151 ibid. pari 36. 
1152 Alvarez (n 1224). 246. 
''" Statistics obtained from: http: //www. icty. org/ [last accessed: 21 January 2011 j. 
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ICJ held that the UN `must be deemed to have those powers which, though not expressly provided in 
the Charter, are conferred upon it by necessary implication as being essential to the performance of its 
duties' 
. 
1354 White comments that this range of implied powers will not be static, but will develop over 
time. '355 The EST would comfortably fit within these criteria. Under Article 41 of the UN Charter the 
UNSC was given powers to take economic sanctions. Initially, the provisions of Article 41 were used 
to develop sanctions regimes targeted against states. This later developed to include sanctions targeted 
against individuals. However, the efficacy of such measures is now under threat as a result of recent 
judicial pronouncements by domestic and regional courts as explored in this chapter. In order to 
address the concerns raised by these courts, the UNSC has to ensure that, in so far as it is possible, the 
rights of those subjected to economic sanctions are being protected. As such, the creation of the EST, 
which would offer protection to the due process rights of those subjected to economic sanctions, is 
necessary to fulfil the provisions of Article 41 of the Charter. 
The Expenses Case took a more expansive view of implied powers considering that, if an 
organ of the UN had any competence in a particular field, it was only where there was an express 
restriction on its competence that an organ would be precluded from having an implied power in that 
field. 1356 So, in considering the powers of the UNGA in relation to peace and security, it held that it 
was only precluded from action in relation to matters that are being already considered by the UNSC, 
which is provided for in Article 12 of the Charter. 1357 
White has criticised the court in the Expenses Case for failing to consider whether the 
development of peacekeeping forces by the UNGA was `necessary for the fulfilment of the express 
provisions of the Charter' as he suggests that proving the necessity of an action is a prerequisite to the 
UNSC having an implied power to take that action. 1358 Judge Hackworth, in his dissenting opinion in 
the Reparations case, ''S9 also argued that implied powers must be necessary. The development of an 
EST does meet this requirement, as its development is necessary in order to ensure that measures taken 
under Article 41 are implemented by states. 
In light of these decisions and the powers given to it in the Charter, there is no prohibition on 
the UNSC establishing the EST. 
"`4 The Reparations Case (n 1120) 182-183. 
. 355 White(n 102). 84. 
; '6Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article /7, Paragraph 2, of the Charter) (n 1141) 151 at 163. 1157 ibid. 
"' ` ' White (n 102), 86. 
1 "° The Reparations Case (n 1120) 198. 
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6.6.4 An Independent Institution for Judicial Review 
Although the EST would be an innovation for the UN its structure and methodology would not differ 
greatly from the way in which other court systems function. The EST would have two 
functions. 
Firstly, it would hear the appeals of individuals who had been subjected to targeted economic sanctions 
regimes. Secondly, it would answer questions submitted to it by the UN or its organs or by Member 
States relating to aspects of the legality of any UN economic sanctions regime. 
Until it is clear how active the EST will be, the UNGA and the UNSC would, initially, elect 
three members from a list of persons nominated by the Member States. No two members of the tribunal 
may hold the same nationality, and in order to distinguish the EST from actions of institutions such as 
the sanctions committees, only one of its members should hold the nationality of a UNSC Member 
State. Should a state become a UNSC member whilst one of its nationals is sitting on the EST, and in 
so doing breach this limitation, the member of the tribunal in question will, at his own election, retire 
or be replaced for the period during which his state of nationality is a member of the UNSC. 
The performance of its latter function 
- 
the consideration of questions of legality 
- 
will 
operate by means of written submissions from the entity making the request and from other interested 
parties as approved by the EST. With respect to the EST's appeal function the initial proceedings will 
be made by way of written submission, however, due to the difficulties that have plagued this area of 
targeted economic sanctions there will be an opportunity for oral pleadings and the decision will be 
handed down in person where possible. 
Access to information has been a significant difficulty with respect to targeted economic 
sanctions with some designating states refusing to reveal themselves, or the sources of their 
information, beyond the sanctions committees. Cameron identifies this reluctance to share intelligence 
as the key reason why a judicial tribunal cannot practically be established for the purpose of dealing 
with targeted economic sanctions. 136o However, states' reluctance should not be allowed to stifle the 
creation of an institution, which would ameliorate UNSC targeted economic sanctions, and the EST 
would function in a manner that should alleviate the concerns of states as far as is possible. 
The EST would require all information held by states or the sanctions committees to be 
provided to it. The EST will be precluded from relying on a state's fears of national security with 
respect to the absence of information and if insufficient evidence justifying the sanctioning of an 
1360 Cameron, 'UN Targeted Sanctions. Legal Safeguards and the European Convention on Human Rights' (n 129) 
210-211. 
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individual or entity is not provided the EST must lift the requisite economic sanctions. However, a 
clear indication must be given to the EST as to what information has been made public and what has 
not. The EST is precluded from revealing the latter information, although it may rely on it in its 
decision-making. This is to provide some protection for a state's national security when such protection 
is necessary whilst still allowing the material to be viewed and assessed by an independent body for the 
purpose of ensuring the protection of the rights of those sanctioned. This measure will provide 
increased transparency with respect to the application of targeted economic sanctions. Furthermore, a 
designating state will no longer be permitted to refuse the public revelation of its identity when it 
recommends that a person or entity be subject to sanctions. 
In order for the appeal function to operate successfully the sanctions regimes themselves must 
also be amended. Currently, once sanctions are imposed against an individual or entity they remain in 
place unless challenged under the Focal Point procedure or considered by the sanctions committee 
during a periodic review of sanctions. In order for the appeals procedure to function targeted economic 
sanctions must be treated in their initial implementation as a temporary measure. Sanctions against an 
individual or entity would have to be put in place for an initial period of three months. Within that 
three-month period the target of those sanctions may appeal to the EST for an expedited review of his 
designation. If such an appeal is made the EST has a further three-month period, from the date of that 
appeal, to decide whether or not the target should remain subject to economic sanctions. This short 
timeframe is necessitated by the severe impact of targeted economic sanctions on those subject to them. 
It essentially requires states, the UNSC and other UN institutions be in a position to defend their action 
prior to subjecting a target to economic sanctions, which can then be submitted to the EST if necessary. 
The EST will be entitled to more resources, including at the level of appointment of its 
members, should it prove necessary to ensure that cases can be heard and decisions delivered within 
this time-frame. Whilst the case is being heard sanctions will remain in place. Should a person not 
appeal within the initial three-month period they may appeal at a later date but such an appeal would 
not be heard on an expedited basis. 
The reason for the establishment of the appeal procedure is to protect the due process rights of 
those subjected to targeted economic sanctions. As such, when sitting as an appeal tribunal, the EST is 
not obliged to lift sanctions solely on the basis of breaches of human rights, although it may find that a 
state is required to provide for a target's basic needs, such as food, water, shelter and clothing under the 
235 
humanitarian provisions in the relevant sanctions regime. The decision given may either terminate a 
person's designation or allow it to remain in place. Because finality is essential there will be no 
possible appeal from a decision of the EST. 
Of course it is conceded that the development of the EST is - like other developments in UN 
economic sanctions history 
- 
reactionary. It is being proposed as a means of addressing the difficulties 
that now threaten to paralyse the development and implementation of targeted economic sanctions. 
However, it is hoped that the creation of the EST would ultimately result in less reactive policy-making 
with respect to UN economic sanctions as the EST would be a new body unburdened by previous 
decisions or by the political difficulties being experienced in the current system. The development of 
such a system would be a significant advancement for UN targeted economic sanctions. It would 
provide a balance between targeted economic sanctions as a necessary and legitimate tool of the UNSC 
and the rights of those subjected to such measures. Greater transparency with respect to targeted 
economic sanctions could be ensured by requiring public disclosure of the name of the state that seeks 
to have a person or entity designated together with full disclosure to the EST of the evidence 
supporting such designation. The EST could decide that the reasoning or some of the reasoning for the 
designation should be made public. Finally, by establishing an independent permanent tribunal, the 
domestic and regional courts would be relieved of their obligation to review sanctions and a more 
consistent body of precedent decisions might emerge. 
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7 
Conclusion 
This thesis has traced the development of UN economic sanctions from the establishment of the UN to 
date. The UN economic sanctions landscape is very different today than it was when the UN Charter 
was drafted, when the first cases of economic sanctions were adopted by the UNSC or even when 
Nelson Mandela was inaugurated in 1994, as reflected upon by Ronald Dellums in the quotation that 
opened this thesis, 1361 
The views of Dellums that economic sanctions could effect political change and could do so 
in a less destructive manner than armed conflict underline why such measures were included in the UN 
Charter and invoked by the UNSC in circumstances where military sanctions were unpopular amongst 
Member States. However, on reflection, and with the benefit of almost two more decades of UN 
economic sanctions, Dellums' comments now seem at best idealistic or at worst naive and certainly 
wholly unrepresentative of the UN economic sanctions experience since then. 
Firstly, a review of the economic sanctions regimes discussed in this thesis demonstrates 
various threats to the effectiveness of UN economic sanctions. For example, firstly, UN economic 
sanctions have from their very first case been widely breached by both states and corporate entities. ' 362 
Secondly, in the case of Southern Rhodesia the purposes of economic sanctions were not achieved until 
more than a decade after binding economic sanctions were first imposed. 136' Thirdly, in the case of 
both Haiti164 and Iraq 1.365 economic sanctions were followed shortly by military sanctions, which 
demonstrates that the UN did not believe that the sanctions measures would be effective. Finally, states 
have not always proved capable of implementing sanctions. With respect to sanctions taken against 
states this was often because of the close relationship that a state had with the target of such 
measures. 1366 In the era of targeted economic sanctions, the issue that has arisen has been that some 
states do not have sophisticated banking systems that are capable of implementing targeted 
161 Dellums, n I. 
1162 See comments about breaches of sanctions against Southern Rhodesia in section 2.4.2. 16' Binding economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia stretched from 1966 (UNSC Resolution 232 (n 123)) 
to 1979 (UNSC Resolution 460 (n 174)). 
1304 UNSC Resolution 940 (n 90), 4. 
"665 UNSC Resolution 678 (n 507), 2. 
'' See section 2.4.2.1.3, which discusses Zambia's difficulties in implementing sanctions against Southern 
Rhodesia. 
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sanctions. 1367 These and other issues discussed in the thesis impact on the effectiveness of economic 
sanctions in prompting regime change. 
Secondly, it is clear that economic sanctions can and do have significant humanitarian 
consequences. Both economic sanctions against states 
1365 and those against individuals 1169 have 
significant implications for those subject to them. In fact, Simons has suggested that it was economic 
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sanctions taken against Iraq, rather than military measures, that caused the most civilian 
deaths. 
Furthermore, when sanctions were taken against the FRY they were considered, by preserving the 
military status quo, to have given Serbia a military advantage over Bosnia, thus limiting the latter's 
right of self defence. 171 This, too, was likely to increase the number of people killed. For these reasons 
economic sanctions cannot be seen as a `soft' alternative to military force, which result in fewer deaths. 
Dellums suggested attributes of economic sanctions have been proven inaccurate by the 
research in this thesis. However, three key features of economic sanctions within the UN framework 
have become apparent throughout the thesis, which will be outlined in the next section before a final 
reflection on the future of UN economic sanctions. 
7.1 The Key Features of the UN Economic Sanctions Framework 
The three key features of economic sanctions regimes as adopted by the UNSC are: their reactionary 
nature; the UNSC's powers; and the role that states play. 
7.1.1 The Reactionary Nature of UN Economic Sanctions 
UN economic sanctions have, to date, developed in a wholly reactionary fashion. This fact underpins 
the discussion of economic sanctions throughout this thesis. 
From the very outset the economic sanctions provisions contained in the UN Charter were 
reactive to the deficiencies that had been prevalent in the Covenant of the League of Nations. '372 The 
League of Nations had made recourse to economic sanctions by its Member States automatic when one 
of them resorted to war. 1373 In contrast, the UN Charter provides more nuanced provisions whereby the 
"" See section 5.2.1.2. 
1118 See section 3.5. 
13i9 See section 5.2.3.2. 
1370 Simons, The Scougring of Iraq (n 423) xviii. 
1371 Horowitz (n 143), 173. 
1372 Claude (n 151). 264-265. 
1173 Article 16, Covenant of the League of Nations. 
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UNSC must determine that there has been a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression 
before deciding the most appropriate measures to be put in place, which may include economic 
sanctions. 1374 
This reactionary development continued once the UNSC began to adopt economic sanctions 
regimes. The first binding economic sanctions taken by the UNSC, against Southern Rhodesia, were 
clearly reactionary as they were slowly tightened over time, (starting as non-binding measures, 1375 
becoming partially binding sanctions, 1376 with further sanctions taken'37 until they became fully 
comprehensive in 1976 more than a decade after they commenced 1378) as it became clear that more 
significant measures were needed. This piecemeal implementation of economic sanctions gave 
Southern Rhodesia the opportunity to modify its economy, so that it was less responsive to economic 
sanctions, before fully comprehensive sanctions were implemented. 1379 Southern Rhodesia also ceased 
repaying its debts when subject to economic sanctions, which also impacted on the effectiveness of 
economic sanctions. 1380 Furthermore, despite remaining in place for such a long period, only limited 
force was ever used against Southern Rhodesia, in the form of a port blockade at Beira. 1381 
When sanctions were taken against Iraq they were responsive to these deficiencies. They were 
comprehensive from the outset, 1382 they were militant in their requirement that Iraq repay its debts, 
both those accrued prior to and during sanctions, '383 and they moved quickly to military sanctions. '384 
Yet despite, or perhaps because of, these developments economic sanctions against Iraq also had a 
significant deficiency, in the form of the humanitarian crisis that resulted from them. 1385 Once more 
economic sanctions reacted to this crisis. Within the Iraqi sanctions regime, the Oil-for-Food 
Programme was created in an attempt to enable Iraq to use its own resources to ameliorate the 
humanitarian situation. ''86 As economic sanctions progressed, outside of the Iraqi regime, there was a 
move to targeted sanctions. 
"" Articles 39 and 41, UN Charter. 
11" UNSC Resolution 217 (n 43). 
1376 UNSC Resolution 232 (n 123). 
"" UNSC Resolution 253 (n 314) and UNSC Resolution 277 (n 322). 
"'R UNSC Resolution 388 (n 327). 
1379 See section 2.4.2.2. 
1A0 See section 2.4.2.2.3. 
"81 UNSC Resolution 221 (n 294). 
1182 UNSC Resolution 661 (n 44). 
'383 UNSC Resolution 687 (n 514), UNSC Resolution 778 (n 539). 
1384 UNSC Resolution 665 (n 493) and UNSC Resolution 678 (n 507). 13$5 See section 3.5. 
1186 1JNSC Resolution 986 (n 555). 
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Targeted sanctions were established in order to avoid the collateral damage that had been 
prevalent in sanctions taken against states. They were initially targeted at government officials 
1387 and 
other non-government regimes threatening peace and stability within a state. 
'388 As terrorism became a 
significant item on the global agenda towards in the later years of the 1990s and there was an increased 
awareness that terrorist organisations did not necessarily have roots in any particular state, sanctions 
were targeted at individuals and entities that were connected to an illicit body but that did not have a 
connection to a named state. 1389 Terrorism, however, is not undertaken by a limited group of 
organisations nor always by individuals linked to a particular organisation. For this reason, the most 
recent incarnation of targeted economic sanctions has been those targeted at individuals engaged in 
some form of terrorist activity, ranging from committing acts of terrorism to the financing of 
terrorism. 1390 
Alongside the development of targeted sanctions there has been increased institutional 
development with the establishment of the Focal Point1391 to deal with requests for delisting and the 
recent appointment of the Ombudsperson to monitor and investigate sanctions regimes. '392 These 
innovations aside, changes within the targeted economic sanctions regimes have been more 
incremental than previous developments. For example, whereas they were not initially required to do 
so, because of criticism that the listing procedures were too opaque, when they are requesting that a 
party be added to the Consolidated List, states are now obliged to indicate what information supporting 
that request can be made public. 139-' They are not as yet, however, obliged to reveal their own identities 
nor to allow any information be made public, unless they choose to make it public. 1 '94 
The move to targeted sanctions resulted in the first attempt at the less reactionary development 
of UN economic sanctions, with the occurrence of the European Conferences. '195 However, the 
recommendations of the Conferences were not implemented and economic sanctions continued to 
develop in a reactionary fashion. 
The reactionary development of UN economic sanctions has to an extent been beneficial, as it 
has allowed the UNSC to respond to difficulties within the UN sanctions framework as they developed. 
187 For UNSC Resolution 778 (n 539) imposed economic sanctions on government officials in Iraq. 
""g For example UNSC Resolution 864 (n 713) imposed economic sanctions on the UNI TA in Angola. 
1 X89 UNSC Resolution 1267 (n 164). 
110 UNSC Resolution 1373 (n 164). 
IJNSC Resolution 1730 (n 1010), see section 5.1.2.2.1.2. 
1392 Kimberley Prost appointed under UNSC Resolution 1904 (n 962). 
1 "(` UNSC Resolution 1822 (n 962). 
13,04 Press Conference on Activities of the Al-Qaida and Talihan Sanctions Committee. 14 July 2009. 
q05 See section 4.3. 
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However, in discussing her proposal that international law develops out of crisis, Charlesworth, as well 
as the ethical costs she identifies as discussed in chapter 1, indicates that such development leads to 
three problems of construction, which are also reflected in the reactionary development of UN 
economic sanctions. Firstly, she states that the `crisis model of international law... assumes that the 
elements of the crisis are uncontroversial, that the `facts' are ripe for picking by analysts. ' 396 
Throughout the development of UN economic sanctions the UNSC has, on occasion, assumed certain 
aspects of sanctions, which later prove to be untrue. The clearest example of Charlesworth's contention 
occurred in the drafting of UNSC Resolution 1530, which followed the terrorist bombing of Madrid in 
2004.1397 The resolution attributes the bombing to ETA and requests that Member States act in 
accordance with UNSC Resolution 1530 to bring the perpetrators of the bombing to justice. '"' 
However, it became clear that it was not ETA that perpetrated the bombing but Islamic terrorists. 1399 
Given the significant consequences of economic sanctions, and the need for states implementing them 
to believe in their accuracy, the reliance on unfounded facts threatens the implementation of sanctions. 
Secondly, Charlesworth indicates that the crisis model results in an issue being 
"[rediscovered] constantly and... [analysed] without building on past scholarship. ' 100 In being 
reactionary, economic sanctions do consider past sanctions regimes. However, this consideration is not 
generally extended beyond the next sanctions regime. For example, as mentioned previously in this 
section, following the difficulties caused by the slow move to comprehensive sanctions against 
Southern Rhodesia the UNSC responded by placing comprehensive sanctions against Iraq from the 
outset. Now, as discussed in chapter 5, the UNSC has begun to allow states or entities a period of time 
before sanctions are implemented against them, stated to be for the purpose of that state or entity 
rectifying its behaviour prior to the implementation of sanctions. 1401 It appears, therefore, that the 
UNSC has failed to take a long-term lesson from the issues, such as economy modification, that arose 
in Southern Rhodesia, which may result in their reoccurrence in later sanctions regimes. 
13°6 Charlesworth (n 2). 382. 
1-1117 UNSC Res 1530 (1 1 March 2004) UN Doc S/RES/1530. 
"`'s ibid, 2-3. 
'"'9 Victoria Burnett, '7 Are Acquitted in Madrid Bombings' The New York Times (New York 1 November 2007). 
For a discussion of Resolution 1530 and its implications see Therese O'Donnell, 'Naming and Shaming: 'The Story 
of Security Council Resolution 1530 (2004)' (2006) 17 EJIL 945. 
'400 Charlesworth (n 2). 384. 
1401 See section 5.1.2.1. 
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Thirdly, Charlesworth submits that the crisis model may result in a focus on `a single event or 
series of events' and therefore miss the larger picture. 
1402 This is true of the development of economic 
sanctions, which, whilst responding on a piece-meal basis to the various crises that have arisen, 
has 
failed to deal with the significant breaches of economic sanctions that have occurred. Breaches to 
economic sanctions, which have been experienced with every case of economic sanctions to 
date, 
damage the effectiveness of economic sanctions as they enable targets to avoid their most severe 
consequences and, therefore, such be punished. The UNSC has, on one occasion, cited a state's 
breaches of UN economic sanctions as the justification for adopting economic sanctions, when it 
imposed an arms embargo against Liberia. 1403 However, such action was novel at that time and has not 
been replicated in later sanctions episodes. 
Whilst the reactionary development of economic sanctions has led to some worthwhile and 
necessary developments, the time has come for the UNSC to take a meaningful pause and assess its use 
of economic sanctions. Decisions as to how economic sanctions within the UN framework need to 
progress and how this should be achieved need to be made. And, unlike the recommendations made at 
the European Conferences, these decisions must be implemented. 
7.1.2 The UNSC and Economic Sanctions 
The second feature of economic sanctions that has become apparent throughout this thesis is the 
significant role played by the UNSC in their development. The section could have been titled the 
Institutional Framework of UN Economic Sanctions' because it is clear that one of the features of UN 
economic sanctions has been the development of numerous institutions responsible for making 
recommendations, monitoring the implementation of sanctions and liaising with states in relation to 
sanctions. 1404 The reason that it instead focuses on the role of the UNSC is that, despite the powers and 
functions that have devolved to institutions such as the Focal Point and the various sanctions 
committees and monitoring bodies, the key decisions, and thus the true power, remain with the UNSC. 
The UNSC not only drafts all of the sanctions resolutions, thus deciding who should be 
subjected to sanctions and what format they should take, it also decides what role other institutions and 
entities have with respect to economic sanctions within the UN framework and it makes key decisions, 
1102 Charlesworth (n 2). 384. 
1403 UNSC Resolution 1343 (n 710). 
1404 See section 5.1.2.2.1. 
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such as whether a target will remain subject to sanctions. Leaving these powers in the hands of the 
UNSC means that they are exercised by a small number of states and, because of the actions of the 
UNSC, that there is a lack of accountability within the UN sanctions framework. 
A key issue for economic sanctions, as well as for any other collective action taken by the 
UNSC is the veto, as discussed in chapter one. 1405 In his key text on international organisations Claude 
espouses the view that `[t]he ideal setting for a collective security system is a world characterized by a 
considerable diffusion of power. ' 1406 The veto, which leaves it open to the P-5 to quash any proposed 
economic sanctions, clearly prevents the diffusion of power within the UN system when dealing with 
economic sanctions. It allows each of the P-5 Member States to unilaterally block economic sanctions 
for political reasons when they so choose and to avoid ever being subject to such measures themselves. 
This difficulty with the veto powers was, of course, known when the UN was founded. Claude notes 
that, even in the absence of the veto power, by 1945 the US and the Soviet Union would have been 
immune from the effects of any economic sanctions that could be imposed on them because they 
possessed or were in the position to control such a significant percentage of the world's war-making 
resources. '407 As such, the issue is not the veto powers themselves but their combination with an 
expansion of UNSC action beyond what was envisaged when the UN was founded. 
In taking targeted economic sanctions the UNSC has strayed into the realm of legislator, a role 
that was never envisaged for it. 1408 However, whilst it has been prepared to legislate for its Member 
States in adopted economic sanctions, it has not been willing to bear responsibility for the 
repercussions of such measures. This is clear from the difficulties that have arisen with economic 
sanctions targeted at individuals. Even when given the opportunity, in Kadi (Decision of the ECJ), `409 
to rectify the information deficient that surrounded Mr Kadi's sanctioning, the UNSC failed to do so 
adequately with the result that the GC ultimately ordered he should no longer be sanctioned under the 
EU's implementing measures. '410 Equally, when dealing with sanctions against states, the UNSC has 
adopted wide-ranging sanctions regimes and given other institutions powers with respect to monitoring 
and reporting on breaches by states and other entities but has failed to use any of its powers to resolve 
such breaches. 
1405 See section 1.5.2. 
140' Claude (n 151). 256. 
1407 ibid. 273. 
1408 See section 6.5.1. 
14°° Kadi (Decision of the ECJ) (n 26). 
14 '0 Kadi (Decision of the GC) (n 163). 
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The UN is a public institution, albeit an international one, as such, when it takes action there 
should be concurrent accountability for that action. The significant unfettered powers of the UNSC, an 
institution which has proved unwilling to be accountable for its actions and which operates in an 
opaque manner, has had repercussions for the UN in terms of recent judicial pronouncements on the 
domestic and regional implementation of economic sanctions. ß'4t 1 These decisions threaten the 
continued implementation of UN economic sanctions by states. 
7.1.3 The Role of States 
Throughout this thesis a wide variety of difficulties with UN economic sanctions have been identified. 
However, these difficulties only become apparent once economic sanctions have been implemented by 
Member States. As such, Member States play a key role in the outcome of UN economic sanctions 
regimes. 
The implementation of economic sanctions by states has always been an important and a 
contentious issue. In Southern Rhodesia, where sanctions were widely breached, the US overtly 
breached economic sanctions by implementing domestic legislation to allow it to do so. '412 At that time 
it was widely known, and outlined in various UNSC resolutions, that Portugal and South Africa were 
breaching sanctions. 1413 Furthermore, commercial entities, particularly some of the key oil corporations 
were also breaching sanctions. 1414 As sanctions progressed these breaches continued but less overtly. 
So, for example, it is known that during economic sanctions against Iraq some corporations that were 
otherwise legitimately exporting goods to Iraq under the Oil-for-Food Programme were providing the 
Hussein regime with kickbacks. '415 Equally, in the 1990's when arms embargos were in place in the 
Horn of Africa it is understood that weapons where flowing freely across the borders of Sudan, 
Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda. ' 416 These breaches impact on the effectiveness of UN economic 
sanctions and have yet to be prevented or restricted by the UNSC. 
However, in analysing targeted economic sanctions it becomes clear that the Member States 
are tasked with a far greater role in relation to them. Whereas previously, when dealing with economic 
1411 See chapter 6. 
1412 Act of November 17 1971. Pub. L. No. 92-156. See commentary in 'T'he Rhodesian Chrome Statute: The 
Congressional Response to UN Economic Sanctions Against Southern Rhodesia'. (1972) 58 Va L Rev 511 (n 
246). 
14" UNSC Resolution 326 (n 341) and UNSC Resolution 328 (n 337). 
1414 Bailey (n 275), 59. 
1415 Cole Report (n 617); Duelfer Report (n 615); Gordon (n 679). 173-189. 
1416 Prendergast (n 687), 2. 
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sanctions against states, Member States were simply required to ensure that sanctions were not 
breached, with respect to targeted economic sanctions Member States also have other roles. They are 
required to locate any assets of targeted individuals and entities being held on their territory and ensure 
that such assets are frozen. This assumes that states have the requisite capacity to achieve this. 
Specifically, it presumes that there is suitable banking and financial legislation in place, as it is at that 
level that assets will generally be frozen. ''" In freezing these assets Member States are frequently 
being asked to take significant measures against their own citizens, which they may not agree with, in 
circumstances where there has been no criminal charge taken against the target and his or its due 
process rights have not been respected. '418 Furthermore, targeted economic sanctions may place a 
burden on states that have to pay state benefits to a target once his assets are frozen, in order to ensure 
that their humanitarian obligations are fulfilled, and have to deal with extensive requests for 
exemptions from sanctions measures. 14 '9 These requirements place an increased burden on Member 
States and they should be given further support by the UN. 
Whilst Member States are obliged to implement economic sanctions measures, a key issue in 
their doing so in practice is whether they continue to have faith in the legitimacy and necessity of the 
measures. This faith has been eroded of late. Firstly, the recent judicial pronouncements call into 
question whether states and regional organisations can be required to implement UNSC resolutions that 
fail to protect fundamental rights. '420 The immediate impact of these decisions may be that particular 
individuals or entities are not subject to UN economic sanctions within a particular Member State. 
However, the long-term impact may be more significant as the decisions may serve to erode Member 
States belief that UN economic sanctions are legitimate or that they are obligated to implement such 
measures. 
Secondly, the inconsistent application of economic sanctions may colour Member State's 
views on the legitimacy of such measures. 142' Bianchi describes the decision-making policy of the 
UNSC as ad-hoc. '422 He notes that this ad-hoc development has prevented UNSC decisions being 
`grounded and justified on a clear set of principles and objectives', which he suggests would make their 
141' Section 5.2.1.2. 
1418 See A, K, Al v HAf Treasury (No /) (n 26), para 36,82, which discusses the UK's belief and request that a UK 
resident should be removed from the Consolidated List although he remained subjected to economic sanctions. 1411' Sec A, K. Al. Q&Gv I/A1 Treasury [20081 EWI IC 869 (Admin), para 42, which indicates one instance where in excess of 50 applications for exemptions from economic sanctions were made. 1420 See chapter 6. 
1421 See section 1.4.3. 
422 Andrea Bianchi, `Ad-hocism and the Rule of Law' (2002) 13 EJIL 263 at 270. ('Bianchi, Ad-hocism and the 
Rule of Law') 
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efficacy and impact on international law much greater. He also, comments that this impacts on the 
perceived legitimacy of UN economic sanctions. 1423 When UN economic sanctions against Zimbabwe 
were being considered there were indications that Member States felt that economic sanctions were 
being unjustly targeted at Zimbabwe. Mugabe had indicated his belief that UN economic sanctions are 
a neo-colonialist construct stating that they are put in place to `force Western norms upon sovereign 
nations in an effort to continue or to renew colonialism. ' 1424 This type of rhetoric was also clear during 
the UNSC debates on sanctions against Zimbabwe where the country's representative said that 
Zimbabwe was `at peace with itself and its neighbours', but that the British and their allies had used 
their media to `viciously portray Zimbabwe as a lawless, disorderly and undemocratic country' and that 
the current sanctions are basically an expression of imperialist conquest and no amount of propaganda 
or denial can ever wish this away. ' 1425 Of course Zimbabwe, as the proposed subject of the economic 
sanctions, would have been anxious to resist such measures by any means that it could. However, other 
Member States also viewed the proposed sanctions suspiciously with the Russian delegate, Mr 
Churkin, submitting that to subject the individuals in the resolution to sanctions would be `artificially 
elevating [the problems of Zimbabwe] to the level of a threat to international peace and security. ' 426 
The reality is, of course, that economic sanctions have predominately been taken against 
former colonial states. However, this may not be attributable to any intention on the part of the UNSC 
to create a two-tier system of statehood but may rather simply be reflective of the vast number of states 
that were at one point colonised. Statistically, however, there is geographic disparity in relation to 
where there have been UN economic sanctions imposed. As Wallensteen and Johansson note, the 
UNSC has concentrated on conflicts in Africa, Europe and the Middle East in adopting resolutions. '427 
For example, out of the 1,400 UNSC resolutions dealing with conflicts to the year 2004,400 dealt with 
Europe, 400 dealt with the Middle East/North Africa and 350 dealt with Africa proper whereas fewer 
than 200 dealt with Asia or the Americas. '428 In terms of economic sanctions regimes, only the 
sanctions imposed against Haiti were outside of Europe, the Middle East or Africa. Whilst attributing 
this in part to the colonial links those states have with some of the P-5 members, they also focus on the 
1423 ibid. 270. 
1424 Hughes (n 154). 
1425 UNSC Verbatim Record (I I July 2008) UN Doc S/PV/5933. 
14`6 ibid. 
1427 Wallensteen and Johansson (n 73). 24-25. 
1428 ibid. 24. 
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cultural, economic and geographic links between the P-5 members and the subjects of UNSC 
resolutions. 129 
However, the issue is not whether sanctions against a particular target can be justified, as 
indeed the proposed sanctions against Zimbabwe could have been justified, WO but whether states 
perceive the selection of targets as discriminatory or focused on a particular category of states. If UN 
Member States do perceive the selection of economic sanctions to be discriminatory this may impact 
on whether they support their adoption and implementation, as seen with the Russian criticism of the 
proposed measures against Zimbabwe. 
It is clear that UN economic sanctions require the support of Member States if they are to be 
implemented. It is further clear that this support is currently under threat. For this reason the resolution 
of the difficulties outlined by national and regional courts and the concerns raised at the UNSC meeting 
in relation to proposed sanctions against Zimbabwe need to be addressed. 
7.2 The Future of UN Economic Sanctions 
The Volcker Report notes that the UN's `ability to respond promptly and effectively to the 
responsibilities thrust upon it by the realties of a turbulent, and often violent, world... rests upon the 
Organization's credibility 
- 
on maintaining a widely-held perception among member states and their 
populations of its competence, honesty, and accountability. ' 1431 It is clear, in light of the judicial 
decisions discussed in this thesis that Member States are now concerned about the legality of economic 
sanctions. However, despite the flaws of UN economic sanctions outlined in this chapter and 
throughout this thesis, the UNSC is continuing to adopt economic sanctions regimes. Craven has 
commented that `economic sanctions are no longer isolated or exceptional but rather commonplace and 
that this routinization has tended to bring with it a broad acceptance of the necessity and utility of 
sanctions'. 1432 The more suitable progression of economic sanctions in a manner that addresses the 
criticisms currently being levelled at UN economic sanctions is therefore needed to order to ensure that 
they remain an effective measure. They must be responsive when necessary, implemented fully by 
states and have adequate institutional support. They must not cause unnecessary collateral damage. 
Decisions made with respect to their implementation, revocation and development must also be 
ibid. 25. 
Section 1.4.3: Hughes (n 154). 
1411 The Vockler Report (n 617), Volume 1,1. 
1412 Craven (n 669), 45. 
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consistent in order to bolster the political credibility of the UNSC and `establish a sense of 
predictability and fairness. ' 433 Like cases should be treated alike. Institutional change is necessary to 
ensure that UN economic sanctions meet these criteria. It is for this reason that the proposal for the 
creation of the EST was made in chapter 6. This, together with the creation of the Sanctions Unit 
suggested at the Bonn-Berlin process, would address the issues raised and strengthen UN economic 
sanctions. 
To an extent the development of such institutions would take place in a reactionary fashion 
because they would be developed as a reaction to the difficulties currently apparent with UN economic 
sanctions. However, in some respects their development would not be reactionary because, as it would 
be a substantial long-term investment for the UN intended to resolve difficulties seen across all 
sanctions regimes to date, it would have to be carefully considered and structured and could not be 
unduly influenced by any particular sanctions regime. Their establishment would provide an 
opportunity for the UNSC to take a meaningful pause and assess its use of economic sanctions. 
The EST would restore legitimacy to the use of economic sanctions by the UNSC in 
circumstances where domestic and regional courts as well as commentators have raised significant 
concerns about their use. It would focus on resolving the due process issues that have arisen, which 
would allow a balance to be struck between ensuring that economic sanctions are being implemented 
and protecting the human rights of those targeted by them. It would allow for a direct right of appeal 
for any individual who believes that he has wrongly been subjected to economic sanctions and should, 
therefore, ensure that economic sanctions are only implemented against the correct people. This would 
discourage further judicial decisions mandating the lifting of economic sanctions. Furthermore, the 
EST would be able to address concerns about the legality of UNSC economic sanctions, which may be 
useful if the limits of UNSC power with respect to economic sanctions are clarified in the future. 
lt must be noted that the EST will not address all of the difficulties experienced by those 
targeted by economic sanctions. Cameron identifies four categories of individuals who may seek to 
challenge their designation. '434 Firstly, individuals who argue that they are wrongly identified by the 
sanctions committee. Secondly, individuals who state that they were rightly identified in the first 
instance but that they are now no longer engaged in the sanctioned behaviour. Thirdly, individuals who 
"; " Bianchi. Ad-hocism and the Rule of Law (n 1422), 271-272. 
1434 Cameron. 'UN Targeted Sanctions. Legal Safeguards and the European Convention on Human Rights' (n 129) 
197. 
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argue that the behaviour cited is not one that should be sanctioned. Fourthly, individuals who argue that 
the sanctions in place against them are disproportionate. The EST would only deal with requests from 
individuals that come within the first three categories. It would not deal with the fourth category of 
individuals because the EST would only protect the due process rights of those targeted by economic 
sanctions and not other fundamental rights. As such, it would not consider whether an individual who it 
is established should legitimately be the target of economic sanctions is suffering unduly as a result of 
sanctions. The EST would be limited in this way because it is accepted that economic sanctions do 
restrict the rights of those subjected to them and that such restriction is necessary when economic 
sanctions are legitimately imposed in order for economic sanctions to be as effective as possible. 
However, it is important that a balance be achieved between meeting the aims of economic sanctions 
and ensuring that an individual's rights are protected. The EST would ensure this by allowing the 
targets of economic sanctions a means of appealing their subjection to sanctions on the grounds that 
they are not rightly the target of economic sanctions, whether by mistake or because they have changed 
their behaviour or indeed because the behaviour they are accused of should not be sanctioned. For 
those individuals arguing that economic sanctions have adversely impacted on them their only recourse 
would be through making a humanitarian application to the Sanctions Unit. 
Aside from the limitations noted above it is also the case that the EST would not respond to 
problems with economic sanctions targeted broadly against states. In practice this is not a significant 
restriction for two reasons. Firstly, UNSC economic sanctions no longer usually take the form of broad 
sweeping sanctions against states. Secondly, if there is a resurgence of that type of economic sanctions 
states are in a stronger position than individuals with respect to having their views heard by other states 
and by the UNSC and thus having economic sanctions against them removed if they are not legitimate 
or if they become illegitimate over time. 
The Sanctions Unit would be responsible for providing the UNSC with full administrative 
support in relation to UN economic sanctions. By and large the Sanctions Unit would consolidate the 
roles of the various institutions already in place, rather than performing any new function. It would 
replace the various sanctions committees and monitoring bodies as well as the role of the Ombudsman. 
It would be responsible for investigating proposed targets of economic sanctions to assess whether or 
not they should be subjected to such measures, providing any relevant information to the UNSC, which 
would decide whether in fact the proposed targets should be subjected to sanctions, and maintaining 
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lists of those that were targeted. It would monitor the implementation of sanctions and investigate 
potential breaches of sanctions by states and commercial entities. In investigating breaches of sanctions 
the Sanctions Unit would include consideration of the various means and ways in which individuals 
and entities subject to targeted economic sanctions hold their assets. '435 The UNSC will need to address 
how such breaches are to be punished. 
The Sanctions Unit will also deal with granting humanitarian exemptions in relation to 
economic sanctions regimes. Although it is not argued here that the UNSC is obliged to adhere fully to 
human rights in taking economic sanctions, the importance of humanitarian exemptions that work 
efficiently cannot be underestimated. Further work is needed in relation to humanitarian exemptions in 
the sanctions context. Too often it appears that there are no clear rules with respect to what should be 
considered as a suitable humanitarian exemption either in sanctions against states, as demonstrated by 
the difficulties experienced in Iraq, 1436 or with respect to targeted economic sanctions, as discussed in 
section 5.2.3.2.1. It is recommended that certain humanitarian organisations, such as the (CRC, be 
allowed a blanket humanitarian exemption to import goods for humanitarian purposes when a state is 
under sanction. Targeted economic sanctions too could benefit from further consideration of exempted 
activities, such as transportation for the purpose of obtaining food or medical supplies. Even if such 
advances are not made, by consolidating the decision making with respect to humanitarian exemptions 
in the Sanctions Unit the process should become quicker and more transparent as experience and 
knowledge develops in the Unit. 
In terms of innovation the Sanctions Unit would collate material in relation to all sanctions in 
place, which would enable it to ensure that material is not duplicated and that it can be located and 
accessed where necessary. It would also allow for the creation of standing expert committees where 
necessary, which could focus on particular features of UN economic sanctions across all regimes rather 
than focussing on a single regime. The key benefit of the Sanctions Unit is that institutional memory 
can be built, which should limit the replication of mistakes previously seen in economic sanctions. It 
would, however, only make recommendations with decision-making resting with the UNSC. 
The issue of state capacity, which was mentioned in this chapter and discussed in detail in 
chapter 5,1437 remains outstanding. The process of building state capacity with respect to the 
1435 See section 5.2.2. 
14'6 See section 3.6.2. 
143' Section 5.2.1.2. 
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implementation of economic sanctions, against states and particularly against individuals, is going to 
be gradual and will need to be driven by the states themselves. It would not be feasible for example for 
the UN to insist that every state develops the type of sophisticated banking systems that jurisdictions 
like the US and UK have, which facilitate the implementation of economic sanctions. The Sanctions 
Unit can, however, play a role in assisting states to develop capacity where such assistance is 
requested. 
By developing the Sanctions Unit, the UN is creating an institution that will have a wealth of 
information with respect to how Member States have implemented and monitored economic sanctions 
and any state in difficulty or requiring assistance will be able to approach a single institution in the 
knowledge that that institution possesses all of the relevant information to come to its aid. The 
Sanctions Unit will also, by combining the resources already available to the UN in relation to 
economic sanctions, be able to provide monitoring teams to go to states and investigate and supervise 
the implementation of sanctions. Furthermore, one of the standing expert committees that it develops 
could be tasked with supporting states in building capacity in relation to economic sanctions. This 
expert committee could provide support not only to states but also to the financial institutions within 
states that are responsible for freezing the financial assets of the targets of economic sanctions. 
In contrast to the Sanctions Unit the EST, as outlined in detail in chapter 6, would be almost 
wholly innovative. It would replace the Focal Point, however, its role would be far more expansive 
than the role of the Focal Point, as it would decide whether an individual or entity should remain 
subjected to sanctions. It would, therefore, provide accountability for UN economic sanctions. By 
placing a limit on the actions of the UNSC, the EST would address the criticisms that too much power 
rests in its hands. The EST would also address the criticisms levelled at UN economic sanctions by 
both states and courts. Any target of economic sanctions, whether an individual a corporate entity or a 
member of a government or other regime, would be afforded a right to appeal their selection as a target, 
by being allowed to address the EST. It would provide greater transparency and 'should therefore 
reassure states of the legitimacy of economic sanctions. 
The UN has now been adopting economic sanctions for almost fifty years with varying 
degrees of success. This thesis has traced the historical development of UN economic sanctions, it has 
outlined their current deficiencies and made recommendations for their future development. It is 
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tempting to allow economic sanctions to continue to develop in a reactionary fashion. However, it is 
clear that the time has come for some significant changes to UN economic sanctions in order that they 
can be usefully employed by the UNSC in the future. 
252 
Bibliography 
-- 
*Africa Urged to Act on Zimbabwe' BBC News Online (30 June 2008) 
-- 
Amnesty International, `Zimbabwe: More deaths mass evictions continue unabated' (30 June 2005) 
-- 
BP Statistical Review of World Energy Full Report' 2009 
-- 
-Charter of the United Nations', Report to the President on the Results of the San Francisco 
Conference by the Chairman of the United States Delegation The Secretary of State, June 26,1945 
-- 
Economist Intelligence Unit, `Iraq: EIU Country Report' (Economist Intelligence Unit, London 
1994) 
--Editorial Opinion, `Peace in the Horn of Africa' The New York Times (New York 12 December 2000) 
-- 
Financial Action Task Force, `Annual Review of Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories 2006- 
2007: Eighth NCCT Review' (12 October 2007) 
-- 
General Accounting Office, `United Nations: Observations on the Oil for Food Program' GAO-04- 
651T (7 April 2004) 
-- 
Global Witness, `A Rough Trade: The Role of Companies and Government in the Angolan Conflict' 
December 1997 
--'Greece Closes Macedonia's Main Trade Route' New York Times (New York 18 February 1994) 
--'Haiti: USAID Monitoring Report' May 1994 
-- 
Independent Inquiry Committee into the United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme, `Manipulation of 
the Oil-for-Food Programme by the Iraqi Regime' (27 October 2005) 
-- 
Ministry of Health and UNICEF/Iraq, 'Nutritional Status Survey of Infants in Iraq, Baghdad, Iraq' 
1997 
-- 
'The Rhodesian Chrome Statute: The Congressional Response to UN Economic Sanctions Against 
Southern Rhodesia' (1972) 58 Va L Rev 511,524 
-- 
Unicef press release, `Disastrous Situation of Children in Iraq' (New York 4 October 1996 
-- 
UNSC Press Release, 'Security Council Announces Measures Against Taliban for Failure to Hand 
Over Usama bin Laden' (15 November 1999) 
-- 
UNSC Press Release `AI-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee Welcomes Appointment of Judge 
Kimberley Prost to Serve as Ombudsperson' (7 June 2010) 
-- 
World Heath Organization and United Nations Children's Fund, `Joint WHO/UNICEF Team Report: 
A Visit to Iraq' (WHO and UNICEF, New York 16-21 February 1991) 
-- 
Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, `Order out of Chaos, or Chaos out of Order? A Preliminary 
Report on Operation "Murambatsvina"' June 2005 
Abdullah TAJ, A Short History of Iraq (Pearson Education Limited 2003) 
Abi-Saab G, 'The Concept of Sanction in International Law' in Vera Gowlland-Debbas (ed), United 
Nations Sanctions and International Law (Kluwer Law International 2001) 
253 
Ahtisaari M, The Impact of War on Iraq', Report to the Secretary General on humanitarian needs in 
Iraq in the immediate post-crisis environment by a mission to the area led by Mr Martti Ahtisaari, 
Under-Secretary-General for Administration and Management (United Nations, New York, 20 March 
1991) 
Akande D, `The International Court of Justice and the Security Council: Is There Room For Judicial 
Control of Decisions of the Political Organs of the United Nations? ' (1997) 46 ICLQ 309. 
Al-Anbari AA, `The Impact of United Nations Sanctions on Economic Development' in Gowlland- 
Debbas, Vera (ed), United Nations Sanctions and International Law (Kluwer Law International 2001) 
Alvarez JE, `Judging the Security Council' (1996) 90 AJIL I 
-- 
'Symposium: The International Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia Comes of Age' (1996) 7 EJIL 245 
Angelet N, `International Law Limits to the Security Council' in Gowlland-Debbas, V (ed), United 
Nations Sanctions and International Law (Kluwer Law International 2001) 
Anglin, DG, 'UN Economic Sanctions Against South Africa and Rhodesia' in Leyton-Brown D (ed), 
The Utility of Economic Sanctions (St. Martins Press 1987) 
Aria I, `Shumanitarian Intervention: Could the Security Council Kill the United Nations? ' (2002) 23 
Fordham International Law Journal 1005 
Auerbach S, `Iraq Seen as Vulnerable to Economic Warfare' The Washington Post (Washington, 8 
August 1990) 
Aust A, `Lockerbie: The Other Case' (2000) 49 ICLQ 278 
Austin R, Racism and apartheid in southern Africa, Rhodesia, A book of data (The Unesco Press 1975) 
Aznar-Gomez MJ, `A Decade of Human Rights Protection by the UN Security Council: A Sketch of 
Deregulation? ' (2002) 13 EJIL 223 
Bachus, AS, From Drugs to Terrorism: The Focus Shifts in the International Fight Against Money 
Laundering After September 11,2001' (2004) 21 Arizona Journal of International & Comparative Law 
835 
Bailey M, Oilgate, The Sanctions Scandal (Coronet 1979) 
Barber J, `Economic Sanctions As a Policy Instrument' (1979) 55 International Affairs 367 
Barnard D, 'Narco-Terrorism Realities: The Connection Between Drugs and Terror' (2003) 9 Journal 
of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International 31 
Benard A and Leaf PJ, 'Modern Threats and the United Nations Security Council: No Time for 
Complacency (A Response to Professor Allen Weiner)' (2010) 62 Stanford Law Review 1395 
Bennis P and Halliday DJ (interviewed by Barsamian D), 'Iraq: The Impact of Sanctions and US 
Policy' in Arnove A (ed), Iraq Under Siege The Deadly Impact of , Sanctions and War (2°d edn, South End Press 2002) 
Bennoune K, "Sovereignty vs. Suffering'? Re-examining Sovereignty and Human Rights through the 
Lens of Iraq' (2002) 13 EJIL 243 at 251. 
Bernhardt R, `Article 103' in Simma B (ed), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary (2"d 
edn, Oxford University Press 2002) 
Bianchi A, `Ad-hocism and the Rule of Law' (2002) 13 EJIL 263 
-- 
'Assessing the Effectiveness of the UN Security Council's Anti-Terrorism Measures: The Quest for 
Legitimacy and Cohesion' (2006) 17 EJIL 881 
254 
Blanchard JMF and Ripsman NM, `Lightning Rods Rather Than Light Switches: Arab Economic 
Sanctions against Canada in 1979' (2002) 35 Canadian Journal of Political Science 151 
Blessing J, `The suspension of foreign aid by the United States, 1927-1948' (PhD thesis, State 
University of New York at Albany 1975) 
Blix H, Disarming Iraq: The Search for Weapons of Mass Destruction (Bloombury 2004) 
Bond P, Against Global Apartheid: South Africa meets the World Bank, IMF and International 
Finance (2"d edn, UCT Press 2003) 
Bondi L, `Arms Embargoes: In Name Only? ' in Cortright D and Lopez GA, Smart Sanctions: 
Targeting Economic Statecraft (Rowman & Littlefield 2002) 
Boulden J, `The Council and Terrorism' in Lowe V, Roberts A, Welsh J and Zaum D (eds), The United 
Nations Security Council and War (Oxford University Press 2008) 
Burdeau G and Stern B, `France' in Gowlland-Debbas V (ed), National Implementation of United 
Nations Sanctions A Comparative Study (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2004) 
Burnett V, `7 Are Acquitted in Madrid Bombings' The New York Times (New York 1 November 2007) 
Boyle A and Chinkin C, The Making of International Law (Oxford University Press 2007) 
Bowers CB, `Hawala, Money Laundering and Terrorism Finance: Micro-Lending as an End to Illicit 
Remittance' (2009) 37 Denver Journal of International Law & Policy 379 
Brierly JL, The Law of Nations (4'h edn, Clarendon Press 1949) 
Bring 0, Cramer P and Lysen G, `Sweden' in Gowlland-Debbas V, National Implementation of United 
Nations Sanctions A Comparative Study (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2004) 
Byers M, Custom, Power and the Power of Rules: International Relations and Customary 
International Law (Cambridge University Press 1999) 
Cameron 1, ` Targeted Sanctions and Legal Safeguards', Report to the Swedish Foreign Office (2002) 
-- 
'UN Targeted Sanctions, Legal Safeguards and the European Convention on Human Rights' (2003) 
72 Nordic Journal of International Law 
Cassese A, International Law (Oxford University Press 2001) 
Charlesworth H, `International Law: A Discipline of Crisis' (2002) 65 Modern Law Review 377 
Charnovitz S, ` Rethinking WTO Trade Sanctions' (2001) 95 AJIL 792 
Chungong Ayafor M, `Report of the Panel of Experts appointed pursuant to Security Council 
resolution 1306 (2000), paragraph 19, in relation to Sierra Leone', (December 2000) 
Clapham A, 'Sanctions and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights' in Gowlland-Debbas V (ed) United 
Nations Sanctions and International Law (Kluwer Law International 2001) 
Claude IL, Swords into Plowshares The Problems and Progress of International Organization (4th edn, 
Random House 1984) 
Clayton J, `Zimbabwe slashes ten zeros off its currency' Times Online, 30 July 2008. 
Cohan JA, 'Formulation of a State's Response to Terrorism and State-Sponsored Terrorism' (2002) 14 
Pace International Law Review 77 
255 
Cohen R, `Yugoslav Sanctions Taking High Toll' The New York Times (New York 6 September 1992) 
Cole The Honourable T RH AO RFD QC, `Report of the Inquiry into certain Australian companies in 
relation to the UN Oil-for-Food Programme' (24 November 2006) 
Colgate Selden R, `The Executive Protection: Freezing the Assets of Alleged Terrorists, the 
Constitution, and Foreign Participation in U. S. Financial Markets' 8 Fordham Journal of Corporate & 
Financial Law 491 
Conroy RW, The UN Experience with Travel Sanctions: Selected Cases and Conclusions' in Cortright 
D and Lopez GA, Smart Sanctions: Targeting Economic Statecraft (Rowman & Littlefield 2002) 
Cortright D and Lopez GA (eds), Economic Sanctions, Panacea or Peacebuilding in a Post-Cold War 
World? (Westview Press 1995) 
-- 
and Lopez GA, The Sanctions Decade: Assessing UN Strategies in the 1990s (Rienner 2000) 
-- 
and Lopez GA, Sanctions and the Search for Security: Challenges to UN Action (Rienner 2002) 
-- 
and Lopez GA, `Containing Iraq: Sanctions Worked' (2004) 83 Foreign Affairs 90 
Craven M, `Humanitarianism and the Quest for Smarter Sanctions' (2002) 13 EJIL 43 
Crawford J, `The Relationship Between Sanctions and Countermeasures' in Gowlland-Debbas V (ed), 
United Nations Sanctions and International Law (Kluwer Law International 2001) 
-- 
The Creation of States (2°d edn, Oxford University Press 2006) 
Constable P, 'U. N. Imposes Air, Economic Sanctions on Afghanistan; Taliban still Refuses to Hand 
Over Bin Laden' The Washington Post (Washington D. C. 14 November 1999) 
Crossette B, `Arms Embargo Ordered for Eritrea and Ethiopia' The New York Times (New York 19 
May 2000) World 
Curtain TRC, `Rhodesian Economic Development Under Sanctions and `The Long Haul' (1968) 267 
African Affairs 100 
Davidsson E, `Legal Boundaries to UN Sanctions' (2002) 7 International Journal of Human Rights I 
de Burca G, `The European Court of Justice and the International Legal Order after Kadi' (2010) 51 Harvard International Law Journal I 
della Cananea G, `Case Law: Global Security and Procedural Due Process of Law Between the United Nations and the European Union: Yassin Abdullah Kadi & Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council' 15 Columbia Journal of European Law 511 
Dellums RV, `Foreword' in Cortright D and Lopez GA (eds) Economic Sanctions, Panacea or Peacebuilding in a Post-Cold War World? (Westview Press 1995) 
Devin J and Dashti-Gibson J, `Sanctions in the Former Yugoslavia: Convoluted Goals and Complicated Consequences' in Weiss TG, Cortright D, Lopez GA and Minear L (eds), Political Gain 
and Civilian Pain Humanitarian Impacts of Economic Sanctions (Bowman & Littlefield 1997) 
Devroy A and Hoffman D, `Bush Says U. N. Sanctions ` Must Be Enforced' to Isolate Iraq; President 
Presses Complete Embargo, Closing of Pipelines' Washington Post, (Washington 7 August 1990) 
De Wet E, `Holding the United Nations Security Council accountable for human rights violations 
through domestic courts: A case of `be careful what you wish for'? ' in Farrall J and Rubenstein K (eds), Sanctions, Accountability and Governance in a Globalised World (Cambridge University Press 
2009) 
Doehring K, `Unlawful Resolutions of the Security Council and their Legal Consequences' (1997) 
Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 91 
256 
Drezner D. The Sanctions Paradox Economic Statecraft and International Relations (Cambridge 
University Press 1999) 
Drury AC, 'Economic sanctions and presidential decisions: models of political rationality' (PhD thesis, 
Arizona State University 1997) 
Duelfer C, `Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's WMD' (Washington 
DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2004). 
Eland 1, 'Economic Sanctions as Tools of Foreign Policy', in Cortright D and Lopez GA (eds), 
Economic Sanctions, Panacea or Peacebuilding in a Post-Cold War World? (Westview Press 1995) 
Ellings R, Embargoes and World Power: Lessons From American Foreign Policy (Westview Press 
1985) 
Elkins C, Britain's Gulag, The Brutal End of Empire in Kenya (Pimlico 2005) 
Elliot KA, 'Factors Affecting the Success of Sanctions' in Cortright D and Lopez GA (eds), Economic 
Sanctions, Panacea or Peacebuilding in a Post-Cold War World? (Westview Press 1995) 51 
FarralI JM, UN Sanctions and the Rule of Law (Cambridge University Press 2007) 
Fassbender B, Uncertain Steps into a Post-Cold War World: The Role and Functioning of the UN 
Security Council after a Decade of Measures against Iraq (2002) 13 EJIL 273 
Flaherty MP, Ottaway DB and Grimaldi JV, `How Afghanistan Went Unlisted as Terrorist Sponsor' 
The Washington Post (Washington DC 2 November 2001) 
Foran P, `The Cuban Embargo and Human Rights; Intercultural Human Rights Law Review Annual 
Symposium; October 24,2008: Why Human Rights Confuse the Sanctions Debate: Towards a Goal- 
Sensitive Framework for Evaluating United Nations Security Council Sanctions' (2009) 4 Intercultural 
Human Rights Law Review 123 
Frowein J and Krisch N, `Article 41' in Simma, Bruno (ed), The Charter of the United Nations: A 
Commentary (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2002) 
Galtung J, `On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions: With Examples from the Case of 
Rhodesia', (1967) 19 World Politics 378 
Garfield R, `Morbidity and Mortality Among Iraqi Children from 1990 Through 1998: Assessing the 
Impact of the Gulf War and Economic Sanctions', Report commissioned by the Fourth Freedom Forum 
and the Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame, 1999 
Geiss R, 'Humanitarian Safeguards in Economic Sanctions Regimes 
-A Call for Automatic Suspension Clauses, Periodic Monitoring, and Follow-Up Assessment of Long-Term Effects', (2005) 
18 Harvard Human Rights Journal 167 
Gibbons ED, Sanctions in Haiti, Human Rights and Democracy tinder Assault (Praeger 1991) 
Golden T, `The World; A War on Terror Meets a War on Drugs' The New York Times (New York 25 
November 2001) 
Gordon J, Invisible War The United States and the Iraq Sanctions (Harvard University Press 2010) 
Gowlland-Debbas V, `The Relationship Between the International Court of Justice and the Security 
Council in Light of the Lockerbie Case' (1994) 88 AJIL 643 
-- 
United Nations Sanctions and International Law (Kluwer Law International 2001) 
-- 
`Sanctions Regimes Under Article 41 of the UN Charter' in Gowlland-Debbas V (ed), National 
Implementation of United Nations Sanctions A Comparative Study (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2004) 
Graham-Brown S, Sanctioning Saddam The Politics of Intervention in Iraq (lB Tauris 1999) 
257 
Gray C, `After the Ceasefire: Iraq, the Security Council and the Use of Force' (1994) 65 BYIL 135 
Greenwood C, `New World Order or Old? The Invasion of Kuwait and the Rule of Law' (1992) 55 
Modern Law Review 161 
Grunfeld F, `The Effectiveness of United Nations Economic Sanctions' in van Genugten WJM and de 
Groot GA, United Nations Sanctions: Effectiveness and Effects, Especially in the Field of Human 
Rights, A Multi-disciplinary Approach (Intersentia 1999) 
Halderman J W, `Some Aspects of Sanctions in the Rhodesian Case' (1968) 17 ICLQ 672 
Hatzfeld J, Machete Season: The Killers in Rwanda Speak (Farrar, Straus and Grioux 2005) 
Hawkins A, `The Rhodesian Economy under Sanctions' (1967) IThe Rhodesian Economic Journal 58 
Hilderbrand RC, Dumbarton Oaks, The Origins of the United Nations and the Search for Postwar 
Security (University of North Carolina Press 1990) 
Higgins R, `The Advisory Opinion on Namibia: Which UN Resolutions are Binding Under Article 25 
of the Charter? ' (1972) 21 ICLQ 270 
Horowitz S, From Ethnic Conflict to Stillborn Reform The Former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia 
(Texas A&M University Press 2005) 
Hoskins E, `The Humanitarian Impacts of Economic Sanctions and War in Iraq' in Thomas G Weiss, 
David Cortright, George A Lopez and Larry Minear (eds), Political Gain and Civilian Pain 
Humanitarian Impacts of Economic Sanctions (Rowman & Littlefield 1997) 
Hufbauer GC, Scott J and Elliot KA, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, Supplemental Case Histories 
(2"a edn, Institute for International Economics, Washington, DC 1990) 
-- 
and B. Oegg, `Targeted Sanctions: A Policy Alternative? ' (2000) 32 Law & Policy in International 
Business II 
-- 
Scott J and Elliot KA and Oegg B, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered (3d edn, Peterson Institute for 
International Economics 2007) 
Hughes K, `Note: Operation "Drive Out the Trash": The Case for Imposing Targeted United Nations 
Sanctions Against Zimbabwean Officials' (2007) 76 Fordham Law Review 323 
Hull RE, Imposing International Sanctions Legal Aspects and Enforcement by the Military (National 
Defense University Press 1997) 
Hummel J, `Diamonds are a Smugglers Best Friend: Regulation, Economics, and Enforcement in the 
Global Effort to Curb the Trade in Conflict Diamonds' (2007) 41 International Lawyer 1145 
Ignatieff M, `Paying for Security with Liberty' Financial Times (13 September 2001) 
Jardim J, Sanctions Double Cross: Oil to Rhodesia (Books of Rhodesia Publishing Company Limited 
1978) 
Jehl D, `Showdown in Haiti: The Overview; Haiti's Military Leaders Agree to Resign; Clinton Halts 
Assault, Recalls 61 Planes: Troops in Today' The New York Times (New York 19 September 1994) 
Jenks CW, The Common Law of Mankind (Stevens 1958) 
Jolly D, `2 Nations Agree to Ease Bank Secrecy Rules' The New York Times (New York 12 March 
2009) 
258 
Kajumulo Tibaijuka A, UN Special Envoy on Human Settlements Issues in Zimbabwe, 'Report of the 
Fact-Finding Mission to Zimbabwe to assess the Scope and Impact of Operation Murambatsvina' 18 
July 2005 
Kapungu LT, The United Nations and Economic Sanctions Against Rhodesia (Lexington Books 1973) 
-- 
Rhodesia: The Struggle for Freedom (Orbis Books 1974) 
Kennedy D, `The Move to Institutions' (1987) 8 Cardozo Law Review 841 
Kennedy P, The Parliament of Man The United Nations and the Quest for Global Governance 
(Penguin Books 2006) 
Kinzer S, `Sanctions Driving Yugoslav Economy into Deep Decline' The New York Times (New York 
31 August 1992) 
Klein E, `The Cuban Embargo and Human Rights; Intercultural Human Rights Law Review Annual 
Symposium; October 24,2008: International Sanctions From a Human Rights Law Perspective: Some 
Observations on the Kadi Judgment of the European Court of Justice' (2009) 4 Intercultural Human 
Rights Law Review 111 
Lamb C, In Love and War; ' The Sunday Times Magazine (London 2 July 2010) 
Lauterpacht E, Greenwood CJ, Weller Marc and Bethlehem Daniel (eds), The Kuwait Crisis: Basic 
Documents, Cambridge International Documents Series, Volume I (Grotius Publications Limited 
1991) 
Lowenfeld A, `Unilateral Versus Collective Sanctions: An American's Perception' in Gowlland- 
Debbas V (ed), United Nations Sanctions and International Law (Kluwer Law International 2001) 
Lambert A, `Underground Banking and Financing of Terrorism' in Baldwin FN, Jr, 'Organized Crime, 
Terrorism, and Money Laundering in the Americas' (2002) 15 Florida Journal of International Law 3 
LaRae-Perez C, `Economic Sanctions as a Use of Force: Re-evaluating the Legality of Economic 
Sanctions from an Effects-Based Perspective' 20 Boston University International Law Journal 161 
Lauterpacht E, Greenwood CJ, Weller M and Bethlehem D (eds), The Kuwait Crisis: Basic 
Documents, Cambridge International Documents Series, Volume I (Grotius Publications Limited 
1991) 
Leys C, European Politics in Southern Rhodesia (Clarendon Press 1959) 
Liivoja R, The Scope of the Supremacy Clause of the United Nations Charter' (2008) 57 ICLQ 583 
Little A and Silber L, The Death of Yugoslavia (Revised edn, Penguin 1996) 
Lukic R and Lynch A, Europe from the Balkans to the Urals: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia and the 
Soviet Union (Oxford University Press 1996) 
MacFarquhar N and Dugger CW, `Security Council Urges Zimbabwe to Halt Violence' The New York 
Times (New York 24 June 2008) 
MacKay MJ, `Economic Sanctions: Are they Actually Enforcing International Law in Serbia- 
Montenegro? ' (1995) 3 Tulane Journal of International & Comparative Law 203 
MacMillan M, Peacemakers Six Months that Changed the World (John Murray (Publishers) 2001) 
Marder M, `Operation Washington Shield' Neiman Reports (22 December 1999) 
Marks S and Clapham A, International Human Rights Lexicon (Oxford University Press 2005) 
259 
Matheson MJ, `ICJ Review of Security Council Decisions' (2004) 36 George Washington International 
Law Review 615 
-- 
Council Unbound: The Growth of 'UN Decision Making on Conflict and Postconflict Issues after the 
Cold War (United States Institute of Peace Press 2006) 
Mathiason N, `Penalties doubled in crackdown on offshore tax havens' Guardian Online (9 December 
2009) 
Mazumdar T, `Inside Afghanistan's Heroin Fields' BBC News Online (I May 2008) 
McGee RW, `Legal Ethics, Business Ethics and International Trade: Some Neglected Issues' (2002) 10 
Cardozo Journal of International & Comparative Law 109 
McDougal MS and Reisman WM, `Rhodesia and the UN: The Lawfulness of International Concern', 
(1968) 62 AJIL I 
McKinnell R, `Sanctions and the Rhodesia Economy', (1969) 4 Journal of Modern African Studies 559 
Megret F and Hoffman F, `The UN as a Human Rights Violator? Some Reflections on the United 
Nations Changing Human Rights Responsibility' (2003) 25 Human Rights Quarterly 315 
Meredith M, The State of Africa, A History of Fifty Years of Independence (Free Press 2006) 
Milstein S, `Taming the Task of Checking for Terrorists' Names' The New York Times, (New York 30 
December 2002) 
Miyagawa M, Do Economic Sanctions Work? (St Martin's Press 1992) 
Mollander A, `Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against 
UNITA' (10 March 2003) S/2000/203 
Morrison B, `Ex-USA Today reporter faked major stories' USA Today (19 March 2004) 
Munzele Maimbo S, The Money Exchange Dealers of Kabul A Study of the Hawala System in 
Afghanistan (The World Bank 2003) 
Nafziger JA and Wise EM, `Section IV: The Status in United States Law of Security Council Resolutions Under Chapter VII of the United Nations' (1998) 46 American Journal of Comparative Law 421 
Napoleoni L, Terror Inc Tracing the Money Behind Global Terrorism (Penguin 2003) 
Ngobi JC, "The UN Experience with Sanctions" in Cortright D and Lopez GA (eds), Economic 
Sanctions Panacea or Peacebuilding in a Post-Cold War World (Westview Press 1995) 17 
Niblock T, "Pariah States" and Sanctions in the Middle East Iraq, Libya, Sudan (Rienner 2002) 
Nkala J, The UN, International Law, and the Rhodesia Independence Crisis (Clarendon Press 1985) 
Normand R, `A Human Rights Assessment of Sanctions: The Case of Iraq, 1990-1997' in van Genugten WJM and de Groot GA (eds), United Nations Sanctions: Effectiveness and Effects, Especially in the Field of'Human Rights, A Multi-disciplinary Approach (Intersentia 1999) 
O'Donnell T, Naming and Shaming: The Story of Security Council Resolution 1530 (2004)' (2006) 17 
EJIL 945 
Oette L, `A Decade of Sanctions against Iraq: Never Again! The End of Unlimited Sanctions in the 
Recent Practice of the UN Security Council' (2002) 13 EJIL 93 
Owen D, Balkan Odyssey (Indigo 1996) 
260 
Palley C, The Constitutional History and Law of Southern Rhodesia 1888-1965 with Special Reference 
to Imperial Control (Clarendon Press 1966) 
Passell P, 'Confrontation in the Gulf; How Vulnerable is Iraq? ' New York Times (New York 20 August 
1990) 
Patterson JT, `The Political and Moral Appropriateness of Sanctions' in Cortright D and Lopez GA 
(eds), Economic Sanctions Panacea or Peacebuilding in a Post-Cold War World? (Westview 1995) 
Pellett PL, `Sanctions, Food, Nutrition, and Health in Iraq' in Arnove A (ed), Iraq Under Siege The 
Deadly Impact of Sanctions and War (2°d edn, South End Press 2002) 
Perlez J, `U. S. Did Little to Deter Build-Up as Ethiopia and Eritrea Prepared for War' The New York 
Times (New York 22 May 2000) 
Pilger J, 'Collateral Damage' in Arnove A (ed) Iraq Under Siege The Deadly Impact of Sanctions and 
War (2°d edn, South End Press 2002) 
Polk WR, Understanding Iraq (IB Tauris 2006) 
Popal GR, `Impact of sanctions on the population of Iraq' (2000) 4 Eastern Mediterranean Health 
Journal 791 
Power S, "A Problem From Hell " America and the Age of Genocide (Flamingo 2003) 
Prendergast J, Building for Peace in the Horn of Africa: Diplomacy and Beyond (United States Institute 
of Peace 1999) 
Radcliffe Rt Hon Lord, The Rights of Man' (1950) 36 Transactions of the Grotius Society for the Year 
1950 
Reich J, 'Recent Development: Due Process and Sanctions Targeted Against Individuals Pursuant to 
U. N. Resolution 1267 (1999)' 33 Yale Journal of International Law 505 
Reid T, `Hilary Clinton: US will organise `crippling' Iran sanctions if diplomacy fails' Times Online 
(22 April 2009) 
Reinisch A, `Developing Human Rights and Humanitarian Accountability of the Security Council for 
the Imposition of Economic Sanctions' (2001) 95 AJIL 851 
Reisman WM and Stevick DL, `The Applicability of International Law Standards to United Nations 
Economic Sanctions Programmes' (1998) 9 EJIL 86 
Renwick R, Economic Sanctions, (Harvard Center for International Studies, 1981) 
Ricks TE, Fiasco The American Military Adventure in Iraq (Allen Lane 2006) 
Risen J, `Poppy Fields Are Now a Front Line in Afghan War' The New York Times (New York 16 May 
2007) 
Robinson J, The Sink, How Banks, Lawyers and Accountants Finance Terrorism and Crime 
- 
And Why 
Governments Can't Stop Them (Constable & Robinson Ltd 2003) 
Rosand E, `Current Development: The Security Council's Efforts to Monitor the Implementation of Al- Qaeda/Taliban Sanctions' 98 AJIL 748 
Rosenthal A, 'Confrontation in the Gulf; Strategy: Embargo; U. S. Bets Its Troops Will Deter Iraq 
While Sanctions Do the Real Fighting' New York Times (New York 9 August 1990) 
261 
Roth J, Greenburg D and Wille S, `Staff Report', National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the 
United States, Monograph on Terrorist Financing 
Safford J, `Experiment in Containment: The United States Steel Embargo and Japan, 1917-1918' 
(1970) 39 Pacific Historical Review 439 
Sauer E, `Universal Principles in International Law' (1956) 42 Transactions of the Grotius Society for 
the Year 1956 
Schabas W, `Reservations to the Convention on the Rights of the Child' (1996) 18 Human Rights 
Quarterly, 472 
Schachter 0, `United Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict' (1991) 85 AJIL 452 
Schlesinger S, Act of Creation The Founding of the United Nations (Westview, 2003) 
Scott G, The Rise and Fall of the League of Nations (Hutchinson 1973) 
Segall A, `Economic sanctions: legal and policy constraints' (1999) 836 International Review of the 
Red Cross 
Shamuyarira NM, Crisis in Rhodesia, (Deutsch 1965) 
Shaw MN, International Law (6`h edn, Cambridge University Press 2008) 
Simma B, Brunner S and Kaul H-P, `Article 27' 41' in Simma B (ed), The Charter of the United 
Nations: A Commentary (2°d edn, Oxford University Press 2002) 
Simons G, The Scourging of Iraq: Sanctions, Law and Natural Justice (2°d edn, MacMillian Press Ltd 
1998) 
-- 
Imposing Economic Sanctions, Legal Remedy or Genocidal Tool? (Pluto Press 1999) 
Simpson J, From the House of War (Hutchinson 1991) 
Smith 1, Bitter Harvest: The Great Betrayal and the Dreadful Aftermath (Blake 2001) 
Sponeck, HCG `Sanctions and Humanitarian Exemptions: A Practitioner's Commentary' (2002) 13 
EJIL 81 
Stewart D, `Who's responsible? Justiciability of private and political decisions' in Farrall J and Rubenstein K (eds), Sanctions, Accountability and Governance in a Globalised World (Cambridge 
University Press 2009) 
Strack HR, Sanctions The Case of Southern Rhodesia (Syracuse University Press 1978) 
Swindells F, 'U. N. Sanctions in Haiti: A Contradiction Under Articles 41 and 55 of the U. N. Charter' (1997) 20 Fordham International Law Journal 1878 
Talmon S, `The Security Council as World Legislature' (2005) 99 AJIL 175 
Thornycroft P, ` Zimbabwe police detain MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai for second time in three days' 
Telegraph (London 6 June 2008) 
Thitrer D, `The "failed State" and international law' (1999) International Review of the Red Cross 836 
Tredgold R, The Rhodesia that was my life (George Allen & Unwin 1968) 
Tripp C, A History of Iraq (3`d edn, Cambridge University Press 2007) 
262 
Tully S, 'International legal advisers and transnational corporations: Untangling roles and 
responsibilities for sanctions compliance' in Farrall J and Rubenstein K (eds), Sanctions, 
Accountability and Governance in a Globalised World (Cambridge University Press 2009) 
Tyler PE, `China Asserts Taiwan's Ties to Guatemala Led to Veto' The New York Times (New York 12 
January 1997) 
Udombana NJ, 'Globalization of Justice and the Special Court for Sierra Leone's War Crimes' (2003) 
17 Emory International Law Review 55 
Van den Herik L, 'The Security Council's Targeted Sanctions Regimes: In Need of Better Protection of 
the Individual' (2007) 20 Leiden Journal of International Law 797 
Van der Stoel M, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, 'Report on the situation of 
human rights in Iraq in accordance with Commission resolution 1991/74' (18 February 1992) 
Van Genugten W, de Groot G and Lavrijssen S, `Guidelines on the Future Use of Sanctions; An 
Evaluation' in van Genugten WJM and de Groot GA (eds), United Nations Sanctions: Effectiveness 
and Effects, Especially in the Field of Human Rights, A Multi-disciplinary Approach (Intersentia 1999) 
Vesel D, `The Lonely Pragmatist: Humanitarian intervention in an imperfect World' (2003) 18 
Brigham Young University Journal of Public Law I 
Villalobos J, The War in El Salvador, Current Situation and Outlook for the Future (Solidarity 
Publications 1990) 
Volcker PA (Chairman), Independent Inquiry Committee into the United Nations Oil-for-Food 
Programme, The Management of the United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme 
Von Burgsdorff, SK `The Cuban Embargo and Human Rights; Intercultural Human Rights Law 
Review Annual Symposium; October 24,2008: The Effectiveness of Economic Sanctions: The Case of 
Cuba' (2009) 4 Intercultural Human Rights Law Review 31 
Von Sponeck HC, A Different Kind of War The UN Sanctions Regime in Iraq (Berghahn Books 2006) 
Wallensteen P and Johansson P, `Security Council Decisions in Perspective' in Malone DM (ed), The 
Security Council From the Cold War to the 21" Century (Rienner 2004) 
Waszak JDG, `The Obstacles to Suppressing Radical Islamic Terrorist Financing' (2005) 37 Case 
Western Reserve Journal of International Law 673 
Weiss TG, Cortright D, Lopez GA and Minear L (eds), Political Gain and Civilian Pain Humanitarian 
Impacts of'Economic Sanctions (Bowman & Littlefield 1997) 
Weller M (ed), Iraq and Kuwait: The Hostilities and their Aftermath, Cambridge International 
Documents Series, Volume 3 (Grotius Publications Limited, Cambridge 1993) 
Wheatley J, `Ancient Banking, Modem Crimes: How Hawala Secretly Transfers the Finances of 
Criminals and Thwarts Existing Laws' (2005) 26 University of Pennsylvania Journal of International 
Economic Law 347 
White ND, The Law of International Organisations (Manchester University Press 1996) 
Wilde R, International Territorial Administration, How Trusteeship and the Civilizing Mission Never 
Went Away (Oxford University Press 2008) 
Williams PR, ` Why the Bosnian Arms Embargo is Illegal' The Wall Street Journal (15 June 1995) 
Wills AJ, An Introduction to the History of Central Africa, Zambia, Malawi and Zimbabwe (4'h' edn, Oxford University Press 1985) 
263 
Wilson H, The Labour Government 1964-1970, A Personal Record (Weidenfeld and Nicolson and 
Michael Joseph, London 1971) 
Wolfrum R, `Chapter 1. Purposes and Principles' 41' in Simma B (ed), The Charter of the United 
Nations: A Commentary (god edn, Oxford University Press 2002) 
Wood MC, `The Interpretation of Security Council Resolutions' (1998) 2 Max Plank Yearbook of 
United Nations Law 80 
Zaharia F, `The failed-state conundrum' The Washington Post (Washington DC 19 July 2010) 
Ziegler P, Wilson: The Authorised Life, (Weidenfold & Nicolson 1993) 
264 
